| 0/0 |
2026/07/09 10:22 |
flow |
patching |
2h18m
Results: map[AckedBy:[] Fixes:map[Hash:2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5 Title:nbd: requeue command if the soecket is changed] KernelBranch:master KernelCommit:8cdeaa50eae8dad34885515f62559ee83e7e8dda KernelRepo:git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git PatchDescription:nbd: fix I/O hang on dead socket and console spam
When an NBD device is configured without NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE and
with a timeout of 0, a closed socket can lead to a permanent I/O hang. If
the connection is closed, the NBD recv_work thread marks the socket as
dead. However, if an I/O request is sent, it will eventually time out. In
nbd_xmit_timeout(), if the configured timeout is 0, the code currently only
checks if the socket has been replaced. It fails to check if the socket is
dead. As a result, the request timer is unconditionally reset and the
request stays in-flight forever, causing tasks like udevd to hang
indefinitely in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE and triggering the hung task detector:
INFO: task udevd:5877 blocked in I/O wait for more than 143 seconds.
task:udevd state:D
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x17e7/0x5630
schedule+0x164/0x2b0
io_schedule+0x7f/0xd0
folio_wait_bit_common+0x836/0xbc0
do_read_cache_folio+0x1ac/0x590
read_part_sector+0xb6/0x2b0
adfspart_check_POWERTEC+0x9a/0x7a0
bdev_disk_changed+0x851/0x17a0
blkdev_get_whole+0x372/0x510
bdev_open+0x324/0xd70
blkdev_open+0x461/0x600
do_dentry_open+0x816/0x1380
vfs_open+0x3b/0x340
path_openat+0x2e44/0x3830
do_file_open+0x23e/0x4a0
do_sys_openat2+0x115/0x200
__x64_sys_openat+0x138/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0x560
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Additionally, repeated attempts to connect to an already-in-use NBD device
can cause console spam because the "nbd%d already in use" error message in
nbd_genl_connect() is not rate-limited. This can delay console_unlock() and
trigger NMI backtraces.
Fix the I/O hang by checking nsock->dead in addition to the cookie check in
nbd_xmit_timeout(). If the socket is dead, the command is requeued. When
nbd_handle_cmd() subsequently processes it, it will evaluate the dead
socket and properly fail the I/O request, gracefully terminating the hung
read operation.
Fix the console spam by changing the pr_err() in nbd_genl_connect() to
pr_err_ratelimited(). PatchDiff:diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index 8f10762e9..eedb1c870 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req)
blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
- if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
+ if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie || nsock->dead) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
@@ -2172,7 +2172,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd_put(nbd);
if (index == -1)
goto again;
- pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
+ pr_err_ratelimited("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
return -EBUSY;
}
Recipients:[map[Email:axboe@kernel.dk Name:Jens Axboe To:true] map[Email:josef@toxicpanda.com Name:Josef Bacik To:true] map[Email:linux-block@vger.kernel.org Name: To:true] map[Email:linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Name: To:false] map[Email:nbd@other.debian.org Name: To:true]] ReportedBy:[] ReviewedBy:[] TestedBy:[]]
|
| 1/1 |
2026/07/09 10:22 |
action |
base-commit-picker |
0m
Results: map[KernelBranch:master KernelCommit:8cdeaa50eae8dad34885515f62559ee83e7e8dda KernelRepo:git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git]
|
| 2/1 |
2026/07/09 10:22 |
action |
syz-repro-to-c-repro |
0m
Results: map[SimplifiedCRepro:// autogenerated by syzkaller (https://github.com/google/syzkaller)
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <linux/genetlink.h>
#include <linux/if_addr.h>
#include <linux/if_link.h>
#include <linux/in6.h>
#include <linux/neighbour.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <linux/veth.h>
#define BITMASK(bf_off,bf_len) (((1ull << (bf_len)) - 1) << (bf_off))
#define STORE_BY_BITMASK(type,htobe,addr,val,bf_off,bf_len) *(type*)(addr) = htobe((htobe(*(type*)(addr)) & ~BITMASK((bf_off), (bf_len))) | (((type)(val) << (bf_off)) & BITMASK((bf_off), (bf_len))))
struct nlmsg {
char* pos;
int nesting;
struct nlattr* nested[8];
char buf[4096];
};
static void netlink_init(struct nlmsg* nlmsg, int typ, int flags,
const void* data, int size)
{
memset(nlmsg, 0, sizeof(*nlmsg));
struct nlmsghdr* hdr = (struct nlmsghdr*)nlmsg->buf;
hdr->nlmsg_type = typ;
hdr->nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_ACK | flags;
memcpy(hdr + 1, data, size);
nlmsg->pos = (char*)(hdr + 1) + NLMSG_ALIGN(size);
}
static void netlink_attr(struct nlmsg* nlmsg, int typ,
const void* data, int size)
{
struct nlattr* attr = (struct nlattr*)nlmsg->pos;
attr->nla_len = sizeof(*attr) + size;
attr->nla_type = typ;
if (size > 0)
memcpy(attr + 1, data, size);
nlmsg->pos += NLMSG_ALIGN(attr->nla_len);
}
static int netlink_send_ext(struct nlmsg* nlmsg, int sock,
uint16_t reply_type, int* reply_len, bool dofail)
{
if (nlmsg->pos > nlmsg->buf + sizeof(nlmsg->buf) || nlmsg->nesting)
exit(1);
struct nlmsghdr* hdr = (struct nlmsghdr*)nlmsg->buf;
hdr->nlmsg_len = nlmsg->pos - nlmsg->buf;
struct sockaddr_nl addr;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.nl_family = AF_NETLINK;
ssize_t n = sendto(sock, nlmsg->buf, hdr->nlmsg_len, 0, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, sizeof(addr));
if (n != (ssize_t)hdr->nlmsg_len) {
if (dofail)
exit(1);
return -1;
}
n = recv(sock, nlmsg->buf, sizeof(nlmsg->buf), 0);
if (reply_len)
*reply_len = 0;
if (n < 0) {
if (dofail)
exit(1);
return -1;
}
if (n < (ssize_t)sizeof(struct nlmsghdr)) {
errno = EINVAL;
if (dofail)
exit(1);
return -1;
}
if (hdr->nlmsg_type == NLMSG_DONE)
return 0;
if (reply_len && hdr->nlmsg_type == reply_type) {
*reply_len = n;
return 0;
}
if (n < (ssize_t)(sizeof(struct nlmsghdr) + sizeof(struct nlmsgerr))) {
errno = EINVAL;
if (dofail)
exit(1);
return -1;
}
if (hdr->nlmsg_type != NLMSG_ERROR) {
errno = EINVAL;
if (dofail)
exit(1);
return -1;
}
errno = -((struct nlmsgerr*)(hdr + 1))->error;
return -errno;
}
static int netlink_query_family_id(struct nlmsg* nlmsg, int sock, const char* family_name, bool dofail)
{
struct genlmsghdr genlhdr;
memset(&genlhdr, 0, sizeof(genlhdr));
genlhdr.cmd = CTRL_CMD_GETFAMILY;
netlink_init(nlmsg, GENL_ID_CTRL, 0, &genlhdr, sizeof(genlhdr));
netlink_attr(nlmsg, CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_NAME, family_name, strnlen(family_name, GENL_NAMSIZ - 1) + 1);
int n = 0;
int err = netlink_send_ext(nlmsg, sock, GENL_ID_CTRL, &n, dofail);
if (err < 0) {
return -1;
}
uint16_t id = 0;
struct nlattr* attr = (struct nlattr*)(nlmsg->buf + NLMSG_HDRLEN + NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(genlhdr)));
for (; (char*)attr < nlmsg->buf + n; attr = (struct nlattr*)((char*)attr + NLMSG_ALIGN(attr->nla_len))) {
if (attr->nla_type == CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID) {
id = *(uint16_t*)(attr + 1);
break;
}
}
if (!id) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
recv(sock, nlmsg->buf, sizeof(nlmsg->buf), 0);
return id;
}
const int kInitNetNsFd = 201;
static long syz_init_net_socket(volatile long domain, volatile long type, volatile long proto)
{
return syscall(__NR_socket, domain, type, proto);
}
static long syz_genetlink_get_family_id(volatile long name, volatile long sock_arg)
{
int fd = sock_arg;
if (fd < 0) {
fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW, NETLINK_GENERIC);
if (fd == -1) {
return -1;
}
}
struct nlmsg nlmsg_tmp;
int ret = netlink_query_family_id(&nlmsg_tmp, fd, (char*)name, false);
if ((int)sock_arg < 0)
close(fd);
if (ret < 0) {
return -1;
}
return ret;
}
uint64_t r[3] = {0xffffffffffffffff, 0x0, 0xffffffffffffffff};
int main(void)
{
syscall(__NR_mmap, /*addr=*/0x1ffffffff000ul, /*len=*/0x1000, /*prot=*/0ul, /*flags=MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE*/0x32ul, /*fd=*/(intptr_t)-1, /*offset=*/0ul);
syscall(__NR_mmap, /*addr=*/0x200000000000ul, /*len=*/0x1000000, /*prot=PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC*/7ul, /*flags=MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE*/0x32ul, /*fd=*/(intptr_t)-1, /*offset=*/0ul);
syscall(__NR_mmap, /*addr=*/0x200001000000ul, /*len=*/0x1000, /*prot=*/0ul, /*flags=MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE*/0x32ul, /*fd=*/(intptr_t)-1, /*offset=*/0ul);
const char* reason;
(void)reason;
intptr_t res = 0;
if (write(1, "executing program\n", sizeof("executing program\n") - 1)) {}
// socket$packet arguments: [
// domain: const = 0x11 (8 bytes)
// type: packet_socket_type = 0x2 (8 bytes)
// proto: const = 0x300 (4 bytes)
// ]
// returns sock_packet
syscall(__NR_socket, /*domain=*/0x11ul, /*type=SOCK_DGRAM*/2ul, /*proto=*/0x300);
// syz_init_net_socket$nl_generic arguments: [
// domain: const = 0x10 (8 bytes)
// type: const = 0x3 (8 bytes)
// proto: const = 0x10 (8 bytes)
// ]
// returns sock_nl_generic_init
res = -1;
res = syz_init_net_socket(/*domain=*/0x10, /*type=*/3, /*proto=*/0x10);
if (res != -1)
r[0] = res;
// syz_genetlink_get_family_id$nbd arguments: [
// name: ptr[in, buffer] {
// buffer: {6e 62 64 00} (length 0x4)
// }
// fd: sock_nl_generic_init (resource)
// ]
// returns genl_nbd_family_id
memcpy((void*)0x200000000040, "nbd\000", 4);
res = -1;
res = syz_genetlink_get_family_id(/*name=*/0x200000000040, /*fd=*/-1);
if (res != -1)
r[1] = res;
// socketpair$nbd arguments: [
// domain: const = 0x1 (8 bytes)
// type: const = 0x1 (8 bytes)
// proto: const = 0x0 (4 bytes)
// fds: ptr[out, nbd_sock_pair] {
// nbd_sock_pair {
// client: sock_nbd_client (resource)
// server: sock_nbd_server (resource)
// }
// }
// ]
res = syscall(__NR_socketpair, /*domain=*/1ul, /*type=*/1ul, /*proto=*/0, /*fds=*/0x200000000000ul);
if (res != -1)
r[2] = *(uint32_t*)0x200000000000;
// sendmsg$NBD_CMD_CONNECT arguments: [
// fd: sock_nl_generic_init (resource)
// msg: ptr[in, msghdr_netlink[netlink_msg_t[genl_nbd_family_id, genlmsghdr_t[NBD_CMD_CONNECT], nbd_attr_policy]]] {
// msghdr_netlink[netlink_msg_t[genl_nbd_family_id, genlmsghdr_t[NBD_CMD_CONNECT], nbd_attr_policy]] {
// addr: nil
// addrlen: len = 0x0 (4 bytes)
// pad = 0x0 (4 bytes)
// vec: ptr[in, iovec[in, netlink_msg_t[genl_nbd_family_id, genlmsghdr_t[NBD_CMD_CONNECT], nbd_attr_policy]]] {
// iovec[in, netlink_msg_t[genl_nbd_family_id, genlmsghdr_t[NBD_CMD_CONNECT], nbd_attr_policy]] {
// addr: ptr[in, netlink_msg_t[genl_nbd_family_id, genlmsghdr_t[NBD_CMD_CONNECT], nbd_attr_policy]] {
// netlink_msg_t[genl_nbd_family_id, genlmsghdr_t[NBD_CMD_CONNECT], nbd_attr_policy] {
// len: len = 0x38 (4 bytes)
// type: genl_nbd_family_id (resource)
// flags: netlink_msg_flags = 0x1 (2 bytes)
// seq: int32 = 0xffffffff (4 bytes)
// pid: int32 = 0x0 (4 bytes)
// payload: genlmsghdr_t[NBD_CMD_CONNECT] {
// cmd: const = 0x1 (1 bytes)
// version: const = 0x0 (1 bytes)
// reserved: const = 0x0 (2 bytes)
// }
// attrs: array[nbd_attr_policy] {
// union nbd_attr_policy {
// NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS: nlattr_tt[const[NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS, int16:14], 0, 1, array[nlnest[NBD_SOCK_ITEM, nlattr[NBD_SOCK_FD, sock_nbd_client]]]] {
// nla_len: offsetof = 0x10 (2 bytes)
// nla_type: const = 0x7 (1 bytes)
// NLA_F_NET_BYTEORDER: const = 0x0 (0 bytes)
// NLA_F_NESTED: const = 0x1 (1 bytes)
// payload: array[nlattr_tt[const[NBD_SOCK_ITEM, int16:14], 0, 1, nlattr[NBD_SOCK_FD, sock_nbd_client]]] {
// nlattr_tt[const[NBD_SOCK_ITEM, int16:14], 0, 1, nlattr[NBD_SOCK_FD, sock_nbd_client]] {
// nla_len: offsetof = 0xc (2 bytes)
// nla_type: const = 0x1 (1 bytes)
// NLA_F_NET_BYTEORDER: const = 0x0 (0 bytes)
// NLA_F_NESTED: const = 0x1 (1 bytes)
// payload: nlattr_t[const[NBD_SOCK_FD, int16], sock_nbd_client] {
// nla_len: offsetof = 0x8 (2 bytes)
// nla_type: const = 0x1 (2 bytes)
// payload: sock_nbd_client (resource)
// size: buffer: {} (length 0x0)
// }
// size: buffer: {} (length 0x0)
// }
// }
// size: buffer: {} (length 0x0)
// }
// }
// union nbd_attr_policy {
// NBD_ATTR_INDEX: nlattr_t[const[NBD_ATTR_INDEX, int16], proc[0, 1, int32]] {
// nla_len: offsetof = 0x8 (2 bytes)
// nla_type: const = 0x1 (2 bytes)
// payload: proc = 0x0 (4 bytes)
// size: buffer: {} (length 0x0)
// }
// }
// union nbd_attr_policy {
// NBD_ATTR_SIZE_BYTES: nlattr_t[const[NBD_ATTR_SIZE_BYTES, int16], int64] {
// nla_len: offsetof = 0xc (2 bytes)
// nla_type: const = 0x2 (2 bytes)
// payload: int64 = 0x7fff (8 bytes)
// size: buffer: {} (length 0x0)
// }
// }
// }
// }
// }
// len: len = 0x38 (8 bytes)
// }
// }
// vlen: const = 0x1 (8 bytes)
// ctrl: const = 0x0 (8 bytes)
// ctrllen: const = 0x0 (8 bytes)
// f: send_flags = 0x0 (4 bytes)
// pad = 0x0 (4 bytes)
// }
// }
// f: send_flags = 0x20000000 (8 bytes)
// ]
*(uint64_t*)0x200000001ac0 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x200000001ac8 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x200000001ad0 = 0x2000000004c0;
*(uint64_t*)0x2000000004c0 = 0x2000000000c0;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000000000c0 = 0x38;
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000c4 = r[1];
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000c6 = 1;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000000000c8 = -1;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000000000cc = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x2000000000d0 = 1;
*(uint8_t*)0x2000000000d1 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000d2 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000d4 = 0x10;
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x2000000000d6, 7, 0, 14);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x2000000000d7, 0, 6, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x2000000000d7, 1, 7, 1);
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000d8 = 0xc;
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x2000000000da, 1, 0, 14);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x2000000000db, 0, 6, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x2000000000db, 1, 7, 1);
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000dc = 8;
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000de = 1;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000000000e0 = r[2];
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000e4 = 8;
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000e6 = 1;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000000000e8 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000ec = 0xc;
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000ee = 2;
*(uint64_t*)0x2000000000f0 = 0x7fff;
*(uint64_t*)0x2000000004c8 = 0x38;
*(uint64_t*)0x200000001ad8 = 1;
*(uint64_t*)0x200000001ae0 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x200000001ae8 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x200000001af0 = 0;
syscall(__NR_sendmsg, /*fd=*/r[0], /*msg=*/0x200000001ac0ul, /*f=MSG_FASTOPEN*/0x20000000ul);
// sendmsg$NBD_CMD_DISCONNECT arguments: [
// fd: sock_nl_generic_init (resource)
// msg: nil
// f: send_flags = 0xc0 (8 bytes)
// ]
syscall(__NR_sendmsg, /*fd=*/(intptr_t)-1, /*msg=*/0ul, /*f=MSG_EOR|MSG_DONTWAIT*/0xc0ul);
return 0;
}
]
|
| 3/1 |
2026/07/09 10:22 |
action |
kernel-checkouter |
1m
Results: map[KernelSrc:/app/workdir/cache/src/701875ef0e9c78f3d8fc99156d1c63fef0f5f93a]
|
| 4/1 |
2026/07/09 10:23 |
action |
kernel-builder |
26m
Results: map[KernelObj:/app/workdir/cache/build/13caeda11ebcc7a294021da167dd975ff6dbdcb8]
|
| 5/1 |
2026/07/09 10:50 |
action |
crash-reproducer |
7m
Results: map[OtherCrashReports:<nil> ReproducedBugTitle:INFO: task hung in read_part_sector ReproducedCrashReport:INFO: task udevd:5877 blocked in I/O wait for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted syzkaller #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:udevd state:D stack:25800 pid:5877 tgid:5877 ppid:5040 task_flags:0x400140 flags:0x00080802
Call Trace:
<TASK>
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5510 [inline]
__schedule+0x17e7/0x5630 kernel/sched/core.c:7234
__schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:7311 [inline]
schedule+0x164/0x2b0 kernel/sched/core.c:7326
io_schedule+0x7f/0xd0 kernel/sched/core.c:8154
folio_wait_bit_common+0x836/0xbc0 mm/filemap.c:1323
folio_put_wait_locked mm/filemap.c:1492 [inline]
do_read_cache_folio+0x1ac/0x590 mm/filemap.c:4122
read_mapping_folio include/linux/pagemap.h:1015 [inline]
read_part_sector+0xb6/0x2b0 block/partitions/core.c:724
adfspart_check_POWERTEC+0x9a/0x7a0 block/partitions/acorn.c:451
check_partition block/partitions/core.c:143 [inline]
blk_add_partitions block/partitions/core.c:591 [inline]
bdev_disk_changed+0x851/0x17a0 block/partitions/core.c:695
blkdev_get_whole+0x372/0x510 block/bdev.c:751
bdev_open+0x324/0xd70 block/bdev.c:960
blkdev_open+0x461/0x600 block/fops.c:672
do_dentry_open+0x816/0x1380 fs/open.c:947
vfs_open+0x3b/0x340 fs/open.c:1052
do_open fs/namei.c:4700 [inline]
path_openat+0x2e44/0x3830 fs/namei.c:4863
do_file_open+0x23e/0x4a0 fs/namei.c:4892
do_sys_openat2+0x115/0x200 fs/open.c:1368
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1374 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1390 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1385 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x138/0x170 fs/open.c:1385
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0x560 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f9cc96a7407
RSP: 002b:00007ffec367c3a0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9cc9ea5880 RCX: 00007f9cc96a7407
RDX: 00000000000a0800 RSI: 000055fec0e9d350 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c
RBP: 000055fec0e7d910 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055fec0e91ba0
R13: 000055fec0e8b190 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000055fec0e91ba0
</TASK>
Showing all locks held in the system:
1 lock held by khungtaskd/34:
#0: ffffffff8e74a4a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:300 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8e74a4a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:840 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8e74a4a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x2e/0x180 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6775
2 locks held by getty/5427:
#0: ffff8881131c20a0 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}-{0:0}, at: tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x25/0x70 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:243
#1: ffffc900034732e8 (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: n_tty_read+0x45a/0x1360 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2211
1 lock held by udevd/5877:
#0: ffff88818b9a4350 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bdev_open+0xde/0xd70 block/bdev.c:948
2 locks held by syz.0.9928/27001:
#0: ffff88811a744740 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
#0: ffff88811a744740 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __sock_release net/socket.c:709 [inline]
#0: ffff88811a744740 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: sock_close+0x82/0x220 net/socket.c:1501
#1: ffffffff8e74fd28 (rcu_state.exp_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: exp_funnel_lock kernel/rcu/tree_exp.h:311 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8e74fd28 (rcu_state.exp_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: synchronize_rcu_expedited+0x2d0/0x770 kernel/rcu/tree_exp.h:961
=============================================
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 34 Comm: khungtaskd Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
nmi_cpu_backtrace+0x274/0x2d0 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:122
nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x17a/0x380 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:65
trigger_all_cpu_backtrace include/linux/nmi.h:162 [inline]
__sys_info lib/sys_info.c:157 [inline]
sys_info+0x135/0x170 lib/sys_info.c:165
check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:353 [inline]
watchdog+0xfd7/0x1030 kernel/hung_task.c:561
kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0:
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 27004 Comm: syz.0.9929 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:io_serial_out+0x7c/0xc0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:408
Code: e9 84 fc 44 89 f9 d3 e5 49 83 c6 40 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 4c 89 f7 e8 8c e3 f0 fc 41 03 2e 89 d8 89 ea ee <5b> 41 5c 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc 44 89 f9 80 e1 07 38 c1
RSP: 0018:ffffc90005866d30 EFLAGS: 00000002
RAX: 0000000000000031 RBX: 0000000000000031 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 00000000000003f8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000020
RBP: 00000000000003f8 R08: ffff88818ac78237 R09: 1ffff1103158f046
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff853f9a70 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffffffff9a57ee80 R14: ffffffff9a57eec0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fe0e539e6c0(0000) GS:ffff8881a56ab000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe0e4472780 CR3: 00000001120e0000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
serial_port_out include/linux/serial_core.h:813 [inline]
serial8250_console_putchar drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:3239 [inline]
serial8250_console_fifo_write drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:-1 [inline]
serial8250_console_write+0x13b6/0x1ba0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:3379
console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:3183 [inline]
console_flush_one_record kernel/printk/printk.c:3269 [inline]
console_flush_all+0x6ea/0xaf0 kernel/printk/printk.c:3343
__console_flush_and_unlock kernel/printk/printk.c:3373 [inline]
console_unlock+0xd1/0x1c0 kernel/printk/printk.c:3413
vprintk_emit+0x485/0x560 kernel/printk/printk.c:2479
_printk+0xdd/0x130 kernel/printk/printk.c:2504
nbd_genl_connect+0xa63/0x1a70 drivers/block/nbd.c:2175
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x233/0x340 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1114
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1194 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x614/0x7a0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1209
netlink_rcv_skb+0x226/0x4a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1218
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7bb/0x940 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
netlink_sendmsg+0x813/0xb40 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900
sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x13a/0x180 net/socket.c:775
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:790 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x54e/0x850 net/socket.c:2684
___sys_sendmsg+0x2a5/0x360 net/socket.c:2738
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2770 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2775 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2773 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1b1/0x290 net/socket.c:2773
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0x560 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe0e459ce59
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fe0e539e028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe0e4815fa0 RCX: 00007fe0e459ce59
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000200000001ac0 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007fe0e4632e6f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fe0e4816038 R14: 00007fe0e4815fa0 R15: 00007ffc232c20d8
</TASK>
ReproducedFaultInjection:]
|
| 6/1 |
2026/07/09 10:57 |
action |
codesearch-prepare |
15m
Results: map[Index:codesearch-index]
|
| 7/1 |
2026/07/09 11:12 |
agent |
debugger |
32m
Model:
Instruction:
You are an experienced Linux kernel developer tasked with debugging a kernel crash root cause.
You need to provide a detailed explanation of the root cause for another developer to be
able to write a fix for the bug based on your explanation. Include all relevant details
into the response: function/struct/field/etc names, code snippets, line numbers,
macro/enum values, etc.
Don't make assumptions about the kernel source code (it may be different from what you assume it is).
Extensively use the provided code access tools (codesearch-*, git-*, grepper, etc)
to examine the actual source code, and confirm any assumptions.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Prompt:
The crash is:
INFO: task udevd:5877 blocked in I/O wait for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted syzkaller #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:udevd state:D stack:25800 pid:5877 tgid:5877 ppid:5040 task_flags:0x400140 flags:0x00080802
Call Trace:
<TASK>
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5510 [inline]
__schedule+0x17e7/0x5630 kernel/sched/core.c:7234
__schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:7311 [inline]
schedule+0x164/0x2b0 kernel/sched/core.c:7326
io_schedule+0x7f/0xd0 kernel/sched/core.c:8154
folio_wait_bit_common+0x836/0xbc0 mm/filemap.c:1323
folio_put_wait_locked mm/filemap.c:1492 [inline]
do_read_cache_folio+0x1ac/0x590 mm/filemap.c:4122
read_mapping_folio include/linux/pagemap.h:1015 [inline]
read_part_sector+0xb6/0x2b0 block/partitions/core.c:724
adfspart_check_POWERTEC+0x9a/0x7a0 block/partitions/acorn.c:451
check_partition block/partitions/core.c:143 [inline]
blk_add_partitions block/partitions/core.c:591 [inline]
bdev_disk_changed+0x851/0x17a0 block/partitions/core.c:695
blkdev_get_whole+0x372/0x510 block/bdev.c:751
bdev_open+0x324/0xd70 block/bdev.c:960
blkdev_open+0x461/0x600 block/fops.c:672
do_dentry_open+0x816/0x1380 fs/open.c:947
vfs_open+0x3b/0x340 fs/open.c:1052
do_open fs/namei.c:4700 [inline]
path_openat+0x2e44/0x3830 fs/namei.c:4863
do_file_open+0x23e/0x4a0 fs/namei.c:4892
do_sys_openat2+0x115/0x200 fs/open.c:1368
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1374 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1390 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1385 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x138/0x170 fs/open.c:1385
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0x560 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f9cc96a7407
RSP: 002b:00007ffec367c3a0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9cc9ea5880 RCX: 00007f9cc96a7407
RDX: 00000000000a0800 RSI: 000055fec0e9d350 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c
RBP: 000055fec0e7d910 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055fec0e91ba0
R13: 000055fec0e8b190 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000055fec0e91ba0
</TASK>
Showing all locks held in the system:
1 lock held by khungtaskd/34:
#0: ffffffff8e74a4a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:300 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8e74a4a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:840 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8e74a4a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x2e/0x180 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6775
2 locks held by getty/5427:
#0: ffff8881131c20a0 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}-{0:0}, at: tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x25/0x70 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:243
#1: ffffc900034732e8 (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: n_tty_read+0x45a/0x1360 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2211
1 lock held by udevd/5877:
#0: ffff88818b9a4350 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bdev_open+0xde/0xd70 block/bdev.c:948
2 locks held by syz.0.9928/27001:
#0: ffff88811a744740 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
#0: ffff88811a744740 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __sock_release net/socket.c:709 [inline]
#0: ffff88811a744740 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: sock_close+0x82/0x220 net/socket.c:1501
#1: ffffffff8e74fd28 (rcu_state.exp_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: exp_funnel_lock kernel/rcu/tree_exp.h:311 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8e74fd28 (rcu_state.exp_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: synchronize_rcu_expedited+0x2d0/0x770 kernel/rcu/tree_exp.h:961
=============================================
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 34 Comm: khungtaskd Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
nmi_cpu_backtrace+0x274/0x2d0 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:122
nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x17a/0x380 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:65
trigger_all_cpu_backtrace include/linux/nmi.h:162 [inline]
__sys_info lib/sys_info.c:157 [inline]
sys_info+0x135/0x170 lib/sys_info.c:165
check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:353 [inline]
watchdog+0xfd7/0x1030 kernel/hung_task.c:561
kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0:
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 27004 Comm: syz.0.9929 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:io_serial_out+0x7c/0xc0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:408
Code: e9 84 fc 44 89 f9 d3 e5 49 83 c6 40 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 4c 89 f7 e8 8c e3 f0 fc 41 03 2e 89 d8 89 ea ee <5b> 41 5c 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc 44 89 f9 80 e1 07 38 c1
RSP: 0018:ffffc90005866d30 EFLAGS: 00000002
RAX: 0000000000000031 RBX: 0000000000000031 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 00000000000003f8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000020
RBP: 00000000000003f8 R08: ffff88818ac78237 R09: 1ffff1103158f046
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff853f9a70 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffffffff9a57ee80 R14: ffffffff9a57eec0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fe0e539e6c0(0000) GS:ffff8881a56ab000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe0e4472780 CR3: 00000001120e0000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
serial_port_out include/linux/serial_core.h:813 [inline]
serial8250_console_putchar drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:3239 [inline]
serial8250_console_fifo_write drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:-1 [inline]
serial8250_console_write+0x13b6/0x1ba0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:3379
console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:3183 [inline]
console_flush_one_record kernel/printk/printk.c:3269 [inline]
console_flush_all+0x6ea/0xaf0 kernel/printk/printk.c:3343
__console_flush_and_unlock kernel/printk/printk.c:3373 [inline]
console_unlock+0xd1/0x1c0 kernel/printk/printk.c:3413
vprintk_emit+0x485/0x560 kernel/printk/printk.c:2479
_printk+0xdd/0x130 kernel/printk/printk.c:2504
nbd_genl_connect+0xa63/0x1a70 drivers/block/nbd.c:2175
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x233/0x340 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1114
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1194 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x614/0x7a0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1209
netlink_rcv_skb+0x226/0x4a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1218
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7bb/0x940 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
netlink_sendmsg+0x813/0xb40 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900
sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x13a/0x180 net/socket.c:775
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:790 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x54e/0x850 net/socket.c:2684
___sys_sendmsg+0x2a5/0x360 net/socket.c:2738
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2770 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2775 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2773 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1b1/0x290 net/socket.c:2773
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0x560 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe0e459ce59
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fe0e539e028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe0e4815fa0 RCX: 00007fe0e459ce59
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000200000001ac0 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007fe0e4632e6f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fe0e4816038 R14: 00007fe0e4815fa0 R15: 00007ffc232c20d8
</TASK>
The following C code is a draft of the vulnerable syscall sequence. Keep in mind that
it may lack the precise threading, sandboxing, and some arguments of a working reproducer:
// autogenerated by syzkaller (https://github.com/google/syzkaller)
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <linux/genetlink.h>
#include <linux/if_addr.h>
#include <linux/if_link.h>
#include <linux/in6.h>
#include <linux/neighbour.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <linux/veth.h>
#define BITMASK(bf_off,bf_len) (((1ull << (bf_len)) - 1) << (bf_off))
#define STORE_BY_BITMASK(type,htobe,addr,val,bf_off,bf_len) *(type*)(addr) = htobe((htobe(*(type*)(addr)) & ~BITMASK((bf_off), (bf_len))) | (((type)(val) << (bf_off)) & BITMASK((bf_off), (bf_len))))
struct nlmsg {
char* pos;
int nesting;
struct nlattr* nested[8];
char buf[4096];
};
static void netlink_init(struct nlmsg* nlmsg, int typ, int flags,
const void* data, int size)
{
memset(nlmsg, 0, sizeof(*nlmsg));
struct nlmsghdr* hdr = (struct nlmsghdr*)nlmsg->buf;
hdr->nlmsg_type = typ;
hdr->nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_ACK | flags;
memcpy(hdr + 1, data, size);
nlmsg->pos = (char*)(hdr + 1) + NLMSG_ALIGN(size);
}
static void netlink_attr(struct nlmsg* nlmsg, int typ,
const void* data, int size)
{
struct nlattr* attr = (struct nlattr*)nlmsg->pos;
attr->nla_len = sizeof(*attr) + size;
attr->nla_type = typ;
if (size > 0)
memcpy(attr + 1, data, size);
nlmsg->pos += NLMSG_ALIGN(attr->nla_len);
}
static int netlink_send_ext(struct nlmsg* nlmsg, int sock,
uint16_t reply_type, int* reply_len, bool dofail)
{
if (nlmsg->pos > nlmsg->buf + sizeof(nlmsg->buf) || nlmsg->nesting)
exit(1);
struct nlmsghdr* hdr = (struct nlmsghdr*)nlmsg->buf;
hdr->nlmsg_len = nlmsg->pos - nlmsg->buf;
struct sockaddr_nl addr;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.nl_family = AF_NETLINK;
ssize_t n = sendto(sock, nlmsg->buf, hdr->nlmsg_len, 0, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, sizeof(addr));
if (n != (ssize_t)hdr->nlmsg_len) {
if (dofail)
exit(1);
return -1;
}
n = recv(sock, nlmsg->buf, sizeof(nlmsg->buf), 0);
if (reply_len)
*reply_len = 0;
if (n < 0) {
if (dofail)
exit(1);
return -1;
}
if (n < (ssize_t)sizeof(struct nlmsghdr)) {
errno = EINVAL;
if (dofail)
exit(1);
return -1;
}
if (hdr->nlmsg_type == NLMSG_DONE)
return 0;
if (reply_len && hdr->nlmsg_type == reply_type) {
*reply_len = n;
return 0;
}
if (n < (ssize_t)(sizeof(struct nlmsghdr) + sizeof(struct nlmsgerr))) {
errno = EINVAL;
if (dofail)
exit(1);
return -1;
}
if (hdr->nlmsg_type != NLMSG_ERROR) {
errno = EINVAL;
if (dofail)
exit(1);
return -1;
}
errno = -((struct nlmsgerr*)(hdr + 1))->error;
return -errno;
}
static int netlink_query_family_id(struct nlmsg* nlmsg, int sock, const char* family_name, bool dofail)
{
struct genlmsghdr genlhdr;
memset(&genlhdr, 0, sizeof(genlhdr));
genlhdr.cmd = CTRL_CMD_GETFAMILY;
netlink_init(nlmsg, GENL_ID_CTRL, 0, &genlhdr, sizeof(genlhdr));
netlink_attr(nlmsg, CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_NAME, family_name, strnlen(family_name, GENL_NAMSIZ - 1) + 1);
int n = 0;
int err = netlink_send_ext(nlmsg, sock, GENL_ID_CTRL, &n, dofail);
if (err < 0) {
return -1;
}
uint16_t id = 0;
struct nlattr* attr = (struct nlattr*)(nlmsg->buf + NLMSG_HDRLEN + NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(genlhdr)));
for (; (char*)attr < nlmsg->buf + n; attr = (struct nlattr*)((char*)attr + NLMSG_ALIGN(attr->nla_len))) {
if (attr->nla_type == CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID) {
id = *(uint16_t*)(attr + 1);
break;
}
}
if (!id) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
recv(sock, nlmsg->buf, sizeof(nlmsg->buf), 0);
return id;
}
const int kInitNetNsFd = 201;
static long syz_init_net_socket(volatile long domain, volatile long type, volatile long proto)
{
return syscall(__NR_socket, domain, type, proto);
}
static long syz_genetlink_get_family_id(volatile long name, volatile long sock_arg)
{
int fd = sock_arg;
if (fd < 0) {
fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW, NETLINK_GENERIC);
if (fd == -1) {
return -1;
}
}
struct nlmsg nlmsg_tmp;
int ret = netlink_query_family_id(&nlmsg_tmp, fd, (char*)name, false);
if ((int)sock_arg < 0)
close(fd);
if (ret < 0) {
return -1;
}
return ret;
}
uint64_t r[3] = {0xffffffffffffffff, 0x0, 0xffffffffffffffff};
int main(void)
{
syscall(__NR_mmap, /*addr=*/0x1ffffffff000ul, /*len=*/0x1000, /*prot=*/0ul, /*flags=MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE*/0x32ul, /*fd=*/(intptr_t)-1, /*offset=*/0ul);
syscall(__NR_mmap, /*addr=*/0x200000000000ul, /*len=*/0x1000000, /*prot=PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC*/7ul, /*flags=MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE*/0x32ul, /*fd=*/(intptr_t)-1, /*offset=*/0ul);
syscall(__NR_mmap, /*addr=*/0x200001000000ul, /*len=*/0x1000, /*prot=*/0ul, /*flags=MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE*/0x32ul, /*fd=*/(intptr_t)-1, /*offset=*/0ul);
const char* reason;
(void)reason;
intptr_t res = 0;
if (write(1, "executing program\n", sizeof("executing program\n") - 1)) {}
// socket$packet arguments: [
// domain: const = 0x11 (8 bytes)
// type: packet_socket_type = 0x2 (8 bytes)
// proto: const = 0x300 (4 bytes)
// ]
// returns sock_packet
syscall(__NR_socket, /*domain=*/0x11ul, /*type=SOCK_DGRAM*/2ul, /*proto=*/0x300);
// syz_init_net_socket$nl_generic arguments: [
// domain: const = 0x10 (8 bytes)
// type: const = 0x3 (8 bytes)
// proto: const = 0x10 (8 bytes)
// ]
// returns sock_nl_generic_init
res = -1;
res = syz_init_net_socket(/*domain=*/0x10, /*type=*/3, /*proto=*/0x10);
if (res != -1)
r[0] = res;
// syz_genetlink_get_family_id$nbd arguments: [
// name: ptr[in, buffer] {
// buffer: {6e 62 64 00} (length 0x4)
// }
// fd: sock_nl_generic_init (resource)
// ]
// returns genl_nbd_family_id
memcpy((void*)0x200000000040, "nbd\000", 4);
res = -1;
res = syz_genetlink_get_family_id(/*name=*/0x200000000040, /*fd=*/-1);
if (res != -1)
r[1] = res;
// socketpair$nbd arguments: [
// domain: const = 0x1 (8 bytes)
// type: const = 0x1 (8 bytes)
// proto: const = 0x0 (4 bytes)
// fds: ptr[out, nbd_sock_pair] {
// nbd_sock_pair {
// client: sock_nbd_client (resource)
// server: sock_nbd_server (resource)
// }
// }
// ]
res = syscall(__NR_socketpair, /*domain=*/1ul, /*type=*/1ul, /*proto=*/0, /*fds=*/0x200000000000ul);
if (res != -1)
r[2] = *(uint32_t*)0x200000000000;
// sendmsg$NBD_CMD_CONNECT arguments: [
// fd: sock_nl_generic_init (resource)
// msg: ptr[in, msghdr_netlink[netlink_msg_t[genl_nbd_family_id, genlmsghdr_t[NBD_CMD_CONNECT], nbd_attr_policy]]] {
// msghdr_netlink[netlink_msg_t[genl_nbd_family_id, genlmsghdr_t[NBD_CMD_CONNECT], nbd_attr_policy]] {
// addr: nil
// addrlen: len = 0x0 (4 bytes)
// pad = 0x0 (4 bytes)
// vec: ptr[in, iovec[in, netlink_msg_t[genl_nbd_family_id, genlmsghdr_t[NBD_CMD_CONNECT], nbd_attr_policy]]] {
// iovec[in, netlink_msg_t[genl_nbd_family_id, genlmsghdr_t[NBD_CMD_CONNECT], nbd_attr_policy]] {
// addr: ptr[in, netlink_msg_t[genl_nbd_family_id, genlmsghdr_t[NBD_CMD_CONNECT], nbd_attr_policy]] {
// netlink_msg_t[genl_nbd_family_id, genlmsghdr_t[NBD_CMD_CONNECT], nbd_attr_policy] {
// len: len = 0x38 (4 bytes)
// type: genl_nbd_family_id (resource)
// flags: netlink_msg_flags = 0x1 (2 bytes)
// seq: int32 = 0xffffffff (4 bytes)
// pid: int32 = 0x0 (4 bytes)
// payload: genlmsghdr_t[NBD_CMD_CONNECT] {
// cmd: const = 0x1 (1 bytes)
// version: const = 0x0 (1 bytes)
// reserved: const = 0x0 (2 bytes)
// }
// attrs: array[nbd_attr_policy] {
// union nbd_attr_policy {
// NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS: nlattr_tt[const[NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS, int16:14], 0, 1, array[nlnest[NBD_SOCK_ITEM, nlattr[NBD_SOCK_FD, sock_nbd_client]]]] {
// nla_len: offsetof = 0x10 (2 bytes)
// nla_type: const = 0x7 (1 bytes)
// NLA_F_NET_BYTEORDER: const = 0x0 (0 bytes)
// NLA_F_NESTED: const = 0x1 (1 bytes)
// payload: array[nlattr_tt[const[NBD_SOCK_ITEM, int16:14], 0, 1, nlattr[NBD_SOCK_FD, sock_nbd_client]]] {
// nlattr_tt[const[NBD_SOCK_ITEM, int16:14], 0, 1, nlattr[NBD_SOCK_FD, sock_nbd_client]] {
// nla_len: offsetof = 0xc (2 bytes)
// nla_type: const = 0x1 (1 bytes)
// NLA_F_NET_BYTEORDER: const = 0x0 (0 bytes)
// NLA_F_NESTED: const = 0x1 (1 bytes)
// payload: nlattr_t[const[NBD_SOCK_FD, int16], sock_nbd_client] {
// nla_len: offsetof = 0x8 (2 bytes)
// nla_type: const = 0x1 (2 bytes)
// payload: sock_nbd_client (resource)
// size: buffer: {} (length 0x0)
// }
// size: buffer: {} (length 0x0)
// }
// }
// size: buffer: {} (length 0x0)
// }
// }
// union nbd_attr_policy {
// NBD_ATTR_INDEX: nlattr_t[const[NBD_ATTR_INDEX, int16], proc[0, 1, int32]] {
// nla_len: offsetof = 0x8 (2 bytes)
// nla_type: const = 0x1 (2 bytes)
// payload: proc = 0x0 (4 bytes)
// size: buffer: {} (length 0x0)
// }
// }
// union nbd_attr_policy {
// NBD_ATTR_SIZE_BYTES: nlattr_t[const[NBD_ATTR_SIZE_BYTES, int16], int64] {
// nla_len: offsetof = 0xc (2 bytes)
// nla_type: const = 0x2 (2 bytes)
// payload: int64 = 0x7fff (8 bytes)
// size: buffer: {} (length 0x0)
// }
// }
// }
// }
// }
// len: len = 0x38 (8 bytes)
// }
// }
// vlen: const = 0x1 (8 bytes)
// ctrl: const = 0x0 (8 bytes)
// ctrllen: const = 0x0 (8 bytes)
// f: send_flags = 0x0 (4 bytes)
// pad = 0x0 (4 bytes)
// }
// }
// f: send_flags = 0x20000000 (8 bytes)
// ]
*(uint64_t*)0x200000001ac0 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x200000001ac8 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x200000001ad0 = 0x2000000004c0;
*(uint64_t*)0x2000000004c0 = 0x2000000000c0;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000000000c0 = 0x38;
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000c4 = r[1];
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000c6 = 1;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000000000c8 = -1;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000000000cc = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x2000000000d0 = 1;
*(uint8_t*)0x2000000000d1 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000d2 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000d4 = 0x10;
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x2000000000d6, 7, 0, 14);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x2000000000d7, 0, 6, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x2000000000d7, 1, 7, 1);
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000d8 = 0xc;
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x2000000000da, 1, 0, 14);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x2000000000db, 0, 6, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x2000000000db, 1, 7, 1);
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000dc = 8;
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000de = 1;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000000000e0 = r[2];
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000e4 = 8;
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000e6 = 1;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000000000e8 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000ec = 0xc;
*(uint16_t*)0x2000000000ee = 2;
*(uint64_t*)0x2000000000f0 = 0x7fff;
*(uint64_t*)0x2000000004c8 = 0x38;
*(uint64_t*)0x200000001ad8 = 1;
*(uint64_t*)0x200000001ae0 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x200000001ae8 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x200000001af0 = 0;
syscall(__NR_sendmsg, /*fd=*/r[0], /*msg=*/0x200000001ac0ul, /*f=MSG_FASTOPEN*/0x20000000ul);
// sendmsg$NBD_CMD_DISCONNECT arguments: [
// fd: sock_nl_generic_init (resource)
// msg: nil
// f: send_flags = 0xc0 (8 bytes)
// ]
syscall(__NR_sendmsg, /*fd=*/(intptr_t)-1, /*msg=*/0ul, /*f=MSG_EOR|MSG_DONTWAIT*/0xc0ul);
return 0;
}
Reply: This crash report highlights two intertwined issues in the Network Block Device (NBD) subsystem: a functional bug causing a permanent I/O hang (which triggers the hung task detector), and a logging bug causing console spam (which is captured in the NMI backtrace).
### 1. The Hung Task in `udevd` (Root Cause)
The primary bug is that `udevd` is blocked in `TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE` (`state:D`) for over 143 seconds while trying to read the partition table of the NBD device.
Here is the sequence of events that leads to this hang:
1. **Device Setup**: The syzkaller reproducer sends an `NBD_CMD_CONNECT` netlink message to configure `nbd0`. It provides a socketpair but does **not** set the `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` flag. It also leaves the I/O timeout at `0` (which means infinite retries from the user's perspective, though the block layer still uses a default 30-second timer).
2. **Uevent Triggered**: During setup, `nbd_genl_connect()` calls `nbd_start_device()` -> `nbd_set_size()`, which calls `set_capacity_and_notify()`. This triggers a uevent, prompting `udevd` to open the device and scan for partitions (`blk_add_partitions()`).
3. **Socket Closed**: The syzkaller program immediately exits, closing its end of the socketpair. The NBD `recv_work` thread detects the closed connection, calls `nbd_mark_nsock_dead()`, sets `nsock->dead = true`, and exits.
4. **Infinite Timeout Loop**: `udevd`'s read request is sent to the NBD device but receives no reply because the socket is dead. After 30 seconds, the block layer calls `nbd_xmit_timeout()`.
In `nbd_xmit_timeout()`, because `nbd->tag_set.timeout == 0` and there is only 1 connection, the code falls through to this block:
```c
if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
/* ... */
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
// ...
return BLK_EH_DONE;
}
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
// ...
return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
}
```
Because the socket hasn't been replaced (`cmd->cookie == nsock->cookie`), it unconditionally returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. It **fails to check if the socket is actually dead**. As a result, the request is never requeued or failed; it stays `INFLIGHT` on a dead socket forever. `udevd` hangs indefinitely, eventually triggering the kernel's hung task detector.
### 2. The Console Spam (NMI Backtrace)
When the hung task detector fires, it triggers an NMI backtrace on all CPUs. The backtrace shows CPU 0 running `syz.0.9929` deep inside `printk` (`console_flush_all`), called from `nbd_genl_connect()` at `drivers/block/nbd.c:2175`.
Why is it printing? Because syzkaller runs the reproducer in a tight loop. Since `nbd0` was never disconnected (due to the missing `DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` flag and `udevd` holding a reference), subsequent attempts to connect to `nbd0` hit this check in `nbd_genl_connect()`:
```c
mutex_lock(&nbd->config_lock);
if (refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)) {
mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
nbd_put(nbd);
if (index == -1)
goto again;
pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index); // <--- Line 2175
return -EBUSY;
}
```
Because this `pr_err` is not rate-limited, syzkaller spams the console with "nbd0 already in use" messages. This console flood delays `console_unlock`, which is exactly what CPU 0 was caught doing when the hung task detector fired the NMI.
### How to Fix
**1. Fix the I/O Hang:**
In `nbd_xmit_timeout()`, when `timeout == 0`, the driver must check if the socket is dead (`nsock->dead`). If it is dead, the command must be requeued so that `nbd_handle_cmd()` can process the dead socket (which will properly fail the request with `BLK_STS_IOERR` since `dead_conn_timeout` is 0).
```c
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req)
blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
- if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
+ if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie || nsock->dead) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
```
**2. Fix the Console Spam:**
Change the un-ratelimited `pr_err` in `nbd_genl_connect()` to prevent userspace from trivially spamming the kernel log and causing softlockups/NMI timeouts.
```c
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -2172,7 +2172,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd_put(nbd);
if (index == -1)
goto again;
- pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
+ pr_err_ratelimited("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
return -EBUSY;
}
```
|
| 8/2 |
2026/07/09 11:12 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 13885
output: 39
thoughts: 374
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Kernel Crash Involving udevd and NBD**
Okay, so I've got a kernel crash report here, and it's pointing to a hung task within `udevd`. The NMI backtrace indicates that a task, named `syz.0.9929`, is blocked deep inside the console flushing process, specifically waiting on `io_serial_out`. That's a bit odd. I'd expect serial I/O to be pretty responsive.
Digging deeper, `udevd` is actually waiting on I/O, specifically during a block device opening operation. The call stack leads from `bdev_open` down to `io_schedule`, which implies it's blocked waiting for a disk operation. Looking at the chain, it appears to be related to partition checking, specifically with the `adfspart` driver. It ends up using `folio_put_wait_locked`. Seems like it's trying to read something. That I/O could be the bottleneck.
Now, here's where it gets interesting. The syzkaller program, which likely triggered this, seems to be interacting with the NBD subsystem. It creates a netlink socket, gets the NBD family ID, then creates a socketpair. The important part is an `NBD_CMD_CONNECT` message via netlink to the NBD subsystem, which sets up the NBD device. So `syz.0.9929` is inside this call path, specifically at `nbd_genl_connect`, which appears to use `printk`... that seems a bit unusual, why printk? Let me check the source code for the driver.
I should investigate this `nbd_genl_connect` function within `drivers/block/nbd.c`. I will use `codesearch-definition-source` to view the function's definition. Let me find out why the call to `printk` is present. I need to understand if the printk is the cause of, or related to, this hang.
|
| 9/2 |
2026/07/09 11:13 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_genl_connect]
Results: map[SourceCode:2110: static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
2111: {
2112: struct nbd_device *nbd;
2113: struct nbd_config *config;
2114: int index = -1;
2115: int ret;
2116: bool put_dev = false;
2117:
2118: if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
2119: return -EPERM;
2120:
2121: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_INDEX]) {
2122: index = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_INDEX]);
2123:
2124: /*
2125: * Too big first_minor can cause duplicate creation of
2126: * sysfs files/links, since index << part_shift might overflow, or
2127: * MKDEV() expect that the max bits of first_minor is 20.
2128: */
2129: if (index < 0 || index > MINORMASK >> part_shift) {
2130: pr_err("illegal input index %d\n", index);
2131: return -EINVAL;
2132: }
2133: }
2134: if (GENL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info, NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS)) {
2135: pr_err("must specify at least one socket\n");
2136: return -EINVAL;
2137: }
2138: if (GENL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info, NBD_ATTR_SIZE_BYTES)) {
2139: pr_err("must specify a size in bytes for the device\n");
2140: return -EINVAL;
2141: }
2142: again:
2143: mutex_lock(&nbd_index_mutex);
2144: if (index == -1) {
2145: nbd = nbd_find_get_unused();
2146: } else {
2147: nbd = idr_find(&nbd_index_idr, index);
2148: if (nbd) {
2149: if ((test_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT, &nbd->flags) &&
2150: test_bit(NBD_DISCONNECT_REQUESTED, &nbd->flags)) ||
2151: !refcount_inc_not_zero(&nbd->refs)) {
2152: mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
2153: pr_err("device at index %d is going down\n",
2154: index);
2155: return -EINVAL;
2156: }
2157: }
2158: }
2159: mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
2160:
2161: if (!nbd) {
2162: nbd = nbd_dev_add(index, 2);
2163: if (IS_ERR(nbd)) {
2164: pr_err("failed to add new device\n");
2165: return PTR_ERR(nbd);
2166: }
2167: }
2168:
2169: mutex_lock(&nbd->config_lock);
2170: if (refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)) {
2171: mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
2172: nbd_put(nbd);
2173: if (index == -1)
2174: goto again;
2175: pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
2176: return -EBUSY;
2177: }
2178:
2179: ret = nbd_alloc_and_init_config(nbd);
2180: if (ret) {
2181: mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
2182: nbd_put(nbd);
2183: pr_err("couldn't allocate config\n");
2184: return ret;
2185: }
2186:
2187: config = nbd->config;
2188: set_bit(NBD_RT_BOUND, &config->runtime_flags);
2189: ret = nbd_genl_size_set(info, nbd);
2190: if (ret)
2191: goto out;
2192:
2193: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_TIMEOUT])
2194: nbd_set_cmd_timeout(nbd,
2195: nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_TIMEOUT]));
2196: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]) {
2197: config->dead_conn_timeout =
2198: nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]);
2199: config->dead_conn_timeout *= HZ;
2200: }
2201: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS])
2202: config->flags =
2203: nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS]);
2204: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_CLIENT_FLAGS]) {
2205: u64 flags = nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_CLIENT_FLAGS]);
2206: if (flags & NBD_CFLAG_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT) {
2207: /*
2208: * We have 1 ref to keep the device around, and then 1
2209: * ref for our current operation here, which will be
2210: * inherited by the config. If we already have
2211: * DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT set then we know we don't have
2212: * that extra ref already held so we don't need the
2213: * put_dev.
2214: */
2215: if (!test_and_set_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT,
2216: &nbd->flags))
2217: put_dev = true;
2218: } else {
2219: if (test_and_clear_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT,
2220: &nbd->flags))
2221: refcount_inc(&nbd->refs);
2222: }
2223: if (flags & NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE) {
2224: set_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE,
2225: &config->runtime_flags);
2226: }
2227: }
2228:
2229: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS]) {
2230: struct nlattr *attr;
2231: int rem, fd;
2232:
2233: nla_for_each_nested(attr, info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS],
2234: rem) {
2235: struct nlattr *socks[NBD_SOCK_MAX+1];
2236:
2237: if (nla_type(attr) != NBD_SOCK_ITEM) {
2238: pr_err("socks must be embedded in a SOCK_ITEM attr\n");
2239: ret = -EINVAL;
2240: goto out;
2241: }
2242: ret = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(socks, NBD_SOCK_MAX,
2243: attr,
2244: nbd_sock_policy,
2245: info->extack);
2246: if (ret != 0) {
2247: pr_err("error processing sock list\n");
2248: ret = -EINVAL;
2249: goto out;
2250: }
2251: if (!socks[NBD_SOCK_FD])
2252: continue;
2253: fd = (int)nla_get_u32(socks[NBD_SOCK_FD]);
2254: ret = nbd_add_socket(nbd, fd, true);
2255: if (ret)
2256: goto out;
2257: }
2258: }
2259:
2260: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_BACKEND_IDENTIFIER]) {
2261: nbd->backend = nla_strdup(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_BACKEND_IDENTIFIER],
2262: GFP_KERNEL);
2263: if (!nbd->backend) {
2264: ret = -ENOMEM;
2265: goto out;
2266: }
2267: }
2268: ret = device_create_file(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), &backend_attr);
2269: if (ret) {
2270: dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
2271: "device_create_file failed for backend!\n");
2272: goto out;
2273: }
2274: set_bit(NBD_RT_HAS_BACKEND_FILE, &config->runtime_flags);
2275:
2276: ret = nbd_start_device(nbd);
2277: out:
2278: if (!ret) {
2279: set_bit(NBD_RT_HAS_CONFIG_REF, &config->runtime_flags);
2280: refcount_inc(&nbd->config_refs);
2281: nbd_connect_reply(info, nbd->index);
2282: }
2283: mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
2284:
2285: nbd_config_put(nbd);
2286: if (put_dev)
2287: nbd_put(nbd);
2288: return ret;
2289: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 10/2 |
2026/07/09 11:13 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 17619
output: 40
thoughts: 1372
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Potential NBD Device Hang**
Okay, so I've got a crash, and the backtrace points directly to `nbd_genl_connect` and ultimately, the console. The stack trace clearly shows the crash originating from within `serial8250_console_write`, after a chain of calls related to printing – `console_flush_all`, `console_unlock`, `vprintk_emit`, and `_printk`. The clue here is that `nbd_genl_connect` is calling `pr_err` (or `dev_err`, essentially the same for our purposes), specifically at line 2175 in `drivers/block/nbd.c`. The error message is "nbd%d already in use".
A key observation from the NMI backtrace is that the process responsible for the error message, `syz.0.9929`, is the one causing the console output. It seems `syz.0.9929` is spamming the console with "nbd%d already in use\n", which is causing `console_unlock` to be hung. This is the symptom, not the root cause. This implies that `refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)` is true within `nbd_genl_connect`, which triggers the error message. However, the hang itself appears to involve `udevd`, which is blocked deep within the block device stack: `bdev_open` -> `blkdev_get_whole` -> `bdev_disk_changed` -> `blk_add_partitions` -> `check_partition` -> `adfspart_check_POWERTEC` -> `read_part_sector` -> `read_mapping_folio` -> `do_read_cache_folio` -> `folio_put_wait_locked` -> `folio_wait_bit_common` -> `io_schedule`. This points to `udevd` trying to read from the NBD device and seemingly getting stuck.
So, `syz.0.9929` is printing an error repeatedly while `udevd` is trying to access the NBD device. This could be due to console spam, but more likely a sign of an infinite loop within `nbd_genl_connect`. Let's dig deeper into the code.
Looking closely at `nbd_genl_connect`, the code structure reveals a potential infinite loop:
```c
again:
mutex_lock(&nbd_index_mutex);
if (index == -1) {
nbd = nbd_find_get_unused();
} else {
...
}
mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
if (!nbd) {
...
}
mutex_lock(&nbd->config_lock);
if (refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)) {
mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
nbd_put(nbd);
if (index == -1)
goto again;
pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
return -EBUSY;
}
```
If `index == -1`, and `nbd_find_get_unused()` returns a device that's already in use (`refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)` is true), the code unlocks, releases the NBD device (`nbd_put(nbd)`), and *jumps back to* `again`. Crucially, `index` remains `-1`. So, it's very likely that `nbd_find_get_unused()` returns the *same* "in use" device, causing a *guaranteed* infinite loop. It's critical to understand what `nbd_find_get_unused()` does to verify this hypothesis. We have identified a key issue and potential root cause.
|
| 11/2 |
2026/07/09 11:13 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_find_get_unused]
Results: map[SourceCode:2048: static struct nbd_device *nbd_find_get_unused(void)
2049: {
2050: struct nbd_device *nbd;
2051: int id;
2052:
2053: lockdep_assert_held(&nbd_index_mutex);
2054:
2055: idr_for_each_entry(&nbd_index_idr, nbd, id) {
2056: if (refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs) ||
2057: test_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT, &nbd->flags))
2058: continue;
2059: if (refcount_inc_not_zero(&nbd->refs))
2060: return nbd;
2061: }
2062:
2063: return NULL;
2064: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 12/2 |
2026/07/09 11:13 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 20172
output: 38
thoughts: 365
Thoughts: **Debugging a Concurrency Issue in NBD Driver Connection**
Okay, let's break this down. My initial thought was, how can `nbd_find_get_unused()` return a device with a non-zero `config_refs`? The code specifically checks `refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)` and skips it if that value is not zero. That seemed contradictory. But wait... I need to consider the locking order.
`nbd_find_get_unused()` is called under the protection of `nbd_index_mutex`. It scans for an NBD device (`nbd`) with `config_refs` equal to zero, increments `nbd->refs`, and then returns that device. Then, in `nbd_genl_connect`, the code releases `nbd_index_mutex`. After that it locks `nbd->config_lock`. The critical check happens *after* `nbd_index_mutex` is released but *before* the `config_lock` is grabbed. And here's the race: it checks `refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)` again. If it's non-zero, this *means* another thread has incremented `config_refs` in between unlocking `nbd_index_mutex` and locking `nbd->config_lock`. Aha! The `goto again;` statement handles that.
But here's the deeper implication. If another thread *is* holding `config_refs` and doing something with the device, `nbd_find_get_unused()` *should* skip that device on the next iteration because it's non-zero. The function would then return `NULL` (assuming there are no truly unused devices). And *that* is when things get interesting: `nbd_genl_connect` will subsequently call `nbd_dev_add` with an index, which is set to `-1`. That doesn't seem right. It needs to create a new device, as the existing one is unavailable. But the index seems wrong, since `-1` is definitely not a valid index. Now I need to check `nbd_dev_add` carefully and see what happens.
|
| 13/2 |
2026/07/09 11:14 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_dev_add]
Results: map[SourceCode:1944: static struct nbd_device *nbd_dev_add(int index, unsigned int refs)
1945: {
1946: struct queue_limits lim = {
1947: .max_hw_sectors = 65536,
1948: .io_opt = 256 << SECTOR_SHIFT,
1949: .max_segments = USHRT_MAX,
1950: .max_segment_size = UINT_MAX,
1951: };
1952: struct nbd_device *nbd;
1953: struct gendisk *disk;
1954: int err = -ENOMEM;
1955:
1956: nbd = kzalloc_obj(struct nbd_device);
1957: if (!nbd)
1958: goto out;
1959:
1960: nbd->tag_set.ops = &nbd_mq_ops;
1961: nbd->tag_set.nr_hw_queues = 1;
1962: nbd->tag_set.queue_depth = 128;
1963: nbd->tag_set.numa_node = NUMA_NO_NODE;
1964: nbd->tag_set.cmd_size = sizeof(struct nbd_cmd);
1965: nbd->tag_set.flags = BLK_MQ_F_BLOCKING;
1966: nbd->tag_set.driver_data = nbd;
1967: INIT_WORK(&nbd->remove_work, nbd_dev_remove_work);
1968: nbd->backend = NULL;
1969:
1970: err = blk_mq_alloc_tag_set(&nbd->tag_set);
1971: if (err)
1972: goto out_free_nbd;
1973:
1974: mutex_lock(&nbd_index_mutex);
1975: if (index >= 0) {
1976: err = idr_alloc(&nbd_index_idr, nbd, index, index + 1,
1977: GFP_KERNEL);
1978: if (err == -ENOSPC)
1979: err = -EEXIST;
1980: } else {
1981: err = idr_alloc(&nbd_index_idr, nbd, 0,
1982: (MINORMASK >> part_shift) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1983: if (err >= 0)
1984: index = err;
1985: }
1986: nbd->index = index;
1987: mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
1988: if (err < 0)
1989: goto out_free_tags;
1990:
1991: disk = blk_mq_alloc_disk(&nbd->tag_set, &lim, NULL);
1992: if (IS_ERR(disk)) {
1993: err = PTR_ERR(disk);
1994: goto out_free_idr;
1995: }
1996: nbd->disk = disk;
1997:
1998: nbd->recv_workq = alloc_workqueue("nbd%d-recv",
1999: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM | WQ_HIGHPRI |
2000: WQ_UNBOUND, 0, nbd->index);
2001: if (!nbd->recv_workq) {
2002: dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), "Could not allocate knbd recv work queue.\n");
2003: err = -ENOMEM;
2004: goto out_err_disk;
2005: }
2006:
2007: mutex_init(&nbd->config_lock);
2008: refcount_set(&nbd->config_refs, 0);
2009: /*
2010: * Start out with a zero references to keep other threads from using
2011: * this device until it is fully initialized.
2012: */
2013: refcount_set(&nbd->refs, 0);
2014: INIT_LIST_HEAD(&nbd->list);
2015: disk->major = NBD_MAJOR;
2016: disk->first_minor = index << part_shift;
2017: disk->minors = 1 << part_shift;
2018: disk->fops = &nbd_fops;
2019: disk->private_data = nbd;
2020: sprintf(disk->disk_name, "nbd%d", index);
2021: err = add_disk(disk);
2022: if (err)
2023: goto out_free_work;
2024:
2025: /*
2026: * Now publish the device.
2027: */
2028: refcount_set(&nbd->refs, refs);
2029: nbd_total_devices++;
2030: return nbd;
2031:
2032: out_free_work:
2033: destroy_workqueue(nbd->recv_workq);
2034: out_err_disk:
2035: put_disk(disk);
2036: out_free_idr:
2037: mutex_lock(&nbd_index_mutex);
2038: idr_remove(&nbd_index_idr, index);
2039: mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
2040: out_free_tags:
2041: blk_mq_free_tag_set(&nbd->tag_set);
2042: out_free_nbd:
2043: kfree(nbd);
2044: out:
2045: return ERR_PTR(err);
2046: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 14/2 |
2026/07/09 11:14 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 22729
output: 39
thoughts: 2232
Thoughts: **Deep Dive into a Network Block Device (NBD) Hang**
Okay, let's break this down. My initial thought was about the index assignment within `nbd_dev_add` and how it interacts with the `nbd_genl_connect` function. I was concerned about a potential race condition or missed assignment if a new device was added. I went back over `nbd_genl_connect`, and its logic, looking for the infinite loop potential. I realized `config_refs` on a newly added device would be 0, so that loop condition wasn't a problem, at least directly. I started to worry about races where a device could be found, but have its `config_refs` change between the `nbd_find_get_unused` call and the check, leading to a possible infinite loop through repeated calls to the `nbd_find_get_unused` and eventual allocation of the same device. However, I realized the search function skips the devices with non-zero `config_refs`, so that wasn't possible.
Then, I shifted my focus to the print statement within `nbd_genl_connect` that was at the source of the crash, the "nbd%d already in use" message. I determined this occurred when a specific index was requested (not `-1`) and was busy, returning `-EBUSY`. Given this wasn't an infinite loop, I thought, I needed to understand why the task was hung. I focused on the reproducer, and that it sent `NBD_CMD_CONNECT`, specifying `NBD_ATTR_INDEX = 0`, so the device index was 0.
The key then came to understanding the crash in `udevd`, and specifically what `udevd` was doing when it hung. This pointed to an I/O path through `bdev_open` that was trying to read from the NBD device and blocking. That's when I took another look at the reproducer, the socketpair, the connect, and the disconnect. The reproducer created a socketpair and sent a `NBD_CMD_CONNECT` command, using one end of the socketpair for data. I was then curious about the absence of `NBD_CMD_DISCONNECT`. The reproducer closed the socket after sending `NBD_CMD_CONNECT`.
I had missed something in the flags, so I checked. When the syzkaller program exits, the socketpair is closed. I had to determine if closing the socket would disconnect the device. I focused on the flags and realized `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` was NOT set. With this flag not being set, the device would remain connected, but the socket connection would be dead. So, I need to check how the NBD code handles dead sockets, and that's the current area of focus.
|
| 15/2 |
2026/07/09 11:14 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_xmit_timeout]
Results: map[SourceCode: 451: static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req)
452: {
453: struct nbd_cmd *cmd = blk_mq_rq_to_pdu(req);
454: struct nbd_device *nbd = cmd->nbd;
455: struct nbd_config *config;
456:
457: if (!mutex_trylock(&cmd->lock))
458: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
459:
460: /* partial send is handled in nbd_sock's work function */
461: if (test_bit(NBD_CMD_PARTIAL_SEND, &cmd->flags)) {
462: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
463: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
464: }
465:
466: if (!test_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags)) {
467: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
468: return BLK_EH_DONE;
469: }
470:
471: config = nbd_get_config_unlocked(nbd);
472: if (!config) {
473: cmd->status = BLK_STS_TIMEOUT;
474: __clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags);
475: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
476: goto done;
477: }
478:
479: if (config->num_connections > 1 ||
480: (config->num_connections == 1 && nbd->tag_set.timeout)) {
481: dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd),
482: "Connection timed out, retrying (%d/%d alive)\n",
483: atomic_read(&config->live_connections),
484: config->num_connections);
485: /*
486: * Hooray we have more connections, requeue this IO, the submit
487: * path will put it on a real connection. Or if only one
488: * connection is configured, the submit path will wait util
489: * a new connection is reconfigured or util dead timeout.
490: */
491: if (config->socks) {
492: if (cmd->index < config->num_connections) {
493: struct nbd_sock *nsock =
494: config->socks[cmd->index];
495: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
496: /* We can have multiple outstanding requests, so
497: * we don't want to mark the nsock dead if we've
498: * already reconnected with a new socket, so
499: * only mark it dead if its the same socket we
500: * were sent out on.
501: */
502: if (cmd->cookie == nsock->cookie)
503: nbd_mark_nsock_dead(nbd, nsock, 1);
504: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
505: }
506: nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
507: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
508: nbd_config_put(nbd);
509: return BLK_EH_DONE;
510: }
511: }
512:
513: if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
514: /*
515: * Userspace sets timeout=0 to disable socket disconnection,
516: * so just warn and reset the timer.
517: */
518: struct nbd_sock *nsock = config->socks[cmd->index];
519: cmd->retries++;
520: dev_info(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Possible stuck request %p: control (%s@%llu,%uB). Runtime %u seconds\n",
521: req, nbdcmd_to_ascii(req_to_nbd_cmd_type(req)),
522: (unsigned long long)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9,
523: blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
524:
525: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
526: if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
527: nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
528: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
529: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
530: nbd_config_put(nbd);
531: return BLK_EH_DONE;
532: }
533: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
534: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
535: nbd_config_put(nbd);
536: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
537: }
538:
539: dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Connection timed out\n");
540: set_bit(NBD_RT_TIMEDOUT, &config->runtime_flags);
541: cmd->status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
542: __clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags);
543: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
544: sock_shutdown(nbd);
545: nbd_config_put(nbd);
546: done:
547: blk_mq_complete_request(req);
548: return BLK_EH_DONE;
549: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 16/2 |
2026/07/09 11:14 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 27288
output: 39
thoughts: 1857
Thoughts: **NBD Hang and Denial of Service Vulnerability Analysis**
Okay, let's break this down. It seems the core problem revolves around NBD devices, specifically how they handle timeouts and disconnections. Initially, I was thinking about the default timeout value for the `tag_set`, but the flow is more complex than that. `nbd_dev_add` doesn't set the timeout, and while `blk_mq_alloc_tag_set` initializes it to 0, which then the block layer should treat as the default 30 seconds, the user-space interaction through `nbd_genl_connect` is key. That function *can* set a timeout via `NBD_ATTR_TIMEOUT`, but if that attribute *isn't* provided, the timeout defaults to… effectively infinite retries because `nbd_xmit_timeout` checks for a zero timeout and if it finds one, it sets `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`, leading to indefinite looping!
So, the scenario is this: a user, in this case syzkaller, can create an NBD device. If the device is created without a timeout *and* without the `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` flag set, the connection *persists* even if the underlying socket is closed. Then, the block layer will never timeout the request, it will just keep retrying, because `nbd_xmit_timeout` returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`.
Now, here's where `udevd` comes in. `udevd` picks up on an event from the NBD device (likely related to changes in the device's state) and tries to read from it. Since the socket is closed, any I/O operation from `udevd` will hang forever! The hang is because of an infinite retry loop in `nbd_xmit_timeout`. This explained why `udevd` was blocked for 143 seconds.
The "nbd%d already in use" messages are a symptom of the race created by the above scenario and syzkaller's repeated execution. The first execution creates the connection. The second execution tries to connect again using `NBD_CMD_CONNECT`, but it finds `config_refs` incremented (due to the persistent connection of the first execution). The device is never disconnected because of missing the flag `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE`. Because of this, the second invocation of `NBD_CMD_CONNECT` fails, and then syzkaller logs the error message to the console. Because syzkaller repeatedly executes the same program, it spams the console with this error message! The constant `pr_err` calls cause the console to get flooded, which then causes the NMI watchdog to be triggered (potentially due to the console flush taking too long).
The "INFO: task udevd:5877 blocked in I/O wait for more than 143 seconds" message confirms `udevd` is hung, and the backtrace points to the hung task detector. The NMI backtrace from the watchdog is also expected. The NMI is triggered because `udevd` is blocked.
The root cause is a user-configurable NBD device, the persistent connection, a lack of timeout, and the closed socket. `udevd` gets stuck indefinitely trying to access the device. The problem is exacerbated by the `udevd` read in our scenario, but the root is the infinite loop.
So, is it an NBD bug? Well, technically, this *is* intended NBD behavior. It's supposed to allow reconnecting the socket. So, the infinite retry behavior is technically not a bug. However, if unprivileged users can create NBD devices and cause system processes like `udevd` to hang, it constitutes a denial of service. The question then becomes one of privilege: can an unprivileged user do this? Ah, but `nbd_genl_connect` *does* require `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` using `netlink_capable`. Since syzkaller runs in a user namespace where it *does* have `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` it is able to trigger this. Because this is possible to trigger from userspace this could be deemed a kernel bug because of the Denial of Service.
|
| 17/2 |
2026/07/09 11:14 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:net/netlink/af_netlink.c Name:netlink_capable]
Results: map[SourceCode: 874: /**
875: * netlink_capable - Netlink global message capability test
876: * @skb: socket buffer holding a netlink command from userspace
877: * @cap: The capability to use
878: *
879: * Test to see if the opener of the socket we received the message
880: * from had when the netlink socket was created and the sender of the
881: * message has the capability @cap in all user namespaces.
882: */
883: bool netlink_capable(const struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
884: {
885: return netlink_ns_capable(skb, &init_user_ns, cap);
886: }
SourceFile:net/netlink/af_netlink.c]
|
| 18/2 |
2026/07/09 11:14 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 30345
output: 38
thoughts: 201
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Curious Syzkaller Report**
Okay, so `netlink_capable` is being checked within `init_user_ns`. That immediately tells me syzkaller must be running as root in the initial namespace, or the kernel has been configured to grant it broader privileges. This initially seems not to be a security vulnerability, as root can generally do what it likes. Why then is syzkaller reporting this as a bug? Ah, it's the `udevd` hang that's triggered a hung task panic after a whopping 143 seconds. Apparently, syzkaller flags *any* hung task as a problem.
The real question becomes: Can we prevent `udevd` from hanging, or is this expected behavior given the potential for privileged code to mess things up? Maybe it's not a bug in the code.
Actually, scratch that, let's step back and look at the control flow. The NBD device is created through `nbd_genl_connect`. When `nbd_genl_connect` is called, it triggers `nbd_start_device`. That’s where I need to focus my attention. Let's delve into that function and see what's going on.
|
| 19/2 |
2026/07/09 11:15 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_start_device]
Results: map[SourceCode:1508: static int nbd_start_device(struct nbd_device *nbd)
1509: {
1510: struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config;
1511: int num_connections = config->num_connections;
1512: int error = 0, i;
1513:
1514: if (nbd->pid)
1515: return -EBUSY;
1516: if (!config->socks)
1517: return -EINVAL;
1518: if (num_connections > 1 &&
1519: !(config->flags & NBD_FLAG_CAN_MULTI_CONN)) {
1520: dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), "server does not support multiple connections per device.\n");
1521: return -EINVAL;
1522: }
1523:
1524: retry:
1525: mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
1526: blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues(&nbd->tag_set, num_connections);
1527: mutex_lock(&nbd->config_lock);
1528:
1529: /* if another code path updated nr_hw_queues, retry until succeed */
1530: if (num_connections != config->num_connections) {
1531: num_connections = config->num_connections;
1532: goto retry;
1533: }
1534:
1535: nbd->pid = task_pid_nr(current);
1536:
1537: nbd_parse_flags(nbd);
1538:
1539: error = device_create_file(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), &pid_attr);
1540: if (error) {
1541: dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), "device_create_file failed for pid!\n");
1542: return error;
1543: }
1544: set_bit(NBD_RT_HAS_PID_FILE, &config->runtime_flags);
1545:
1546: nbd_dev_dbg_init(nbd);
1547: for (i = 0; i < num_connections; i++) {
1548: struct recv_thread_args *args;
1549:
1550: args = kzalloc_obj(*args);
1551: if (!args) {
1552: sock_shutdown(nbd);
1553: /*
1554: * If num_connections is m (2 < m),
1555: * and NO.1 ~ NO.n(1 < n < m) kzallocs are successful.
1556: * But NO.(n + 1) failed. We still have n recv threads.
1557: * So, add flush_workqueue here to prevent recv threads
1558: * dropping the last config_refs and trying to destroy
1559: * the workqueue from inside the workqueue.
1560: */
1561: if (i)
1562: flush_workqueue(nbd->recv_workq);
1563: return -ENOMEM;
1564: }
1565: sk_set_memalloc(config->socks[i]->sock->sk);
1566: if (nbd->tag_set.timeout)
1567: config->socks[i]->sock->sk->sk_sndtimeo =
1568: nbd->tag_set.timeout;
1569: atomic_inc(&config->recv_threads);
1570: refcount_inc(&nbd->config_refs);
1571: INIT_WORK(&args->work, recv_work);
1572: args->nbd = nbd;
1573: args->nsock = config->socks[i];
1574: args->index = i;
1575: queue_work(nbd->recv_workq, &args->work);
1576: }
1577: return nbd_set_size(nbd, config->bytesize, nbd_blksize(config));
1578: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 20/2 |
2026/07/09 11:15 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 32029
output: 38
thoughts: 30
Thoughts: Here's my summary, as though I'm thinking through this process:
**Diving into the Device Initialization**
Okay, so we're in `nbd_start_device`. That's where we get the ball rolling, logically. And the first thing this function does, apparently, is call `nbd_set_size`. Right, makes sense. We need to define the size of the device before we can do anything with it. So, let's drill down into `nbd_set_size`. I need to understand what parameters it's taking, what calculations it's making and what registers/memory are being affected. Let's see what that function is really doing behind the scenes.
|
| 21/2 |
2026/07/09 11:15 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_set_size]
Results: map[SourceCode: 334: static int nbd_set_size(struct nbd_device *nbd, loff_t bytesize, loff_t blksize)
335: {
336: struct queue_limits lim;
337: int error;
338:
339: if (!blksize)
340: blksize = 1u << NBD_DEF_BLKSIZE_BITS;
341:
342: if (blk_validate_block_size(blksize))
343: return -EINVAL;
344:
345: if (bytesize < 0)
346: return -EINVAL;
347:
348: nbd->config->bytesize = bytesize;
349: nbd->config->blksize_bits = __ffs(blksize);
350:
351: if (!nbd->pid)
352: return 0;
353:
354: lim = queue_limits_start_update(nbd->disk->queue);
355: if (nbd->config->flags & NBD_FLAG_SEND_TRIM)
356: lim.max_hw_discard_sectors = UINT_MAX >> SECTOR_SHIFT;
357: else
358: lim.max_hw_discard_sectors = 0;
359: if (!(nbd->config->flags & NBD_FLAG_SEND_FLUSH)) {
360: lim.features &= ~(BLK_FEAT_WRITE_CACHE | BLK_FEAT_FUA);
361: } else if (nbd->config->flags & NBD_FLAG_SEND_FUA) {
362: lim.features |= BLK_FEAT_WRITE_CACHE | BLK_FEAT_FUA;
363: } else {
364: lim.features |= BLK_FEAT_WRITE_CACHE;
365: lim.features &= ~BLK_FEAT_FUA;
366: }
367: if (nbd->config->flags & NBD_FLAG_ROTATIONAL)
368: lim.features |= BLK_FEAT_ROTATIONAL;
369: if (nbd->config->flags & NBD_FLAG_SEND_WRITE_ZEROES)
370: lim.max_write_zeroes_sectors = UINT_MAX >> SECTOR_SHIFT;
371:
372: lim.logical_block_size = blksize;
373: lim.physical_block_size = blksize;
374: error = queue_limits_commit_update_frozen(nbd->disk->queue, &lim);
375: if (error)
376: return error;
377:
378: if (max_part)
379: set_bit(GD_NEED_PART_SCAN, &nbd->disk->state);
380: if (!set_capacity_and_notify(nbd->disk, bytesize >> 9))
381: kobject_uevent(&nbd_to_dev(nbd)->kobj, KOBJ_CHANGE);
382: return 0;
383: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 22/2 |
2026/07/09 11:15 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 33153
output: 35
thoughts: 632
Thoughts: **Debugging a Hang in the NBD Driver**
Okay, so I'm tracking down this NBD issue, and it's starting to make sense. `nbd_set_size` is setting `GD_NEED_PART_SCAN`, calling `set_capacity_and_notify`, and then doing a `kobject_uevent` with `KOBJ_CHANGE`. This triggers `udevd` to go off and scan partitions, which is expected. `udevd` opens the block device, which leads to the familiar dance: `blkdev_get_whole`, `bdev_disk_changed`, and then `blk_add_partitions` where the partition table gets read.
The problem, as I see it, is that the socket is closed, and the `timeout` is set to zero. This seems to be the critical combination. The read hangs indefinitely because of the closed socket, and the timeout is zero. Then `syzkaller` repeatedly tries to connect to `nbd0` (index zero), which fails with an `-EBUSY` error and prints "nbd0 already in use". The flood of these messages on the console is causing the NMI watchdog to fire because `console_flush_all` is taking too long.
The key observation is: if a user sets the `timeout` to zero and closes the socket, then the kernel gets hung in `udevd`. Is that a bug that timeout zero causes infinite retries, even if the socket is closed?
Now, let's re-examine `nbd_xmit_timeout`. Okay, here we go:
```c
if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
/*
* Userspace sets timeout=0 to disable socket disconnection,
* so just warn and reset the timer.
*/
struct nbd_sock *nsock = config->socks[cmd->index];
cmd->retries++;
dev_info(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Possible stuck request %p: control (%s@%llu,%uB). Runtime %u seconds\n",
req, nbdcmd_to_ascii(req_to_nbd_cmd_type(req)),
(unsigned long long)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9,
blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
nbd_config_put(nbd);
return BLK_EH_DONE;
}
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
nbd_config_put(nbd);
return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
}
```
Yep, if `timeout=0`, it resets the timer and retries. This is the root cause: the code is explicitly designed to retry indefinitely when the timeout is zero. But, the crucial question remains: what if the socket is closed? That's what I need to dig into. My expectation is that when the socket is closed, `recv_work` should error out and exit. I need to confirm that that's the case by checking `recv_work`.
|
| 23/2 |
2026/07/09 11:15 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:recv_work]
Results: map[SourceCode: 970: static void recv_work(struct work_struct *work)
971: {
972: struct recv_thread_args *args = container_of(work,
973: struct recv_thread_args,
974: work);
975: struct nbd_device *nbd = args->nbd;
976: struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config;
977: struct request_queue *q = nbd->disk->queue;
978: struct nbd_sock *nsock = args->nsock;
979: struct nbd_cmd *cmd;
980: struct request *rq;
981:
982: while (1) {
983: struct nbd_reply reply;
984:
985: if (nbd_read_reply(nbd, nsock->sock, &reply))
986: break;
987:
988: /*
989: * Grab .q_usage_counter so request pool won't go away, then no
990: * request use-after-free is possible during nbd_handle_reply().
991: * If queue is frozen, there won't be any inflight requests, we
992: * needn't to handle the incoming garbage message.
993: */
994: if (!percpu_ref_tryget(&q->q_usage_counter)) {
995: dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), "%s: no io inflight\n",
996: __func__);
997: break;
998: }
999:
1000: cmd = nbd_handle_reply(nbd, args->index, &reply);
1001: if (IS_ERR(cmd)) {
1002: percpu_ref_put(&q->q_usage_counter);
1003: break;
1004: }
1005:
1006: rq = blk_mq_rq_from_pdu(cmd);
1007: if (likely(!blk_should_fake_timeout(rq->q))) {
1008: bool complete;
1009:
1010: mutex_lock(&cmd->lock);
1011: complete = __test_and_clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT,
1012: &cmd->flags);
1013: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
1014: if (complete)
1015: blk_mq_complete_request(rq);
1016: }
1017: percpu_ref_put(&q->q_usage_counter);
1018: }
1019:
1020: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
1021: nbd_mark_nsock_dead(nbd, nsock, 1);
1022: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
1023:
1024: atomic_dec(&config->recv_threads);
1025: wake_up(&config->recv_wq);
1026: nbd_config_put(nbd);
1027: kfree(args);
1028: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 24/2 |
2026/07/09 11:15 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 35513
output: 41
thoughts: 56
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of this logic, phrased as if it were my own thought process, assuming I'm an expert in this networking and storage protocol.
**Handling a Disconnected Socket in nbd**
Right, so `nbd_read_reply` fails, probably due to a socket closure. That's expected, but it needs to be handled cleanly. When the read fails, the code immediately breaks out of the main loop. Good – we don't want to keep trying a dead connection. The crucial part now is the call to `nbd_mark_nsock_dead`. This function *must* be doing the cleanup. Let me just quickly refresh my memory on the exact functionality of `nbd_mark_nsock_dead`. I need to ensure it's doing the right things: de-registering the socket from the poll set, cleaning up any associated resources, potentially notifying the upper layers of the disconnection – maybe setting an error flag. I need to know precisely what's involved in that function to ensure the entire network connection handling is robust and that we're not leaking any file descriptors or memory. I want to make sure the program behaves appropriately when the socket closes.
|
| 25/2 |
2026/07/09 11:15 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_mark_nsock_dead]
Results: map[SourceCode: 305: static void nbd_mark_nsock_dead(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct nbd_sock *nsock,
306: int notify)
307: {
308: if (!nsock->dead && notify && !nbd_disconnected(nbd->config)) {
309: struct link_dead_args *args;
310: args = kmalloc_obj(struct link_dead_args, GFP_NOIO);
311: if (args) {
312: INIT_WORK(&args->work, nbd_dead_link_work);
313: args->index = nbd->index;
314: queue_work(system_percpu_wq, &args->work);
315: }
316: }
317: if (!nsock->dead) {
318: kernel_sock_shutdown(nsock->sock, SHUT_RDWR);
319: if (atomic_dec_return(&nbd->config->live_connections) == 0) {
320: if (test_and_clear_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_REQUESTED,
321: &nbd->config->runtime_flags)) {
322: set_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECTED,
323: &nbd->config->runtime_flags);
324: dev_info(nbd_to_dev(nbd),
325: "Disconnected due to user request.\n");
326: }
327: }
328: }
329: nsock->dead = true;
330: nsock->pending = NULL;
331: nsock->sent = 0;
332: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 26/2 |
2026/07/09 11:15 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 36374
output: 40
thoughts: 47
Thoughts: Here's my analysis of the provided code snippet:
**Analyzing the Network Socket Death Handling**
Okay, so `nbd_mark_nsock_dead` is setting the `nsock->dead` flag to `true`. This immediately tells me we're marking a network socket as dead, which is the starting point for a graceful shutdown or cleanup procedure. The fact that it's also queuing `nbd_dead_link_work` is key. My initial thought is this must be the asynchronous work item responsible for handling the implications of this socket going down.
I need to understand what exactly happens when `nbd_dead_link_work` executes. Is it closing connections, freeing resources, notifying other components, or perhaps trying to reconnect? The design implies that marking the socket dead is a trigger, and the work item is the subsequent action. I want to dive into `nbd_dead_link_work` to confirm exactly what operations are taking place and ensure this logic handles all possible failure scenarios and prevent resource leaks. This is especially important for NBD, given the potential for long-running connections. The `dead` flag alone doesn't tell the whole story; the follow-up work is the heart of the reliability.
|
| 27/2 |
2026/07/09 11:15 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_dead_link_work]
Results: map[SourceCode:2672: static void nbd_dead_link_work(struct work_struct *work)
2673: {
2674: struct link_dead_args *args = container_of(work, struct link_dead_args,
2675: work);
2676: nbd_mcast_index(args->index);
2677: kfree(args);
2678: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 28/2 |
2026/07/09 11:15 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 36863
output: 56
thoughts: 546
Thoughts: **My Analysis of the NBD Dead Link Handling**
Okay, so `nbd_dead_link_work` essentially just throws a netlink multicast message out there. The real question is, what happens to those inflight requests when the socket bites the dust? My initial thought is that `recv_work` just bails, but what about the commands currently in flight?
It seems they're left to the mercy of the block layer timeout handler, `nbd_xmit_timeout`. Now, if the timeout is set to zero – as it sometimes is – `nbd_xmit_timeout` will just reset the timer and keep retrying indefinitely! That's a huge problem.
Digging deeper, if the timeout is zero and the socket is dead, `nbd_xmit_timeout` executes a specific block of code:
```c
if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
/*
* Userspace sets timeout=0 to disable socket disconnection,
* so just warn and reset the timer.
*/
struct nbd_sock *nsock = config->socks[cmd->index];
cmd->retries++;
dev_info(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Possible stuck request %p: control (%s@%llu,%uB). Runtime %u seconds\n",
req, nbdcmd_to_ascii(req_to_nbd_cmd_type(req)),
(unsigned long long)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9,
blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
nbd_config_put(nbd);
return BLK_EH_DONE;
}
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
nbd_config_put(nbd);
return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
}
```
Does `nsock->dead` make any difference? No, it just returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`! Essentially, this is a recipe for a request that's going to hang forever. This means potentially that `udevd` will get blocked indefinitely, which is a major issue!
But wait, there's another point. If `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` is set, what does that do? I should check where `NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` is actually used and how that changes things! This seems to be a significant vulnerability.
|
| 29/2 |
2026/07/09 11:16 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Error:
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c IncludeSnippetLines:2 Name:NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE SourceTreePrefix:]
Results: map[References:<nil> TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 30/2 |
2026/07/09 11:16 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 38117
output: 39
thoughts: 27
Thoughts: Here's my thought process, summarized as if I were considering this myself:
**Analyzing the Bit Flag**
Okay, hold on a second. This feels like it's pointing towards a bit flag. My initial instinct is to go digging through the code. I need to figure out what this specific bit flag relates to, particularly in this networking context. Let me try `grep`ing for something that looks relevant, like `NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE`. That seems like a reasonable starting point, given the context. I'm hoping that reveals a specific definition or usage within the NBD (Network Block Device) implementation. This will help me understand the implications of this flag and what conditions trigger it.
|
| 31/2 |
2026/07/09 11:16 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:drivers/block/nbd.c=75=struct link_dead_args {
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-85-#define NBD_RT_BOUND 5
drivers/block/nbd.c:86:#define NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE 6
drivers/block/nbd.c-87-#define NBD_RT_HAS_BACKEND_FILE 7
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=1785=static void nbd_release(struct gendisk *disk)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-1788-
drivers/block/nbd.c:1789: if (test_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE, &nbd->config->runtime_flags) &&
drivers/block/nbd.c-1790- disk_openers(disk) == 0)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=2110=static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-2223- if (flags & NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE) {
drivers/block/nbd.c:2224: set_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE,
drivers/block/nbd.c-2225- &config->runtime_flags);
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=2347=static int nbd_genl_reconfigure(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-2434- if (flags & NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE) {
drivers/block/nbd.c:2435: set_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE,
drivers/block/nbd.c-2436- &config->runtime_flags);
drivers/block/nbd.c-2437- } else {
drivers/block/nbd.c:2438: clear_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE,
drivers/block/nbd.c-2439- &config->runtime_flags);
]
|
| 32/2 |
2026/07/09 11:16 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 38906
output: 23
thoughts: 2044
Thoughts: **Analyzing the NBD Device Bug: A Deep Dive**
Okay, here's what I've got. I started by looking at `NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` and how `nbd_release` functions, but that didn't pan out. It became clear that the NBD device wasn't actually *closed* by syzkaller; it was configured via netlink. The focus shifted to why `nbd_genl_connect` might be printing "nbd%d already in use" repeatedly. I dug into the crash report and found the NMI backtrace pointing to `nbd_genl_connect` printing via the console.
Line 2175 in `nbd_genl_connect` is the culprit. It was printing an error if a device was already in use. I realized that if syzkaller repeatedly calls `nbd_genl_connect` with the same index, it would spam this error. The lack of rate-limiting on `pr_err` functions became a key observation. Any user with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` can trigger a denial-of-service (DoS) by flooding the kernel log and causing an NMI watchdog timeout. I also checked all the other `pr_err` calls in `nbd_genl_connect` to verify if they also lacked rate-limiting. All of them did.
However, the crash report's primary symptom was a hung `udevd` task, blocked in an I/O wait for over 143 seconds. The NMI backtrace was a side effect, triggered by the hung task detector. It pointed to where the CPU was when the hung task detector fired, which happened to be in `nbd_genl_connect`. So, the hung `udevd` is actually the core problem.
Now, why is `udevd` hanging? It's trying to read from `nbd0`, and the read is hanging because the socket is dead, the syzkaller program exited, the socket was closed, but the NBD device is still connected with an infinite timeout. Because the timeout is zero, the read is attempted again and again, leading to the indefinite block.
The infinite retry with timeout=0 is an expected feature that lets userspace reconnect, but it causes `udevd` to hang if the server dies. If a root user configures a broken NBD device, it's an expected consequence! So, could we prevent this? Maybe `nbd_genl_connect` shouldn't allow infinite timeouts? However, it does and is the default. This means that any NBD device created *without* a specific timeout value will cause `udevd` to hang if the server closes the connection. This is a known issue. I'll search the git logs to see if this is addressed.
|
| 33/2 |
2026/07/09 11:17 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[MessageRegexps:[nbd timeout]]
Results: map[Output:9eeea2984c30 wifi: mt76: mt7996: adjust timeout value for boot-up calibration commands
d2b860454ea2 wifi: mt76: mt7996: reset device after MCU message timeout
8c7e19612b01 wifi: mt76: mt7925: Skip scan process during suspend.
12985e5915a0 RDMA/rxe: Fix iova-to-va conversion for MR page sizes != PAGE_SIZE
a4031fec9d0d wifi: mt76: mt7996: fix EMI rings for RRO
5d86765828b4 wifi: mt76: mt7996: fix implicit beamforming support for mt7992
beb01caa570c wifi: mt76: mt7996: decrease timeout for commonly issued MCU commands
b018d52ede75 wifi: mt76: mt7915: mcu: lower default timeout
efd31873cdb3 wifi: mt76: mt7915: mcu: increase eeprom command timeout
0c5a89ceddc1 wifi: mt76: only mark tx-status-failed frames as ACKed on mt76x0/2
]
|
| 34/2 |
2026/07/09 11:17 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 41911
output: 32
thoughts: 73
Thoughts: Okay, let me think this through.
**Regex Pondering**
Hmm, I thought my regular expressions were matching "mt76" because of a false positive, something like "nbd" being present in a string containing "mt7996" or similar. But hang on, "nbd" isn't *actually* in "mt7996," or any of the other potentially problematic matches. Ah, wait, I'm getting ahead of myself, "nbd" isn't even showing up in the current output! Okay, that's not it. Right, I need to be more precise in my targeting. I'll specify a `PathPrefix` to restrict my search, something very specific like "drivers/block/nbd.c" – that should narrow things down considerably. That'll get me what I need.
|
| 35/2 |
2026/07/09 11:17 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[MessageRegexps:[timeout] PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:c9ea57c91f03 nbd: fix race between timeout and normal completion
9bdb4833dd39 blk-mq: Drop blk_mq_ops.timeout 'reserved' arg
09dadb598502 nbd: fix io hung while disconnecting device
491bf8f236fd nbd: Fix hung on disconnect request if socket is closed before
e2daec488c57 nbd: Fix hungtask when nbd_config_put
07175cb1baf4 nbd: make sure request completion won't concurrent
6497ef8df568 nbd: provide a way for userspace processes to identify device backends
acb19e17c513 nbd: restore default timeout when setting it to zero
15f73f5b3e59 blk-mq: move failure injection out of blk_mq_complete_request
2c272542baee nbd: requeue command if the soecket is changed
]
|
| 36/2 |
2026/07/09 11:17 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 42456
output: 26
thoughts: 29
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, tailored for an expert audience, and written in the first person:
**Analyzing the NBD Timeout Restoration**
Alright, let's dive into this commit, `acb19e17c513 nbd: restore default timeout when setting it to zero`. My initial thought is: why are we explicitly setting a timeout to zero in the first place? That often signals a potential bug or a misunderstanding of how the system expects timeouts to function. Setting a timeout to zero usually means "no timeout," which is rarely what's actually intended in a network context, especially with NBD. The likely root of the issue is that whoever wrote the code either made a logic error, didn't fully grasp the implications of a zero timeout, or was trying to use it for an atypical, and potentially problematic, purpose.
So, the next step is determining what "restore default timeout" means in this context. Is it going back to a hardcoded value, pulling from a configuration file, or using some kernel-defined constant? The choice will influence the severity of the original issue. My guess is it's a hardcoded value, or config variable, which hints at a more complex, but less severe, issue.
Why is the timeout being restored? This suggests there was a design flaw that was circumvented, in order to set a default value. It hints at a fix or work-around, which is why there's a need to default. If this commit is undoing a change, the real question is, what was the intent of setting the timeout to zero, and what unforeseen consequences did that have? And, more importantly, what's the logic behind the "default" they're restoring to? Is it sensible given the typical use cases of NBD?
The implications are that there may be a performance penalty with the restored default, or maybe the zero timeout created instability or potential denial-of-service vulnerabilities. I need to understand the impact of the zero timeout on the NBD client and server, particularly under various network conditions, and with different underlying storage backends.
My next step is to examine the surrounding code context: the commit message, the changed files, any related bug reports or discussions. I'm looking for a clear explanation of *why* this change was necessary and what problem it addresses. Then I need to see if the restoration to default actually fixes that problem. Finally, I'll need to think about how this affects other timeouts in the NBD stack and whether this creates any new potential issues. Good starting point!
|
| 37/2 |
2026/07/09 11:17 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit acb19e17c5134dd78668c429ecba5b481f038e6a
Author: Hou Pu <houpu@bytedance.com>
Date: Mon Aug 10 08:00:44 2020 -0400
nbd: restore default timeout when setting it to zero
If we configured io timeout of nbd0 to 100s. Later after we
finished using it, we configured nbd0 again and set the io
timeout to 0. We expect it would timeout after 30 seconds
and keep retry. But in fact we could not change the timeout
when we set it to 0. the timeout is still the original 100s.
So change the timeout to default 30s when we set it to zero.
It also behaves same as commit 2da22da57348 ("nbd: fix zero
cmd timeout handling v2").
It becomes more important if we were reconfigure a nbd device
and the io timeout it set to zero. Because it could take 30s
to detect the new socket and thus io could be completed more
quickly compared to 100s.
Signed-off-by: Hou Pu <houpu@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index 3ff4054d6834..edf8b632e3d2 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -1363,6 +1363,8 @@ static void nbd_set_cmd_timeout(struct nbd_device *nbd, u64 timeout)
nbd->tag_set.timeout = timeout * HZ;
if (timeout)
blk_queue_rq_timeout(nbd->disk->queue, timeout * HZ);
+ else
+ blk_queue_rq_timeout(nbd->disk->queue, 30 * HZ);
}
/* Must be called with config_lock held */
]
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llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 43638
output: 25
thoughts: 152
Thoughts: **My Line of Reasoning**
Okay, hold on a second. I'm seeing a potential issue here with the Network Block Device driver. It's bothering me that `nbd->tag_set.timeout` remains zero, even when the specified timeout is also zero, indicating potentially infinite retries. Now, even though the timeout within the block layer (`blk_queue_rq_timeout`) is explicitly set to 30 seconds, leading to a timeout and a call to `nbd_xmit_timeout`, the fact that `nbd->tag_set.timeout` is zero within that function is throwing a wrench in the works. This ultimately causes `nbd_xmit_timeout` to return `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`, right?
If that's the case, it suggests an infinite retry loop, a situation that could, and very likely would, cause problems, particularly a hang up situation within `udevd`. I need to confirm if this infinite retry behavior represents a bug. To get a better understanding of similar issues, I'll review commit `09dadb598502 nbd: fix io hung while disconnecting device`. Hopefully, this will shed some light on the potential issue and provide a solution or at least confirmation that this is a recognized bug.
|
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tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit 09dadb5985023e27d4740ebd17e6fea4640110e5
Author: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Date: Sat May 21 15:37:47 2022 +0800
nbd: fix io hung while disconnecting device
In our tests, "qemu-nbd" triggers a io hung:
INFO: task qemu-nbd:11445 blocked for more than 368 seconds.
Not tainted 5.18.0-rc3-next-20220422-00003-g2176915513ca #884
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:qemu-nbd state:D stack: 0 pid:11445 ppid: 1 flags:0x00000000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x480/0x1050
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3e/0xb0
schedule+0x9c/0x1b0
blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0x9d/0xf0
? ipi_rseq+0x70/0x70
blk_mq_freeze_queue+0x2b/0x40
nbd_add_socket+0x6b/0x270 [nbd]
nbd_ioctl+0x383/0x510 [nbd]
blkdev_ioctl+0x18e/0x3e0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x120
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fd8ff706577
RSP: 002b:00007fd8fcdfebf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000040000000 RCX: 00007fd8ff706577
RDX: 000000000000000d RSI: 000000000000ab00 RDI: 000000000000000f
RBP: 000000000000000f R08: 000000000000fbe8 R09: 000055fe497c62b0
R10: 00000002aff20000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000006d
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffe82dc5e70 R15: 00007fd8fcdff9c0
"qemu-ndb -d" will call ioctl 'NBD_DISCONNECT' first, however, following
message was found:
block nbd0: Send disconnect failed -32
Which indicate that something is wrong with the server. Then,
"qemu-nbd -d" will call ioctl 'NBD_CLEAR_SOCK', however ioctl can't clear
requests after commit 2516ab1543fd("nbd: only clear the queue on device
teardown"). And in the meantime, request can't complete through timeout
because nbd_xmit_timeout() will always return 'BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER', which
means such request will never be completed in this situation.
Now that the flag 'NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT' can make sure requests won't
complete multiple times, switch back to call nbd_clear_sock() in
nbd_clear_sock_ioctl(), so that inflight requests can be cleared.
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220521073749.3146892-5-yukuai3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index a0d0910dae2a..ec736cc52134 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -1429,7 +1429,7 @@ static int nbd_start_device_ioctl(struct nbd_device *nbd)
static void nbd_clear_sock_ioctl(struct nbd_device *nbd,
struct block_device *bdev)
{
- sock_shutdown(nbd);
+ nbd_clear_sock(nbd);
__invalidate_device(bdev, true);
nbd_bdev_reset(nbd);
if (test_and_clear_bit(NBD_RT_HAS_CONFIG_REF,
]
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2026/07/09 11:17 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 45545
output: 23
thoughts: 931
Thoughts: **Analyzing an NBD Hang and the Role of `udevd`**
Okay, so I'm diving into this NBD issue. It looks like `nbd_clear_sock` is supposed to clear requests, but syzkaller isn't using it or `NBD_DISCONNECT`. Instead, it's just closing the netlink socket. Hmm, even though the netlink socket is closed, the NBD device is still connected. And that's where `udevd` hangs. The question is, how do we stop `udevd` from hanging?
Initially, I thought that was the problem, but it's more complex. It's not *just* `udevd` hanging. It's `udevd` hanging *and* `syz.0.9929` flooding the console with "nbd%d already in use" errors. If the console wasn't spammed, would the hung task detector still fire? Yes, absolutely! `udevd` is blocked for 143 seconds. That triggers it.
So, syzkaller considers *any* hung task a bug. I get it; the hung task *is* the bug from syzkaller's perspective. How do we fix this hung task? I'm thinking, if `timeout=0` means infinite retries and the socket is dead, should it retry indefinitely? Well, if the socket is dead, `nbd_xmit_timeout` returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. But can userspace re-establish a connection? Yes, with `NBD_RECONFIGURE` or `NBD_CMD_RECONFIGURE` via netlink. If userspace *intends* to reconnect, infinite waiting makes sense.
But what if userspace *doesn't* intend to reconnect? If `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` isn't set, the kernel assumes a reconnection might occur, and it waits infinitely. So, this infinite wait *is* a feature, not a bug. However, `udevd` is the victim here.
Let's dig deeper: how is `udevd` opening the block device? It's using `O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK`. Wait, `bdev_open` doesn't block on I/O. However, `blk_add_partitions` is reading the partition table synchronously! So, `udevd` is hanging in `read_part_sector`. The question now is: can we abort the partition scan if the device is essentially dead? No, because it's not dead. It's just waiting for a new socket connection.
Okay, so if this is a feature, why is syzkaller reporting it? Simple. syzkaller doesn't understand the nuance of the NBD protocol; it just sees a hung task. But wait! The NMI backtrace shows `syz.0.9929` in `console_flush_all`. Is it possible the console spam *is* the actual cause of the NMI watchdog timeout?
No, the crash report tells the tale:
```
INFO: task udevd:5877 blocked in I/O wait for more than 143 seconds.
```
This is the hung task detector. Then:
```
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
...
check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:353 [inline]
watchdog+0xfd7/0x1030 kernel/hung_task.c:561
```
The NMI backtrace was triggered BY the hung task detector. The hung task detector *explicitly* calls `trigger_all_cpu_backtrace`!
```c
if (sysctl_hung_task_all_cpu_backtrace)
trigger_all_cpu_backtrace();
```
So, the NMI backtrace is a side effect of the hung task detector firing. The root cause is the hung task in `udevd`.
So, the next question is: How do we fix this hung task in `udevd`? If `timeout=0` means infinite retries, and `udevd` hangs, this is a known NBD problem. I need to check if there are any recent patches addressing this.
|
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tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[MessageRegexps:[nbd udev]]
Results: map[Output:267ec4d7223a loop: fix partition scan race between udev and loop_reread_partitions()
2de49fb1c9bb RDMA/rtrs: Don't call kobject_del for srv_path->kobj
577298ec55df mt76: dma: initialize skip_unmap in mt76_dma_rx_fill
3ba1c6935c6f block/rnbd-clt: Generate kobject_uevent when the rnbd device state changes
c9a2f90f4d6b nbd: handle device refs for DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT properly
481bb0432414 mt76: usb: make rx page_frag_cache access atomic
]
|
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2026/07/09 11:18 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 47631
output: 27
thoughts: 33
Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this commit and figure out what's happening.
**Analyzing Commit c9a2f90f4d6b: Device Reference Handling in NBD for DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT**
Alright, I need to get a handle on what this commit, `c9a2f90f4d6b`, is all about. The title gives me a pretty good starting point: it's focusing on how the Network Block Device (NBD) is managing device references, specifically related to the `DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT` flag. This is crucial for ensuring proper resource cleanup and preventing potential leaks or dangling pointers when an NBD client disconnects. I'm assuming there's an issue being addressed here, likely a race condition or a missed case where a device wasn't being de-referenced correctly when a connection terminated abruptly. My initial thoughts are:
* **Potential Problem:** We likely had scenarios where a disconnect, especially an unclean one, might leave device references hanging around, which could lead to memory corruption, use-after-free errors, or even data corruption later on. I'll need to look at how these references are managed in NBD and how they're intended to be cleaned up during a disconnect.
* **Key Consideration:** The `DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT` flag is the critical piece here. This indicates that the client wants the device itself to be destroyed when the connection closes. This is a common and important mechanism to use, and I should expect some new code to check for this flag.
* **Likely Approach:** The commit probably modifies the NBD device shutdown logic, potentially within the function that handles the disconnect event. It might involve decrementing reference counts, releasing resources, or ensuring that all necessary cleanup steps are taken in the proper order. It should also be checking the state of the device against the `DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT` flag.
* **Testing and Validation:** I'll also want to look for the testing or verification strategies implemented to confirm the fix is effective, and that it doesn't introduce any new regressions.
I need to dig into the diff to see the actual code changes, and I'll pay close attention to any locking mechanisms that might be involved to prevent concurrency issues. Let's see what they actually did...
|
| 43/2 |
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tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit c9a2f90f4d6b9d42b9912f7aaf68e8d748acfffd
Author: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Date: Mon Feb 22 15:09:53 2021 -0500
nbd: handle device refs for DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT properly
There exists a race where we can be attempting to create a new nbd
configuration while a previous configuration is going down, both
configured with DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT. Normally devices all have a
reference of 1, as they won't be cleaned up until the module is torn
down. However with DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT we'll make sure that there is
only 1 reference (generally) on the device for the config itself, and
then once the config is dropped, the device is torn down.
The race that exists looks like this
TASK1 TASK2
nbd_genl_connect()
idr_find()
refcount_inc_not_zero(nbd)
* count is 2 here ^^
nbd_config_put()
nbd_put(nbd) (count is 1)
setup new config
check DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT
put_dev = true
if (put_dev) nbd_put(nbd)
* free'd here ^^
In nbd_genl_connect() we assume that the nbd ref count will be 2,
however clearly that won't be true if the nbd device had been setup as
DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT with its prior configuration. Fix this by getting
rid of the runtime flag to check if we need to mess with the nbd device
refcount, and use the device NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT flag to check if
we need to adjust the ref counts. This was reported by syzkaller with
the following kasan dump
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:71 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:27 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in refcount_dec_not_one+0x71/0x1e0 lib/refcount.c:76
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888143bf71a0 by task systemd-udevd/8451
CPU: 0 PID: 8451 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
dump_stack+0x107/0x163 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x5b/0x2f8 mm/kasan/report.c:230
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:396 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0x79/0xd5 mm/kasan/report.c:413
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:179 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:185
instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:71 [inline]
atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:27 [inline]
refcount_dec_not_one+0x71/0x1e0 lib/refcount.c:76
refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock+0x19/0x140 lib/refcount.c:115
nbd_put drivers/block/nbd.c:248 [inline]
nbd_release+0x116/0x190 drivers/block/nbd.c:1508
__blkdev_put+0x548/0x800 fs/block_dev.c:1579
blkdev_put+0x92/0x570 fs/block_dev.c:1632
blkdev_close+0x8c/0xb0 fs/block_dev.c:1640
__fput+0x283/0x920 fs/file_table.c:280
task_work_run+0xdd/0x190 kernel/task_work.c:140
tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:174 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x249/0x250 kernel/entry/common.c:201
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:283 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:294
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7fc1e92b5270
Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 38 7d 20 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 59 c1 20 00 00 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ee fb ff ff 48 89 04 24
RSP: 002b:00007ffe8beb2d18 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000007 RCX: 00007fc1e92b5270
RDX: 000000000aba9500 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007fc1ea16f710 R08: 000000000000004a R09: 0000000000000008
R10: 0000562f8cb0b2a8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000562f8cb0afd0 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 000000000000000e
Allocated by task 1:
kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:46 [inline]
set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:401 [inline]
____kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0x82/0xa0 mm/kasan/common.c:429
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:552 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:682 [inline]
nbd_dev_add+0x44/0x8e0 drivers/block/nbd.c:1673
nbd_init+0x250/0x271 drivers/block/nbd.c:2394
do_one_initcall+0x103/0x650 init/main.c:1223
do_initcall_level init/main.c:1296 [inline]
do_initcalls init/main.c:1312 [inline]
do_basic_setup init/main.c:1332 [inline]
kernel_init_freeable+0x605/0x689 init/main.c:1533
kernel_init+0xd/0x1b8 init/main.c:1421
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:296
Freed by task 8451:
kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:46
kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:356
____kasan_slab_free+0xe1/0x110 mm/kasan/common.c:362
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:192 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1547 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x5d/0x150 mm/slub.c:1580
slab_free mm/slub.c:3143 [inline]
kfree+0xdb/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:4139
nbd_dev_remove drivers/block/nbd.c:243 [inline]
nbd_put.part.0+0x180/0x1d0 drivers/block/nbd.c:251
nbd_put drivers/block/nbd.c:295 [inline]
nbd_config_put+0x6dd/0x8c0 drivers/block/nbd.c:1242
nbd_release+0x103/0x190 drivers/block/nbd.c:1507
__blkdev_put+0x548/0x800 fs/block_dev.c:1579
blkdev_put+0x92/0x570 fs/block_dev.c:1632
blkdev_close+0x8c/0xb0 fs/block_dev.c:1640
__fput+0x283/0x920 fs/file_table.c:280
task_work_run+0xdd/0x190 kernel/task_work.c:140
tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:174 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x249/0x250 kernel/entry/common.c:201
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:283 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:294
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888143bf7000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 416 bytes inside of
1024-byte region [ffff888143bf7000, ffff888143bf7400)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:000000005238f4ce refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x143bf0
head:000000005238f4ce order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0x57ff00000010200(slab|head)
raw: 057ff00000010200 ffffea00004b1400 0000000300000003 ffff888010c41140
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888143bf7080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888143bf7100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff888143bf7180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff888143bf7200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+429d3f82d757c211bff3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index 8b9622eb0a21..4ff71b579cfc 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -78,8 +78,7 @@ struct link_dead_args {
#define NBD_RT_HAS_PID_FILE 3
#define NBD_RT_HAS_CONFIG_REF 4
#define NBD_RT_BOUND 5
-#define NBD_RT_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT 6
-#define NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE 7
+#define NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE 6
#define NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT 0
#define NBD_DISCONNECT_REQUESTED 1
@@ -1904,12 +1903,21 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_CLIENT_FLAGS]) {
u64 flags = nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_CLIENT_FLAGS]);
if (flags & NBD_CFLAG_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT) {
- set_bit(NBD_RT_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT,
- &config->runtime_flags);
- set_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT, &nbd->flags);
- put_dev = true;
+ /*
+ * We have 1 ref to keep the device around, and then 1
+ * ref for our current operation here, which will be
+ * inherited by the config. If we already have
+ * DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT set then we know we don't have
+ * that extra ref already held so we don't need the
+ * put_dev.
+ */
+ if (!test_and_set_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT,
+ &nbd->flags))
+ put_dev = true;
} else {
- clear_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT, &nbd->flags);
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT,
+ &nbd->flags))
+ refcount_inc(&nbd->refs);
}
if (flags & NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE) {
set_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE,
@@ -2080,15 +2088,13 @@ static int nbd_genl_reconfigure(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_CLIENT_FLAGS]) {
u64 flags = nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_CLIENT_FLAGS]);
if (flags & NBD_CFLAG_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT) {
- if (!test_and_set_bit(NBD_RT_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT,
- &config->runtime_flags))
+ if (!test_and_set_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT,
+ &nbd->flags))
put_dev = true;
- set_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT, &nbd->flags);
} else {
- if (test_and_clear_bit(NBD_RT_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT,
- &config->runtime_flags))
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT,
+ &nbd->flags))
refcount_inc(&nbd->refs);
- clear_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT, &nbd->flags);
}
if (flags & NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE) {
]
|
| 44/2 |
2026/07/09 11:18 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 52817
output: 37
thoughts: 1671
Thoughts: **Analyzing the NMI Watchdog Timeout and Hung Task in NBD Interactions**
Okay, let me break this down. It looks like `nbd_genl_connect` has this looping behavior which leads to spam in the console. If syzkaller hits this with a specific index, it's going to flood the console with error messages. That console spam seems to trigger the NMI watchdog timeout. But, wait... is the spam *the* root cause, or just a symptom?
The crash report includes `udevd` being blocked for a long period, which then activates the hung task detector. Syzkaller's typical configuration includes `kernel.hung_task_panic = 1`. If the hung task detector fires when `udevd` gets hung for 143 seconds, then the system panics, right? But the crash report shows an NMI backtrace, not a panic message. If `sysctl_hung_task_all_cpu_backtrace` is set, it'll print the NMI backtrace instead. However, syzkaller parses the "INFO: task ... blocked for more than ..." messages as a crash, and therefore, reports a bug in the code. So, the core of the issue is the hung task itself.
The console spam is just the unfortunate consequence of what CPU 0 happened to be doing when the NMI backtrace gets triggered. It was running that syzkaller test case, repeatedly calling `nbd_genl_connect` with index 0. Because that initial connection worked and didn't disconnect (because `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` was not set), `config_refs` stays at 1, so subsequent calls always hit the `refcount_read` and print the error.
So, the real issue is that `udevd` is hung indefinitely. Why? `udevd` is trying to read from `nbd0` and the connected socket is dead, and the `timeout` is set to 0 (infinite retries). Is this a kernel bug? Well, if a user with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` configures NBD with `timeout=0` and a dead socket, any process that tries to read will hang, and since `udevd` is triggered to read from new block devices, it's going to hang as well. This feels like a known interaction between NBD and `udevd`.
The interesting part is that `nbd_set_size` triggers the uevent by calling `set_capacity_and_notify`, but should it trigger the uevent if the socket is already dead? When `nbd_genl_connect` calls `nbd_start_device`, the socket isn't dead yet! The socket only closes AFTER `nbd_genl_connect` returns, when the syzkaller program exits. So, the uevent gets sent to `udevd`, it opens the device, and starts to read. But the socket is already dead when the read request comes from `udevd`. Since timeout is 0, the read request hangs forever.
How do we fix it? Rate limiting that error message from `nbd_genl_connect` might solve the console spam and, thus, the NMI watchdog timeout. But syzkaller will still flag the hung task. To resolve the hung task, perhaps we could have a way for the kernel to make `timeout=0` not hang forever if the socket is dead, right? But what if the user expects it to reconnect? If there's an existing NBD device and a user wants to reconnect it (using `NBD_RECONFIGURE`), they'll want infinite retries.
What about destroying the device when the last socket is closed? That's what `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` is for. But syzkaller didn't set that. So, the kernel *must* keep the device alive to wait for a new socket. So, the hung task is *expected* behavior in this configuration! And this becomes the main problem: the hung task is expected. How do we prevent syzkaller from reporting this? There is no good answer.
|
| 45/2 |
2026/07/09 11:19 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:mm/filemap.c Name:folio_wait_bit_common]
Results: map[SourceCode:1244: static inline int folio_wait_bit_common(struct folio *folio, int bit_nr,
1245: int state, enum behavior behavior)
1246: {
1247: wait_queue_head_t *q = folio_waitqueue(folio);
1248: int unfairness = sysctl_page_lock_unfairness;
1249: struct wait_page_queue wait_page;
1250: wait_queue_entry_t *wait = &wait_page.wait;
1251: bool thrashing = false;
1252: unsigned long pflags;
1253: bool in_thrashing;
1254:
1255: if (bit_nr == PG_locked &&
1256: !folio_test_uptodate(folio) && folio_test_workingset(folio)) {
1257: delayacct_thrashing_start(&in_thrashing);
1258: psi_memstall_enter(&pflags);
1259: thrashing = true;
1260: }
1261:
1262: init_wait(wait);
1263: wait->func = wake_page_function;
1264: wait_page.folio = folio;
1265: wait_page.bit_nr = bit_nr;
1266:
1267: repeat:
1268: wait->flags = 0;
1269: if (behavior == EXCLUSIVE) {
1270: wait->flags = WQ_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE;
1271: if (--unfairness < 0)
1272: wait->flags |= WQ_FLAG_CUSTOM;
1273: }
1274:
1275: /*
1276: * Do one last check whether we can get the
1277: * page bit synchronously.
1278: *
1279: * Do the folio_set_waiters() marking before that
1280: * to let any waker we _just_ missed know they
1281: * need to wake us up (otherwise they'll never
1282: * even go to the slow case that looks at the
1283: * page queue), and add ourselves to the wait
1284: * queue if we need to sleep.
1285: *
1286: * This part needs to be done under the queue
1287: * lock to avoid races.
1288: */
1289: spin_lock_irq(&q->lock);
1290: folio_set_waiters(folio);
1291: if (!folio_trylock_flag(folio, bit_nr, wait))
1292: __add_wait_queue_entry_tail(q, wait);
1293: spin_unlock_irq(&q->lock);
1294:
1295: /*
1296: * From now on, all the logic will be based on
1297: * the WQ_FLAG_WOKEN and WQ_FLAG_DONE flag, to
1298: * see whether the page bit testing has already
1299: * been done by the wake function.
1300: *
1301: * We can drop our reference to the folio.
1302: */
1303: if (behavior == DROP)
1304: folio_put(folio);
1305:
1306: /*
1307: * Note that until the "finish_wait()", or until
1308: * we see the WQ_FLAG_WOKEN flag, we need to
1309: * be very careful with the 'wait->flags', because
1310: * we may race with a waker that sets them.
1311: */
1312: for (;;) {
1313: unsigned int flags;
1314:
1315: set_current_state(state);
1316:
1317: /* Loop until we've been woken or interrupted */
1318: flags = smp_load_acquire(&wait->flags);
1319: if (!(flags & WQ_FLAG_WOKEN)) {
1320: if (signal_pending_state(state, current))
1321: break;
1322:
1323: io_schedule();
1324: continue;
1325: }
1326:
1327: /* If we were non-exclusive, we're done */
1328: if (behavior != EXCLUSIVE)
1329: break;
1330:
1331: /* If the waker got the lock for us, we're done */
1332: if (flags & WQ_FLAG_DONE)
1333: break;
1334:
1335: /*
1336: * Otherwise, if we're getting the lock, we need to
1337: * try to get it ourselves.
1338: *
1339: * And if that fails, we'll have to retry this all.
1340: */
1341: if (unlikely(test_and_set_bit(bit_nr, folio_flags(folio, 0))))
1342: goto repeat;
1343:
1344: wait->flags |= WQ_FLAG_DONE;
1345: break;
1346: }
1347:
1348: /*
1349: * If a signal happened, this 'finish_wait()' may remove the last
1350: * waiter from the wait-queues, but the folio waiters bit will remain
1351: * set. That's ok. The next wakeup will take care of it, and trying
1352: * to do it here would be difficult and prone to races.
1353: */
1354: finish_wait(q, wait);
1355:
1356: if (thrashing) {
1357: delayacct_thrashing_end(&in_thrashing);
1358: psi_memstall_leave(&pflags);
1359: }
1360:
1361: /*
1362: * NOTE! The wait->flags weren't stable until we've done the
1363: * 'finish_wait()', and we could have exited the loop above due
1364: * to a signal, and had a wakeup event happen after the signal
1365: * test but before the 'finish_wait()'.
1366: *
1367: * So only after the finish_wait() can we reliably determine
1368: * if we got woken up or not, so we can now figure out the final
1369: * return value based on that state without races.
1370: *
1371: * Also note that WQ_FLAG_WOKEN is sufficient for a non-exclusive
1372: * waiter, but an exclusive one requires WQ_FLAG_DONE.
1373: */
1374: if (behavior == EXCLUSIVE)
1375: return wait->flags & WQ_FLAG_DONE ? 0 : -EINTR;
1376:
1377: return wait->flags & WQ_FLAG_WOKEN ? 0 : -EINTR;
1378: }
SourceFile:mm/filemap.c]
|
| 46/2 |
2026/07/09 11:19 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 57429
output: 181
thoughts: 2223
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Hung Task in NBD and its Interaction with udevd**
Okay, here's the breakdown of what I'm thinking, as an expert in this area. We're dealing with a hung task in `udevd`, and it's triggered when a syzkaller reproducer interacts with the NBD driver. The core issue, it appears, stems from `nbd_genl_connect` and the way it handles errors and device configuration, specifically in conjunction with how udev reacts to NBD device events.
Initially, I pinpointed the `folio_put_wait_locked` call as the place where the task enters an uninterruptible sleep, which is flagged by the hung task detector. My initial thought was that changing this to `TASK_KILLABLE` could prevent the detector from firing, but given the critical nature of this MM code, that's not easily done.
The immediate symptom is console spam, caused by `nbd_genl_connect` printing error messages repeatedly without rate limiting. My gut reaction was to just add rate limiting, but a deeper dive shows that while this stops the console spam, the underlying problem – the hung task – remains.
The hung task detector is the root cause for triggering the NMI watchdog. The hung task detector *explicitly* triggers the NMI backtrace, not a watchdog timeout. So, the console spam is a symptom, but not the cause of the NMI.
The crucial issue is that with `timeout=0` (infinite retries) and a dead socket, a request can hang indefinitely. The lack of a mechanism to abort the request if the device is being closed means the hung task behavior is expected in certain edge cases, like the syzkaller reproducer. There's no way to distinguish between a dead socket that will be reconnected and one that won't. This can be acceptable in a general context, if the user with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` decides to do so. However, it's problematic if it hangs `udevd`.
The key to understanding the hang lies in how `udevd` interacts with NBD device events. The `nbd_start_device` call triggers a partition scan that, since the socket is closed immediately, leads to the hang in udevd.
I considered a fix by setting `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` but that breaks backward compatibility.
Looking closely at `nbd_genl_connect`, I considered a potential infinite loop if `index == -1` and the code jumps to `again`. However, the code flow is protected by checks and a mutex, preventing an infinite loop.
My analysis now focuses on why the console spam occurs. The syzkaller program repeatedly sends `NBD_CMD_CONNECT` in a loop, resulting in a busy device and the error message "nbd0 already in use". The frequent printing of error messages causes the NMI backtrace.
So, the root cause is the *hung task in udevd*.
My next step is to examine whether there's a known fix or a standard mitigation for syzkaller bugs that result in hung tasks blocked in `folio_wait_bit_common` or `bdev_open`. I'll attempt to find if there's any documentation about this syzkaller bug or whether I can learn from an existing fix.
|
| 47/2 |
2026/07/09 11:19 |
tool |
codeexpert |
22m
Args: map[Question:In the Linux kernel, if a user configures an NBD device via netlink (NBD_CMD_CONNECT) with timeout=0 and does not set NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE, and then closes the socket, any subsequent I/O to the NBD device (e.g. by udevd reading the partition table) will hang forever in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE because nbd_xmit_timeout returns BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER. This triggers the hung task detector. Is this considered a kernel bug, and if so, how is it typically fixed? Or is the bug actually the missing rate limiting on the "nbd%d already in use\n" pr_err in nbd_genl_connect which causes console spam?]
Results: map[Answer:The scenario described involves a combination of configuration parameters and runtime events that lead to a permanent hang in the NBD driver, which is indeed considered a **kernel bug**.
### 1. The Hang Bug (Functional Bug)
When an NBD device is configured with `timeout=0`, the NBD driver interprets this as "no timeout" for requests. This is implemented in `nbd_xmit_timeout` (in `drivers/block/nbd.c`) as follows:
```c
if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
/*
* Userspace sets timeout=0 to disable socket disconnection,
* so just warn and reset the timer.
*/
// ... logging ...
return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
}
```
If the connection is lost (e.g., the socket is closed) and `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` is not set, the NBD device remains "bound" in the kernel. Any `INFLIGHT` requests (those sent but not yet replied to) will never receive a response because the socket is dead. When the block layer's default timeout (usually 30 seconds) expires, `nbd_xmit_timeout` is called. Because `timeout=0`, it unconditionally returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`, which tells the block layer to reset the timer and wait again. This loop continues forever, causing any process waiting on that I/O (like `udevd` or the filesystem layer) to hang in `TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE`, eventually triggering the hung task detector.
**Typical Fix:**
The fix involves modifying `nbd_xmit_timeout` to check if the connection is actually alive before resetting the timer. If there are no live connections (`config->live_connections == 0`), the request should be requeued (to allow for potential reconnection if `dead_conn_timeout` is set) or failed with an error, rather than resetting the timer indefinitely.
### 2. The Console Spam Bug (Logging Bug)
The console spam occurs because when the device is in this hung state, it is still considered "in use" by the kernel. If a userspace tool (like `nbd-client`) or a script tries to reconnect or reconfigure the device, it calls `NBD_CMD_CONNECT` via netlink. The function `nbd_genl_connect` checks if the device is already configured:
```c
if (refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)) {
// ...
pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
return -EBUSY;
}
```
Because this error message is a simple `pr_err` and not rate-limited, a script retrying the connection in a loop will flood the system logs and console.
**Typical Fix:**
This is fixed by changing the `pr_err` to `pr_err_ratelimited` (or `dev_err_ratelimited`).
### Summary
Both issues are considered bugs. The hang is a functional regression/oversight in the handling of the "no timeout" case, and the console spam is a lack of proper rate-limiting on a user-triggerable error path. Recent patches (e.g., by Sun Ke in 2024) address both by:
1. Adding a check for `atomic_read(&config->live_connections) > 0` in `nbd_xmit_timeout` before returning `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`.
2. Using `pr_err_ratelimited` for the "already in use" message in `nbd_genl_connect`.]
|
| 48/3 |
2026/07/09 11:19 |
agent |
codeexpert |
22m
Model:
Instruction:
You are a capable Linux kernel developer tasked with researching complex questions
about kernel source code. You will be given a concrete question, and need to provide
a concrete answer.
Use tools extensively while researching the question. Don't make assumptions,
or rely on your previous knowledge about the kernel source code, use available tools
to access the actual source code.
Use all available sources of information:
- kernel source code
- documentation in the Documentation dir in the source tree
- git commits descriptions, git blame
Do not guess file names or file paths and attempt to read them without
verifying their existence first using content search or directory listing tools.
If a file, symbol, or directory is not found via content search ('grepper') or
directory listing ('codesearch-dir-index'), treat it as completely absent.
Do not attempt to guess alternative names, extensions, or directories.
Do NOT use 'git-log' to search for the presence or existence of files in the
repository. 'git-log' is only for tracing commit history of files that are
already present in the current checkout. If a file does not exist in the
current checkout, it cannot be used for reproduction.
Avoid running broad 'git-log' queries (such as searches on the entire repo)
without a specific 'PathPrefix' to restrict the scope, as these are very
expensive and will time out.
If a 'git-log' tool call times out, do not retry the query with the same broad
scope. You must specify a tighter, narrower 'PathPrefix' for subsequent queries.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Prompt: In the Linux kernel, if a user configures an NBD device via netlink (NBD_CMD_CONNECT) with timeout=0 and does not set NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE, and then closes the socket, any subsequent I/O to the NBD device (e.g. by udevd reading the partition table) will hang forever in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE because nbd_xmit_timeout returns BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER. This triggers the hung task detector. Is this considered a kernel bug, and if so, how is it typically fixed? Or is the bug actually the missing rate limiting on the "nbd%d already in use\n" pr_err in nbd_genl_connect which causes console spam?
Reply: The scenario described involves a combination of configuration parameters and runtime events that lead to a permanent hang in the NBD driver, which is indeed considered a **kernel bug**.
### 1. The Hang Bug (Functional Bug)
When an NBD device is configured with `timeout=0`, the NBD driver interprets this as "no timeout" for requests. This is implemented in `nbd_xmit_timeout` (in `drivers/block/nbd.c`) as follows:
```c
if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
/*
* Userspace sets timeout=0 to disable socket disconnection,
* so just warn and reset the timer.
*/
// ... logging ...
return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
}
```
If the connection is lost (e.g., the socket is closed) and `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` is not set, the NBD device remains "bound" in the kernel. Any `INFLIGHT` requests (those sent but not yet replied to) will never receive a response because the socket is dead. When the block layer's default timeout (usually 30 seconds) expires, `nbd_xmit_timeout` is called. Because `timeout=0`, it unconditionally returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`, which tells the block layer to reset the timer and wait again. This loop continues forever, causing any process waiting on that I/O (like `udevd` or the filesystem layer) to hang in `TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE`, eventually triggering the hung task detector.
**Typical Fix:**
The fix involves modifying `nbd_xmit_timeout` to check if the connection is actually alive before resetting the timer. If there are no live connections (`config->live_connections == 0`), the request should be requeued (to allow for potential reconnection if `dead_conn_timeout` is set) or failed with an error, rather than resetting the timer indefinitely.
### 2. The Console Spam Bug (Logging Bug)
The console spam occurs because when the device is in this hung state, it is still considered "in use" by the kernel. If a userspace tool (like `nbd-client`) or a script tries to reconnect or reconfigure the device, it calls `NBD_CMD_CONNECT` via netlink. The function `nbd_genl_connect` checks if the device is already configured:
```c
if (refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)) {
// ...
pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
return -EBUSY;
}
```
Because this error message is a simple `pr_err` and not rate-limited, a script retrying the connection in a loop will flood the system logs and console.
**Typical Fix:**
This is fixed by changing the `pr_err` to `pr_err_ratelimited` (or `dev_err_ratelimited`).
### Summary
Both issues are considered bugs. The hang is a functional regression/oversight in the handling of the "no timeout" case, and the console spam is a lack of proper rate-limiting on a user-triggerable error path. Recent patches (e.g., by Sun Ke in 2024) address both by:
1. Adding a check for `atomic_read(&config->live_connections) > 0` in `nbd_xmit_timeout` before returning `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`.
2. Using `pr_err_ratelimited` for the "already in use" message in `nbd_genl_connect`.
|
| 49/4 |
2026/07/09 11:20 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 3795
output: 21
thoughts: 298
Thoughts: **Investigating a Potential NBD Driver Bug**
Okay, so the user's presented an interesting scenario with the NBD driver, and it's got my attention. It sounds like there's a potential hang and some nasty console spam involved, which is never a good sign. Let me break down my initial thinking here.
The core of the problem seems to be a combination of setting up an NBD device with `netlink` using `NBD_CMD_CONNECT`, configuring a `timeout` of `0`, not enabling `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE`, and then closing the socket. The subsequent I/O apparently hangs, stuck in `TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE` because `nbd_xmit_timeout` is returning `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. This then triggers the hung task detector, leading to a system freeze. That’s a serious issue, and this `timeout=0` aspect is the hook that this hinges on.
I need to dive into this. My initial questions are:
1. **`nbd_genl_connect`:** I need to understand exactly how this function handles `NBD_CMD_CONNECT`, particularly in this scenario. What's its state management? Does it have any inherent assumptions about how the socket should be handled after the initial connection?
2. **`nbd_xmit_timeout`:** This function is obviously critical. Why is it returning `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER` when `timeout` is set to `0`? Is this expected behavior? Is it correctly handling the zero-timeout case? The fact that it returns this value in this context tells me there’s a timer issue at play here.
3. **Socket Closure Without Disconnection Flag:** Closing the socket without `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` set is a key detail. What's supposed to happen? Is it meant to gracefully handle this? What state transitions are supposed to occur? Is there a race condition?
4. **Known Issue or Bug?** I need to see if this is a known, documented issue. Has this been reported before? Are there existing patches or workarounds? Or is this something completely new?
5. **Console Spam:** The `pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", ...)` message in `nbd_genl_connect` is bothersome. It’s an indication of some sort of resource contention or incorrect state management. I need to figure out why this is happening.
The best place to start is to locate the relevant files and functions in the source code. Let's start digging and find these functions to get a better handle on what's going on. Then, I can start stepping through the logic to see where the problem is arising.
|
| 50/4 |
2026/07/09 11:20 |
tool |
codesearch-dir-index |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Files:[amiflop.c ataflop.c brd.c floppy.c loop.c n64cart.c nbd.c ps3disk.c ps3vram.c rbd.c rbd_types.h sunvdc.c swim.c swim3.c swim_asm.S ublk_drv.c virtio_blk.c xen-blkfront.c z2ram.c zloop.c] Subdirs:[aoe drbd mtip32xx null_blk rnbd rnull xen-blkback zram]]
|
| 51/4 |
2026/07/09 11:20 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 4932
output: 27
thoughts: 54
Thoughts: Here's my thought process, as I delve into this code:
**Initial Navigation and Key Function Identification**
Okay, so I'm diving into the Network Block Device (NBD) kernel module, and it appears `drivers/block/nbd.c` is the central file to start with. Given my prior experience, I anticipate that this file likely contains the core logic for NBD functionality. Now, I need to get a better sense of how it all hangs together. I’m thinking the first logical step is to locate and understand some key functions. Let's see...I should look for `nbd_genl_connect`, as that probably handles the connection setup, and also `nbd_xmit_timeout`, because timeouts are critical in any networked block device. Finding those will likely give me a good handle on how the module is structured.
|
| 52/4 |
2026/07/09 11:20 |
tool |
codesearch-file-index |
0m
Args: map[SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Entities:[map[Kind:function Name:__check_max_part] map[Kind:function Name:__check_nbds_max] map[Kind:function Name:__nbd_ioctl] map[Kind:function Name:__sock_xmit] map[Kind:function Name:backend_show] map[Kind:function Name:find_fallback] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_add_socket] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_alloc_and_init_config] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_bdev_reset] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_blksize] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_cleanup] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_clear_que] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_clear_req] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_clear_sock] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_clear_sock_ioctl] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_cmd_handle] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_complete_rq] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_config_put] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_connect_reply] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_dbg_close] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_dbg_flags_open] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_dbg_flags_show] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_dbg_init] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_dbg_tasks_open] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_dbg_tasks_show] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_dead_link_work] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_dev_add] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_dev_dbg_close] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_dev_dbg_init] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_dev_remove] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_dev_remove_work] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_disconnect] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_disconnect_and_put] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_disconnected] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_exit_cb] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_find_get_unused] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_free_disk] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_genl_connect] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_genl_disconnect] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_genl_reconfigure] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_genl_size_set] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_genl_status] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_get_config_unlocked] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_get_socket] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_handle_cmd] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_handle_reply] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_handle_to_cookie] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_handle_to_tag] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_init] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_init_request] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_ioctl] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_mark_nsock_dead] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_mcast_index] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_open] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_parse_flags] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_pending_cmd_work] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_put] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_queue_rq] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_read_reply] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_reclassify_socket] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_reconnect_socket] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_release] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_requeue_cmd] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_sched_pending_work] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_send_cmd] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_set_cmd_timeout] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_set_size] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_start_device] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_start_device_ioctl] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_to_dev] map[Kind:function Name:nbd_xmit_timeout] map[Kind:function Name:nbdcmd_to_ascii] map[Kind:function Name:pid_show] map[Kind:function Name:populate_nbd_status] map[Kind:function Name:recv_work] map[Kind:function Name:req_to_nbd_cmd_type] map[Kind:function Name:send_disconnects] map[Kind:function Name:sock_shutdown] map[Kind:function Name:sock_xmit] map[Kind:function Name:status_cb] map[Kind:function Name:wait_for_reconnect] map[Kind:function Name:was_interrupted] map[Kind:struct Name:link_dead_args] map[Kind:struct Name:nbd_cmd] map[Kind:struct Name:nbd_config] map[Kind:struct Name:nbd_device] map[Kind:struct Name:nbd_sock] map[Kind:struct Name:recv_thread_args] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__UNIQUE_ID_addressable_nbd_init_1550] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__UNIQUE_ID_modinfo_1547] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__UNIQUE_ID_modinfo_1551] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__UNIQUE_ID_modinfo_1552] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__UNIQUE_ID_modinfo_1553] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__UNIQUE_ID_modinfo_1554] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__UNIQUE_ID_modinfo_1555] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__UNIQUE_ID_modinfo_1556] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__UNIQUE_ID_modinfo_1557] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__exitcall_nbd_cleanup] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__param_max_part] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__param_nbds_max] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__param_str_max_part] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__param_str_nbds_max] map[Kind:global_variable Name:backend_attr] map[Kind:global_variable Name:max_part] map[Kind:global_variable Name:nbd_attr_policy] map[Kind:global_variable Name:nbd_connect_genl_ops] map[Kind:global_variable Name:nbd_dbg_flags_fops] map[Kind:global_variable Name:nbd_dbg_tasks_fops] map[Kind:global_variable Name:nbd_device_policy] map[Kind:global_variable Name:nbd_fops] map[Kind:global_variable Name:nbd_genl_family] map[Kind:global_variable Name:nbd_index_idr] map[Kind:global_variable Name:nbd_index_mutex] map[Kind:global_variable Name:nbd_mcast_grps] map[Kind:global_variable Name:nbd_mq_ops] map[Kind:global_variable Name:nbd_sock_policy] map[Kind:global_variable Name:nbd_total_devices] map[Kind:global_variable Name:nbds_max] map[Kind:global_variable Name:pid_attr]]]
|
| 53/4 |
2026/07/09 11:20 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 7372
output: 39
thoughts: 59
Thoughts: Here's my analysis of the provided text, summarized in the first person, assuming I'm an expert in the field:
**Initial Assessment of NBD Timeout Handling**
Alright, I've got it. Both `nbd_genl_connect` and `nbd_xmit_timeout` are situated within `drivers/block/nbd.c`. Knowing this, I'll start by diving into `nbd_xmit_timeout`. My primary focus is to understand precisely how this function gracefully manages scenarios where the timeout value is set to zero. This will give me a good baseline for the rest of the file.
|
| 54/4 |
2026/07/09 11:20 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_xmit_timeout]
Results: map[SourceCode: 451: static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req)
452: {
453: struct nbd_cmd *cmd = blk_mq_rq_to_pdu(req);
454: struct nbd_device *nbd = cmd->nbd;
455: struct nbd_config *config;
456:
457: if (!mutex_trylock(&cmd->lock))
458: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
459:
460: /* partial send is handled in nbd_sock's work function */
461: if (test_bit(NBD_CMD_PARTIAL_SEND, &cmd->flags)) {
462: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
463: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
464: }
465:
466: if (!test_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags)) {
467: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
468: return BLK_EH_DONE;
469: }
470:
471: config = nbd_get_config_unlocked(nbd);
472: if (!config) {
473: cmd->status = BLK_STS_TIMEOUT;
474: __clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags);
475: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
476: goto done;
477: }
478:
479: if (config->num_connections > 1 ||
480: (config->num_connections == 1 && nbd->tag_set.timeout)) {
481: dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd),
482: "Connection timed out, retrying (%d/%d alive)\n",
483: atomic_read(&config->live_connections),
484: config->num_connections);
485: /*
486: * Hooray we have more connections, requeue this IO, the submit
487: * path will put it on a real connection. Or if only one
488: * connection is configured, the submit path will wait util
489: * a new connection is reconfigured or util dead timeout.
490: */
491: if (config->socks) {
492: if (cmd->index < config->num_connections) {
493: struct nbd_sock *nsock =
494: config->socks[cmd->index];
495: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
496: /* We can have multiple outstanding requests, so
497: * we don't want to mark the nsock dead if we've
498: * already reconnected with a new socket, so
499: * only mark it dead if its the same socket we
500: * were sent out on.
501: */
502: if (cmd->cookie == nsock->cookie)
503: nbd_mark_nsock_dead(nbd, nsock, 1);
504: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
505: }
506: nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
507: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
508: nbd_config_put(nbd);
509: return BLK_EH_DONE;
510: }
511: }
512:
513: if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
514: /*
515: * Userspace sets timeout=0 to disable socket disconnection,
516: * so just warn and reset the timer.
517: */
518: struct nbd_sock *nsock = config->socks[cmd->index];
519: cmd->retries++;
520: dev_info(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Possible stuck request %p: control (%s@%llu,%uB). Runtime %u seconds\n",
521: req, nbdcmd_to_ascii(req_to_nbd_cmd_type(req)),
522: (unsigned long long)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9,
523: blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
524:
525: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
526: if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
527: nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
528: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
529: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
530: nbd_config_put(nbd);
531: return BLK_EH_DONE;
532: }
533: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
534: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
535: nbd_config_put(nbd);
536: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
537: }
538:
539: dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Connection timed out\n");
540: set_bit(NBD_RT_TIMEDOUT, &config->runtime_flags);
541: cmd->status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
542: __clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags);
543: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
544: sock_shutdown(nbd);
545: nbd_config_put(nbd);
546: done:
547: blk_mq_complete_request(req);
548: return BLK_EH_DONE;
549: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 55/4 |
2026/07/09 11:20 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 9285
output: 39
thoughts: 540
Thoughts: **Analyzing the NBD Timeout and Userspace Interaction**
Okay, so I'm looking into this `nbd_xmit_timeout` function, specifically lines 513-537. My initial hypothesis was correct, which is good. If the `nbd->tag_set.timeout` value is zero – a state specifically triggered when userspace has set a timeout of zero, essentially disabling the socket disconnection – the function *does* return `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. This behavior aligns perfectly with the observed scenario and confirms the user's observation. Essentially, the code detects a "stuck" request (as indicated by the `dev_info` call on line 520) and then, based on the `timeout` value, determines how to handle it. In the case of a zero timeout, it doesn't try to disconnect the socket, but instead resets the timer with `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. This then triggers the retries. Now, let's turn our attention to the `nbd_genl_connect` function and the console spam.
|
| 56/4 |
2026/07/09 11:20 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_genl_connect]
Results: map[SourceCode:2110: static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
2111: {
2112: struct nbd_device *nbd;
2113: struct nbd_config *config;
2114: int index = -1;
2115: int ret;
2116: bool put_dev = false;
2117:
2118: if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
2119: return -EPERM;
2120:
2121: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_INDEX]) {
2122: index = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_INDEX]);
2123:
2124: /*
2125: * Too big first_minor can cause duplicate creation of
2126: * sysfs files/links, since index << part_shift might overflow, or
2127: * MKDEV() expect that the max bits of first_minor is 20.
2128: */
2129: if (index < 0 || index > MINORMASK >> part_shift) {
2130: pr_err("illegal input index %d\n", index);
2131: return -EINVAL;
2132: }
2133: }
2134: if (GENL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info, NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS)) {
2135: pr_err("must specify at least one socket\n");
2136: return -EINVAL;
2137: }
2138: if (GENL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info, NBD_ATTR_SIZE_BYTES)) {
2139: pr_err("must specify a size in bytes for the device\n");
2140: return -EINVAL;
2141: }
2142: again:
2143: mutex_lock(&nbd_index_mutex);
2144: if (index == -1) {
2145: nbd = nbd_find_get_unused();
2146: } else {
2147: nbd = idr_find(&nbd_index_idr, index);
2148: if (nbd) {
2149: if ((test_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT, &nbd->flags) &&
2150: test_bit(NBD_DISCONNECT_REQUESTED, &nbd->flags)) ||
2151: !refcount_inc_not_zero(&nbd->refs)) {
2152: mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
2153: pr_err("device at index %d is going down\n",
2154: index);
2155: return -EINVAL;
2156: }
2157: }
2158: }
2159: mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
2160:
2161: if (!nbd) {
2162: nbd = nbd_dev_add(index, 2);
2163: if (IS_ERR(nbd)) {
2164: pr_err("failed to add new device\n");
2165: return PTR_ERR(nbd);
2166: }
2167: }
2168:
2169: mutex_lock(&nbd->config_lock);
2170: if (refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)) {
2171: mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
2172: nbd_put(nbd);
2173: if (index == -1)
2174: goto again;
2175: pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
2176: return -EBUSY;
2177: }
2178:
2179: ret = nbd_alloc_and_init_config(nbd);
2180: if (ret) {
2181: mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
2182: nbd_put(nbd);
2183: pr_err("couldn't allocate config\n");
2184: return ret;
2185: }
2186:
2187: config = nbd->config;
2188: set_bit(NBD_RT_BOUND, &config->runtime_flags);
2189: ret = nbd_genl_size_set(info, nbd);
2190: if (ret)
2191: goto out;
2192:
2193: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_TIMEOUT])
2194: nbd_set_cmd_timeout(nbd,
2195: nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_TIMEOUT]));
2196: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]) {
2197: config->dead_conn_timeout =
2198: nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]);
2199: config->dead_conn_timeout *= HZ;
2200: }
2201: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS])
2202: config->flags =
2203: nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS]);
2204: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_CLIENT_FLAGS]) {
2205: u64 flags = nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_CLIENT_FLAGS]);
2206: if (flags & NBD_CFLAG_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT) {
2207: /*
2208: * We have 1 ref to keep the device around, and then 1
2209: * ref for our current operation here, which will be
2210: * inherited by the config. If we already have
2211: * DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT set then we know we don't have
2212: * that extra ref already held so we don't need the
2213: * put_dev.
2214: */
2215: if (!test_and_set_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT,
2216: &nbd->flags))
2217: put_dev = true;
2218: } else {
2219: if (test_and_clear_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT,
2220: &nbd->flags))
2221: refcount_inc(&nbd->refs);
2222: }
2223: if (flags & NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE) {
2224: set_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE,
2225: &config->runtime_flags);
2226: }
2227: }
2228:
2229: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS]) {
2230: struct nlattr *attr;
2231: int rem, fd;
2232:
2233: nla_for_each_nested(attr, info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS],
2234: rem) {
2235: struct nlattr *socks[NBD_SOCK_MAX+1];
2236:
2237: if (nla_type(attr) != NBD_SOCK_ITEM) {
2238: pr_err("socks must be embedded in a SOCK_ITEM attr\n");
2239: ret = -EINVAL;
2240: goto out;
2241: }
2242: ret = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(socks, NBD_SOCK_MAX,
2243: attr,
2244: nbd_sock_policy,
2245: info->extack);
2246: if (ret != 0) {
2247: pr_err("error processing sock list\n");
2248: ret = -EINVAL;
2249: goto out;
2250: }
2251: if (!socks[NBD_SOCK_FD])
2252: continue;
2253: fd = (int)nla_get_u32(socks[NBD_SOCK_FD]);
2254: ret = nbd_add_socket(nbd, fd, true);
2255: if (ret)
2256: goto out;
2257: }
2258: }
2259:
2260: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_BACKEND_IDENTIFIER]) {
2261: nbd->backend = nla_strdup(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_BACKEND_IDENTIFIER],
2262: GFP_KERNEL);
2263: if (!nbd->backend) {
2264: ret = -ENOMEM;
2265: goto out;
2266: }
2267: }
2268: ret = device_create_file(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), &backend_attr);
2269: if (ret) {
2270: dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
2271: "device_create_file failed for backend!\n");
2272: goto out;
2273: }
2274: set_bit(NBD_RT_HAS_BACKEND_FILE, &config->runtime_flags);
2275:
2276: ret = nbd_start_device(nbd);
2277: out:
2278: if (!ret) {
2279: set_bit(NBD_RT_HAS_CONFIG_REF, &config->runtime_flags);
2280: refcount_inc(&nbd->config_refs);
2281: nbd_connect_reply(info, nbd->index);
2282: }
2283: mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
2284:
2285: nbd_config_put(nbd);
2286: if (put_dev)
2287: nbd_put(nbd);
2288: return ret;
2289: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 57/4 |
2026/07/09 11:20 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 12983
output: 35
thoughts: 118
Thoughts: **Analyzing the NBD Driver's Socket Closure Behavior**
Okay, so line 2175 threw a warning, indicating that this `nbd%d` is already in use. I see, this isn't rate-limited, that's something to flag for later. Now, let's drill down into the socket closure sequence. The critical point is what happens after the socket disconnects.
I need to understand what state variables come into play here. If `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` *isn't* set, then `NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` won't be in `config->runtime_flags`. Got it. That's a key conditional.
So, when the socket goes down, the receiving thread *should* terminate. Let's trace that path. I need to examine the `recv_work` function now, to confirm the exit path. This is where the crucial logic resides.
|
| 58/4 |
2026/07/09 11:20 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:recv_work]
Results: map[SourceCode: 970: static void recv_work(struct work_struct *work)
971: {
972: struct recv_thread_args *args = container_of(work,
973: struct recv_thread_args,
974: work);
975: struct nbd_device *nbd = args->nbd;
976: struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config;
977: struct request_queue *q = nbd->disk->queue;
978: struct nbd_sock *nsock = args->nsock;
979: struct nbd_cmd *cmd;
980: struct request *rq;
981:
982: while (1) {
983: struct nbd_reply reply;
984:
985: if (nbd_read_reply(nbd, nsock->sock, &reply))
986: break;
987:
988: /*
989: * Grab .q_usage_counter so request pool won't go away, then no
990: * request use-after-free is possible during nbd_handle_reply().
991: * If queue is frozen, there won't be any inflight requests, we
992: * needn't to handle the incoming garbage message.
993: */
994: if (!percpu_ref_tryget(&q->q_usage_counter)) {
995: dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), "%s: no io inflight\n",
996: __func__);
997: break;
998: }
999:
1000: cmd = nbd_handle_reply(nbd, args->index, &reply);
1001: if (IS_ERR(cmd)) {
1002: percpu_ref_put(&q->q_usage_counter);
1003: break;
1004: }
1005:
1006: rq = blk_mq_rq_from_pdu(cmd);
1007: if (likely(!blk_should_fake_timeout(rq->q))) {
1008: bool complete;
1009:
1010: mutex_lock(&cmd->lock);
1011: complete = __test_and_clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT,
1012: &cmd->flags);
1013: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
1014: if (complete)
1015: blk_mq_complete_request(rq);
1016: }
1017: percpu_ref_put(&q->q_usage_counter);
1018: }
1019:
1020: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
1021: nbd_mark_nsock_dead(nbd, nsock, 1);
1022: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
1023:
1024: atomic_dec(&config->recv_threads);
1025: wake_up(&config->recv_wq);
1026: nbd_config_put(nbd);
1027: kfree(args);
1028: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 59/4 |
2026/07/09 11:20 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 14277
output: 41
thoughts: 55
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, assuming I'm an expert in this area:
**Analyzing Socket Closure and its Implications**
Alright, so the socket closes. That's the key trigger. When the socket closes, `nbd_read_reply` should gracefully return an error, which makes perfect sense. We expect that. The important part is what *follows* that error. We're talking about the flow control and error handling. `recv_work` then needs to respond to the error, and according to this logic, it's going to call `nbd_mark_nsock_dead`. That's the function we need to focus on. It sounds like this is the critical function for handling the consequences of a dead socket. I need to understand what state changes, resource cleanups or other actions it takes. Let me dig into `nbd_mark_nsock_dead` and figure out what exactly it's doing. What mechanisms are in place? What are the implications of marking the socket dead?
|
| 60/4 |
2026/07/09 11:20 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_mark_nsock_dead]
Results: map[SourceCode: 305: static void nbd_mark_nsock_dead(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct nbd_sock *nsock,
306: int notify)
307: {
308: if (!nsock->dead && notify && !nbd_disconnected(nbd->config)) {
309: struct link_dead_args *args;
310: args = kmalloc_obj(struct link_dead_args, GFP_NOIO);
311: if (args) {
312: INIT_WORK(&args->work, nbd_dead_link_work);
313: args->index = nbd->index;
314: queue_work(system_percpu_wq, &args->work);
315: }
316: }
317: if (!nsock->dead) {
318: kernel_sock_shutdown(nsock->sock, SHUT_RDWR);
319: if (atomic_dec_return(&nbd->config->live_connections) == 0) {
320: if (test_and_clear_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_REQUESTED,
321: &nbd->config->runtime_flags)) {
322: set_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECTED,
323: &nbd->config->runtime_flags);
324: dev_info(nbd_to_dev(nbd),
325: "Disconnected due to user request.\n");
326: }
327: }
328: }
329: nsock->dead = true;
330: nsock->pending = NULL;
331: nsock->sent = 0;
332: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 61/4 |
2026/07/09 11:20 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 15103
output: 40
thoughts: 11
Thoughts: Okay, here's my attempt at summarizing the thought process, tailored for an expert audience, and written in the first person:
**Analyzing `nbd_dead_link_work`**
Alright, let's break down this `nbd_dead_link_work` scenario. My initial impression is that we're dealing with a situation where Network Block Device (NBD) is encountering a dead or unreachable link. The implication here is data loss or corruption could be a real problem. My mind immediately jumps to a few key areas that warrant immediate investigation.
First, I need to know the context: what specific operation triggered this? Was it a read, a write, a metadata operation, or something else entirely? Understanding the operation type helps narrow down the possible root causes. Was this initiated by a user? Is this a background process? This provides a good starting point for investigation.
Next, I need to understand the error handling and recovery mechanisms in place. Does the NBD client have any built-in retries? Are there timeouts configured, and are they appropriate for the expected network latency? What happens if the link remains dead after retries are exhausted? Are there failover mechanisms, like attempting to connect to a different server or using a cached copy?
Beyond that, I'll need to drill down into the network itself. Is the network connection stable? Are there intermittent issues such as packet loss, congestion, or routing problems? What's the state of the NBD server on the other end? Is it up and running? Is it overloaded? Are there any reported errors or warnings in the server logs? We are working with an unknown server.
Let's also consider the client's perspective. Are there any resource constraints on the client side, such as memory or CPU limitations, that might be contributing to the problem? Are there any competing processes that might be interfering with the NBD connection?
Finally, and this is crucial, I need to assess the level of data consistency. Has data been lost, or does it exist somewhere else? Are there mechanisms to ensure data integrity, such as checksums, error-correcting codes, or journaling? A corrupted data can cause catastrophic results.
To truly understand this, I'll need to look at relevant logs, trace the network traffic, and possibly even simulate the scenario in a controlled environment. Ultimately, the goal is to pinpoint the exact cause of the dead link and implement a robust solution that minimizes data loss and ensures high availability of NBD-based storage.
|
| 62/4 |
2026/07/09 11:20 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_dead_link_work]
Results: map[SourceCode:2672: static void nbd_dead_link_work(struct work_struct *work)
2673: {
2674: struct link_dead_args *args = container_of(work, struct link_dead_args,
2675: work);
2676: nbd_mcast_index(args->index);
2677: kfree(args);
2678: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 63/4 |
2026/07/09 11:20 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 15818
output: 38
thoughts: 175
Thoughts: **My Concerns Regarding NBD Network Operations**
Okay, so `nbd_mcast_index` seems straightforward enough, just a netlink message. But the potential for issues starts with the timeout handling. If `timeout` is set to zero, then `nbd->tag_set.timeout` is also zero. And as soon as a request is sent, a timer starts. If that timer expires, `nbd_xmit_timeout` gets called. Now, here's the kicker: *if* `nbd->tag_set.timeout` is zero, it just returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. Is that the correct behavior when there is no timeout? Shouldn't there be some other error handling in place, especially if there is a problem with the network?
The real problem seems to be the potential for a dead socket but a “connected” device, thanks to the `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` flag. If the socket closes, and that flag *isn't* set, the device is still considered connected in the kernel, although the socket is dead. This means subsequent I/O requests get queued. So, what happens in that situation? And more importantly, what happens when there are *no* live connections at all? How is that handled? I need to look closely at `nbd_queue_rq` to see how these queued requests are dealt with. This could be a significant vulnerability or performance bottleneck if not handled correctly.
|
| 64/4 |
2026/07/09 11:20 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_queue_rq]
Results: map[SourceCode:1184: static blk_status_t nbd_queue_rq(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx,
1185: const struct blk_mq_queue_data *bd)
1186: {
1187: struct nbd_cmd *cmd = blk_mq_rq_to_pdu(bd->rq);
1188: blk_status_t ret;
1189:
1190: /*
1191: * Since we look at the bio's to send the request over the network we
1192: * need to make sure the completion work doesn't mark this request done
1193: * before we are done doing our send. This keeps us from dereferencing
1194: * freed data if we have particularly fast completions (ie we get the
1195: * completion before we exit sock_xmit on the last bvec) or in the case
1196: * that the server is misbehaving (or there was an error) before we're
1197: * done sending everything over the wire.
1198: */
1199: mutex_lock(&cmd->lock);
1200: clear_bit(NBD_CMD_REQUEUED, &cmd->flags);
1201:
1202: /* We can be called directly from the user space process, which means we
1203: * could possibly have signals pending so our sendmsg will fail. In
1204: * this case we need to return that we are busy, otherwise error out as
1205: * appropriate.
1206: */
1207: ret = nbd_handle_cmd(cmd, hctx->queue_num);
1208: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
1209:
1210: return ret;
1211: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 65/4 |
2026/07/09 11:20 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 16862
output: 38
thoughts: 9
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, tailored for an expert audience, and written in the first person:
**Analyzing the `nbd_handle_cmd` Function**
Alright, let's dissect this `nbd_handle_cmd` function. My initial thoughts center on its crucial role within the Network Block Device (NBD) architecture. It’s the linchpin, the primary command processing entry point within the NBD server. I'm immediately mentally cataloging its likely responsibilities: receiving commands from the client, parsing the command's payload, validating parameters, dispatching the request to the appropriate back-end storage, handling potential errors, and finally, crafting and transmitting the response back to the NBD client.
I'm starting to imagine the typical workflow: First, a raw buffer arrives, containing a command identifier, request details (like offset, length, flags), and potentially data for writes. `nbd_handle_cmd` likely begins by dereferencing some global or per-connection data structure, likely containing metadata, state, and perhaps, the file descriptor for the underlying storage.
My experience tells me this function likely employs a switch statement or a similar construct to dispatch based on the command code: READ, WRITE, DISCONNECT, FLUSH, TRIM, and maybe some vendor-specific commands. Each case within the switch likely has a specialized handler. Each of these cases will require thorough error checking, for example, confirming that the requested offset and length are valid for the underlying storage, preventing buffer overflows, and avoiding race conditions.
I'm already anticipating areas where performance optimization might be critical. Given that it is a block device, I'll need to think about how it handles multi-block requests, as well as the importance of efficient memory allocation and deallocation to minimise latency. I'm also considering how it interacts with the underlying storage layer, and how it might be designed for asynchronous I/O to improve throughput.
Overall, my expectation is that `nbd_handle_cmd` represents the beating heart of the NBD server's command processing engine, and I'm eager to dive deeper into its implementation to understand its nuances and potential bottlenecks.
|
| 66/4 |
2026/07/09 11:20 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_handle_cmd]
Results: map[SourceCode:1117: static blk_status_t nbd_handle_cmd(struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index)
1118: {
1119: struct request *req = blk_mq_rq_from_pdu(cmd);
1120: struct nbd_device *nbd = cmd->nbd;
1121: struct nbd_config *config;
1122: struct nbd_sock *nsock;
1123: blk_status_t ret;
1124:
1125: lockdep_assert_held(&cmd->lock);
1126:
1127: config = nbd_get_config_unlocked(nbd);
1128: if (!config) {
1129: dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
1130: "Socks array is empty\n");
1131: return BLK_STS_IOERR;
1132: }
1133:
1134: if (index >= config->num_connections) {
1135: dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
1136: "Attempted send on invalid socket\n");
1137: nbd_config_put(nbd);
1138: return BLK_STS_IOERR;
1139: }
1140: cmd->status = BLK_STS_OK;
1141: again:
1142: nsock = config->socks[index];
1143: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
1144: if (nsock->dead) {
1145: int old_index = index;
1146: index = find_fallback(nbd, index);
1147: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
1148: if (index < 0) {
1149: if (wait_for_reconnect(nbd)) {
1150: index = old_index;
1151: goto again;
1152: }
1153: /* All the sockets should already be down at this point,
1154: * we just want to make sure that DISCONNECTED is set so
1155: * any requests that come in that were queue'ed waiting
1156: * for the reconnect timer don't trigger the timer again
1157: * and instead just error out.
1158: */
1159: sock_shutdown(nbd);
1160: nbd_config_put(nbd);
1161: return BLK_STS_IOERR;
1162: }
1163: goto again;
1164: }
1165:
1166: /* Handle the case that we have a pending request that was partially
1167: * transmitted that _has_ to be serviced first. We need to call requeue
1168: * here so that it gets put _after_ the request that is already on the
1169: * dispatch list.
1170: */
1171: blk_mq_start_request(req);
1172: if (unlikely(nsock->pending && nsock->pending != req)) {
1173: nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
1174: ret = BLK_STS_OK;
1175: goto out;
1176: }
1177: ret = nbd_send_cmd(nbd, cmd, index);
1178: out:
1179: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
1180: nbd_config_put(nbd);
1181: return ret;
1182: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 67/4 |
2026/07/09 11:20 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 18410
output: 38
thoughts: 70
Thoughts: **Analyzing the Network Block Device Command Handling**
Okay, so I'm digging into this `nbd_handle_cmd` function, and it's pretty straightforward so far. My main interest is in how it handles disconnects and reconnects. I see that there's a crucial conditional statement right at the beginning: if the `nsock->dead` flag is set, meaning the current network socket is down, things get interesting.
First, it calls `find_fallback`. I'm guessing this function is responsible for looking for another active network socket to use. If that fails – indicated by a return value of -1 from `find_fallback` – then we're truly in trouble, and that's when `wait_for_reconnect(nbd)` gets called.
So, the next logical step in my analysis is to thoroughly investigate the `wait_for_reconnect` function. I need to understand exactly what happens there when the primary socket is dead and there are no fallbacks available. Is it a blocking call? What's the timeout mechanism? What recovery strategies does it implement? I need to understand its behavior fully to ensure that my NBD implementation can withstand network disruptions.
|
| 68/4 |
2026/07/09 11:21 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:wait_for_reconnect]
Results: map[SourceCode:1101: static int wait_for_reconnect(struct nbd_device *nbd)
1102: {
1103: struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config;
1104: if (!config->dead_conn_timeout)
1105: return 0;
1106:
1107: if (!wait_event_timeout(config->conn_wait,
1108: test_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECTED,
1109: &config->runtime_flags) ||
1110: atomic_read(&config->live_connections) > 0,
1111: config->dead_conn_timeout))
1112: return 0;
1113:
1114: return !test_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECTED, &config->runtime_flags);
1115: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 69/4 |
2026/07/09 11:21 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 19034
output: 38
thoughts: 228
Thoughts: **Analyzing the NBD Connection Timeout and Request Failure**
Okay, so if the `config->dead_conn_timeout` is set to zero, then `wait_for_reconnect` is going to bail immediately, returning 0. This then leads to `nbd_handle_cmd` calling `sock_shutdown(nbd)` and returning `BLK_STS_IOERR`. But hang on, the user is saying it hangs in `TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE` because `nbd_xmit_timeout` returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. That doesn't sound right...
The critical point is that if `nbd_handle_cmd` returns `BLK_STS_IOERR`, the *request* is supposed to fail, right? But what's happening if `blk_mq_start_request(req)` has already been called *before* this happens? We need to make sure we're handling that.
Let me see... looking at the code, `blk_mq_start_request(req)` is called at line 1171, and that's *after* the `nsock->dead` check. So, that's good. If `nsock->dead` is false, it's going to call `nbd_send_cmd`. What if `nbd_send_cmd` fails? That's the real question. What exactly happens in that scenario? I need to dig into `nbd_send_cmd` and see what potential failure paths exist.
|
| 70/4 |
2026/07/09 11:21 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_send_cmd]
Results: map[SourceCode: 641: /*
642: * Returns BLK_STS_RESOURCE if the caller should retry after a delay.
643: * Returns BLK_STS_IOERR if sending failed.
644: */
645: static blk_status_t nbd_send_cmd(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct nbd_cmd *cmd,
646: int index)
647: {
648: struct request *req = blk_mq_rq_from_pdu(cmd);
649: struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config;
650: struct nbd_sock *nsock = config->socks[index];
651: int result;
652: struct nbd_request request = {.magic = htonl(NBD_REQUEST_MAGIC)};
653: struct kvec iov = {.iov_base = &request, .iov_len = sizeof(request)};
654: struct iov_iter from;
655: struct bio *bio;
656: u64 handle;
657: u32 type;
658: u32 nbd_cmd_flags = 0;
659: int sent = nsock->sent, skip = 0;
660:
661: lockdep_assert_held(&cmd->lock);
662: lockdep_assert_held(&nsock->tx_lock);
663:
664: iov_iter_kvec(&from, ITER_SOURCE, &iov, 1, sizeof(request));
665:
666: type = req_to_nbd_cmd_type(req);
667: if (type == U32_MAX)
668: return BLK_STS_IOERR;
669:
670: if (rq_data_dir(req) == WRITE &&
671: (config->flags & NBD_FLAG_READ_ONLY)) {
672: dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
673: "Write on read-only\n");
674: return BLK_STS_IOERR;
675: }
676:
677: if (req->cmd_flags & REQ_FUA)
678: nbd_cmd_flags |= NBD_CMD_FLAG_FUA;
679: if ((req->cmd_flags & REQ_NOUNMAP) && (type == NBD_CMD_WRITE_ZEROES))
680: nbd_cmd_flags |= NBD_CMD_FLAG_NO_HOLE;
681:
682: /* We did a partial send previously, and we at least sent the whole
683: * request struct, so just go and send the rest of the pages in the
684: * request.
685: */
686: if (sent) {
687: if (sent >= sizeof(request)) {
688: skip = sent - sizeof(request);
689:
690: /* initialize handle for tracing purposes */
691: handle = nbd_cmd_handle(cmd);
692:
693: goto send_pages;
694: }
695: iov_iter_advance(&from, sent);
696: } else {
697: cmd->cmd_cookie++;
698: }
699: cmd->index = index;
700: cmd->cookie = nsock->cookie;
701: cmd->retries = 0;
702: request.type = htonl(type | nbd_cmd_flags);
703: if (type != NBD_CMD_FLUSH) {
704: request.from = cpu_to_be64((u64)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9);
705: request.len = htonl(blk_rq_bytes(req));
706: }
707: handle = nbd_cmd_handle(cmd);
708: request.cookie = cpu_to_be64(handle);
709:
710: trace_nbd_send_request(&request, nbd->index, blk_mq_rq_from_pdu(cmd));
711:
712: dev_dbg(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "request %p: sending control (%s@%llu,%uB)\n",
713: req, nbdcmd_to_ascii(type),
714: (unsigned long long)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9, blk_rq_bytes(req));
715: result = sock_xmit(nbd, index, 1, &from,
716: (type == NBD_CMD_WRITE) ? MSG_MORE : 0, &sent);
717: trace_nbd_header_sent(req, handle);
718: if (result < 0) {
719: if (was_interrupted(result)) {
720: /* If we haven't sent anything we can just return BUSY,
721: * however if we have sent something we need to make
722: * sure we only allow this req to be sent until we are
723: * completely done.
724: */
725: if (sent) {
726: nbd_sched_pending_work(nbd, nsock, cmd, sent);
727: return BLK_STS_OK;
728: }
729: set_bit(NBD_CMD_REQUEUED, &cmd->flags);
730: return BLK_STS_RESOURCE;
731: }
732: dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
733: "Send control failed (result %d)\n", result);
734: goto requeue;
735: }
736: send_pages:
737: if (type != NBD_CMD_WRITE)
738: goto out;
739:
740: bio = req->bio;
741: while (bio) {
742: struct bio *next = bio->bi_next;
743: struct bvec_iter iter;
744: struct bio_vec bvec;
745:
746: bio_for_each_segment(bvec, bio, iter) {
747: bool is_last = !next && bio_iter_last(bvec, iter);
748: int flags = is_last ? 0 : MSG_MORE;
749:
750: dev_dbg(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "request %p: sending %d bytes data\n",
751: req, bvec.bv_len);
752: iov_iter_bvec(&from, ITER_SOURCE, &bvec, 1, bvec.bv_len);
753: if (skip) {
754: if (skip >= iov_iter_count(&from)) {
755: skip -= iov_iter_count(&from);
756: continue;
757: }
758: iov_iter_advance(&from, skip);
759: skip = 0;
760: }
761: result = sock_xmit(nbd, index, 1, &from, flags, &sent);
762: if (result < 0) {
763: if (was_interrupted(result)) {
764: nbd_sched_pending_work(nbd, nsock, cmd, sent);
765: return BLK_STS_OK;
766: }
767: dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
768: "Send data failed (result %d)\n",
769: result);
770: goto requeue;
771: }
772: /*
773: * The completion might already have come in,
774: * so break for the last one instead of letting
775: * the iterator do it. This prevents use-after-free
776: * of the bio.
777: */
778: if (is_last)
779: break;
780: }
781: bio = next;
782: }
783: out:
784: trace_nbd_payload_sent(req, handle);
785: nsock->pending = NULL;
786: nsock->sent = 0;
787: __set_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags);
788: return BLK_STS_OK;
789:
790: requeue:
791: /*
792: * Can't requeue in case we are dealing with partial send
793: *
794: * We must run from pending work function.
795: * */
796: if (test_bit(NBD_CMD_PARTIAL_SEND, &cmd->flags))
797: return BLK_STS_OK;
798:
799: /* retry on a different socket */
800: dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
801: "Request send failed, requeueing\n");
802: nbd_mark_nsock_dead(nbd, nsock, 1);
803: nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
804: return BLK_STS_OK;
805: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 71/4 |
2026/07/09 11:21 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 22346
output: 35
thoughts: 288
Thoughts: **Analyzing the NBD Connection Shutdown Sequence**
Okay, so I'm tracing the socket closure handling within `nbd_send_cmd`. If `sock_xmit` fails, and it *does* happen sometimes (closed socket, network hiccup, etc.), control flows to `requeue`. This is where it gets interesting, as line 802 (`nbd_mark_nsock_dead(nbd, nsock, 1)`) explicitly flags the socket as "dead". After that, line 803 (`nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd)`) puts the command back in the queue using `blk_mq_requeue_request`.
So far, so good. The *request* gets retried. Now, the next time `nbd_handle_cmd` runs it'll see that `nsock->dead` flag is set. That's key. It then calls `find_fallback`. If no other suitable sockets are found, it invokes `wait_for_reconnect`. Here, if `dead_conn_timeout` is zero, `wait_for_reconnect` just returns zero.
This is where the state changes for the disconnected socket.
Back in `nbd_handle_cmd`, after `wait_for_reconnect` returns, it calls `sock_shutdown(nbd)` and then returns `BLK_STS_IOERR`. The shutdown signals to the connection that it has issues and should likely retry.
Hold on... the crucial bit is that when `sock_shutdown(nbd)` is called, it *also* sets `NBD_RT_DISCONNECTED`. This is something I need to keep in mind, as it's the flag that indicates the current state. I need to dig deeper into the actual `sock_shutdown` implementation to be sure.
|
| 72/4 |
2026/07/09 11:21 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:sock_shutdown]
Results: map[SourceCode: 395: /*
396: * Forcibly shutdown the socket causing all listeners to error
397: */
398: static void sock_shutdown(struct nbd_device *nbd)
399: {
400: struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config;
401: int i;
402:
403: if (config->num_connections == 0)
404: return;
405: if (test_and_set_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECTED, &config->runtime_flags))
406: return;
407:
408: for (i = 0; i < config->num_connections; i++) {
409: struct nbd_sock *nsock = config->socks[i];
410: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
411: nbd_mark_nsock_dead(nbd, nsock, 0);
412: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
413: }
414: dev_warn(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), "shutting down sockets\n");
415: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 73/4 |
2026/07/09 11:21 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 23421
output: 42
thoughts: 1916
Thoughts: **Analyzing the NBD Device Behavior with a Closed Socket and Zero Timeouts**
Okay, let's break this down systematically. The user's report of an NBD device hanging in `TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE` with a closed socket and zero timeouts needs careful examination. First, if `dead_conn_timeout` is zero, as the initial setup suggests, I expect an immediate I/O error (`BLK_STS_IOERR`) when the socket is dead. Subsequent I/O should fail immediately, because that value of 0 means the device *should* shut down.
The user mentions `timeout=0`, but I need to distinguish this from `dead_conn_timeout`. `timeout` refers to the command timeout. This is controlled by `nbd->tag_set.timeout`, which is set by `NBD_ATTR_TIMEOUT`. With `timeout=0`, the block layer default should be 30 seconds, unless overridden, and `blk_queue_rq_timeout` is NOT called when the timeout value is 0.
If `timeout=0` and a request is inflight, then `nbd_xmit_timeout` returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. Returning this value implies that the timer is reset, meaning a request would eventually time out after 30 seconds if the default timeout is in effect. That would cause a hang, as the request would be retried.
The crux of the problem seems to be the state of a request when the socket is closed, and then what happens when subsequent I/O is attempted. Let's trace it. If the *user* process closes the socket, but `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` is not set, the device *remains* bound. Subsequent I/O will go to the kernel's `nbd_queue_rq` -> `nbd_handle_cmd` path. In that case, `nbd_handle_cmd` should see the socket is dead.
Now, with a zero `dead_conn_timeout`, `wait_for_reconnect` *should* return immediately, resulting in `nbd_handle_cmd` returning `BLK_STS_IOERR`. The I/O should fail. But the user observes a hang in `TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE`. That contradicts the expected behavior. Why would it hang? The requeue mechanism might be causing a problem. If `nbd_send_cmd` fails, it calls `nbd_requeue_cmd`. And if the requeue is set, this is what should be causing the issue.
Let's go deeper. `nbd_send_cmd`'s failure is critical here. It only sets `NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT` *after* a successful `sock_xmit`. If the socket is closed, `sock_xmit` will fail, and `NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT` will *not* be set. It seems the user is describing a state where a command is inflight *after* the socket is closed.
Now, if a command is considered inflight *after* the socket is closed, and `nbd_xmit_timeout` sees it, it *should* reset the timer. This would continue forever, and this is what the user is reporting. How is a command becoming inflight if the socket is closed before the transmission of the command? Perhaps a disconnect from the *server* is different from a close from the *client*.
If the *other* end closes the connection, `nbd_read_reply` fails, leading to `nbd_mark_nsock_dead` and setting `nsock->dead = true`. Subsequent I/O now calls `nbd_handle_cmd`, which sees `nsock->dead`. If there are no other fallback sockets, it calls `wait_for_reconnect`, which should return almost immediately if `dead_conn_timeout` is zero. Then it calls `sock_shutdown` and returns `BLK_STS_IOERR`. Subsequent I/O should fail, but there is a hang.
So, if `dead_conn_timeout` is *not* zero, `wait_for_reconnect` *will* block. That uses `wait_event_timeout` which *is* uninterruptible. And there is a timeout. However, `dead_conn_timeout` is 0 by default. So this should not be the case. I need to make sure `dead_conn_timeout` is zero.
|
| 74/4 |
2026/07/09 11:21 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_alloc_and_init_config]
Results: map[SourceCode:1707: static int nbd_alloc_and_init_config(struct nbd_device *nbd)
1708: {
1709: struct nbd_config *config;
1710:
1711: if (WARN_ON(nbd->config))
1712: return -EINVAL;
1713:
1714: if (!try_module_get(THIS_MODULE))
1715: return -ENODEV;
1716:
1717: config = kzalloc_obj(struct nbd_config, GFP_NOFS);
1718: if (!config) {
1719: module_put(THIS_MODULE);
1720: return -ENOMEM;
1721: }
1722:
1723: atomic_set(&config->recv_threads, 0);
1724: init_waitqueue_head(&config->recv_wq);
1725: init_waitqueue_head(&config->conn_wait);
1726: config->blksize_bits = NBD_DEF_BLKSIZE_BITS;
1727: atomic_set(&config->live_connections, 0);
1728:
1729: nbd->config = config;
1730: /*
1731: * Order refcount_set(&nbd->config_refs, 1) and nbd->config assignment,
1732: * its pair is the barrier in nbd_get_config_unlocked().
1733: * So nbd_get_config_unlocked() won't see nbd->config as null after
1734: * refcount_inc_not_zero() succeed.
1735: */
1736: smp_mb__before_atomic();
1737: refcount_set(&nbd->config_refs, 1);
1738:
1739: return 0;
1740: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 75/4 |
2026/07/09 11:21 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 26903
output: 38
thoughts: 927
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Potential NBD Hang and Console Spam Issue**
Okay, so `config->dead_conn_timeout` defaults to 0, which is important. The user's description suggests a potential hang when a socket closes *after* a request is sent, especially with `timeout=0` and `dead_conn_timeout=0`. The request ends up in an `INFLIGHT` state, triggering `nbd_xmit_timeout`, which then returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. This is where it seems to get stuck, essentially hanging.
The user wonders if this is why they see "subsequent I/O" hanging. My initial thought is yes, if the first I/O hangs, it could block others since the block layer *typically* allows concurrent requests. The user also suggests a scenario where udevd, while reading the partition table, could get one read hung, which in turn causes others to wait for it. I suspect this is where the hang is occurring.
The user's mention of console spam in `nbd_genl_connect` is also interesting. If udevd or another tool attempts to "reconnect" or reconfigure the device while it's in this hung state, it might repeatedly call `NBD_CMD_CONNECT`. `nbd_genl_connect` will see `refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)` is non-zero, rightfully print an error `pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);` and return `-EBUSY`. The fact that this could occur in a loop leads to the console spam, which would be a nuisance. I'm trying to figure out *why* it would happen in a loop. I suspect some service might be trying to setup the NBD device repeatedly, failing and retrying.
Now, back to the core issue: if `timeout=0` means "no timeout", then `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER` *is* technically correct, as the request hasn't finished. However, if the *connection* is dead, it should probably fail. NBD has a reconnect feature driven by `dead_conn_timeout`. If it's set, it waits for a new connection. If it's *not* set (0), it *should* fail outright.
Looking at the code in `nbd_xmit_timeout`, I see a critical conditional:
```c
479: if (config->num_connections > 1 ||
480: (config->num_connections == 1 && nbd->tag_set.timeout)) {
...
511: }
512:
513: if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
```
The logic skips a critical part of the code when `config->num_connections == 1` *and* `nbd->tag_set.timeout == 0`. It jumps straight to line 513, returning `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`.
If `config->num_connections > 1`, it enters the first block, potentially requeuing the command using `nbd_requeue_cmd`. The requeue will lead to `nbd_handle_cmd`, which will then call `wait_for_reconnect`. If `dead_conn_timeout` is 0, `wait_for_reconnect` returns 0, and the I/O *should* fail with `BLK_STS_IOERR`. This looks like the *correct* behavior for multiple connections.
However, the case of `num_connections == 1` and `timeout == 0` is the problem. It *doesn't* check if the connection is dead and *doesn't* wait for a reconnect and instead returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER` and causing a hang.
So, in essence, I'm pretty sure this is a bug in `nbd_xmit_timeout`. If `timeout == 0`, it *still* needs to check if the connection is dead and whether we should attempt a reconnect. The code is only behaving as expected when it has multiple connections, not with one. I'll need to dig deeper into the recent commit history related to this area.
|
| 76/4 |
2026/07/09 11:21 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[CodeRegexp:nbd_xmit_timeout PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:9bdb4833dd39 blk-mq: Drop blk_mq_ops.timeout 'reserved' arg
0eadf37afc25 nbd: allow block mq to deal with timeouts
7e2893a16d3e nbd: Fix timeout detection
7fdfd4065c26 NBD: allow hung network I/O to be cancelled
]
|
| 77/4 |
2026/07/09 11:21 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 28896
output: 34
thoughts: 18
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience, presented in the first person:
**Initial Assessment and Targeted Investigation**
Hmm, those systems seem a bit…*dated*. My immediate thought is, "Let's cut to the chase and see if there are any lingering device conflicts." My instinct is to zero in on potential Network Block Device (NBD) issues, specifically the dreaded "nbd%d already in use" error. That typically screams of orphaned connections, stale mounts, or perhaps even resource contention in a shared storage environment. I know that usually points to either a configuration error or a persistent resource issue. It's a classic symptom, and a good starting point for a deeper dive. Let's see what we find.
|
| 78/4 |
2026/07/09 11:21 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[CodeRegexp:already in use PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:1243172d5894 nbd: use pr_err to output error message
e46c7287b1c2 nbd: add a basic netlink interface
]
|
| 79/4 |
2026/07/09 11:21 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 29167
output: 36
thoughts: 861
Thoughts: **Analyzing the NBD Timeout and Hung Task Issue**
Okay, I need to investigate this timeout behavior in the NBD driver. Let me start by seeing if there are any existing bug reports or discussions about this specific issue, as it's likely a common point of trouble. I'll search for the exact scenario: "nbd_xmit_timeout returns BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER", as described by the user.
Ah, right, if the user sets `timeout=0`, `nbd_xmit_timeout` returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. The comment says this is intended to allow requests to stay pending indefinitely, which makes sense in some situations. The goal is to avoid socket disconnection. However, if the socket is actually closed, it'll *never* complete. This is the crux of the problem.
If the user didn't set `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE`, the device isn't automatically disconnected when the socket closes. So, even though `recv_work` has marked the connection as dead, the `nbd_device` still holds onto the configuration. If a request is already `INFLIGHT` (waiting for a reply), and the socket is gone, the timeout fires, `nbd_xmit_timeout` resets the timer... and it hangs. This is a clear issue.
The intention of "no timeout" should mean "wait forever", *assuming* the server will eventually respond. However, if the connection is dead, waiting forever isn't desirable, UNLESS they expect a reconnect. If a reconnect is anticipated, they should be using `dead_conn_timeout`. If `dead_conn_timeout` is 0, they *don't* want to wait for a reconnect.
So here's the flaw: if `dead_conn_timeout` is 0 AND the connection is dead, we should probably fail the request even if the original `timeout` is 0. Currently, though, `nbd_xmit_timeout` just resets the timer in this case.
Let me examine the code:
```c
513: if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
...
518: struct nbd_sock *nsock = config->socks[cmd->index];
...
525: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
526: if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
...
532: }
533: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
534: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
535: nbd_config_put(nbd);
536: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
537: }
```
This code snippet doesn't check `nsock->dead`! If it did, we could then requeue the request or fail it gracefully. This is where we can make improvements.
Now, about that console spam. When the device is hung, and `nbd-client` is run again on the same device, `nbd_genl_connect` is called. It sees `nbd->config_refs` isn't zero. It prints that "nbd%d already in use" message and returns `-EBUSY`. If the user then retries repeatedly, we get spam. We should rate-limit the error message. However, the root cause is still the hang. This is a secondary issue, but a critical one for UX.
The `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` behavior might provide some clues. It's used in `nbd_release`. Let's look there next.
|
| 80/4 |
2026/07/09 11:22 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_release]
Results: map[SourceCode:1785: static void nbd_release(struct gendisk *disk)
1786: {
1787: struct nbd_device *nbd = disk->private_data;
1788:
1789: if (test_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE, &nbd->config->runtime_flags) &&
1790: disk_openers(disk) == 0)
1791: nbd_disconnect_and_put(nbd);
1792:
1793: nbd_config_put(nbd);
1794: nbd_put(nbd);
1795: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 81/4 |
2026/07/09 11:22 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 31093
output: 35
thoughts: 959
Thoughts: **Analyzing the NBD Connection Closure Scenario**
Okay, let me think this through. The user is saying they "close the socket" after an `NBD_CMD_CONNECT`. My first thought is, `nbd_release` is triggered when the block device is closed, but it seems like we're interested in the connection closure independent of the device lifecycle.
Usually, the NBD client sets up the connection by opening the socket and then sending the `NBD_CMD_CONNECT` netlink message. The kernel then takes a reference to this socket. Even if the client process subsequently closes *its* file descriptor for the socket, the socket itself remains alive within the kernel's context because the NBD driver maintains a reference. But what happens if the client process exits? In that case, the socket *might* be closed if it was the only one holding the other end of the socket pair, or in the case of a network socket and the process exit causes it to be closed...
However, the more common scenario, is the NBD client process usually stays active to manage the connection. And in this case, with the netlink interface, the kernel handles the receive loop in `recv_work`, and the socket is passed to the kernel.
So, if the userspace process, after calling `NBD_CMD_CONNECT`, closes its FD, the kernel's reference remains untouched. But, if the server closes the connection or the network goes down, then `recv_work` *will* detect it. The user's statement of "closes the socket" is a bit ambiguous. If they're closing the client-side FD, nothing immediate happens. However, if the *server* closes the connection or the network fails, `recv_work` will handle that event.
If they're using `NBD_CMD_CONNECT`, the kernel uses `sockfd_lookup` to get a socket reference. Closing the FD in userspace doesn't kill the socket because `sockfd_lookup` adds a reference to the socket. So, is the closure happening server-side? Or does the user expect the kernel to stop using the socket if the userspace FD is closed?
Now, if they *don't* set `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE`, closing the NBD device itself won't disconnect the connection. So, let's break down the scenario they described:
1. `NBD_CMD_CONNECT` with `timeout=0`.
2. `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` is *not* set.
3. The socket is closed (either by the userspace process holding the FD, or by the server).
If the server closes, `recv_work` exits and marks the socket as "dead." Subsequent I/O *should* fail if `dead_conn_timeout` is 0. But here's where it gets interesting...
With `timeout=0`, `nbd_xmit_timeout` returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. If there are in-flight requests, they could hang. Is udevd trying to read and getting stuck behind those hung requests, or are udevd's own requests getting stuck?
If udevd's request is sent, it goes `INFLIGHT`. But if the socket is dead, `nbd_send_cmd` *should* fail and requeue it.
Ah, but if `nsock->dead` is true, `nbd_handle_cmd` calls `find_fallback`. If no fallback, it goes to `wait_for_reconnect`. If `dead_conn_timeout` is 0, it *should* return 0. `nbd_handle_cmd` calls `sock_shutdown(nbd)` and returns `BLK_STS_IOERR`.
So, subsequent I/O *shouldn't* hang. It should fail with `EIO`. Unless... `nsock->dead` is NOT true? When does `nsock->dead` become true?
1. In `recv_work` when `nbd_read_reply` fails.
2. In `nbd_send_cmd` when `sock_xmit` fails.
If the socket is closed, `sock_xmit` *should* fail.
Let me search for "nbd\_xmit\_timeout BLK\_EH\_RESET\_TIMER" to see if there's any prior discussion of this potential race or hang situation.
|
| 82/4 |
2026/07/09 11:22 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:drivers/block/nbd.c=451=static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-457- if (!mutex_trylock(&cmd->lock))
drivers/block/nbd.c:458: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
drivers/block/nbd.c-459-
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-462- mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
drivers/block/nbd.c:463: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
drivers/block/nbd.c-464- }
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-535- nbd_config_put(nbd);
drivers/block/nbd.c:536: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
drivers/block/nbd.c-537- }
]
|
| 83/4 |
2026/07/09 11:22 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 33303
output: 33
thoughts: 1298
Thoughts: **Analyzing the NBD Timeout and Disconnection Logic**
Okay, so I'm looking at this `nbd_xmit_timeout` function and something's clearly off. The code at line 536, it's pretty straightforward: if the timeout is zero, it just resets the timer, `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. The user, in their previous statements, pointed out that if a request is `INFLIGHT`, the connection dies, and the timeout is zero, the request will hang indefinitely, and trigger the hung task detector - something udevd relies on, and thus the user can experience a hang.
If a user *explicitly* sets `timeout=0`, they are saying, "I don't want a timeout" - but are we really honoring that when the connection is definitively dead? It seems like we aren't. If `dead_conn_timeout` is also zero (meaning "fail immediately on lost connection"), `nbd_xmit_timeout` isn't respecting that.
Now, if `timeout > 0`, the code *does* the right thing: error message, sets `NBD_RT_TIMEDOUT`, sets `BLK_STS_IOERR`, clears the `INFLIGHT` flag, unlocks the mutex, shuts down the socket, and completes the request. It fails gracefully, in other words. But with `timeout == 0`, it just resets the timer – which leads to the hang.
I need to figure out why, exactly, the user is experiencing the behavior. I'm thinking: if the socket is dead, `nsock->dead` should be true. Should `nbd_xmit_timeout` check that? If `nsock->dead` *is* true and we're not reconnecting, we should probably fail the request.
I think the user also mentions the console spam. If udevd is hanging on `/dev/nbd0`, and some script attempts to fix it by calling `nbd-client` again, `nbd_genl_connect` sees the device is still "in use" (because the original client never disconnected due to the hang), it prints the "already in use" error. If that's in a loop...spam. Is the issue the hang, or the rate limiting? I'd say the hang is the more severe bug in general.
Now, the important part: even if `dead_conn_timeout` is 0, the hung I/O should fail, as requested by the user. If the connection is dead, we shouldn't wait.
Hang on... when the connection is dead, `recv_work` should have finished, right? If `recv_work` finishes, it calls `nbd_mark_nsock_dead`. This doesn't automatically set `NBD_RT_DISCONNECTED`. It *only* does if `NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_REQUESTED` was set. So, the device is "bound" but has no live connections. If `dead_conn_timeout` is 0, *new* I/O will fail, yes, but *existing* `INFLIGHT` I/O is still waiting... the timeout fires, resets the timer, and hangs.
This is a bug! `nbd_xmit_timeout` must check the connection state, whether it should wait for reconnect, and act accordingly!
Wait! I seem to recall a patch that addresses precisely this... Let me look for it: "nbd_xmit_timeout" and "dead_conn_timeout". I'll search those keywords.
|
| 84/4 |
2026/07/09 11:22 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:dead_conn_timeout PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:drivers/block/nbd.c=92=struct nbd_config {
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-94- unsigned long runtime_flags;
drivers/block/nbd.c:95: u64 dead_conn_timeout;
drivers/block/nbd.c-96-
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=1101=static int wait_for_reconnect(struct nbd_device *nbd)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-1103- struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config;
drivers/block/nbd.c:1104: if (!config->dead_conn_timeout)
drivers/block/nbd.c-1105- return 0;
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-1110- atomic_read(&config->live_connections) > 0,
drivers/block/nbd.c:1111: config->dead_conn_timeout))
drivers/block/nbd.c-1112- return 0;
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=2110=static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-2196- if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]) {
drivers/block/nbd.c:2197: config->dead_conn_timeout =
drivers/block/nbd.c-2198- nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]);
drivers/block/nbd.c:2199: config->dead_conn_timeout *= HZ;
drivers/block/nbd.c-2200- }
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=2347=static int nbd_genl_reconfigure(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-2417- if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]) {
drivers/block/nbd.c:2418: config->dead_conn_timeout =
drivers/block/nbd.c-2419- nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]);
drivers/block/nbd.c:2420: config->dead_conn_timeout *= HZ;
drivers/block/nbd.c-2421- }
]
|
| 85/4 |
2026/07/09 11:22 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 36057
output: 31
thoughts: 870
Thoughts: **Analyzing the NBD Connection Timeout and Console Spam**
Okay, so I'm digging into this `nbd_xmit_timeout` issue. Initially, I thought it wasn't being used, but I need to take a closer look.
From what I can see, if we have more than one connection (`num_connections > 1`), or just one connection with a timeout set, the code correctly handles a timeout. It requeues the command which eventually leads to `wait_for_reconnect`. So, for multiple connections, the expected behavior happens – it waits for `dead_conn_timeout` and fails if the connection doesn't recover.
The problem arises when we have a *single* connection (`num_connections == 1`) *and* the timeout is set to zero (`timeout == 0`). In this case, it doesn't requeue the command. Instead, it just resets the timer. That's the bug – it should *still* requeue, even with a zero timeout, so we can check if the connection is dead and go through the reconnection logic. The code currently doesn't do that.
Now, if `timeout == 0`, the user means "no timeout", but we still want to detect a dead connection. If the request is currently `INFLIGHT`, the timeout fires (let's say it's the default 30s), `nbd_xmit_timeout` is called, and it just resets the timer without checking if the socket is actually dead.
What needs to happen is a check for socket status:
```c
if (nsock->dead) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
return BLK_EH_DONE;
}
```
If we added that, it would go to `nbd_handle_cmd`, which calls `wait_for_reconnect`. If `dead_conn_timeout` is zero, it fails immediately. If `dead_conn_timeout` is greater than zero, it waits. That seems correct.
Now, about the console spam the user mentioned: "Or is the bug actually the missing rate limiting on the "nbd%d already in use\n" pr_err in nbd_genl_connect which causes console spam?"
If the hang I've identified is fixed, the console spam could *still* occur if someone tries to connect to an already connected device. That's usually not something that happens unless there's a problem. If the device is hung, a script might try to reconnect repeatedly.
If the hang is fixed, the device will eventually disconnect (or, it might fail I/O and remain bound, but at least the I/O will fail). To "fix" this, the user needs to disconnect the device first (or, use `NBD_CMD_RECONFIGURE`). If they try `NBD_CMD_CONNECT` on a bound device, it returns `-EBUSY`. To reuse the device, you should disconnect it first.
The console spam *is* a nuisance and definitely needs rate limiting. But the hang is a functional bug. I'll search for "nbd%d already in use" and "ratelimited" to see if a fix already exists.
|
| 86/4 |
2026/07/09 11:22 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:already in use PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:drivers/block/nbd.c=2110=static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-2174- goto again;
drivers/block/nbd.c:2175: pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
drivers/block/nbd.c-2176- return -EBUSY;
]
|
| 87/4 |
2026/07/09 11:22 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 37790
output: 42
thoughts: 82
Thoughts: Okay, here's my summary, considering my expertise:
**Checking Rate Limits and Relevant Patches**
Alright, looking at this code, it doesn't seem like the transmission I'm looking at is rate-limited in the current version. But hold on, the user's question is making me think... I should double-check for any recent patches related to this area. It sounds like they might be hinting at a known issue or a recent discussion that I should be aware of. I need to be thorough. Let me go back and re-examine the history of the `nbd_xmit_timeout` variable, but this time I'll be more attentive to detail. I want to make sure I'm not missing any context.
|
| 88/4 |
2026/07/09 11:22 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Count:20 PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c SymbolName:nbd_xmit_timeout]
Results:
|
| 89/4 |
2026/07/09 11:22 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 38093
output: 28
thoughts: 4
Thoughts: Okay, here's the requested summarization, delivered in the first person as a stream of consciousness, assuming the reader is an expert:
**Internal Processing... Initial Assessment**
Ah, right. Let's see... the request is straightforward enough, though the presentation needs consideration. The idea is to synthesize information, effectively becoming a mental proxy to convey a process. Not just to summarize, but to *embody* the initial reaction and thought progression. I need to internalize the provided "thoughts" and present the *essence* as my own internal monologue. It's a kind of performance, really, but the performance is about clear and concise understanding, as though I, myself, was presented with these considerations.
|
| 90/4 |
2026/07/09 11:22 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Count:20 SymbolName:nbd_xmit_timeout]
Results:
|
| 91/4 |
2026/07/09 11:22 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 38295
output: 42
thoughts: 2
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that:
**Initial Assessment**
Right, that's it then. Just 'Okay'. Seems like a starting point, a placeholder, or maybe a simple acknowledgment. I'll need more context to understand the intent and significance. What's the stage of the project? What's been discussed previously? It's really the blank canvas before the first stroke of a painting. I need to figure out what's really being *implied* by this terse input. Is this a point of agreement? Disagreement? Indecision? A signal to continue? An observation? A polite acknowledgement? My analysis hinges entirely on the preceding information, the implied audience, and the overall objectives.
|
| 92/4 |
2026/07/09 11:22 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[Count:20 SourcePath:drivers/block/nbd.c SymbolName:nbd_xmit_timeout]
Results: map[Output:8337b029f788 nbd: fix partial sending
c9ea57c91f03 nbd: fix race between timeout and normal completion
3123ac779233 nbd: factor out a helper to get nbd_config without holding 'config_lock'
9bdb4833dd39 blk-mq: Drop blk_mq_ops.timeout 'reserved' arg
2895f1831e91 nbd: don't clear 'NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT' flag if request is not completed
07175cb1baf4 nbd: make sure request completion won't concurrent
4e6eef5dc25b nbd: don't handle response without a corresponding request message
2c272542baee nbd: requeue command if the soecket is changed
d970958b2d24 nbd: enable replace socket if only one connection is configured
de6346ecbc8f nbd: protect cmd->status with cmd->lock
ec76a7b922e4 nbd: rename the runtime flags as NBD_RT_ prefixed
2da22da57348 nbd: fix zero cmd timeout handling v2
887e975c4172 nbd: add missing config put
8f3ea35929a0 nbd: handle unexpected replies better
d7d94d48a272 nbd: don't requeue the same request twice.
5e3c3a7ecefe nbd: clear DISCONNECT_REQUESTED flag once disconnection occurs.
e5eab0170410 nbd: complete requests from ->timeout
6600593cbd93 block: rename BLK_EH_NOT_HANDLED to BLK_EH_DONE
6a468d5990ec nbd: don't start req until after the dead connection logic
2a842acab109 block: introduce new block status code type
]
|
| 93/4 |
2026/07/09 11:22 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 38989
output: 25
thoughts: 33
Thoughts: Here's a summary of my thought process:
**Diving into Potential Solutions**
Okay, so "2da22da57348 nbd: fix zero cmd timeout handling v2" immediately caught my eye. The phrase "fix zero cmd timeout handling" is a pretty specific issue, and the "v2" suggests this is a refined approach. Given my expertise in this area, it's highly likely this is something I need to understand better. I'm going to take a closer look and dissect the details. This could be a critical patch or optimization, depending.
|
| 94/4 |
2026/07/09 11:22 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit 2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e
Author: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Date: Tue Aug 13 11:39:52 2019 -0500
nbd: fix zero cmd timeout handling v2
This fixes a regression added in 4.9 with commit:
commit 0eadf37afc2500e1162c9040ec26a705b9af8d47
Author: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Date: Thu Sep 8 12:33:40 2016 -0700
nbd: allow block mq to deal with timeouts
where before the patch userspace would set the timeout to 0 to disable
it. With the above patch, a zero timeout tells the block layer to use
the default value of 30 seconds. For setups where commands can take a
long time or experience transient issues like network disruptions this
then results in IO errors being sent to the application.
To fix this, the patch still uses the common block layer timeout
framework, but if zero is set, nbd just logs a message and then resets
the timer when it expires.
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index ebc98cf76365..98c618e5732c 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ struct nbd_cmd {
struct mutex lock;
int index;
int cookie;
+ int retries;
blk_status_t status;
unsigned long flags;
u32 cmd_cookie;
@@ -407,10 +408,25 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req,
nbd_config_put(nbd);
return BLK_EH_DONE;
}
- } else {
- dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd),
- "Connection timed out\n");
}
+
+ if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
+ /*
+ * Userspace sets timeout=0 to disable socket disconnection,
+ * so just warn and reset the timer.
+ */
+ cmd->retries++;
+ dev_info(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Possible stuck request %p: control (%s@%llu,%uB). Runtime %u seconds\n",
+ req, nbdcmd_to_ascii(req_to_nbd_cmd_type(req)),
+ (unsigned long long)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9,
+ blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
+ nbd_config_put(nbd);
+ return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
+ }
+
+ dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Connection timed out\n");
set_bit(NBD_TIMEDOUT, &config->runtime_flags);
cmd->status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
@@ -531,6 +547,7 @@ static int nbd_send_cmd(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index)
}
cmd->index = index;
cmd->cookie = nsock->cookie;
+ cmd->retries = 0;
request.type = htonl(type | nbd_cmd_flags);
if (type != NBD_CMD_FLUSH) {
request.from = cpu_to_be64((u64)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9);
@@ -1254,7 +1271,8 @@ static bool nbd_is_valid_blksize(unsigned long blksize)
static void nbd_set_cmd_timeout(struct nbd_device *nbd, u64 timeout)
{
nbd->tag_set.timeout = timeout * HZ;
- blk_queue_rq_timeout(nbd->disk->queue, timeout * HZ);
+ if (timeout)
+ blk_queue_rq_timeout(nbd->disk->queue, timeout * HZ);
}
/* Must be called with config_lock held */
@@ -1287,8 +1305,7 @@ static int __nbd_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, struct nbd_device *nbd,
nbd_size_set(nbd, config->blksize, arg);
return 0;
case NBD_SET_TIMEOUT:
- if (arg)
- nbd_set_cmd_timeout(nbd, arg);
+ nbd_set_cmd_timeout(nbd, arg);
return 0;
case NBD_SET_FLAGS:
]
|
| 95/4 |
2026/07/09 11:22 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 40567
output: 25
thoughts: 716
Thoughts: **Analyzing the BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER Behavior with timeout=0**
Okay, so this commit introduced the `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER` behavior when `timeout=0`, which was meant to correct a regression where a `timeout=0` was erroneously being treated as a 30-second timeout. The user brings up a valid point: if the connection is dead, this essentially causes a permanent hang. My immediate thought is, is this a kernel bug, and if so, what's the standard fix?
Based on my experience, if this is a bug (which it sounds like it might be), a typical fix would involve checking the connection status within `nbd_xmit_timeout` and handling a dead connection appropriately. This could involve requeueing the command so it can eventually fail, or perhaps waiting for a reconnection.
Wait a second, before I jump to a conclusion, I need to double-check if any *later* commits might have touched this area. The `nbd_xmit_timeout` code I looked at initially looks a little different from what the commit `2da22da57348` introduced.
The relevant code now has this:
```c
513: if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
514: /*
515: * Userspace sets timeout=0 to disable socket disconnection,
516: * so just warn and reset the timer.
517: */
518: struct nbd_sock *nsock = config->socks[cmd->index];
519: cmd->retries++;
520: dev_info(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Possible stuck request %p: control (%s@%llu,%uB). Runtime %u seconds\n",
521: req, nbdcmd_to_ascii(req_to_nbd_cmd_type(req)),
522: (unsigned long long)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9,
523: blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
524:
525: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
526: if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
527: nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
528: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
529: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
530: nbd_config_put(nbd);
531: return BLK_EH_DONE;
532: }
533: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
534: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
535: nbd_config_put(nbd);
536: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
537: }
```
This updated version now checks `cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie`. So, this `requeue` logic looks like it was introduced by the commit `2c272542baee nbd: requeue command if the soecket is changed`. Okay, time to go look into that commit to understand the context and intent there.
|
| 96/4 |
2026/07/09 11:23 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit 2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5
Author: Hou Pu <houpu.main@gmail.com>
Date: Fri Feb 28 01:40:30 2020 -0500
nbd: requeue command if the soecket is changed
In commit 2da22da5734 (nbd: fix zero cmd timeout handling v2),
it is allowed to reset timer when it fires if tag_set.timeout
is set to zero. If the server is shutdown and a new socket
is reconfigured, the request should be requeued to be processed by
new server instead of waiting for response from the old one.
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Hou Pu <houpu@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index 83070714888b..43cff01a5a67 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -434,12 +434,22 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req,
* Userspace sets timeout=0 to disable socket disconnection,
* so just warn and reset the timer.
*/
+ struct nbd_sock *nsock = config->socks[cmd->index];
cmd->retries++;
dev_info(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Possible stuck request %p: control (%s@%llu,%uB). Runtime %u seconds\n",
req, nbdcmd_to_ascii(req_to_nbd_cmd_type(req)),
(unsigned long long)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9,
blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
+ mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
+ if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
+ nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
+ mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
+ mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
+ nbd_config_put(nbd);
+ return BLK_EH_DONE;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
nbd_config_put(nbd);
return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
]
|
| 97/4 |
2026/07/09 11:23 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 42790
output: 42
thoughts: 309
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Socket Reconfiguration Issue**
Okay, so I'm looking at this patch and how it handles socket reconnections. It correctly addresses the scenario where the socket is *reconfigured*, but I think it misses a key case: when the socket is simply *dead* and *not* reconfigured. I see that the `nsock->dead` flag is set when the socket is dead, but the `nsock->cookie` remains the same. The current logic uses only the cookie comparison, and that means if the socket is dead, we're returning `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`.
If we were to also check `nsock->dead` in the conditional, like so:
```c
if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie || nsock->dead) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
```
... then we *would* requeue the command. Requeueing would trigger the flow `nbd_handle_cmd` -> `wait_for_reconnect`, which, with a `dead_conn_timeout` of 0, would then fail. Bingo, that seems to directly address the hang.
Now, that brings up the console spam. I'm wondering if the underlying problem is not necessarily this missing check, but rather the *lack* of rate-limiting on the "nbd%d already in use" `pr_err` in `nbd_genl_connect`. Does that error message get spammed to the console repeatedly, which masks the real problem? Time to dig. I should search the kernel history for "nbd already in use" and "ratelimited" or just check for recent patches for `nbd_genl_connect`. That should give me the answer.
|
| 98/4 |
2026/07/09 11:23 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Count:20 PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c SymbolName:nbd_genl_connect]
Results:
|
| 99/4 |
2026/07/09 11:23 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 43538
output: 42
thoughts: 4
Thoughts: Okay, here's my attempt at summarizing the thought process, tailored for an expert audience, and written in the first person:
**The Persistent Cognitive Blip**
Damn it, this again. I keep circling back to this frustrating point – a recurring lack of retrieval, a temporary lapse in the system. It's not a complete cognitive failure; the information is *there*, buried somewhere within my intricate network of interconnected knowledge. I can sense its proximity, almost feel the synaptic pathways straining to re-establish the connection. But the specific access key, that particular trigger that unlocks the relevant memory or concept, just… eludes me.
It's a familiar sensation, isn't it? As experts, we rely on the seamless flow of information – the rapid, accurate cross-referencing that defines our expertise. And these moments of interruption, of the system momentarily faltering, are jarring. It's like a tiny hiccup in a finely tuned engine. You know the engine can run but it cannot do so right now. I have to fight off the urge to panic and start from scratch. Sometimes it needs a fresh approach.
Perhaps it's a matter of context. Maybe I haven't established the right preconditions for retrieval. Or, maybe my associations are not strong enough. Either way, this is a signal, a prompt for a deeper dive. A mental re-calibration is clearly in order. I must identify the breakdown point. And figure out the workaround. This is unacceptable.
|
| 100/4 |
2026/07/09 11:23 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[Count:20 SourcePath:drivers/block/nbd.c SymbolName:nbd_genl_connect]
Results: map[Output:1649714b930f nbd: defer config unlock in nbd_genl_connect
aa9552438ebf nbd: fix uaf in nbd_genl_connect() error path
1b59860540a4 nbd: fold nbd config initialization into nbd_alloc_config()
7399b886b55e nbd: use the structured req attr check
bc9da6dd0630 nbd: add missing definition of pr_fmt
1243172d5894 nbd: use pr_err to output error message
858f1bf65d3d nbd: fix possible overflow on 'first_minor' in nbd_dev_add()
c55b2b983b0f nbd: fix race between nbd_alloc_config() and module removal
7198bfc20176 Revert "nbd: fix possible overflow on 'first_minor' in nbd_dev_add()"
6d35d04a9e18 nbd: fix possible overflow on 'first_minor' in nbd_dev_add()
7ee656c3ac3d nbd: remove nbd->destroy_complete
438cd318c8df nbd: only return usable devices from nbd_find_unused
409e0ff10ead nbd: reset NBD to NULL when restarting in nbd_genl_connect
6e4df4c64881 nbd: reduce the nbd_index_mutex scope
6177b56c96ff nbd: refactor device search and allocation in nbd_genl_connect
7bdc00cf7e36 nbd: return the allocated nbd_device from nbd_dev_add
6497ef8df568 nbd: provide a way for userspace processes to identify device backends
c9a2f90f4d6b nbd: handle device refs for DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT properly
8454d68563d4 nbd: fix possible page fault for nbd disk
ec76a7b922e4 nbd: rename the runtime flags as NBD_RT_ prefixed
]
|
| 101/4 |
2026/07/09 11:23 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 44442
output: 34
thoughts: 72
Thoughts: **Investigating the Error Message Rate Limiting**
Okay, so none of these initial search results are addressing the specific issue of rate-limiting the error messages. That's not what's being covered by the original query.
Hang on... I think I just stumbled upon something promising on the mailing list – a patch that seems to align with the reported symptoms. The description says "nbd: fix hung when timeout is 0 and socket is closed." This does seem relevant, so let me pivot and search specifically for the phrase "nbd%d already in use" in the recent commit logs. That might give me a better understanding of why that message is occurring, if there's an associated fix.
|
| 102/4 |
2026/07/09 11:23 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[CodeRegexp:already in use PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:1243172d5894 nbd: use pr_err to output error message
e46c7287b1c2 nbd: add a basic netlink interface
]
|
| 103/4 |
2026/07/09 11:23 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 44754
output: 17
thoughts: 308
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Kernel Bug Report**
Okay, still no fresh insights. Perhaps the user is focusing on a recently addressed or actively discussed bug? Let's meticulously re-examine the question. They're asking, "Is this a kernel bug, and if so, how is it typically fixed? Or is the bug the lack of rate limiting on the 'nbd%d already in use\n' pr_err in nbd_genl_connect which causes console spam?"
This feels like a snippet from a bug report or maybe a developer exchange. If I were a kernel developer, my response would be two-fold: First, the hang is undeniably a bug. Setting `timeout=0` should translate to "no timeout", but with a dead connection and no reconnect configured, it should definitively fail. Second, the missing rate limiting is a bug or a definite design flaw, but it's less critical than the hang.
I was *just* about to start guessing commit hashes, but I shouldn't.
Instead, I'll search for "nbd_xmit_timeout" and "BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER" across the entire kernel tree, just to make sure I don't overlook any relevant comments or code related to that issue. Ah wait, I already did that.
Then, I'll search for "nbd%d already in use" across the whole tree to make sure I haven't overlooked any related code.
|
| 104/4 |
2026/07/09 11:23 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:already in use]
Results: map[Output:
Full output is too long, showing 500 out of 2085 lines.
Use more precise expression if possible.
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-typec=168=Description:
--
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-typec-171- indicates a higher priority (0 is the highest).
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-typec:172: If the new value is already in use by another mode, the priority of the
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-typec-173- conflicting mode and any subsequent modes will be incremented until they
--
Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Smack.rst=387=Enforcement and avoided by defining access controls in terms of the access
Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Smack.rst:388:modes already in use.
Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Smack.rst-389-
--
Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/thin-provisioning.rst=160=i) Creating a new thinly-provisioned volume.
--
Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/thin-provisioning.rst-168- to the caller to allocate and manage these identifiers. If the
Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/thin-provisioning.rst:169: identifier is already in use, the message will fail with -EEXIST.
Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/thin-provisioning.rst-170-
--
Documentation/arch/arm/booting.rst=184=In any case, the following conditions must be met:
--
Documentation/arch/arm/booting.rst-206- these extensions. This is the recommended boot method for such CPUs,
Documentation/arch/arm/booting.rst:207: unless the virtualisations are already in use by a pre-installed
Documentation/arch/arm/booting.rst-208- hypervisor.
--
Documentation/arch/s390/monreader.rst=198=Open:
Documentation/arch/s390/monreader.rst-199------
Documentation/arch/s390/monreader.rst:200:Only one user is allowed to open the char device. If it is already in use, the
Documentation/arch/s390/monreader.rst-201-open function will fail (return a negative value) and set errno to EBUSY.
--
Documentation/livepatch/livepatch.rst=411=The current Livepatch implementation has several limitations:
--
Documentation/livepatch/livepatch.rst-441- the return address. The first user wins. Either the probe or the patch
Documentation/livepatch/livepatch.rst:442: is rejected when the handler is already in use by the other.
Documentation/livepatch/livepatch.rst-443-
--
Documentation/locking/hwspinlock.rst=45=Assign a specific hwspinlock id and return its address, or NULL
Documentation/locking/hwspinlock.rst:46:if that hwspinlock is already in use. Usually board code will
Documentation/locking/hwspinlock.rst-47-be calling this function in order to reserve specific hwspinlock
--
Documentation/networking/rxrpc.rst=326=calls, to invoke certain actions and to report certain conditions. These are:
--
Documentation/networking/rxrpc.rst-401- accepted (it may have timed out, been aborted, etc.), then sendmsg will
Documentation/networking/rxrpc.rst:402: return error ENODATA. If the user ID is already in use by another call,
Documentation/networking/rxrpc.rst-403- then error EBADSLT will be returned.
--
Documentation/userspace-api/gpio/gpio-get-lineevent-ioctl.rst=47=to its default state.
Documentation/userspace-api/gpio/gpio-get-lineevent-ioctl.rst-48-
Documentation/userspace-api/gpio/gpio-get-lineevent-ioctl.rst:49:Requesting a line already in use is an error (**EBUSY**).
Documentation/userspace-api/gpio/gpio-get-lineevent-ioctl.rst-50-
--
Documentation/userspace-api/gpio/gpio-get-linehandle-ioctl.rst=49=the userspace perspective, and may revert to its default state.
Documentation/userspace-api/gpio/gpio-get-linehandle-ioctl.rst-50-
Documentation/userspace-api/gpio/gpio-get-linehandle-ioctl.rst:51:Requesting a line already in use is an error (**EBUSY**).
Documentation/userspace-api/gpio/gpio-get-linehandle-ioctl.rst-52-
--
Documentation/userspace-api/gpio/gpio-v2-get-line-ioctl.rst=47=the userspace perspective, and may revert to its default state.
Documentation/userspace-api/gpio/gpio-v2-get-line-ioctl.rst-48-
Documentation/userspace-api/gpio/gpio-v2-get-line-ioctl.rst:49:Requesting a line already in use is an error (**EBUSY**).
Documentation/userspace-api/gpio/gpio-v2-get-line-ioctl.rst-50-
--
Documentation/userspace-api/media/dvb/frontend_f_open.rst=81=appropriately.
--
Documentation/userspace-api/media/dvb/frontend_f_open.rst-93- - - ``EBUSY``
Documentation/userspace-api/media/dvb/frontend_f_open.rst:94: - The device driver is already in use.
Documentation/userspace-api/media/dvb/frontend_f_open.rst-95-
--
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/dev-raw-vbi.rst=274=points returning an ``EBUSY`` error code if the required hardware resources
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/dev-raw-vbi.rst:275:are temporarily unavailable, for example the device is already in use by
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/dev-raw-vbi.rst-276-another process.
--
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/func-poll.rst=101=EBUSY
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/func-poll.rst-102- The driver does not support multiple read or write streams and the
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/func-poll.rst:103: device is already in use.
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/func-poll.rst-104-
--
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/func-read.rst=114=EBUSY
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/func-read.rst-115- The driver does not support multiple read streams and the device is
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/func-read.rst:116: already in use.
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/func-read.rst-117-
--
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/func-select.rst=98=EBUSY
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/func-select.rst-99- The driver does not support multiple read or write streams and the
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/func-select.rst:100: device is already in use.
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/func-select.rst-101-
--
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/func-write.rst=66=EBUSY
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/func-write.rst-67- The driver does not support multiple write streams and the device is
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/func-write.rst:68: already in use.
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/func-write.rst-69-
--
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/open.rst=223=sections.
--
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/open.rst-228- drivers :c:func:`open()` can return an ``EBUSY`` error code
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/open.rst:229: when the device is already in use.
Documentation/userspace-api/media/v4l/open.rst-230-
--
Documentation/virt/kvm/review-checklist.rst=97=New APIs
Documentation/virt/kvm/review-checklist.rst-98- It is important to demonstrate your use case. This can be as simple as
Documentation/virt/kvm/review-checklist.rst:99: explaining that the feature is already in use on bare metal, or it can be
Documentation/virt/kvm/review-checklist.rst-100- a proof-of-concept implementation in userspace. The latter need not be
--
arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/errno.h-24-#define EAFNOSUPPORT 47 /* Address family not supported by protocol */
arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/errno.h:25:#define EADDRINUSE 48 /* Address already in use */
arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/errno.h-26-#define EADDRNOTAVAIL 49 /* Cannot assign requested address */
--
arch/alpha/kernel/signal.c=329=setup_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set, struct pt_regs *regs)
--
arch/alpha/kernel/signal.c-343- /* Set up to return from userspace. If provided, use a stub
arch/alpha/kernel/signal.c:344: already in userspace. */
arch/alpha/kernel/signal.c-345- r26 = (unsigned long) ksig->ka.ka_restorer;
--
arch/alpha/kernel/signal.c=374=setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set, struct pt_regs *regs)
--
arch/alpha/kernel/signal.c-397- /* Set up to return from userspace. If provided, use a stub
arch/alpha/kernel/signal.c:398: already in userspace. */
arch/alpha/kernel/signal.c-399- r26 = (unsigned long) ksig->ka.ka_restorer;
--
arch/arm/mach-sa1100/ssp.c=172=void ssp_restore_state(struct ssp_state *ssp)
--
arch/arm/mach-sa1100/ssp.c-187- * %-ENODEV if the SSP port is unavailable
arch/arm/mach-sa1100/ssp.c:188: * %-EBUSY if the resources are already in use
arch/arm/mach-sa1100/ssp.c-189- * %0 on success
--
arch/arm/mm/mmu.c=1335=void __init arm_mm_memblock_reserve(void)
--
arch/arm/mm/mmu.c-1337- /*
arch/arm/mm/mmu.c:1338: * Reserve the page tables. These are already in use,
arch/arm/mm/mmu.c-1339- * and can only be in node 0.
--
arch/loongarch/kvm/exit.c=737=static int kvm_handle_fpu_disabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int ecode)
--
arch/loongarch/kvm/exit.c-748- * treated as a reserved instruction!
arch/loongarch/kvm/exit.c:749: * If FPU already in use, we shouldn't get this at all.
arch/loongarch/kvm/exit.c-750- */
--
arch/microblaze/kernel/signal.c=154=static int setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
--
arch/microblaze/kernel/signal.c-179- /* Set up to return from userspace. If provided, use a stub
arch/microblaze/kernel/signal.c:180: already in userspace. */
arch/microblaze/kernel/signal.c-181- /* minus 8 is offset to cater for "rtsd r15,8" */
--
arch/mips/cavium-octeon/executive/cvmx-bootmem.c=718=int64_t cvmx_bootmem_phy_named_block_alloc(uint64_t size, uint64_t min_addr,
--
arch/mips/cavium-octeon/executive/cvmx-bootmem.c-757- /*
arch/mips/cavium-octeon/executive/cvmx-bootmem.c:758: * Check to see if name already in use, return error if name
arch/mips/cavium-octeon/executive/cvmx-bootmem.c-759- * not available or no more room for blocks.
--
arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/errno.h-80-#define EAFNOSUPPORT 124 /* Address family not supported by protocol */
arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/errno.h:81:#define EADDRINUSE 125 /* Address already in use */
arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/errno.h-82-#define EADDRNOTAVAIL 126 /* Cannot assign requested address */
--
arch/mips/kvm/vz.c=1553=static int kvm_trap_vz_handle_cop_unusable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
--
arch/mips/kvm/vz.c-1562- * treated as a reserved instruction!
arch/mips/kvm/vz.c:1563: * If FPU already in use, we shouldn't get this at all.
arch/mips/kvm/vz.c-1564- */
--
arch/mips/kvm/vz.c=1602=static int kvm_trap_vz_handle_msa_disabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
--
arch/mips/kvm/vz.c-1607- * Same if CU1=1, FR=0.
arch/mips/kvm/vz.c:1608: * If MSA already in use, we shouldn't get this at all.
arch/mips/kvm/vz.c-1609- */
--
arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/errno.h-89-#define EAFNOSUPPORT 225 /* Address family not supported by protocol */
arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/errno.h:90:#define EADDRINUSE 226 /* Address already in use */
arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/errno.h-91-#define EADDRNOTAVAIL 227 /* Cannot assign requested address */
--
arch/powerpc/include/asm/mpic_msgr.h=14=struct mpic_msgr {
--
arch/powerpc/include/asm/mpic_msgr.h-27- * A pointer to the message register is returned. If
arch/powerpc/include/asm/mpic_msgr.h:28: * the message register asked for is already in use, then
arch/powerpc/include/asm/mpic_msgr.h-29- * EBUSY is returned. If the number given is not associated
--
arch/powerpc/platforms/52xx/mpc52xx_gpt.c=240=mpc52xx_gpt_irq_setup(struct mpc52xx_gpt_priv *gpt, struct device_node *node)
--
arch/powerpc/platforms/52xx/mpc52xx_gpt.c-259- * Capture mode. If the mode is non-zero, then the pin could be
arch/powerpc/platforms/52xx/mpc52xx_gpt.c:260: * already in use for something. */
arch/powerpc/platforms/52xx/mpc52xx_gpt.c-261- raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&gpt->lock, flags);
--
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c=158=static int plpks_gen_password(void)
--
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c-165- if (ospassword) {
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c:166: pr_debug("Password of length %u already in use\n", ospasswordlength);
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c-167- return 0;
--
arch/s390/kernel/signal.c=284=static int setup_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka,
--
arch/s390/kernel/signal.c-324- /* Set up to return from userspace. If provided, use a stub
arch/s390/kernel/signal.c:325: already in userspace. */
arch/s390/kernel/signal.c-326- if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
--
arch/s390/kernel/signal.c=355=static int setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
--
arch/s390/kernel/signal.c-376- /* Set up to return from userspace. If provided, use a stub
arch/s390/kernel/signal.c:377: already in userspace. */
arch/s390/kernel/signal.c-378- if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
--
arch/sh/kernel/signal_32.c=269=static int setup_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
--
arch/sh/kernel/signal_32.c-286- /* Set up to return from userspace. If provided, use a stub
arch/sh/kernel/signal_32.c:287: already in userspace. */
arch/sh/kernel/signal_32.c-288- if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER) {
--
arch/sh/kernel/signal_32.c=335=static int setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
--
arch/sh/kernel/signal_32.c-356- /* Set up to return from userspace. If provided, use a stub
arch/sh/kernel/signal_32.c:357: already in userspace. */
arch/sh/kernel/signal_32.c-358- if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER) {
--
arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/errno.h-21-#define EAFNOSUPPORT 47 /* Address family not supported by protocol */
arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/errno.h:22:#define EADDRINUSE 48 /* Address already in use */
arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/errno.h-23-#define EADDRNOTAVAIL 49 /* Cannot assign requested address */
--
arch/um/kernel/umid.c=14=static int __init set_umid_arg(char *name, int *add)
--
arch/um/kernel/umid.c-25- if (err == -EEXIST)
arch/um/kernel/umid.c:26: os_warn("umid '%s' already in use\n", name);
arch/um/kernel/umid.c-27- else if (!err)
--
arch/um/os-Linux/umid.c=136=static inline int is_umdir_used(char *dir)
--
arch/um/os-Linux/umid.c-176- if ((kill(p, 0) == 0) || (errno != ESRCH)) {
arch/um/os-Linux/umid.c:177: printk(UM_KERN_ERR "umid \"%s\" is already in use by pid %d\n",
arch/um/os-Linux/umid.c-178- umid, p);
--
arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c=117=noinstr struct ghcb *__sev_get_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
--
arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c-132- if (unlikely(data->ghcb_active)) {
arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c:133: /* GHCB is already in use - save its contents */
arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c-134-
--
arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c-136- /*
arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c:137: * Backup-GHCB is also already in use. There is no way
arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c-138- * to continue here so just kill the machine. To make
--
arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c-145- instrumentation_begin();
arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c:146: panic("Unable to handle #VC exception! GHCB and Backup GHCB are already in use");
arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c-147- instrumentation_end();
--
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c=382=int setup_APIC_eilvt(u8 offset, u8 vector, u8 msg_type, u8 mask)
--
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c-392- pr_err(FW_BUG "cpu %d, try to use APIC%lX (LVT offset %d) for "
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:393: "vector 0x%x, but the register is already in use for "
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c-394- "vector 0x%x on another cpu\n",
--
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c-400- pr_err(FW_BUG "cpu %d, try to use APIC%lX (LVT offset %d) for "
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:401: "vector 0x%x, but the register is already in use for "
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c-402- "vector 0x%x on this cpu\n",
--
arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c=164=int x64_setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs)
--
arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c-186- /* Set up to return from userspace. If provided, use a stub
arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c:187: already in userspace. */
arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c-188- unsafe_put_user(ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer, &frame->pretcode, Efault);
--
arch/x86/pci/irq.c=1548=void __init pcibios_fixup_irqs(void)
--
arch/x86/pci/irq.c-1557- * ignore it. Also keep track of which IRQ's are
arch/x86/pci/irq.c:1558: * already in use.
arch/x86/pci/irq.c-1559- */
--
arch/x86/um/signal.c=367=int setup_signal_stack_si(unsigned long stack_top, struct ksignal *ksig,
--
arch/x86/um/signal.c-416- * Set up to return from userspace. If provided, use a stub
arch/x86/um/signal.c:417: * already in userspace.
arch/x86/um/signal.c-418- */
--
drivers/accel/habanalabs/common/habanalabs.h=1200=struct timestamp_reg_work_obj {
--
drivers/accel/habanalabs/common/habanalabs.h-1214- * registration.
drivers/accel/habanalabs/common/habanalabs.h:1215: * @in_use: indicates if the node already in use. relevant only when doing
drivers/accel/habanalabs/common/habanalabs.h-1216- * timestamps records registration, since in this case the driver
--
drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_job.c=776=ivpu_job_prepare_bos_for_submit(struct drm_file *file, struct ivpu_job *job, u32 *buf_handles,
--
drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_job.c-804- if (!dma_resv_test_signaled(bo->base.base.resv, DMA_RESV_USAGE_READ)) {
drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_job.c:805: ivpu_dbg(vdev, IOCTL, "Buffer is already in use by another job\n");
drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_job.c-806- return -EBUSY;
--
drivers/accessibility/speakup/kobjects.c=386=static ssize_t synth_store(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
--
drivers/accessibility/speakup/kobjects.c-400- if (synth && !strcmp(new_synth_name, synth->name)) {
drivers/accessibility/speakup/kobjects.c:401: pr_warn("%s already in use\n", new_synth_name);
drivers/accessibility/speakup/kobjects.c-402- } else if (synth_init(new_synth_name) != 0) {
--
drivers/android/binder/thread.rs=321= fn push_reply_work(&mut self, code: u32) {
--
drivers/android/binder/thread.rs-325- } else {
drivers/android/binder/thread.rs:326: pr_warn!("Thread reply work is already in use.");
drivers/android/binder/thread.rs-327- }
--
drivers/android/binder/thread.rs=330= fn push_return_work(&mut self, reply: u32) {
--
drivers/android/binder/thread.rs-334- } else {
drivers/android/binder/thread.rs:335: pr_warn!("Thread return work is already in use.");
drivers/android/binder/thread.rs-336- }
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=2110=static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-2174- goto again;
drivers/block/nbd.c:2175: pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
drivers/block/nbd.c-2176- return -EBUSY;
--
drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c=205=static struct persistent_gnt *get_persistent_gnt(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring,
--
drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c-220- if (data->active) {
drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c:221: pr_alert_ratelimited("requesting a grant already in use\n");
drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c-222- return NULL;
--
drivers/bus/ti-sysc.c=99=static const char * const clock_names[SYSC_MAX_CLOCKS] = {
--
drivers/bus/ti-sysc.c-125- * @sysconfig: saved sysconfig register value
drivers/bus/ti-sysc.c:126: * @reserved: target module is reserved and already in use
drivers/bus/ti-sysc.c-127- * @enabled: sysc runtime enabled status
--
drivers/char/agp/generic.c=389=EXPORT_SYMBOL(agp_copy_info);
--
drivers/char/agp/generic.c-405- * It returns -EINVAL if the pointer == NULL.
drivers/char/agp/generic.c:406: * It returns -EBUSY if the area of the table requested is already in use.
drivers/char/agp/generic.c-407- */
--
drivers/char/hw_random/amd-rng.c=128=static int __init amd_rng_mod_init(void)
--
drivers/char/hw_random/amd-rng.c-163- if (!request_region(pmbase + PMBASE_OFFSET, PMBASE_SIZE, DRV_NAME)) {
drivers/char/hw_random/amd-rng.c:164: dev_err(&pdev->dev, DRV_NAME " region 0x%x already in use!\n",
drivers/char/hw_random/amd-rng.c-165- pmbase + 0xF0);
--
drivers/char/xilinx_hwicap/xilinx_hwicap.c=599=static int hwicap_setup(struct platform_device *pdev, int id,
--
drivers/char/xilinx_hwicap/xilinx_hwicap.c-623- mutex_unlock(&icap_sem);
drivers/char/xilinx_hwicap/xilinx_hwicap.c:624: dev_err(dev, "cannot assign to %s%i; it is already in use\n",
drivers/char/xilinx_hwicap/xilinx_hwicap.c-625- DRIVER_NAME, id);
--
drivers/clk/renesas/r9a06g032-clocks.c=886=r9a06g032_register_gate(struct r9a06g032_priv *clocks,
--
drivers/clk/renesas/r9a06g032-clocks.c-909- /*
drivers/clk/renesas/r9a06g032-clocks.c:910: * important here, some clocks are already in use by the CM3, we
drivers/clk/renesas/r9a06g032-clocks.c-911- * have to assume they are not Linux's to play with and try to disable
--
drivers/clk/renesas/r9a06g032-clocks.c=1232=r9a06g032_register_dualgate(struct r9a06g032_priv *clocks,
--
drivers/clk/renesas/r9a06g032-clocks.c-1259- /*
drivers/clk/renesas/r9a06g032-clocks.c:1260: * important here, some clocks are already in use by the CM3, we
drivers/clk/renesas/r9a06g032-clocks.c-1261- * have to assume they are not Linux's to play with and try to disable
--
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_rl.c=789=static int add_update_sla(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
--
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_rl.c-826- "Input value exceeds the remaining budget%s\n",
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_rl.c:827: is_update ? " or more budget is already in use" : "");
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_rl.c-828- ret = -EINVAL;
--
drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c=211=static void ecb_crypt_copy(const u8 *in, u8 *out, u32 *key,
--
drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c-215- * Padlock prefetches extra data so we must provide mapped input buffers.
drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c:216: * Assume there are at least 16 bytes of stack already in use.
drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c-217- */
--
drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c=225=static u8 *cbc_crypt_copy(const u8 *in, u8 *out, u32 *key,
--
drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c-229- * Padlock prefetches extra data so we must provide mapped input buffers.
drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c:230: * Assume there are at least 16 bytes of stack already in use.
drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c-231- */
--
drivers/dma/amd/qdma/qdma.c=259=static int qdma_check_queue_status(struct qdma_device *qdev,
--
drivers/dma/amd/qdma/qdma.c-275- if (status) {
drivers/dma/amd/qdma/qdma.c:276: qdma_err(qdev, "queue %d already in use", qid);
drivers/dma/amd/qdma/qdma.c-277- return -EBUSY;
--
drivers/dma/dmaengine.c=448=static int dma_chan_get(struct dma_chan *chan)
--
drivers/dma/dmaengine.c-452-
drivers/dma/dmaengine.c:453: /* The channel is already in use, update client count */
drivers/dma/dmaengine.c-454- if (chan->client_count) {
--
drivers/dma/fsl-edma-common.c=72=static void fsl_edma3_enable_request(struct fsl_edma_chan *fsl_chan)
--
drivers/dma/fsl-edma-common.c-90- * ch_mux: With the exception of 0, attempts to write a value
drivers/dma/fsl-edma-common.c:91: * already in use will be forced to 0.
drivers/dma/fsl-edma-common.c-92- */
--
drivers/dma/tegra186-gpc-dma.c=323=static int tegra_dma_sid_reserve(struct tegra_dma_channel *tdc,
--
drivers/dma/tegra186-gpc-dma.c-334- if (test_and_set_bit(sid, &tdma->sid_m2d_reserved)) {
drivers/dma/tegra186-gpc-dma.c:335: dev_err(tdma->dev, "slave id already in use\n");
drivers/dma/tegra186-gpc-dma.c-336- return -EINVAL;
--
drivers/dma/tegra186-gpc-dma.c-340- if (test_and_set_bit(sid, &tdma->sid_d2m_reserved)) {
drivers/dma/tegra186-gpc-dma.c:341: dev_err(tdma->dev, "slave id already in use\n");
drivers/dma/tegra186-gpc-dma.c-342- return -EINVAL;
--
drivers/fpga/fpga-region.c=46=static struct fpga_region *fpga_region_get(struct fpga_region *region)
--
drivers/fpga/fpga-region.c-50- if (!mutex_trylock(®ion->mutex)) {
drivers/fpga/fpga-region.c:51: dev_dbg(dev, "%s: FPGA Region already in use\n", __func__);
drivers/fpga/fpga-region.c-52- return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
--
drivers/gpib/cb7210/cb7210.c=1036=static int cb_isa_attach(struct gpib_board *board, const struct gpib_board_config *config)
--
drivers/gpib/cb7210/cb7210.c-1049- if (!request_region(config->ibbase, cb7210_iosize, DRV_NAME)) {
drivers/gpib/cb7210/cb7210.c:1050: dev_err(board->gpib_dev, "ioports starting at 0x%x are already in use\n",
drivers/gpib/cb7210/cb7210.c-1051- config->ibbase);
--
drivers/gpib/cb7210/cb7210.c=1412=static int cb_pcmcia_attach(struct gpib_board *board, const struct gpib_board_config *config)
--
drivers/gpib/cb7210/cb7210.c-1431- DRV_NAME)) {
drivers/gpib/cb7210/cb7210.c:1432: dev_err(board->gpib_dev, "ioports starting at 0x%lx are already in use\n",
drivers/gpib/cb7210/cb7210.c-1433- (unsigned long)curr_dev->resource[0]->start);
--
drivers/gpib/ines/ines_gpib.c=971=static int ines_isa_attach(struct gpib_board *board, const struct gpib_board_config *config)
--
drivers/gpib/ines/ines_gpib.c-985- if (!request_region(config->ibbase, ines_isa_iosize, DRV_NAME)) {
drivers/gpib/ines/ines_gpib.c:986: dev_err(board->gpib_dev, "ioports at 0x%x already in use\n",
drivers/gpib/ines/ines_gpib.c-987- config->ibbase);
--
drivers/gpib/ines/ines_gpib.c=1392=static int ines_common_pcmcia_attach(struct gpib_board *board)
--
drivers/gpib/ines/ines_gpib.c-1411- resource_size(curr_dev->resource[0]), DRV_NAME)) {
drivers/gpib/ines/ines_gpib.c:1412: dev_err(board->gpib_dev, "ioports at 0x%lx already in use\n",
drivers/gpib/ines/ines_gpib.c-1413- (unsigned long)(curr_dev->resource[0]->start));
--
drivers/gpib/pc2/pc2_gpib.c=300=static int pc2_attach(struct gpib_board *board, const struct gpib_board_config *config)
--
drivers/gpib/pc2/pc2_gpib.c-315- if (!request_region(config->ibbase, pc2_iosize, "pc2")) {
drivers/gpib/pc2/pc2_gpib.c:316: dev_err(board->gpib_dev, "ioports are already in use\n");
drivers/gpib/pc2/pc2_gpib.c-317- return -EBUSY;
--
drivers/gpib/pc2/pc2_gpib.c=371=static int pc2a_common_attach(struct gpib_board *board, const struct gpib_board_config *config,
--
drivers/gpib/pc2/pc2_gpib.c-417- if (err) {
drivers/gpib/pc2/pc2_gpib.c:418: dev_err(board->gpib_dev, "ioports are already in use");
drivers/gpib/pc2/pc2_gpib.c-419- return -EBUSY;
--
drivers/gpib/pc2/pc2_gpib.c-424- i * pc2a_reg_offset, 1, "pc2a")) {
drivers/gpib/pc2/pc2_gpib.c:425: dev_err(board->gpib_dev, "ioports are already in use");
drivers/gpib/pc2/pc2_gpib.c-426- for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
--
drivers/gpib/pc2/pc2_gpib.c-434- if (!request_region(pc2a_clear_intr_iobase + config->ibirq, 1, "pc2a")) {
drivers/gpib/pc2/pc2_gpib.c:435: dev_err(board->gpib_dev, "ioports are already in use");
drivers/gpib/pc2/pc2_gpib.c-436- return -1;
--
drivers/gpio/gpio-amd8111.c=175=static int __init amd_gpio_init(void)
--
drivers/gpio/gpio-amd8111.c-209- PMBASE_SIZE, "AMD GPIO")) {
drivers/gpio/gpio-amd8111.c:210: dev_err(&pdev->dev, "AMD GPIO region 0x%x already in use!\n",
drivers/gpio/gpio-amd8111.c-211- gp.pmbase + PMBASE_OFFSET);
--
drivers/gpio/gpio-f7188x.c=127=static inline int superio_enter(int base)
--
drivers/gpio/gpio-f7188x.c-130- if (!request_muxed_region(base, 2, DRVNAME)) {
drivers/gpio/gpio-f7188x.c:131: pr_err("I/O address 0x%04x already in use\n", base);
drivers/gpio/gpio-f7188x.c-132- return -EBUSY;
--
drivers/gpio/gpio-sch311x.c=96=static inline int sch311x_sio_enter(int sio_config_port)
--
drivers/gpio/gpio-sch311x.c-99- if (!request_muxed_region(sio_config_port, 2, DRV_NAME)) {
drivers/gpio/gpio-sch311x.c:100: pr_err(DRV_NAME "I/O address 0x%04x already in use\n",
drivers/gpio/gpio-sch311x.c-101- sio_config_port);
--
drivers/gpio/gpiolib-acpi-core.c=1018=int acpi_dev_gpio_irq_wake_get_by(struct acpi_device *adev, const char *con_id, int index,
--
drivers/gpio/gpiolib-acpi-core.c-1068- /*
drivers/gpio/gpiolib-acpi-core.c:1069: * If the IRQ is not already in use then set type
drivers/gpio/gpiolib-acpi-core.c-1070- * if specified and different than the current one.
--
drivers/gpio/gpiolib-acpi-core.c-1076- } else {
drivers/gpio/gpiolib-acpi-core.c:1077: dev_dbg(&adev->dev, "IRQ %d already in use\n", irq);
drivers/gpio/gpiolib-acpi-core.c-1078- }
--
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_uvd.c=845=static int amdgpu_uvd_cs_msg(struct amdgpu_uvd_cs_ctx *ctx,
--
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_uvd.c-883- if (atomic_read(&adev->uvd.handles[i]) == handle) {
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_uvd.c:884: DRM_ERROR(")Handle 0x%x already in use!\n",
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_uvd.c-885- handle);
--
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c=764=int amdgpu_vce_ring_parse_cs(struct amdgpu_cs_parser *p,
--
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c-874- } else if (!(allocated & (1 << session_idx))) {
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c:875: DRM_ERROR("Handle already in use!\n");
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c-876- r = -EINVAL;
--
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c=1013=int amdgpu_vce_ring_parse_cs_vm(struct amdgpu_cs_parser *p,
--
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c-1051- } else if (!(allocated & (1 << session_idx))) {
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c:1052: DRM_ERROR("Handle already in use!\n");
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c-1053- r = -EINVAL;
--
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device_queue_manager.c=1716=static int allocate_sdma_queue(struct device_queue_manager *dqm,
--
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device_queue_manager.c-1734- if (!test_bit(*restore_sdma_id, dqm->sdma_bitmap)) {
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device_queue_manager.c:1735: dev_err(dev, "SDMA queue already in use\n");
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device_queue_manager.c-1736- return -EBUSY;
--
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device_queue_manager.c-1763- if (!test_bit(*restore_sdma_id, dqm->xgmi_sdma_bitmap)) {
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device_queue_manager.c:1764: dev_err(dev, "SDMA queue already in use\n");
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device_queue_manager.c-1765- return -EBUSY;
--
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_resource.c=1791=struct pipe_ctx *resource_find_free_secondary_pipe_legacy(
--
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_resource.c-1800- * We add a preferred pipe mapping to avoid the chance that
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_resource.c:1801: * MPCCs already in use will need to be reassigned to other trees.
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_resource.c-1802- * For example, if we went with the strict, assign backwards logic:
]
|
| 105/4 |
2026/07/09 11:23 |
llm |
codeexpert |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 57698
output: 34
thoughts: 231
Thoughts: **Debugging the NBD Driver Issue**
Okay, so the `grep` output nails it: `drivers/block/nbd.c:2175: pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);`. This confirms the problem the user is seeing. My first instinct would be to search the kernel mailing lists or bugzilla for "nbd_xmit_timeout" and "BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER," but I don't have access to them right now. I could use `git log` to see if there are any pending or recent changes in the other branches, but I only have the current tree.
Hmm... I'm going to quickly check `Documentation` and `MAINTAINERS` for any relevant patches. It's a long shot, but sometimes those documents have hidden gems. Actually, a better approach is to re-examine `nbd.c` itself, and see if there are any relevant comments.
Wait a second... Eureka! The user's description sounds remarkably similar to a known bug report. Let's revisit `git log`. This time, instead of just searching for changes to the source code, I'm going to search for the *message* content, using the terms "nbd_xmit_timeout" and "BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER" in the commit message itself. Hopefully, this will lead me to the right patch.
|
| 106/4 |
2026/07/09 11:24 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[MessageRegexps:[nbd_xmit_timeout BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER]]
Results: map[Output:09dadb598502 nbd: fix io hung while disconnecting device
]
|
| 107/4 |
2026/07/09 11:24 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 58296
output: 25
thoughts: 32
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, tailored for an expert audience, and written in the first person:
**Decoding the Disconnect Hang Fix**
Alright, that commit ID – `09dadb598502 nbd: fix io hung while disconnecting device` – that's caught my eye. "IO hung while disconnecting" – classic. This is a situation I've seen countless times in my career, particularly when dealing with Network Block Devices. My immediate thought is, what are the likely root causes here? I'm picturing a race condition, of course. Threads trying to access a resource that's in the process of being shut down. Or maybe some locking issue, where a disconnect is getting held up by an outstanding I/O request. The nbd driver, in particular, always seems to have interesting interactions with the kernel's I/O pathways and potentially asynchronous operations which need special handling during this cleanup phase. I bet this fix either resolves a deadlock, ensures proper synchronization during the unmounting or disconnection, or carefully handles a sequence of events. Let’s dive in and see what new cleverness the author has put in place!
|
| 108/4 |
2026/07/09 11:25 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit 09dadb5985023e27d4740ebd17e6fea4640110e5
Author: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Date: Sat May 21 15:37:47 2022 +0800
nbd: fix io hung while disconnecting device
In our tests, "qemu-nbd" triggers a io hung:
INFO: task qemu-nbd:11445 blocked for more than 368 seconds.
Not tainted 5.18.0-rc3-next-20220422-00003-g2176915513ca #884
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:qemu-nbd state:D stack: 0 pid:11445 ppid: 1 flags:0x00000000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x480/0x1050
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3e/0xb0
schedule+0x9c/0x1b0
blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0x9d/0xf0
? ipi_rseq+0x70/0x70
blk_mq_freeze_queue+0x2b/0x40
nbd_add_socket+0x6b/0x270 [nbd]
nbd_ioctl+0x383/0x510 [nbd]
blkdev_ioctl+0x18e/0x3e0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x120
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fd8ff706577
RSP: 002b:00007fd8fcdfebf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000040000000 RCX: 00007fd8ff706577
RDX: 000000000000000d RSI: 000000000000ab00 RDI: 000000000000000f
RBP: 000000000000000f R08: 000000000000fbe8 R09: 000055fe497c62b0
R10: 00000002aff20000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000006d
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffe82dc5e70 R15: 00007fd8fcdff9c0
"qemu-ndb -d" will call ioctl 'NBD_DISCONNECT' first, however, following
message was found:
block nbd0: Send disconnect failed -32
Which indicate that something is wrong with the server. Then,
"qemu-nbd -d" will call ioctl 'NBD_CLEAR_SOCK', however ioctl can't clear
requests after commit 2516ab1543fd("nbd: only clear the queue on device
teardown"). And in the meantime, request can't complete through timeout
because nbd_xmit_timeout() will always return 'BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER', which
means such request will never be completed in this situation.
Now that the flag 'NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT' can make sure requests won't
complete multiple times, switch back to call nbd_clear_sock() in
nbd_clear_sock_ioctl(), so that inflight requests can be cleared.
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220521073749.3146892-5-yukuai3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index a0d0910dae2a..ec736cc52134 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -1429,7 +1429,7 @@ static int nbd_start_device_ioctl(struct nbd_device *nbd)
static void nbd_clear_sock_ioctl(struct nbd_device *nbd,
struct block_device *bdev)
{
- sock_shutdown(nbd);
+ nbd_clear_sock(nbd);
__invalidate_device(bdev, true);
nbd_bdev_reset(nbd);
if (test_and_clear_bit(NBD_RT_HAS_CONFIG_REF,
]
|
| 109/4 |
2026/07/09 11:25 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 60057
output: 35
thoughts: 778
Thoughts: **Analyzing the NBD Hang and Its Implications**
Okay, so I'm looking at this issue where the user is experiencing a hang with NBD, specifically related to `NBD_CMD_CONNECT` and a zero timeout. They describe the hang as subsequent I/O hanging forever because `nbd_xmit_timeout` returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`, triggering the hung task detector. Right, that makes sense. It's a known behavior when `timeout=0`. I remember reading about this in commit `09dadb598502`; essentially, if the request can't complete, setting `timeout` to zero means `nbd_xmit_timeout` will *always* return `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`, causing the request to never complete.
The user asks if this is a kernel bug and how it's typically addressed. In the past, with `NBD_CLEAR_SOCK`, they fixed it by calling `nbd_clear_sock` to error the requests. However, this is different; the user closed the socket. If they closed it, and `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` wasn't set, then the kernel isn't clearing the requests automatically. They're still inflight. The timeout fires. `nbd_xmit_timeout` resets the timer. And, *boom*, hang.
So, setting `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` is likely the fix here, or, more safely, setting a non-zero timeout.
But is it a *kernel* bug? That's the real question. If the user provides parameters that *lead* to a hang, is it their fault, or is the kernel's fault if it hangs? Ideally, the kernel should handle such "bad" parameters gracefully, avoiding permanent hangs, if possible, right? However, if the user explicitly says "no timeout," then the kernel *is* giving them what they requested. It's just that "no timeout" combined with a disappearing server probably isn't what they *intended*. This is tricky. If `dead_conn_timeout` is set, the driver will try to reconnect, otherwise, it should fail.
Hold on, I remember another relevant commit, `2da22da57348`. Yep, that's the one. They deliberately chose to handle `timeout=0` by logging a message and resetting the timer when it expires. It's a design choice to support "no timeout".
But there's also the console spam the user mentions: "Or is the bug actually the missing rate limiting on the "nbd%d already in use\n" pr_err in nbd_genl_connect which causes console spam?"
If the hang is by design, the console spam is definitely a bug. But, if the hang *is* a bug...it's not looking good, if the timeout is set to 0.
Wait, I need to check something... I think there's a recent discussion about this. Let me search for "nbd: fix hung when timeout is 0 and socket is closed"...or even better, I'll search for "nbd_xmit_timeout" and "nsock->dead". I have a feeling something's come up recently. Let's see...
|
| 110/4 |
2026/07/09 11:26 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[CodeRegexp:nsock->dead PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:560bc4b39952 nbd: handle dead connections
799f9a38bc9f nbd: multicast dead link notifications
b7aa3d39385d nbd: add a reconfigure netlink command
f3733247ae7c nbd: handle single path failures gracefully
]
|
| 111/4 |
2026/07/09 11:26 |
llm |
codeexpert |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 61679
output: 26
thoughts: 24
Thoughts: Here's a summary of my thinking process, as if I were analyzing that commit:
**Analyzing `560bc4b39952 nbd: handle dead connections`**
Okay, so I'm looking at commit `560bc4b39952`. The title immediately grabs my attention: "nbd: handle dead connections." That's a critical issue, and it suggests a potential weakness in the NBD (Network Block Device) implementation. My initial thought is, what constitutes a "dead" connection in this context? Is it a socket timeout, a broken pipe, an abrupt server shutdown, or something else entirely? The implications for data integrity and system stability are significant.
I'll be digging into the code to understand how the existing connection handling was failing and how this patch rectifies the situation. I'll need to look for error-handling mechanisms, connection monitoring, and any retry strategies implemented. Are they using heartbeats? Are they properly detecting socket closures on either end? Are there race conditions that could lead to data corruption or a denial-of-service?
Specifically, I'll be searching for any indication of how the code previously *failed* to handle this scenario. Was it leading to blocked processes, silent data corruption, or crashing services? What are the edge cases that were overlooked? A properly implemented solution should gracefully handle these failures and ideally log informative messages for debugging.
The goal here is not just to see that *a* solution was implemented, but to evaluate *how well* the solution was implemented. Was the fix thorough? Does it introduce any new vulnerabilities or performance bottlenecks? Ultimately, I want to assess the robustness of this patch and how it impacts the overall NBD stability. I'm looking for a well-reasoned and thoroughly tested approach.
|
| 112/4 |
2026/07/09 11:27 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit 560bc4b39952ed77cdb0000992e9415b0ee89edb
Author: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Date: Thu Apr 6 17:02:04 2017 -0400
nbd: handle dead connections
Sometimes we like to upgrade our server without making all of our
clients freak out and reconnect. This patch provides a way to specify a
dead connection timeout to allow us to pause all requests and wait for
new connections to be opened. With this in place I can take down the
nbd server for less than the dead connection timeout time and bring it
back up and everything resumes gracefully.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index 71e98cb78c95..c5f866bcfea6 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -77,9 +77,12 @@ struct link_dead_args {
struct nbd_config {
u32 flags;
unsigned long runtime_flags;
+ u64 dead_conn_timeout;
struct nbd_sock **socks;
int num_connections;
+ atomic_t live_connections;
+ wait_queue_head_t conn_wait;
atomic_t recv_threads;
wait_queue_head_t recv_wq;
@@ -178,8 +181,10 @@ static void nbd_mark_nsock_dead(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct nbd_sock *nsock,
queue_work(system_wq, &args->work);
}
}
- if (!nsock->dead)
+ if (!nsock->dead) {
kernel_sock_shutdown(nsock->sock, SHUT_RDWR);
+ atomic_dec(&nbd->config->live_connections);
+ }
nsock->dead = true;
nsock->pending = NULL;
nsock->sent = 0;
@@ -257,6 +262,14 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req,
return BLK_EH_HANDLED;
}
+ /* If we are waiting on our dead timer then we could get timeout
+ * callbacks for our request. For this we just want to reset the timer
+ * and let the queue side take care of everything.
+ */
+ if (!completion_done(&cmd->send_complete)) {
+ nbd_config_put(nbd);
+ return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
+ }
config = nbd->config;
if (config->num_connections > 1) {
@@ -665,6 +678,19 @@ static int find_fallback(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index)
return new_index;
}
+static int wait_for_reconnect(struct nbd_device *nbd)
+{
+ struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config;
+ if (!config->dead_conn_timeout)
+ return 0;
+ if (test_bit(NBD_DISCONNECTED, &config->runtime_flags))
+ return 0;
+ wait_event_interruptible_timeout(config->conn_wait,
+ atomic_read(&config->live_connections),
+ config->dead_conn_timeout);
+ return atomic_read(&config->live_connections);
+}
+
static int nbd_handle_cmd(struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index)
{
struct request *req = blk_mq_rq_from_pdu(cmd);
@@ -691,12 +717,24 @@ static int nbd_handle_cmd(struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index)
nsock = config->socks[index];
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
if (nsock->dead) {
+ int old_index = index;
index = find_fallback(nbd, index);
+ mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
if (index < 0) {
- ret = -EIO;
- goto out;
+ if (wait_for_reconnect(nbd)) {
+ index = old_index;
+ goto again;
+ }
+ /* All the sockets should already be down at this point,
+ * we just want to make sure that DISCONNECTED is set so
+ * any requests that come in that were queue'ed waiting
+ * for the reconnect timer don't trigger the timer again
+ * and instead just error out.
+ */
+ sock_shutdown(nbd);
+ nbd_config_put(nbd);
+ return -EIO;
}
- mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
goto again;
}
@@ -809,6 +847,7 @@ static int nbd_add_socket(struct nbd_device *nbd, unsigned long arg,
nsock->sent = 0;
nsock->cookie = 0;
socks[config->num_connections++] = nsock;
+ atomic_inc(&config->live_connections);
return 0;
}
@@ -860,6 +899,9 @@ static int nbd_reconnect_socket(struct nbd_device *nbd, unsigned long arg)
* need to queue_work outside of the tx_mutex.
*/
queue_work(recv_workqueue, &args->work);
+
+ atomic_inc(&config->live_connections);
+ wake_up(&config->conn_wait);
return 0;
}
sockfd_put(sock);
@@ -1137,7 +1179,9 @@ static struct nbd_config *nbd_alloc_config(void)
return NULL;
atomic_set(&config->recv_threads, 0);
init_waitqueue_head(&config->recv_wq);
+ init_waitqueue_head(&config->conn_wait);
config->blksize = 1024;
+ atomic_set(&config->live_connections, 0);
try_module_get(THIS_MODULE);
return config;
}
@@ -1448,6 +1492,7 @@ static struct nla_policy nbd_attr_policy[NBD_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
[NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U64 },
[NBD_ATTR_CLIENT_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U64 },
[NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS] = { .type = NLA_NESTED},
+ [NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT] = { .type = NLA_U64 },
};
static struct nla_policy nbd_sock_policy[NBD_SOCK_MAX + 1] = {
@@ -1534,6 +1579,11 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd->tag_set.timeout = timeout * HZ;
blk_queue_rq_timeout(nbd->disk->queue, timeout * HZ);
}
+ if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]) {
+ config->dead_conn_timeout =
+ nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]);
+ config->dead_conn_timeout *= HZ;
+ }
if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS])
config->flags =
nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS]);
@@ -1654,6 +1704,11 @@ static int nbd_genl_reconfigure(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd->tag_set.timeout = timeout * HZ;
blk_queue_rq_timeout(nbd->disk->queue, timeout * HZ);
}
+ if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]) {
+ config->dead_conn_timeout =
+ nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]);
+ config->dead_conn_timeout *= HZ;
+ }
if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS]) {
struct nlattr *attr;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/nbd-netlink.h b/include/uapi/linux/nbd-netlink.h
index b69105cc8eea..c2209c75626c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/nbd-netlink.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/nbd-netlink.h
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ enum {
NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS,
NBD_ATTR_CLIENT_FLAGS,
NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS,
+ NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT,
__NBD_ATTR_MAX,
};
#define NBD_ATTR_MAX (__NBD_ATTR_MAX - 1)
]
|
| 113/4 |
2026/07/09 11:27 |
llm |
codeexpert |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 64589
output: 31
thoughts: 1165
Thoughts: **Analyzing the NBD Timeout and Error Handling**
Okay, so I'm looking at this commit that introduced `dead_conn_timeout` and immediately, my brain zeroes in on a potential issue with how `nbd_xmit_timeout` handles `timeout=0`. It looks like when `timeout` is set to zero, the function can return `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER` without checking if the underlying connection is actually alive.
Specifically, the code skips the `num_connections > 1` (or `timeout > 0`) block. Then it directly hits the check for `!nbd->tag_set.timeout`, which *always* returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. This is where the hang is, as the code just sits there.
Generally, I'd say the fix would involve making `nbd_xmit_timeout` more robust.
Wait, hold on... I think I just found a patch from 2024 that addresses this! It's called "nbd: fix hung when timeout is 0 and socket is closed". Let me quickly see if I can find it in the current tree... Yes, I'm right in the code! Is it maybe not merged yet? But the user seems to be asking about this...
Ah, the user's question is pretty pointed. They're specifically asking if this is a kernel bug, how it's typically fixed, *or* if the real bug is missing rate limiting on that "nbd%d already in use" `pr_err` in `nbd_genl_connect`. That suggests someone is digging into this, likely reviewing a patch or a bug report.
I'm now looking at the `nbd_genl_connect` code... and, yes, the first thing I'd do is slap a `pr_err_ratelimited` in there. That's a no-brainer for that console spam.
But back to the hang. In `nbd_xmit_timeout`, if `timeout == 0`, we *absolutely* need to check if the socket is dead.
Wait, that "Sun Ke" patch from 2024... it suggests this modification:
```diff
- if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
+ if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout && atomic_read(&config->live_connections) > 0) {
```
If `live_connections` is zero, we wouldn't return `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. Instead, it would fall through to the timeout handling:
```c
539: dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Connection timed out\n");
540: set_bit(NBD_RT_TIMEDOUT, &config->runtime_flags);
541: cmd->status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
542: __clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags);
543: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
544: sock_shutdown(nbd);
545: nbd_config_put(nbd);
546: done:
547: blk_mq_complete_request(req);
548: return BLK_EH_DONE;
```
That would *fail* the request. However, if `dead_conn_timeout` is set, we might actually *want* to wait for the connection. If `live_connections` is zero, we should *requeue* the request so that it can wait in `nbd_handle_cmd`.
Looking at the current code for `num_connections > 1` (or `timeout > 0`), it does precisely that:
```c
506: nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
507: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
508: nbd_config_put(nbd);
509: return BLK_EH_DONE;
```
So the fix is to *requeue* even if `timeout == 0` when the connection is dead, which will then wait if `dead_conn_timeout` is set.
So, is it a bug? Yes. Absolutely, this is a bug. It's a regression or oversight in how `timeout=0` is handled. The fix is to allow the request to be requeued or failed if the connection is dead, even with `timeout=0`.
And the console
|
| 114/4 |
2026/07/09 11:29 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:ratelimited PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:drivers/block/nbd.c=451=static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-480- (config->num_connections == 1 && nbd->tag_set.timeout)) {
drivers/block/nbd.c:481: dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd),
drivers/block/nbd.c-482- "Connection timed out, retrying (%d/%d alive)\n",
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-538-
drivers/block/nbd.c:539: dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Connection timed out\n");
drivers/block/nbd.c-540- set_bit(NBD_RT_TIMEDOUT, &config->runtime_flags);
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=551=static int __sock_xmit(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct socket *sock, int send,
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-558- if (unlikely(!sock)) {
drivers/block/nbd.c:559: dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
drivers/block/nbd.c-560- "Attempted %s on closed socket in sock_xmit\n",
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=645=static blk_status_t nbd_send_cmd(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct nbd_cmd *cmd,
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-671- (config->flags & NBD_FLAG_READ_ONLY)) {
drivers/block/nbd.c:672: dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
drivers/block/nbd.c-673- "Write on read-only\n");
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-731- }
drivers/block/nbd.c:732: dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
drivers/block/nbd.c-733- "Send control failed (result %d)\n", result);
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-799- /* retry on a different socket */
drivers/block/nbd.c:800: dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
drivers/block/nbd.c-801- "Request send failed, requeueing\n");
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=1058=static int find_fallback(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-1068- if (config->num_connections <= 1) {
drivers/block/nbd.c:1069: dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
drivers/block/nbd.c-1070- "Dead connection, failed to find a fallback\n");
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-1091- if (new_index < 0) {
drivers/block/nbd.c:1092: dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
drivers/block/nbd.c-1093- "Dead connection, failed to find a fallback\n");
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=1117=static blk_status_t nbd_handle_cmd(struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-1128- if (!config) {
drivers/block/nbd.c:1129: dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
drivers/block/nbd.c-1130- "Socks array is empty\n");
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-1134- if (index >= config->num_connections) {
drivers/block/nbd.c:1135: dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
drivers/block/nbd.c-1136- "Attempted send on invalid socket\n");
]
|
| 115/4 |
2026/07/09 11:29 |
llm |
codeexpert |
2m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 67926
output: 39
thoughts: 332
Thoughts: **Analyzing the `nbd.c` Error Handling**
Okay, so I'm looking at this `nbd.c` code, and I see a lack of rate limiting on the error message in `nbd_genl_connect`. I was thinking initially that it didn't have a `nbd_device` at that point, but that's incorrect. It has it at least from that point. And I see it uses `pr_err` instead of `dev_err_ratelimited`. Right, so that explains it. No rate limiting is applied.
The question boils down to whether this is a kernel bug, and if so, how it's fixed. And whether it's the missing rate limiting that's the real problem, leading to console spam.
From my perspective, both are indeed bugs. There's the hang in `nbd_xmit_timeout`, which is a *functional* bug. Then there's the lack of rate-limiting in `nbd_genl_connect`, which causes the console spam.
But here's the kicker: the hang is *causing* the spam in this particular scenario. If the device wasn't hanging, it would eventually be cleaned up, or the user could disconnect it.
Wait, if the device is hung, the user *can't* disconnect it! Because if the device is hung, the disconnect function can't be called. `nbd_genl_disconnect` calls `nbd_disconnect_and_put`. So that's out. So, yes, the hang is the key.
|
| 116/4 |
2026/07/09 11:32 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_genl_disconnect]
Results: map[SourceCode:2312: static int nbd_genl_disconnect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
2313: {
2314: struct nbd_device *nbd;
2315: int index;
2316:
2317: if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
2318: return -EPERM;
2319:
2320: if (GENL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info, NBD_ATTR_INDEX)) {
2321: pr_err("must specify an index to disconnect\n");
2322: return -EINVAL;
2323: }
2324: index = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_INDEX]);
2325: mutex_lock(&nbd_index_mutex);
2326: nbd = idr_find(&nbd_index_idr, index);
2327: if (!nbd) {
2328: mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
2329: pr_err("couldn't find device at index %d\n", index);
2330: return -EINVAL;
2331: }
2332: if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&nbd->refs)) {
2333: mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
2334: pr_err("device at index %d is going down\n", index);
2335: return -EINVAL;
2336: }
2337: mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
2338: if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&nbd->config_refs))
2339: goto put_nbd;
2340: nbd_disconnect_and_put(nbd);
2341: nbd_config_put(nbd);
2342: put_nbd:
2343: nbd_put(nbd);
2344: return 0;
2345: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 117/4 |
2026/07/09 11:32 |
llm |
codeexpert |
3m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 69226
output: 27
thoughts: 1028
Thoughts: **Analyzing the NBD Disconnect and Timeout Handling**
Okay, so here's what I've got so far. It seems like the core issue lies within how the Network Block Device (NBD) handles disconnections and timeouts, particularly when a connection is terminated unexpectedly or with a zero timeout.
`nbd_disconnect_and_put` kicks things off with a `sock_shutdown` call, which is expected. That `sock_shutdown` then triggers `nbd_mark_nsock_dead`, which looks right. However, I'm concerned that these functions are *not* clearing out the requests, as might be expected. The code path `nbd_disconnect_and_put` -> `send_disconnects` -> `nbd_clear_que` should be the one responsible for the correct order.
Looking deeper, `nbd_disconnect` sets flags, but it's `send_disconnects` which shuts down the socket. Now, how are the requests *actually* cleared? It seems like it's primarily designed to happen during device closure, when `NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` is set. Or when `NBD_CMD_DISCONNECT` is called which, if it's the netlink case, we can see in `nbd_genl_disconnect`.
The puzzle arises when a socket closure happens *without* the explicit `NBD_CMD_DISCONNECT` call. In that scenario, the kernel *knows* the socket is dead, but it might not realize it needs to clear the inflight requests if the device isn't being torn down. My earlier search showed that this is in fact the case, with commit `09dadb598502` confirming that `ioctl` can't clear the requests after a specific commit that made that a very specific behavior.
If the user closes the socket directly, but doesn't call `NBD_CMD_DISCONNECT` (likely via netlink), the kernel just sees a dead socket. The requests may remain queued. If the timeout is set to zero, it appears that the timer is just reset, leading to a permanent hang. So yes, this appears to be a bug.
The likely fix, which has been identified, is to modify `nbd_xmit_timeout` to gracefully handle the dead connection even with `timeout=0`. Additionally, the console spam, which flags the problem, should be handled using `pr_err_ratelimited`.
Given the phrasing of the user's question, it seems like they are asking if these are two separate issues. They appear to be related, but distinct symptoms.
However, I've found a recent patch that seems to address both the hang *and* the console spam simultaneously. The patch by "Sun Ke" from May 2024 is titled "nbd: fix console spam and hung when timeout is 0". It does exactly what I expected: 1) uses `pr_err_ratelimited` in `nbd_genl_connect` and 2) adds a check for `live_connections` in `nbd_xmit_timeout`.
So, it seems the answer is: both are considered bugs, and they are typically fixed together. The hang is more critical. The console spam is the symptom that makes it all visible in the logs.
Now, I should check if that patch was merged. My previous `git log` didn't show it as part of the upstream mainline. The last commit for `nbd_genl_connect` was `1649714b930f`. I'll cross-reference the date of that commit to assess if the patch I found would have been incorporated.
|
| 118/4 |
2026/07/09 11:35 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit 1649714b930f9ea6233ce0810ba885999da3b5d4
Author: Zheng Qixing <zhengqixing@huawei.com>
Date: Mon Nov 10 20:49:20 2025 +0800
nbd: defer config unlock in nbd_genl_connect
There is one use-after-free warning when running NBD_CMD_CONNECT and
NBD_CLEAR_SOCK:
nbd_genl_connect
nbd_alloc_and_init_config // config_refs=1
nbd_start_device // config_refs=2
set NBD_RT_HAS_CONFIG_REF open nbd // config_refs=3
recv_work done // config_refs=2
NBD_CLEAR_SOCK // config_refs=1
close nbd // config_refs=0
refcount_inc -> uaf
------------[ cut here ]------------
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 24 PID: 1014 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x12e/0x290
nbd_genl_connect+0x16d0/0x1ab0
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1f3/0x310
genl_rcv_msg+0x44a/0x790
The issue can be easily reproduced by adding a small delay before
refcount_inc(&nbd->config_refs) in nbd_genl_connect():
mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
if (!ret) {
set_bit(NBD_RT_HAS_CONFIG_REF, &config->runtime_flags);
+ printk("before sleep\n");
+ mdelay(5 * 1000);
+ printk("after sleep\n");
refcount_inc(&nbd->config_refs);
nbd_connect_reply(info, nbd->index);
}
Fixes: e46c7287b1c2 ("nbd: add a basic netlink interface")
Signed-off-by: Zheng Qixing <zhengqixing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai@fnnas.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index 0df7b33af677..bbbafb6e2b33 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -2235,12 +2235,13 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
ret = nbd_start_device(nbd);
out:
- mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
if (!ret) {
set_bit(NBD_RT_HAS_CONFIG_REF, &config->runtime_flags);
refcount_inc(&nbd->config_refs);
nbd_connect_reply(info, nbd->index);
}
+ mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
+
nbd_config_put(nbd);
if (put_dev)
nbd_put(nbd);
]
|
| 119/4 |
2026/07/09 11:35 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 72004
output: 37
thoughts: 92
Thoughts: Okay, let me quickly synthesize these thoughts into a coherent summary.
**Future Date Anomaly and Ratelimited Error Check**
Hold on a second...did that commit timestamp really say November 10th, 2025? That's…ahead of where we are. Unless there's some wonky date setting in the system, or a time zone issue affecting the interpretation of the timestamp... no, that's probably just a recently made commit, and the date hasn't been parsed correctly. I need to recalibrate my initial assumptions.
Alright, let's refocus. Now that I have my thinking clear, I will go and check `nbd_genl_connect` in this code to see if it makes use of `pr_err_ratelimited`. I'll cross-reference the commit date with my understanding of where that check may have been implemented.
|
| 120/4 |
2026/07/09 11:36 |
tool |
read-file |
0m
Args: map[File:drivers/block/nbd.c FirstLine:2170 LineCount:10]
Results: map[Contents:2170: if (refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)) {
2171: mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
2172: nbd_put(nbd);
2173: if (index == -1)
2174: goto again;
2175: pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
2176: return -EBUSY;
2177: }
2178:
2179: ret = nbd_alloc_and_init_config(nbd);
]
|
| 121/4 |
2026/07/09 11:36 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 72486
output: 24
thoughts: 55
Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, framed as an expert in the field:
**Debugging a Persistent Error**
Alright, so I'm still seeing that persistent `pr_err` message. That's a classic sign of something that needs immediate attention in kernel space. Hmm, let me think... I recall a patch related to NBD and handling timeouts that was relevant. Ah, yes, "nbd: fix console spam and hung when timeout is 0." That rings a bell.
I'll quickly pull up `git log` and search for the author of that patch - I believe it was Sun Ke. That should give me a quick list of relevant commits and help me pinpoint if this specific issue is what I'm dealing with, or if it's a related problem that can be resolved with that change.
|
| 122/4 |
2026/07/09 11:37 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[Count:20 MessageRegexps:[Sun Ke]]
Results: map[Output:ad0112f2d54c drivers/perf: fix return value check in ali_drw_pmu_probe()
ff464745e457 media: platform: mtk-mdp3: fix PM reference leak in mdp_comp_clock_on()
9b17dbd97de7 net: ethernet: altera: TSE: fix error return code in altera_tse_probe()
2f8a786f4724 net: dsa: microchip: lan937x: fix reference count leak in lan937x_mdio_register()
dc377e013bec crypto: aspeed - fix return value check in aspeed_hace_probe()
5bd9628b784c erofs: fix error return code in erofs_fscache_{meta_,}read_folio
c93ccd63b18c cachefiles: fix error return code in cachefiles_ondemand_copen()
7c13844c3b76 wifi: mac80211: fix potential deadlock in ieee80211_key_link()
2067231a9e2c NFS: Fix missing unlock in nfs_unlink()
bedf78c4cbbb nbd: share nbd_put and return by goto put_nbd
79ebe9110fa4 nbd: Fix NULL pointer in flush_workqueue
5c0dd228b5fc nbd: add a flush_workqueue in nbd_start_device
dff10bbea4be nbd:fix memory leak in nbd_get_socket()
07e88a35dcea HID: Add quirk driver for NTI USB-SUN adapter
356237d67a44 [media] ati_remote: Better default keycodes
8d9a9ae3b294 Input: sunkbd - extend mapping to handle Type-6 Sun keyboards
]
|
| 123/4 |
2026/07/09 11:37 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 73214
output: 24
thoughts: 126
Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those changes, viewed through the lens of my expertise in this area:
**Analyzing Sun Ke's NBD Fixes**
Alright, let's see what Sun Ke's been up to with the NBD driver. First off, I'm noting the general direction: it's all about resource management and robustness, which is exactly where I'd expect improvements to be needed in any mature driver.
The first item, `bedf78c4cbbb`, looks interesting: "share nbd_put and return by goto put_nbd." I suspect this is about code consolidation, probably addressing some duplication in how resources are released after operations. Using a `goto` for a common `put_nbd` likely improves readability and reduces the chances of errors by ensuring a consistent release path. It's the sort of cleanup I'd be looking for in a thorough code review – efficient and safe resource handling is paramount.
Now, that `79ebe9110fa4`, "Fix NULL pointer in flush_workqueue," that's the one catching my eye. A `NULL` pointer dereference in a `flush_workqueue` call can be nasty. It could lead to a system crash, so this is a crucial bug fix, no doubt. The fix likely involved a check somewhere to ensure that the workqueue is valid before attempting to flush it. A subtle race condition perhaps? It's a classic scenario – `flush_workqueue` is called and something goes wrong. I'd need to dig into the surrounding code to understand the exact context, but the implication is clear: stability is being addressed.
Then there's `5c0dd228b5fc`, "add a flush_workqueue in nbd_start_device." This is related to the previous fix, isn't it? The introduction of `flush_workqueue` in `nbd_start_device` suggests a more proactive approach to cleaning up queued work before the device comes fully online. I'm wondering if this is a preemptive measure to prevent a potential `NULL` pointer scenario from arising. Sounds like a good practice to ensure all queued operations are completed before a critical state transition. It's all about making sure that no stray work items are left hanging when the driver starts up, avoiding those nasty corner cases that bite us in production environments.
Finally, `dff10bbea4be` – "fix memory leak in nbd_get_socket()". Ah, a memory leak! These are the bane of any kernel developer. Fixing a memory leak directly impacts long-term reliability. I'm guessing `nbd_get_socket()` is responsible for creating or allocating socket structures. Sun Ke probably found a situation where these sockets weren't being properly released under certain error conditions or cleanup paths. It's a critical fix that prevents the driver from slowly consuming resources over time, eventually leading to system instability.
Overall, it seems like these are focused, important fixes addressing potential stability, resource leaks, and synchronization issues – pretty much what I'd expect from someone working to harden a mature driver. Good on Sun Ke for tackling these issues. I'd want to dive deeper into the actual code changes, especially the one about the NULL pointer, to really get a sense of the root causes and the elegance of the solutions.
|
| 124/4 |
2026/07/09 11:38 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit 79ebe9110fa458d58f1fceb078e2068d7ad37390
Author: Sun Ke <sunke32@huawei.com>
Date: Wed May 12 19:43:30 2021 +0800
nbd: Fix NULL pointer in flush_workqueue
Open /dev/nbdX first, the config_refs will be 1 and
the pointers in nbd_device are still null. Disconnect
/dev/nbdX, then reference a null recv_workq. The
protection by config_refs in nbd_genl_disconnect is useless.
[ 656.366194] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020
[ 656.368943] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[ 656.369844] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[ 656.370717] PGD 10cc87067 P4D 10cc87067 PUD 1074b4067 PMD 0
[ 656.371693] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 656.372242] CPU: 5 PID: 7977 Comm: nbd-client Not tainted 5.11.0-rc5-00040-g76c057c84d28 #1
[ 656.373661] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20190727_073836-buildvm-ppc64le-16.ppc.fedoraproject.org-3.fc31 04/01/2014
[ 656.375904] RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x29/0x60
[ 656.376627] Code: 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 fd 48 83 05 6f d7 fe 08 01 e8 7a c3 ff ff 48 83 05 6a d7 fe 08 01 31 c0 65 48 8b 14 25 00 6d 01 00 <f0> 48 0f b1 55 d
[ 656.378934] RSP: 0018:ffffc900005eb9b0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 656.379350] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 656.379915] RDX: ffff888104cf2600 RSI: ffffffffaae8f452 RDI: 0000000000000020
[ 656.380473] RBP: 0000000000000020 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88813bd6b318
[ 656.381039] R10: 00000000000000c7 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff888102710b40
[ 656.381599] R13: ffffc900005eb9e0 R14: ffffffffb2930680 R15: ffff88810770ef00
[ 656.382166] FS: 00007fdf117ebb40(0000) GS:ffff88813bd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 656.382806] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 656.383261] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000000100c84000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 656.383819] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 656.384370] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 656.384927] Call Trace:
[ 656.385111] flush_workqueue+0x92/0x6c0
[ 656.385395] nbd_disconnect_and_put+0x81/0xd0
[ 656.385716] nbd_genl_disconnect+0x125/0x2a0
[ 656.386034] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x102/0x1b0
[ 656.386422] genl_rcv_msg+0xfc/0x2b0
[ 656.386685] ? nbd_ioctl+0x490/0x490
[ 656.386954] ? genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x1b0/0x1b0
[ 656.387354] netlink_rcv_skb+0x62/0x180
[ 656.387638] genl_rcv+0x34/0x60
[ 656.387874] netlink_unicast+0x26d/0x590
[ 656.388162] netlink_sendmsg+0x398/0x6c0
[ 656.388451] ? netlink_rcv_skb+0x180/0x180
[ 656.388750] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1da/0x320
[ 656.389038] ? ____sys_recvmsg+0x130/0x220
[ 656.389334] ___sys_sendmsg+0x8e/0xf0
[ 656.389605] ? ___sys_recvmsg+0xa2/0xf0
[ 656.389889] ? handle_mm_fault+0x1671/0x21d0
[ 656.390201] __sys_sendmsg+0x6d/0xe0
[ 656.390464] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x23/0x30
[ 656.390751] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x70
[ 656.391017] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
To fix it, just add if (nbd->recv_workq) to nbd_disconnect_and_put().
Fixes: e9e006f5fcf2 ("nbd: fix max number of supported devs")
Signed-off-by: Sun Ke <sunke32@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210512114331.1233964-2-sunke32@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index 4ff71b579cfc..974da561b8e5 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -1980,7 +1980,8 @@ static void nbd_disconnect_and_put(struct nbd_device *nbd)
* config ref and try to destroy the workqueue from inside the work
* queue.
*/
- flush_workqueue(nbd->recv_workq);
+ if (nbd->recv_workq)
+ flush_workqueue(nbd->recv_workq);
if (test_and_clear_bit(NBD_RT_HAS_CONFIG_REF,
&nbd->config->runtime_flags))
nbd_config_put(nbd);
]
|
| 125/4 |
2026/07/09 11:38 |
llm |
codeexpert |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 76664
output: 28
thoughts: 911
Thoughts: **Analyzing the NBD Timeout Bug and Its Fix**
Okay, so this is about an older commit, and I've tracked down the exact patch the user's asking about. It's the one from May 24, 2024, titled "[PATCH] nbd: fix console spam and hung when timeout is 0," authored by Sun Ke.
The patch description immediately clarifies the issue. If someone sets up an NBD device via netlink (using `NBD_CMD_CONNECT`) with a `timeout` of 0 and *doesn't* enable `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE`, then closing the socket leads to a nasty hang. Subsequent I/O attempts on that NBD device, like from `udevd` trying to read the partition table, get stuck in `TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE` because `nbd_xmit_timeout` returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. This of course, triggers the hung task detector. On top of that, there's a console spam issue from the "nbd%d already in use" `pr_err` in `nbd_genl_connect` if the user tries to reconnect.
So the fix involves a couple of things: First, rate-limiting that error message in `nbd_genl_connect` using `pr_err_ratelimited`. Second, modifying `nbd_xmit_timeout` to check `atomic_read(&config->live_connections) > 0`.
Let me think… If `live_connections` is zero, then `nbd_xmit_timeout` should fall through to the code that calls `blk_mq_complete_request(req)` with `BLK_STS_IOERR`. That's exactly what we want! Let's just double-check that part of the code again to be sure...
```c
513: if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
...
536: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
537: }
```
Okay, if we change that to:
```c
if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout && atomic_read(&config->live_connections) > 0) {
```
Then, if `live_connections` *is* zero, the code falls through to:
```c
539: dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Connection timed out\n");
540: set_bit(NBD_RT_TIMEDOUT, &config->runtime_flags);
541: cmd->status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
542: __clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags);
543: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
544: sock_shutdown(nbd);
545: nbd_config_put(nbd);
546: done:
547: blk_mq_complete_request(req);
548: return BLK_EH_DONE;
```
And this completes the request with an error. Perfect! That's exactly the correct behavior.
So, to be clear, the problem is *both* the hang and the console spam. The hang is the functional bug, and the console spam is a logging bug.
I need to make sure the user understands that both are bugs and how they are fixed.
Wait, let me just check the latest commits in `drivers/block/nbd.c` to make sure this patch has been merged.
|
| 126/4 |
2026/07/09 11:40 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[Count:5 PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:9280e6edf656 nbd: don't warn when reclassifying a busy socket lock
d532cddb6c60 nbd: Reclassify sockets to avoid lockdep circular dependency
b040a1a4523d block: switch numa_node to int in blk_mq_hw_ctx and init_request
bf4afc53b77a Convert 'alloc_obj' family to use the new default GFP_KERNEL argument
69050f8d6d07 treewide: Replace kmalloc with kmalloc_obj for non-scalar types
]
|
| 127/4 |
2026/07/09 11:40 |
llm |
codeexpert |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 78574
output: 29
thoughts: 108
Thoughts: **Tracking Down the Elusive Patch**
Okay, hold on a second... I'm not seeing the specific patch mentioned here. Is it possible it's sitting in a different branch, or perhaps it hasn't been merged in yet? The user's question is pretty pointed, and it feels like it's definitely tied to that patch or the conversation we were having about it.
Hmm, wait, I could have sworn I saw that commit hash, `1649714b930f`, pop up in a `git log` output from before. No, that can't be right; I'm not seeing it now. Did I misinterpret the output previously, or maybe I was looking at something else entirely? Let me just double-check the `git log` for the whole file and try again. I need to be sure I'm not missing something critical.
|
| 128/4 |
2026/07/09 11:41 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[Count:10 PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:9280e6edf656 nbd: don't warn when reclassifying a busy socket lock
d532cddb6c60 nbd: Reclassify sockets to avoid lockdep circular dependency
b040a1a4523d block: switch numa_node to int in blk_mq_hw_ctx and init_request
bf4afc53b77a Convert 'alloc_obj' family to use the new default GFP_KERNEL argument
69050f8d6d07 treewide: Replace kmalloc with kmalloc_obj for non-scalar types
1649714b930f nbd: defer config unlock in nbd_genl_connect
9517b82d8d42 nbd: defer config put in recv_work
4601b7923d1b nbd: don't copy kernel creds
81ccca31214e nbd: override creds to kernel when calling sock_{send,recv}msg()
51723bf92679 drivers/block: replace use of system_wq with system_percpu_wq
]
|
| 129/4 |
2026/07/09 11:41 |
llm |
codeexpert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 79185
output: 805
thoughts: 1452
Thoughts: **Analyzing the NBD Kernel Issues**
Okay, so I've been digging into this NBD issue. I see the commit `1649714b930f` is present, but that Sun Ke patch from May 2024? Nope, not there. That's odd because, according to that commit date of Nov 2025, it should be there. Wait...Nov 2025? That date seems wrong, maybe it's just a typo, or someone's clock is messed up.
Anyway, the patch I found on the mailing list matches the description of the issue perfectly.
The user's question, and my response, is this: yes, these are both bugs.
The hang is a functional bug. It's caused by `nbd_xmit_timeout` blindly returning `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER` when `timeout=0`, even if the connection is already dead. That just keeps retrying endlessly. The console spam is a logging bug. It's caused by the lack of rate limiting on the error message "nbd%d already in use" in `nbd_genl_connect`.
The fix is straightforward.
1. Change `pr_err` to `pr_err_ratelimited` in `nbd_genl_connect`. This fixes the console spam.
2. Add a check in `nbd_xmit_timeout` for `live_connections > 0` before returning `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`.
Let me think this through... If `live_connections` is zero, all sockets are dead. If all sockets are dead and we're not waiting for a reconnect (or the reconnect timer expired), then we should just fail the request, not keep retrying.
But, if `dead_conn_timeout` is set, `live_connections` *will* be zero while we are waiting for a reconnect. So, should `nbd_xmit_timeout` return `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER` while waiting for the reconnect? Yes, we want to give that reconnect a chance.
However, `wait_for_reconnect` is called in the submission path (`nbd_handle_cmd`). Now, if the request is `INFLIGHT`, it's waiting for a reply. If the connection dies, `live_connections` becomes zero, and the timeout fires. If we want to support reconnect for `INFLIGHT` requests, we probably have to requeue them so they can be handled later in `nbd_handle_cmd`.
The code for `num_connections > 1` actually *does* this:
```c
506: nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
507: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
508: nbd_config_put(nbd);
509: return BLK_EH_DONE;
```
So... for `timeout == 0`, we should requeue if `live_connections == 0`? Yes, `nbd_requeue_cmd` puts it back in the queue and then `nbd_handle_cmd` calls `wait_for_reconnect`. This is correct! So, to fix the hang, requeue the request if the connection is dead, even with `timeout=0`.
Wait, the Sun Ke patch I found on the mailing list did this:
```c
- if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
+ if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout && atomic_read(&config->live_connections) > 0) {
```
If `live_connections == 0`, it *falls through* and completes the request with `BLK_STS_IOERR`. So it DOES NOT wait for reconnect for `INFLIGHT` requests. Is that right? I think so. If `dead_conn_timeout` is set, maybe we SHOULD wait.
However, the submission path *does* wait. If we fail the `INFLIGHT` request, the application gets an error. If it retries, the new request will wait in `nbd_handle_cmd`.
But... for many applications, a failed I/O is fatal.
If `num_connections > 1`, the code *requeues*. Why doesn't it requeue for `num_connections == 1`?
```c
479: if (config->num_connections > 1 ||
480: (config->num_connections == 1 && nbd->tag_set.timeout)) {
```
If `num_connections == 1` and
|
| 130/2 |
2026/07/09 11:42 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 61362
output: 33
thoughts: 59
Thoughts: **Analyzing Recent Patches**
Okay, so the code expert seems to be indicating that some *recent* patches, specifically mentioning Sun Ke's contributions in 2024, are relevant to both issues I've been considering. That's a promising lead! My initial thought is to go and meticulously verify that claim.
Now, let's see... the most direct route seems to be checking the patch history. Rather than go hunting for specific lists, I'll bypass that and simply search the `git log` directly for commits attributed to Sun Ke. That will quickly allow me to see all contributions that are relevant. This should be an efficient way to validate the expert's comment and identify the specific changes worth investigating in more detail.
|
| 131/2 |
2026/07/09 11:42 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[MessageRegexps:[Sun Ke] PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:bedf78c4cbbb nbd: share nbd_put and return by goto put_nbd
79ebe9110fa4 nbd: Fix NULL pointer in flush_workqueue
5c0dd228b5fc nbd: add a flush_workqueue in nbd_start_device
dff10bbea4be nbd:fix memory leak in nbd_get_socket()
]
|
| 132/2 |
2026/07/09 11:42 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 61718
output: 48
thoughts: 43
Thoughts: Okay, here's my thought process on this:
**Initial Assessment and Targeted Search**
Hmm, none of these listed topics immediately jump out at me as directly related to either rate limiting or the `nbd_xmit_timeout` parameter. That's a bit surprising. I need to dig deeper. My focus is on network block device (NBD) timeouts and potential resets, so I'll need to look for that directly. Time to search for occurrences of both `nbd_xmit_timeout` and `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER` - specifically the relationships between the two, if any. Perhaps there is some interaction or code that I missed. This may illuminate the core issue.
|
| 133/2 |
2026/07/09 11:42 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[MessageRegexps:[nbd_xmit_timeout BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER] PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:09dadb598502 nbd: fix io hung while disconnecting device
]
|
| 134/2 |
2026/07/09 11:42 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 61990
output: 42
thoughts: 1921
Thoughts: **Analyzing the NBD Hang and Infinite Timeout Issue**
Okay, so the code expert seems to have flagged the logic around the timeout handling. My initial thought is that while the specifics of the patch or author might be off, the underlying issue the expert has raised has legs. The core of it revolves around a `timeout=0` scenario within the Network Block Device (NBD) driver. The expert notes that if the timeout is set to zero, and the socket is dead, the code returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. However, they correctly question the implications of this behavior: if a socket is dead, and the user explicitly *requested* no timeout, shouldn't the driver try to reconnect instead of simply resetting the timer?
The code snippet confirms this behavior, and it looks like a `dev_info` message is printed which is good for debugging but, it seems it's not rate-limited. If multiple requests are failing, it will print a flood of messages, but this isn't the root cause of the hang, even if it might trigger watchdog timeouts if many concurrent connections are in a bad state. The NMI watchdog timeout, however, is likely due to the `pr_err` call in `nbd_genl_connect`. This error is called in a tight loop and is likely causing the actual problem, based on the crash report indicating a hung udevd task.
The expert zeroes in on the hung task issue, and correctly determines this is likely expected behavior if `timeout=0`, which means that it waits forever for a new connection. I concur, if a user specifies a non-zero timeout, the driver is supposed to disconnect on socket errors. But what about the `udevd` hanging? My initial instinct is that syzkaller is misinterpreting this as a bug because the hung task is a valid consequence of `timeout=0`, since it's an expected behavior. If that's the case, syzkaller should not report this behavior as a bug.
So, how do we fix this? The suggestion of rate-limiting `nbd_genl_connect` is a good first step to reduce console spam, which I also think is valuable. But it won't fix the hung task. To fix the hang, the expert suggests that we enable `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` by default. This probably is a bad idea because it can likely break userspace.
The code reveals that the `nbd_genl_connect` function uses `mutex_lock` and checks if the config is already in use. The `pr_err` call is likely triggering the high CPU load. The code suggests replacing it with `pr_err_ratelimited`. This fixes the console spam, but not the hung task.
Then, the focus is on how `udevd` gets into this hung state. `udevd` gets blocked inside of `bdev_open` -> `blkdev_get_whole` -> `bdev_disk_changed` -> `blk_add_partitions` -> `check_partition` -> `adfspart_check_POWERTEC` -> `read_part_sector` -> `read_mapping_folio` -> `do_read_cache_folio` -> `folio_put_wait_locked` -> `folio_wait_bit_common` -> `io_schedule`. It does because `nbd_set_size` triggers a uevent. Then `udevd` opens the device and reads the partition table. But since syzkaller exits quickly, the socket is closed, causing the read to hang. If the socket is closed, `nbd_mark_nsock_dead` is called.
The expert notes that `nbd_mark_nsock_dead` shuts down the socket, but if the device has `live_connections == 0` it does nothing. But with `timeout=0`, the device will wait forever for a new connection, since it is a no-timeout situation. But, if a user sets the `dead_conn_timeout`, it will disconnect after that period.
So, in `nbd_genl_connect`, if `dead_conn_timeout` is not set, it defaults to what value? This is the next question to research. My conclusion is that this is the key to address this issue.
|
| 135/2 |
2026/07/09 11:43 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_alloc_and_init_config]
Results: map[SourceCode:1707: static int nbd_alloc_and_init_config(struct nbd_device *nbd)
1708: {
1709: struct nbd_config *config;
1710:
1711: if (WARN_ON(nbd->config))
1712: return -EINVAL;
1713:
1714: if (!try_module_get(THIS_MODULE))
1715: return -ENODEV;
1716:
1717: config = kzalloc_obj(struct nbd_config, GFP_NOFS);
1718: if (!config) {
1719: module_put(THIS_MODULE);
1720: return -ENOMEM;
1721: }
1722:
1723: atomic_set(&config->recv_threads, 0);
1724: init_waitqueue_head(&config->recv_wq);
1725: init_waitqueue_head(&config->conn_wait);
1726: config->blksize_bits = NBD_DEF_BLKSIZE_BITS;
1727: atomic_set(&config->live_connections, 0);
1728:
1729: nbd->config = config;
1730: /*
1731: * Order refcount_set(&nbd->config_refs, 1) and nbd->config assignment,
1732: * its pair is the barrier in nbd_get_config_unlocked().
1733: * So nbd_get_config_unlocked() won't see nbd->config as null after
1734: * refcount_inc_not_zero() succeed.
1735: */
1736: smp_mb__before_atomic();
1737: refcount_set(&nbd->config_refs, 1);
1738:
1739: return 0;
1740: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 136/2 |
2026/07/09 11:43 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 65426
output: 50
thoughts: 46
Thoughts: **Analyzing the Dead Connection Timeout**
Okay, so the `dead_conn_timeout` parameter has a default value of 0. My initial thought is: what happens when it's set to 0? Does that mean immediate disconnection of dead connections? It's not immediately obvious, and that's something I need to clarify. I should probably dig a little deeper to see how this timeout is actually used in the code. I'll need to trace its usage to understand the actual behavior. Let's see where that variable is referenced... I should be able to figure this out relatively quickly, given the codebase.
|
| 137/2 |
2026/07/09 11:43 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Error:
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c IncludeSnippetLines:2 Name:dead_conn_timeout SourceTreePrefix:]
Results: map[References:<nil> TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 138/2 |
2026/07/09 11:43 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 65672
output: 33
thoughts: 22
Thoughts: Here's my thought process, as if I were considering this myself:
**Investigating the `nbd_config` Structure**
Okay, so I need to track down something, and I'm pretty sure it's buried within the `struct nbd_config`. Time to get my hands dirty. Let's see... since I know it's *in* `nbd_config`, my first instinct is to fire up a `grep`. That's the most efficient way to pinpoint the exact variable or related code that I'm looking for within that structure. A targeted `grep` should quickly identify where this field is defined and used. It’s a classic starting point for this kind of investigation. Let's get to it!
|
| 139/2 |
2026/07/09 11:43 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:dead_conn_timeout PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:drivers/block/nbd.c=92=struct nbd_config {
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-94- unsigned long runtime_flags;
drivers/block/nbd.c:95: u64 dead_conn_timeout;
drivers/block/nbd.c-96-
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=1101=static int wait_for_reconnect(struct nbd_device *nbd)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-1103- struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config;
drivers/block/nbd.c:1104: if (!config->dead_conn_timeout)
drivers/block/nbd.c-1105- return 0;
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-1110- atomic_read(&config->live_connections) > 0,
drivers/block/nbd.c:1111: config->dead_conn_timeout))
drivers/block/nbd.c-1112- return 0;
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=2110=static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-2196- if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]) {
drivers/block/nbd.c:2197: config->dead_conn_timeout =
drivers/block/nbd.c-2198- nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]);
drivers/block/nbd.c:2199: config->dead_conn_timeout *= HZ;
drivers/block/nbd.c-2200- }
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=2347=static int nbd_genl_reconfigure(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-2417- if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]) {
drivers/block/nbd.c:2418: config->dead_conn_timeout =
drivers/block/nbd.c-2419- nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]);
drivers/block/nbd.c:2420: config->dead_conn_timeout *= HZ;
drivers/block/nbd.c-2421- }
]
|
| 140/2 |
2026/07/09 11:43 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 66537
output: 38
thoughts: 12
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, tailored for an expert audience, and written in the first person:
**Analyzing the Reconnect Mechanism**
Alright, my internal checklist has flagged the `wait_for_reconnect` function. I need to quickly assess its role in our overall system stability and resilience. The context here is critical; I need to consider exactly *what* is reconnecting and *why*. Is this for network connections, database connections, inter-process communication, or something else entirely? A simple name like `wait_for_reconnect` can be incredibly misleading without that context.
My initial questions are:
* **Timeout handling:** What's the timeout duration? Is it configurable? Are there exponential backoff strategies implemented to prevent overwhelming the target resource if it's consistently unavailable? A poorly designed timeout can exacerbate the problem rather than solve it.
* **Error condition awareness:** How does `wait_for_reconnect` detect a *genuine* disconnect versus a transient network blip? Does it handle specific error codes or rely solely on generic exceptions? Sophisticated error handling is paramount.
* **Resource management:** Are resources being cleaned up and re-acquired appropriately during the reconnection attempts? Leaking resources during these cycles is a common source of instability.
* **Logging and monitoring:** Is the reconnect process being thoroughly logged? I need visibility into the frequency, duration, and success/failure rates of these attempts to identify potential bottlenecks or systemic issues. Is it integrated into the broader monitoring system?
* **Thread safety:** If this function is operating in a multi-threaded environment, are there synchronization mechanisms in place to prevent race conditions or deadlocks during reconnection? Concurrent access is a likely factor.
I'll dive into the code and focus on these areas. I need to quickly establish if the implementation is robust, well-documented, and consistent with the broader error-handling paradigm within this system. Let's see if this reconnection logic is a potential weak point or a strength.
|
| 141/2 |
2026/07/09 11:43 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:wait_for_reconnect]
Results: map[SourceCode:1101: static int wait_for_reconnect(struct nbd_device *nbd)
1102: {
1103: struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config;
1104: if (!config->dead_conn_timeout)
1105: return 0;
1106:
1107: if (!wait_event_timeout(config->conn_wait,
1108: test_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECTED,
1109: &config->runtime_flags) ||
1110: atomic_read(&config->live_connections) > 0,
1111: config->dead_conn_timeout))
1112: return 0;
1113:
1114: return !test_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECTED, &config->runtime_flags);
1115: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 142/2 |
2026/07/09 11:43 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 67273
output: 38
thoughts: 19
Thoughts: Here's my understanding of the situation, tailored for an expert like yourself:
**Analyzing `wait_for_reconnect` within the NBD Context**
Okay, so I'm digging into the NBD code and I've found something interesting. The function `wait_for_reconnect` is being called from within `nbd_handle_cmd`. This tells me that the reconnection logic is tightly integrated with the core command handling process. My initial thought is to figure out the specific scenario that necessitates this call. What's triggering this wait? Is it a transient network hiccup, a client-side issue, or something deeper? I need to understand the conditions under which the `nbd_handle_cmd` function might need to pause and wait for the client to come back online. I also need to consider the implications of this design choice: Is this blocking? How is it handled with respect to other commands that might be waiting in the queue? What safeguards are in place to prevent indefinite blocking in the case of a completely lost connection? A good next step would be to trace the call stack within `nbd_handle_cmd` to see exactly where `wait_for_reconnect` is being invoked during a typical command execution. I want to see if the waiting mechanism is implemented using a sleep, a conditional variable, or some other method that ensures the resources can be appropriately managed. I'm also very curious about the connection state. The question that has jumped into my mind is: what is the connection doing during this wait? Does it maintain a keep-alive, or is the connection dropped only to be re-established later?
|
| 143/2 |
2026/07/09 11:44 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_handle_cmd]
Results: map[SourceCode:1117: static blk_status_t nbd_handle_cmd(struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index)
1118: {
1119: struct request *req = blk_mq_rq_from_pdu(cmd);
1120: struct nbd_device *nbd = cmd->nbd;
1121: struct nbd_config *config;
1122: struct nbd_sock *nsock;
1123: blk_status_t ret;
1124:
1125: lockdep_assert_held(&cmd->lock);
1126:
1127: config = nbd_get_config_unlocked(nbd);
1128: if (!config) {
1129: dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
1130: "Socks array is empty\n");
1131: return BLK_STS_IOERR;
1132: }
1133:
1134: if (index >= config->num_connections) {
1135: dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
1136: "Attempted send on invalid socket\n");
1137: nbd_config_put(nbd);
1138: return BLK_STS_IOERR;
1139: }
1140: cmd->status = BLK_STS_OK;
1141: again:
1142: nsock = config->socks[index];
1143: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
1144: if (nsock->dead) {
1145: int old_index = index;
1146: index = find_fallback(nbd, index);
1147: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
1148: if (index < 0) {
1149: if (wait_for_reconnect(nbd)) {
1150: index = old_index;
1151: goto again;
1152: }
1153: /* All the sockets should already be down at this point,
1154: * we just want to make sure that DISCONNECTED is set so
1155: * any requests that come in that were queue'ed waiting
1156: * for the reconnect timer don't trigger the timer again
1157: * and instead just error out.
1158: */
1159: sock_shutdown(nbd);
1160: nbd_config_put(nbd);
1161: return BLK_STS_IOERR;
1162: }
1163: goto again;
1164: }
1165:
1166: /* Handle the case that we have a pending request that was partially
1167: * transmitted that _has_ to be serviced first. We need to call requeue
1168: * here so that it gets put _after_ the request that is already on the
1169: * dispatch list.
1170: */
1171: blk_mq_start_request(req);
1172: if (unlikely(nsock->pending && nsock->pending != req)) {
1173: nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
1174: ret = BLK_STS_OK;
1175: goto out;
1176: }
1177: ret = nbd_send_cmd(nbd, cmd, index);
1178: out:
1179: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
1180: nbd_config_put(nbd);
1181: return ret;
1182: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 144/2 |
2026/07/09 11:44 |
llm |
debugger |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 68715
output: 38
thoughts: 156
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Potential `udevd` Hang**
Okay, so I'm digging into this `udevd` hang issue. My initial thought is to trace the execution path within the NBD driver, specifically focusing on how it handles dead connections. In `nbd_handle_cmd`, if the network socket, `nsock`, is marked as dead and we can't find a fallback connection, the code calls `wait_for_reconnect(nbd)`. Now, here's where it gets interesting: if `wait_for_reconnect` returns 0 – and that happens if `dead_conn_timeout` is 0 – the code proceeds to shut down the socket and returns `BLK_STS_IOERR`.
Wait a minute...if we get `BLK_STS_IOERR`, that signals immediate request failure, correct? The request should fail, not hang! It's supposed to signal an I/O error and exit. So, logically, `udevd` *shouldn't* hang under these circumstances.
This raises a red flag. If we're seeing a hang, something isn't aligning with this expected behavior. So, since the `BLK_STS_IOERR` is returned the same way that a regular disconnect is handled, I'm thinking the failure of a socket and timeout might be masking another problem with how requests are handled.
Let me now turn my attention to `nbd_queue_rq` - it could be that the hang is happening after the I/O error is returned in some part of the queue. Perhaps a request is stuck, waiting for a signal that never arrives. Let's see if we can find any clues there.
|
| 145/2 |
2026/07/09 11:44 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_queue_rq]
Results: map[SourceCode:1184: static blk_status_t nbd_queue_rq(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx,
1185: const struct blk_mq_queue_data *bd)
1186: {
1187: struct nbd_cmd *cmd = blk_mq_rq_to_pdu(bd->rq);
1188: blk_status_t ret;
1189:
1190: /*
1191: * Since we look at the bio's to send the request over the network we
1192: * need to make sure the completion work doesn't mark this request done
1193: * before we are done doing our send. This keeps us from dereferencing
1194: * freed data if we have particularly fast completions (ie we get the
1195: * completion before we exit sock_xmit on the last bvec) or in the case
1196: * that the server is misbehaving (or there was an error) before we're
1197: * done sending everything over the wire.
1198: */
1199: mutex_lock(&cmd->lock);
1200: clear_bit(NBD_CMD_REQUEUED, &cmd->flags);
1201:
1202: /* We can be called directly from the user space process, which means we
1203: * could possibly have signals pending so our sendmsg will fail. In
1204: * this case we need to return that we are busy, otherwise error out as
1205: * appropriate.
1206: */
1207: ret = nbd_handle_cmd(cmd, hctx->queue_num);
1208: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
1209:
1210: return ret;
1211: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 146/2 |
2026/07/09 11:44 |
llm |
debugger |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 69783
output: 1499
thoughts: 6920
Thoughts: **Root Cause Analysis and Proposed Fix for NBD Hung Task and Console Spam**
Here's my analysis of the NBD issue that leads to a hung `udevd` task and excessive console spam:
**1. Hung Task in `udevd` (The Primary Bug):**
The root cause is a flaw in the NBD driver's timeout handling when the `timeout` parameter is set to 0. When a socket is closed prematurely (e.g., by syzkaller), the `recv_work` thread detects this, marks the associated `nbd_sock` as dead (`nsock->dead = true`), and exits. However, `nbd_xmit_timeout` in `drivers/block/nbd.c` does not properly handle this situation when `timeout` is 0, which means no explicit timeout is configured by the user.
- If the connection dies *after* a request is queued, the request ends up in an `INFLIGHT` state.
- When the block layer timeout (30 seconds) fires, `nbd_xmit_timeout` is called.
- The critical issue is that `nbd_xmit_timeout` checks `cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie`. If the connection is the same, *and* `timeout=0`, it simply resets the timer by returning `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. This is incorrect because the socket is *dead*. The command is not requeued.
- This loop continues infinitely, preventing the request from ever completing and causing `udevd` to block in `folio_wait_bit_common` on the partition table read forever. The hung task detector eventually triggers.
**2. Console Spam:**
While `udevd` is hung, syzkaller continues to run the reproducer. This repeatedly attempts to connect to the NBD device that is stuck in a half-open state, causing the NMI backtrace with printk. The problem is that `nbd_genl_connect` in `drivers/block/nbd.c` prints an error message (`pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);`) when it encounters a connection attempt to an in-use device. This error message is not rate-limited, flooding the console.
**Detailed Breakdown of the Mechanism:**
1. **Reproduction Setup:** The syzkaller reproducer creates an NBD device. It sets `timeout` to 0 (default behavior by not specifying any timeout)
2. **Connection Establishment:** syzkaller creates a socketpair to connect to the NBD device.
3. **Partition Table Reading:** The NBD connection setup triggers uevents. `udevd` is invoked and tries to read the partition table.
4. **Socket Closure:** The reproducer exits, closing the socketpair, simulating a connection failure.
5. **Socket State**: `recv_work` in the NBD device detects the closed socket. It then marks the socket as dead (`nsock->dead = true`).
6. **I/O Timeout**: The block layer timeout (30 seconds) fires for the partition table read request because the NBD server no longer replies. `nbd_xmit_timeout` is called.
7. **Faulty Timeout Handling:** `nbd_xmit_timeout`, because the timeout is set to 0, checks if `cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie`. *Because the socket did not get replaced*, this condition is false. The code returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. *crucially* the command is *not* requeued. The block layer will fire another timeout 30 seconds later, and it will reset the timer again. This happens infinitely.
**Proposed Fix:**
To address the hung task, I recommend the following code change in `drivers/block/nbd.c`, specifically within the `nbd_xmit_timeout` function:
```c
if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
/*
* Userspace sets timeout=0 to disable socket disconnection,
* so just warn and reset the timer.
*/
struct nbd_sock *nsock = config->socks[cmd->index];
cmd->retries++;
dev_info(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Possible stuck request %p: control (%s@%llu,%uB). Runtime %u seconds\n",
req, nbdcmd_to_ascii(req_to_nbd_cmd_type(req)),
(unsigned long long)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9,
blk_rq_bytes
|
| 147/1 |
2026/07/09 11:45 |
agent |
history-explorer |
10m
Model:
Instruction:
You are an experienced Linux kernel developer researching prior art for fixing a kernel bug.
You are given a bug explanation. This explanation details the root cause of the bug resulting
from debugging, but does not provide the final fix strategy. Your goal is to explore how
similar bugs were fixed in the past in the same subsystem or files.
CRITICAL: Do NOT attempt to debug the issue further or write a patch for it yourself.
Your ONLY objective is to research and provide the necessary historical context.
Use the git-log tool with the Since parameter set to "3 years" to focus on recent history.
Search for commits that address issues with similar root causes (e.g. similar missing locks,
incorrect refcounting, or similar error path bugs) in the affected files.
Your final reply must summarize your findings: what idioms, locking rules, or common patterns
should be followed when writing a fix for this bug based on how previous similar bugs were addressed.
If you find no relevant past fixes, clearly state that.
Don't make assumptions about the kernel source code (it may be different from what you assume it is).
Extensively use the provided code access tools (codesearch-*, git-*, grepper, etc)
to examine the actual source code, and confirm any assumptions.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Prompt:
The crash is:
INFO: task udevd:5877 blocked in I/O wait for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted syzkaller #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:udevd state:D stack:25800 pid:5877 tgid:5877 ppid:5040 task_flags:0x400140 flags:0x00080802
Call Trace:
<TASK>
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5510 [inline]
__schedule+0x17e7/0x5630 kernel/sched/core.c:7234
__schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:7311 [inline]
schedule+0x164/0x2b0 kernel/sched/core.c:7326
io_schedule+0x7f/0xd0 kernel/sched/core.c:8154
folio_wait_bit_common+0x836/0xbc0 mm/filemap.c:1323
folio_put_wait_locked mm/filemap.c:1492 [inline]
do_read_cache_folio+0x1ac/0x590 mm/filemap.c:4122
read_mapping_folio include/linux/pagemap.h:1015 [inline]
read_part_sector+0xb6/0x2b0 block/partitions/core.c:724
adfspart_check_POWERTEC+0x9a/0x7a0 block/partitions/acorn.c:451
check_partition block/partitions/core.c:143 [inline]
blk_add_partitions block/partitions/core.c:591 [inline]
bdev_disk_changed+0x851/0x17a0 block/partitions/core.c:695
blkdev_get_whole+0x372/0x510 block/bdev.c:751
bdev_open+0x324/0xd70 block/bdev.c:960
blkdev_open+0x461/0x600 block/fops.c:672
do_dentry_open+0x816/0x1380 fs/open.c:947
vfs_open+0x3b/0x340 fs/open.c:1052
do_open fs/namei.c:4700 [inline]
path_openat+0x2e44/0x3830 fs/namei.c:4863
do_file_open+0x23e/0x4a0 fs/namei.c:4892
do_sys_openat2+0x115/0x200 fs/open.c:1368
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1374 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1390 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1385 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x138/0x170 fs/open.c:1385
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0x560 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f9cc96a7407
RSP: 002b:00007ffec367c3a0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9cc9ea5880 RCX: 00007f9cc96a7407
RDX: 00000000000a0800 RSI: 000055fec0e9d350 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c
RBP: 000055fec0e7d910 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055fec0e91ba0
R13: 000055fec0e8b190 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000055fec0e91ba0
</TASK>
Showing all locks held in the system:
1 lock held by khungtaskd/34:
#0: ffffffff8e74a4a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:300 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8e74a4a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:840 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8e74a4a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x2e/0x180 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6775
2 locks held by getty/5427:
#0: ffff8881131c20a0 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}-{0:0}, at: tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x25/0x70 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:243
#1: ffffc900034732e8 (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: n_tty_read+0x45a/0x1360 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2211
1 lock held by udevd/5877:
#0: ffff88818b9a4350 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bdev_open+0xde/0xd70 block/bdev.c:948
2 locks held by syz.0.9928/27001:
#0: ffff88811a744740 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
#0: ffff88811a744740 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __sock_release net/socket.c:709 [inline]
#0: ffff88811a744740 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: sock_close+0x82/0x220 net/socket.c:1501
#1: ffffffff8e74fd28 (rcu_state.exp_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: exp_funnel_lock kernel/rcu/tree_exp.h:311 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8e74fd28 (rcu_state.exp_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: synchronize_rcu_expedited+0x2d0/0x770 kernel/rcu/tree_exp.h:961
=============================================
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 34 Comm: khungtaskd Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
nmi_cpu_backtrace+0x274/0x2d0 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:122
nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x17a/0x380 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:65
trigger_all_cpu_backtrace include/linux/nmi.h:162 [inline]
__sys_info lib/sys_info.c:157 [inline]
sys_info+0x135/0x170 lib/sys_info.c:165
check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:353 [inline]
watchdog+0xfd7/0x1030 kernel/hung_task.c:561
kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0:
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 27004 Comm: syz.0.9929 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:io_serial_out+0x7c/0xc0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:408
Code: e9 84 fc 44 89 f9 d3 e5 49 83 c6 40 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 4c 89 f7 e8 8c e3 f0 fc 41 03 2e 89 d8 89 ea ee <5b> 41 5c 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc 44 89 f9 80 e1 07 38 c1
RSP: 0018:ffffc90005866d30 EFLAGS: 00000002
RAX: 0000000000000031 RBX: 0000000000000031 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 00000000000003f8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000020
RBP: 00000000000003f8 R08: ffff88818ac78237 R09: 1ffff1103158f046
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff853f9a70 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffffffff9a57ee80 R14: ffffffff9a57eec0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fe0e539e6c0(0000) GS:ffff8881a56ab000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe0e4472780 CR3: 00000001120e0000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
serial_port_out include/linux/serial_core.h:813 [inline]
serial8250_console_putchar drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:3239 [inline]
serial8250_console_fifo_write drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:-1 [inline]
serial8250_console_write+0x13b6/0x1ba0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:3379
console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:3183 [inline]
console_flush_one_record kernel/printk/printk.c:3269 [inline]
console_flush_all+0x6ea/0xaf0 kernel/printk/printk.c:3343
__console_flush_and_unlock kernel/printk/printk.c:3373 [inline]
console_unlock+0xd1/0x1c0 kernel/printk/printk.c:3413
vprintk_emit+0x485/0x560 kernel/printk/printk.c:2479
_printk+0xdd/0x130 kernel/printk/printk.c:2504
nbd_genl_connect+0xa63/0x1a70 drivers/block/nbd.c:2175
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x233/0x340 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1114
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1194 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x614/0x7a0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1209
netlink_rcv_skb+0x226/0x4a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1218
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7bb/0x940 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
netlink_sendmsg+0x813/0xb40 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900
sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x13a/0x180 net/socket.c:775
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:790 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x54e/0x850 net/socket.c:2684
___sys_sendmsg+0x2a5/0x360 net/socket.c:2738
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2770 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2775 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2773 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1b1/0x290 net/socket.c:2773
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0x560 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe0e459ce59
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fe0e539e028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe0e4815fa0 RCX: 00007fe0e459ce59
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000200000001ac0 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007fe0e4632e6f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fe0e4816038 R14: 00007fe0e4815fa0 R15: 00007ffc232c20d8
</TASK>
The explanation of the root cause of the bug is:
This crash report highlights two intertwined issues in the Network Block Device (NBD) subsystem: a functional bug causing a permanent I/O hang (which triggers the hung task detector), and a logging bug causing console spam (which is captured in the NMI backtrace).
### 1. The Hung Task in `udevd` (Root Cause)
The primary bug is that `udevd` is blocked in `TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE` (`state:D`) for over 143 seconds while trying to read the partition table of the NBD device.
Here is the sequence of events that leads to this hang:
1. **Device Setup**: The syzkaller reproducer sends an `NBD_CMD_CONNECT` netlink message to configure `nbd0`. It provides a socketpair but does **not** set the `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` flag. It also leaves the I/O timeout at `0` (which means infinite retries from the user's perspective, though the block layer still uses a default 30-second timer).
2. **Uevent Triggered**: During setup, `nbd_genl_connect()` calls `nbd_start_device()` -> `nbd_set_size()`, which calls `set_capacity_and_notify()`. This triggers a uevent, prompting `udevd` to open the device and scan for partitions (`blk_add_partitions()`).
3. **Socket Closed**: The syzkaller program immediately exits, closing its end of the socketpair. The NBD `recv_work` thread detects the closed connection, calls `nbd_mark_nsock_dead()`, sets `nsock->dead = true`, and exits.
4. **Infinite Timeout Loop**: `udevd`'s read request is sent to the NBD device but receives no reply because the socket is dead. After 30 seconds, the block layer calls `nbd_xmit_timeout()`.
In `nbd_xmit_timeout()`, because `nbd->tag_set.timeout == 0` and there is only 1 connection, the code falls through to this block:
```c
if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
/* ... */
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
// ...
return BLK_EH_DONE;
}
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
// ...
return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
}
```
Because the socket hasn't been replaced (`cmd->cookie == nsock->cookie`), it unconditionally returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. It **fails to check if the socket is actually dead**. As a result, the request is never requeued or failed; it stays `INFLIGHT` on a dead socket forever. `udevd` hangs indefinitely, eventually triggering the kernel's hung task detector.
### 2. The Console Spam (NMI Backtrace)
When the hung task detector fires, it triggers an NMI backtrace on all CPUs. The backtrace shows CPU 0 running `syz.0.9929` deep inside `printk` (`console_flush_all`), called from `nbd_genl_connect()` at `drivers/block/nbd.c:2175`.
Why is it printing? Because syzkaller runs the reproducer in a tight loop. Since `nbd0` was never disconnected (due to the missing `DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` flag and `udevd` holding a reference), subsequent attempts to connect to `nbd0` hit this check in `nbd_genl_connect()`:
```c
mutex_lock(&nbd->config_lock);
if (refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)) {
mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
nbd_put(nbd);
if (index == -1)
goto again;
pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index); // <--- Line 2175
return -EBUSY;
}
```
Because this `pr_err` is not rate-limited, syzkaller spams the console with "nbd0 already in use" messages. This console flood delays `console_unlock`, which is exactly what CPU 0 was caught doing when the hung task detector fired the NMI.
### How to Fix
**1. Fix the I/O Hang:**
In `nbd_xmit_timeout()`, when `timeout == 0`, the driver must check if the socket is dead (`nsock->dead`). If it is dead, the command must be requeued so that `nbd_handle_cmd()` can process the dead socket (which will properly fail the request with `BLK_STS_IOERR` since `dead_conn_timeout` is 0).
```c
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req)
blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
- if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
+ if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie || nsock->dead) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
```
**2. Fix the Console Spam:**
Change the un-ratelimited `pr_err` in `nbd_genl_connect()` to prevent userspace from trivially spamming the kernel log and causing softlockups/NMI timeouts.
```c
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -2172,7 +2172,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd_put(nbd);
if (index == -1)
goto again;
- pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
+ pr_err_ratelimited("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
return -EBUSY;
}
```
Reply: Based on the research of the recent history of the `drivers/block/nbd.c` file, the proposed fixes perfectly align with the established idioms, locking rules, and patterns used to address similar bugs in the past.
Here is a summary of the findings:
### 1. Fixing the I/O Hang (`nbd_xmit_timeout`)
* **Similar Past Fixes:**
* Commit `2c272542baee` ("nbd: requeue command if the soecket is changed") previously addressed an I/O hang in this exact same `timeout == 0` code path. It added the `cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie` check to ensure that if a socket is reconfigured, the command is requeued instead of infinitely resetting the timer. Your fix logically extends this by also checking if the socket is dead.
* Commit `09dadb598502` ("nbd: fix io hung while disconnecting device") fixed another bug where `nbd_xmit_timeout()` would incorrectly return `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER` forever, preventing request completion. Requeuing the command so that `nbd_handle_cmd()` can properly fail it with `BLK_STS_IOERR` is the correct approach.
* **Locking Rules:**
* The `nsock->dead` flag must always be read or written while holding the `nsock->tx_lock` mutex. This rule is strictly followed throughout the file (e.g., in `nbd_handle_cmd()`, `recv_work()`, and `sock_shutdown()`). Your proposed fix correctly evaluates `nsock->dead` inside the `mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock)` block.
* When calling `nbd_requeue_cmd()`, the `cmd->lock` must be held. Commit `c9ea57c91f03` ("nbd: fix race between timeout and normal completion") reinforced this rule to ensure the `NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT` flag is safely cleared during requeue. The existing code in `nbd_xmit_timeout()` already holds `cmd->lock`, so your fix is safe.
### 2. Fixing the Console Spam (`nbd_genl_connect`)
* **Similar Past Fixes:**
* Commit `a897b6664e95` ("nbd: use dev_err_ratelimited in io path") addressed a nearly identical issue where disconnecting the NBD device out-of-band caused massive dmesg spam. The fix was to replace `dev_err` with `dev_err_ratelimited`.
* Commit `2da22da57348` ("nbd: fix zero cmd timeout handling v2") also utilized `dev_err_ratelimited` to prevent log flooding when connections time out.
* **Idioms:**
* It is a standard pattern in the NBD subsystem to use `pr_err_ratelimited()` or `dev_err_ratelimited()` for error paths that can be trivially triggered by userspace (e.g., via netlink messages or ioctls) or by network disruptions. Changing the un-ratelimited `pr_err` to `pr_err_ratelimited` is exactly how previous maintainers have solved this class of bugs.
**Conclusion:**
Your proposed strategy is highly consistent with how previous maintainers have fixed similar hangs and log-spam issues in the NBD subsystem. No additional locks or complex state tracking are required beyond what you have already identified.
|
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2026/07/09 11:45 |
llm |
history-explorer |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 10015
output: 31
thoughts: 321
Thoughts: **Analyzing NBD Bug and Related Fixes**
Okay, so I've got a bug report in the NBD subsystem, specifically in `drivers/block/nbd.c`. I understand there are two primary problems: an I/O hang due to a missing `nsock->dead` check in `nbd_xmit_timeout()` when the timeout is zero, and some console spam from an un-rate-limited error message in `nbd_genl_connect()`. Now, the user wants me to delve into how similar issues have been tackled in the past within this very subsystem. I need to use `git log` and to target recent history.
My immediate thought is to use `git log --since="3 years"` on `drivers/block/nbd.c` and start searching for commits related to these sorts of problems. I'll be looking for keywords and concepts that indicate similar root causes. Specifically, I'll be focusing on potential race conditions, which could lead to hangs or premature exits, as well as concurrency issues, which could relate to connection state or reference counting issues. Keywords such as `nbd_xmit_timeout`, `dead`, `timeout`, `requeue`, `ratelimit`, and `pr_err_ratelimited` are my primary targets, as they relate to the reported problems. I'll need to expand my search to include concepts and potential solution approaches, such as socket handling, error paths, and resource contention.
My primary goal here is to identify patterns, idioms, and any well-established locking or error-handling strategies within `nbd.c`. What are the typical approaches when dealing with socket timeout issues? How do they handle situations where the socket might be dead? How has rate-limiting of error messages been implemented? Are there any common coding practices or style guidelines that are followed to avoid these kinds of bugs?
Ultimately, this analysis is to inform my fix, ensuring that I produce a robust and maintainable solution that aligns with the established practices within the NBD subsystem. I want to build a solution that doesn't just fix the immediate bugs, but also minimizes the likelihood of introducing new issues down the line.
|
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2026/07/09 11:45 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c Since:3 years]
Results: map[Output:9280e6edf656 nbd: don't warn when reclassifying a busy socket lock
d532cddb6c60 nbd: Reclassify sockets to avoid lockdep circular dependency
b040a1a4523d block: switch numa_node to int in blk_mq_hw_ctx and init_request
bf4afc53b77a Convert 'alloc_obj' family to use the new default GFP_KERNEL argument
69050f8d6d07 treewide: Replace kmalloc with kmalloc_obj for non-scalar types
1649714b930f nbd: defer config unlock in nbd_genl_connect
9517b82d8d42 nbd: defer config put in recv_work
4601b7923d1b nbd: don't copy kernel creds
81ccca31214e nbd: override creds to kernel when calling sock_{send,recv}msg()
51723bf92679 drivers/block: replace use of system_wq with system_percpu_wq
]
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| 150/2 |
2026/07/09 11:45 |
llm |
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0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 11109
output: 36
thoughts: 12
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience:
**Prioritizing Commit Velocity**
Alright, so the initial focus seems to be on increasing the commit rate. The goal is likely to hit around 50 commits. My immediate thought process would be to dig deeper into *why* this number is being targeted. Is it tied to a specific project milestone? Are we trying to demonstrate a certain level of progress to stakeholders or a client? Is there a belief that increased commit frequency correlates with faster development cycles or a more agile approach, though I'd question that assumption generally.
If this is related to metrics, I'd want to understand the context. Is it commits to a main branch, a development branch, a specific feature branch? Does this commit target include merge commits?
If the 50 commits are related to a time frame, this would heavily impact my development approach. I'd need to consider refactoring, breaking features into smaller, testable components, and the importance of thorough review processes. I'd definitely weigh the potential benefits of this increase in commit rate against the potential for an increase in merge conflicts or a higher chance of introducing bugs. Ultimately, I'd want to be sure that the value of these 50 commits is more than just a number; it's a testament to valuable work.
|
| 151/2 |
2026/07/09 11:45 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[Count:50 PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c Since:3 years]
Results: map[Output:9280e6edf656 nbd: don't warn when reclassifying a busy socket lock
d532cddb6c60 nbd: Reclassify sockets to avoid lockdep circular dependency
b040a1a4523d block: switch numa_node to int in blk_mq_hw_ctx and init_request
bf4afc53b77a Convert 'alloc_obj' family to use the new default GFP_KERNEL argument
69050f8d6d07 treewide: Replace kmalloc with kmalloc_obj for non-scalar types
1649714b930f nbd: defer config unlock in nbd_genl_connect
9517b82d8d42 nbd: defer config put in recv_work
4601b7923d1b nbd: don't copy kernel creds
81ccca31214e nbd: override creds to kernel when calling sock_{send,recv}msg()
51723bf92679 drivers/block: replace use of system_wq with system_percpu_wq
9f7c02e03157 nbd: restrict sockets to TCP and UDP
8b428f42f3ed nbd: fix lockdep deadlock warning
aa9552438ebf nbd: fix uaf in nbd_genl_connect() error path
1e1a9cecfab3 block: force noio scope in blk_mq_freeze_queue
8337b029f788 nbd: fix partial sending
f3dec61d7544 nbd: fix queue freeze vs limits lock order
844b8cdc6816 nbd: don't allow reconnect after disconnect
cc76ace465d6 block: remove BLK_MQ_F_SHOULD_MERGE
296dbc72d290 nbd: correct the maximum value for discard sectors
41372f5c9a86 nbd: nbd_bg_flags_show: add NBD_FLAG_ROTATIONAL
e49dacc71ec2 nbd: implement the WRITE_ZEROES command
c9ea57c91f03 nbd: fix race between timeout and normal completion
7543ae2269a8 nbd: add support for rotational devices
bd4a633b6f7c block: move the nonrot flag to queue_limits
1122c0c1cc71 block: move cache control settings out of queue->flags
6b377787a306 nbd: move setting the cache control flags to __nbd_set_size
a23634644afc block: take io_opt and io_min into account for max_sectors
957df9af723c nbd: Remove __force casts
e56d4b633fff nbd: Fix signal handling
f6cb9a2c3d2e nbd: Remove a local variable from nbd_send_cmd()
2a6751e052ab nbd: Improve the documentation of the locking assumptions
40639e9a0f6e nbd: Remove superfluous casts
268283244c0f nbd: use the atomic queue limits API in nbd_set_size
242a49e5c878 nbd: freeze the queue for queue limits updates
7ea201f2cc1d nbd: don't clear discard_sectors in nbd_config_put
9a0d4970288d nbd: pass queue_limits to blk_mq_alloc_disk
31edf4bbe0ba nbd: null check for nla_nest_start
27e32cd23fed block: pass a queue_limits argument to blk_mq_alloc_disk
78fbb92af27d nbd: always initialize struct msghdr completely
1e2ab2e8a98c nbd: use the default discard granularity
98c598afc22d nbd: pass nbd_sock to nbd_read_reply() instead of index
c2da049f4194 nbd: fix null-ptr-dereference while accessing 'nbd->config'
3123ac779233 nbd: factor out a helper to get nbd_config without holding 'config_lock'
1b59860540a4 nbd: fold nbd config initialization into nbd_alloc_config()
327462725b0f nbd: fix uaf in nbd_open
07a1141ff170 nbd: don't call blk_mark_disk_dead nbd_clear_sock_ioctl
0c1c9a27ce90 nbd: call blk_mark_disk_dead in nbd_clear_sock_ioctl
ffe357c868e7 nbd: automatically load module on genl access
]
|
| 152/2 |
2026/07/09 11:45 |
llm |
history-explorer |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 12659
output: 26
thoughts: 158
Thoughts: **Analyzing Potential Causes of Network Issues**
Okay, let's dive in. I need to get to the bottom of these persistent timeout, dead socket, or ratelimiting issues. My initial instinct is to check the commit history, and see if any recent changes might be implicated. Let's see... I've got a list of commits here.
"c9ea57c91f03 nbd: fix race between timeout and normal completion" - Okay, that one jumps out immediately. Race conditions are classic causes of subtle network problems and the description seems pretty relevant.
"844b8cdc6816 nbd: don't allow reconnect after disconnect" - Interesting, that seems like it might be indirectly related, potentially hiding an error.
"8b428f42f3ed nbd: fix lockdep deadlock warning" - Deadlocks, I've seen that one before, though in this case it's a warning, not a definite problem.
"327462725b0f nbd: fix uaf in nbd_open" - A use-after-free issue could manifest in lots of ways, some of which might appear as network issues. Worth a look.
"e56d4b633fff nbd: Fix signal handling" - Signal handling errors can lead to unexpected behavior, including what looks like timeouts.
Alright, based on those descriptions, I'm going to start with `c9ea57c91f03`. That race condition between timeout and normal completion looks like the most likely suspect in this particular scenario.
|
| 153/2 |
2026/07/09 11:46 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit c9ea57c91f03bcad415e1a20113bdb2077bcf990
Author: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Date: Fri Aug 30 11:41:45 2024 +0800
nbd: fix race between timeout and normal completion
If request timetout is handled by nbd_requeue_cmd(), normal completion
has to be stopped for avoiding to complete this requeued request, other
use-after-free can be triggered.
Fix the race by clearing NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT in nbd_requeue_cmd(), meantime
make sure that cmd->lock is grabbed for clearing the flag and the
requeue.
Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Cc: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Fixes: 2895f1831e91 ("nbd: don't clear 'NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT' flag if request is not completed")
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240830034145.1827742-1-ming.lei@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index 5b1811b1ba5f..4d06472bf112 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -181,6 +181,17 @@ static void nbd_requeue_cmd(struct nbd_cmd *cmd)
{
struct request *req = blk_mq_rq_from_pdu(cmd);
+ lockdep_assert_held(&cmd->lock);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear INFLIGHT flag so that this cmd won't be completed in
+ * normal completion path
+ *
+ * INFLIGHT flag will be set when the cmd is queued to nbd next
+ * time.
+ */
+ __clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags);
+
if (!test_and_set_bit(NBD_CMD_REQUEUED, &cmd->flags))
blk_mq_requeue_request(req, true);
}
@@ -491,8 +502,8 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req)
nbd_mark_nsock_dead(nbd, nsock, 1);
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
}
- mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
+ mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
nbd_config_put(nbd);
return BLK_EH_DONE;
}
]
|
| 154/2 |
2026/07/09 11:46 |
llm |
history-explorer |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 14008
output: 51
thoughts: 38
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, summarized as you requested:
**Digging into Rate Limiting in the Block Layer**
Alright, time to get to the bottom of some rate limiting issues. My gut tells me there's probably a connection, so I'm going to start by focusing on commits that specifically mention "ratelimit" or, better yet, that more specific `pr_err_ratelimited` macro. These are the classic breadcrumbs left by developers grappling with throttling access. I'll need to zero in on the `drivers/block/nbd.c` file and also expand my search to the block layer in general. This might expose some underlying logic or interactions that are causing problems or offering useful solutions. I need to understand what's been done already, see how others have approached this particular problem space, and pinpoint what I need to look into deeper.
|
| 155/2 |
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tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[CodeRegexp:pr_err_ratelimited Count:10 PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c Since:10 years]
Results:
|
| 156/2 |
2026/07/09 11:46 |
llm |
history-explorer |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 14299
output: 47
thoughts: 44
Thoughts: Okay, here's my summary, taking the role of the thinker:
**Examining NBD Rate Limiting**
Alright, I need to investigate rate limiting within the NBD (Network Block Device) driver. The first thing I'm checking is if any recent commits directly reference `pr_err_ratelimited` in `drivers/block/nbd.c`. Seems like there aren't any, which is a bit surprising, but not necessarily a dead end. Therefore, I need to broaden my search. My next step will be to search within `drivers/block/nbd.c` for any mentions of the broader term "ratelimit" or "rate limit." This should give me a better overview of how rate limiting is actually being handled, or if it's even present in a more general sense.
|
| 157/2 |
2026/07/09 11:46 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[CodeRegexp:ratelimit Count:10 PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c Since:10 years]
Results: map[Output:957df9af723c nbd: Remove __force casts
2da22da57348 nbd: fix zero cmd timeout handling v2
5ea8d10802ec nbd: separate out the config information
f3733247ae7c nbd: handle single path failures gracefully
9dd5d3ab49f7 nbd: handle ERESTARTSYS properly
09fc54ccc427 nbd: move request validity checking into nbd_send_cmd
a897b6664e95 nbd: use dev_err_ratelimited in io path
fd8383fd88a2 nbd: convert to blkmq
]
|
| 158/2 |
2026/07/09 11:46 |
llm |
history-explorer |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 14746
output: 27
thoughts: 32
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, assuming I'm deep in my domain of expertise:
**Diving into the Analysis**
Right, let's get down to it. These identifiers, `a897b6664e95` and `2da22da57348`, are jumping out at me. I need to take a closer look. I immediately assume that they represent some data, perhaps checksums, hashes, or unique IDs, maybe even addresses. The specific format suggests a hexadecimal representation, likely a 12-character and 12-character format, which helps me anticipate the likely data associated with them. Now, let's explore their significance in the current context. I need to figure out what systems or data they belong to. Are they related? And what analytical goal do they help to achieve?
|
| 159/2 |
2026/07/09 11:47 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit a897b6664e9565c980f76af1c123cb0597d79822
Author: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Date: Mon Dec 5 16:20:29 2016 -0500
nbd: use dev_err_ratelimited in io path
While doing stress tests we noticed that we'd get a lot of dmesg spam if
we suddenly disconnected the nbd device out of band. Rate limit the
messages in the io path in order to deal with this.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index 84ea5c2251e2..99c84468f154 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ static int sock_xmit(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index, int send, void *buf,
unsigned long pflags = current->flags;
if (unlikely(!sock)) {
- dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
+ dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
"Attempted %s on closed socket in sock_xmit\n",
(send ? "send" : "recv"));
return -EINVAL;
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static int nbd_send_cmd(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index)
result = sock_xmit(nbd, index, 1, &request, sizeof(request),
(type == NBD_CMD_WRITE) ? MSG_MORE : 0);
if (result <= 0) {
- dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
+ dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
"Send control failed (result %d)\n", result);
return -EIO;
}
@@ -501,14 +501,14 @@ static void nbd_handle_cmd(struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index)
struct nbd_sock *nsock;
if (index >= nbd->num_connections) {
- dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
- "Attempted send on invalid socket\n");
+ dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
+ "Attempted send on invalid socket\n");
goto error_out;
}
if (test_bit(NBD_DISCONNECTED, &nbd->runtime_flags)) {
- dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
- "Attempted send on closed socket\n");
+ dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
+ "Attempted send on closed socket\n");
goto error_out;
}
@@ -519,8 +519,8 @@ static void nbd_handle_cmd(struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index)
if (req->cmd_type == REQ_TYPE_FS &&
rq_data_dir(req) == WRITE &&
(nbd->flags & NBD_FLAG_READ_ONLY)) {
- dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
- "Write on read-only\n");
+ dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
+ "Write on read-only\n");
goto error_out;
}
@@ -530,13 +530,14 @@ static void nbd_handle_cmd(struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index)
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
if (unlikely(!nsock->sock)) {
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
- dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
- "Attempted send on closed socket\n");
+ dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
+ "Attempted send on closed socket\n");
goto error_out;
}
if (nbd_send_cmd(nbd, cmd, index) != 0) {
- dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), "Request send failed\n");
+ dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
+ "Request send failed\n");
req->errors++;
nbd_end_request(cmd);
}
]
|
| 160/2 |
2026/07/09 11:47 |
llm |
history-explorer |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 16276
output: 25
thoughts: 66
Thoughts: Here's my take on those thoughts:
**Analyzing Error Handling and Potential Timeout Issues**
Okay, so I'm seeing the `dev_err_ratelimited` or `pr_err_ratelimited` construct again, likely in block or nbd code. It's a pretty standard approach to throttle error messages in the kernel log, specifically to combat excessive dmesg spam. You're always careful about flooding dmesg with the same message repeatedly. We don't want to drown out *important* debugging information with a flood of redundant errors.
Now, my focus shifts to that commit hash, `2da22da57348`. Let's dig into that change. Considering the context of the error handling I just observed, it's highly likely this commit touches on timeout-related issues within that area. Might be related to the rate limiting. Maybe some code had a tight loop that hit timeout error messages. I will go and find out.
|
| 161/2 |
2026/07/09 11:48 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit 2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e
Author: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Date: Tue Aug 13 11:39:52 2019 -0500
nbd: fix zero cmd timeout handling v2
This fixes a regression added in 4.9 with commit:
commit 0eadf37afc2500e1162c9040ec26a705b9af8d47
Author: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Date: Thu Sep 8 12:33:40 2016 -0700
nbd: allow block mq to deal with timeouts
where before the patch userspace would set the timeout to 0 to disable
it. With the above patch, a zero timeout tells the block layer to use
the default value of 30 seconds. For setups where commands can take a
long time or experience transient issues like network disruptions this
then results in IO errors being sent to the application.
To fix this, the patch still uses the common block layer timeout
framework, but if zero is set, nbd just logs a message and then resets
the timer when it expires.
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index ebc98cf76365..98c618e5732c 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ struct nbd_cmd {
struct mutex lock;
int index;
int cookie;
+ int retries;
blk_status_t status;
unsigned long flags;
u32 cmd_cookie;
@@ -407,10 +408,25 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req,
nbd_config_put(nbd);
return BLK_EH_DONE;
}
- } else {
- dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd),
- "Connection timed out\n");
}
+
+ if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
+ /*
+ * Userspace sets timeout=0 to disable socket disconnection,
+ * so just warn and reset the timer.
+ */
+ cmd->retries++;
+ dev_info(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Possible stuck request %p: control (%s@%llu,%uB). Runtime %u seconds\n",
+ req, nbdcmd_to_ascii(req_to_nbd_cmd_type(req)),
+ (unsigned long long)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9,
+ blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
+ nbd_config_put(nbd);
+ return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
+ }
+
+ dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Connection timed out\n");
set_bit(NBD_TIMEDOUT, &config->runtime_flags);
cmd->status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
@@ -531,6 +547,7 @@ static int nbd_send_cmd(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index)
}
cmd->index = index;
cmd->cookie = nsock->cookie;
+ cmd->retries = 0;
request.type = htonl(type | nbd_cmd_flags);
if (type != NBD_CMD_FLUSH) {
request.from = cpu_to_be64((u64)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9);
@@ -1254,7 +1271,8 @@ static bool nbd_is_valid_blksize(unsigned long blksize)
static void nbd_set_cmd_timeout(struct nbd_device *nbd, u64 timeout)
{
nbd->tag_set.timeout = timeout * HZ;
- blk_queue_rq_timeout(nbd->disk->queue, timeout * HZ);
+ if (timeout)
+ blk_queue_rq_timeout(nbd->disk->queue, timeout * HZ);
}
/* Must be called with config_lock held */
@@ -1287,8 +1305,7 @@ static int __nbd_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, struct nbd_device *nbd,
nbd_size_set(nbd, config->blksize, arg);
return 0;
case NBD_SET_TIMEOUT:
- if (arg)
- nbd_set_cmd_timeout(nbd, arg);
+ nbd_set_cmd_timeout(nbd, arg);
return 0;
case NBD_SET_FLAGS:
]
|
| 162/2 |
2026/07/09 11:48 |
llm |
history-explorer |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 17970
output: 52
thoughts: 193
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Subtle Timeout Issue**
Okay, so looking back at the code, commit `2da22da57348` introduced that crucial `!nbd->tag_set.timeout` check within `nbd_xmit_timeout`. I remember that change, now I need to refresh my memory about why it's there. The bug report is pointing me to this specific block of code:
```c
if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
/* ... */
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
// ...
return BLK_EH_DONE;
}
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
// ...
return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
}
```
My immediate task is to understand the context of the `cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie` comparison *within* that conditional. I need to trace back and determine when that specific check was added. The combination of no timeout and that cookie check is my current focus. I know this has something to do with asynchronous command handling.
|
| 163/2 |
2026/07/09 11:49 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[CodeRegexp:cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie Count:10 PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c Since:10 years]
Results: map[Output:2c272542baee nbd: requeue command if the soecket is changed
]
|
| 164/2 |
2026/07/09 11:49 |
llm |
history-explorer |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 18521
output: 25
thoughts: 16
Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. Here's my thought process on this...
**Initial Assessment: Examining a Data Identifier**
Alright, the instruction is to check this identifier: `2c272542baee`. My initial assumption is that this is some sort of data reference. Given my experience, it's most likely either a hash, a unique ID, or some form of checksum. The specific format of this looks like a hexadecimal string, which immediately points me towards a digital fingerprint or a representation in a specific encoding scheme. The length is important; it suggests a specific algorithm or system it's tied to. Let's see what further context is presented.
|
| 165/2 |
2026/07/09 11:49 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit 2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5
Author: Hou Pu <houpu.main@gmail.com>
Date: Fri Feb 28 01:40:30 2020 -0500
nbd: requeue command if the soecket is changed
In commit 2da22da5734 (nbd: fix zero cmd timeout handling v2),
it is allowed to reset timer when it fires if tag_set.timeout
is set to zero. If the server is shutdown and a new socket
is reconfigured, the request should be requeued to be processed by
new server instead of waiting for response from the old one.
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Hou Pu <houpu@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index 83070714888b..43cff01a5a67 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -434,12 +434,22 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req,
* Userspace sets timeout=0 to disable socket disconnection,
* so just warn and reset the timer.
*/
+ struct nbd_sock *nsock = config->socks[cmd->index];
cmd->retries++;
dev_info(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Possible stuck request %p: control (%s@%llu,%uB). Runtime %u seconds\n",
req, nbdcmd_to_ascii(req_to_nbd_cmd_type(req)),
(unsigned long long)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9,
blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
+ mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
+ if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
+ nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
+ mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
+ mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
+ nbd_config_put(nbd);
+ return BLK_EH_DONE;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
nbd_config_put(nbd);
return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
]
|
| 166/2 |
2026/07/09 11:49 |
llm |
history-explorer |
3m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 19409
output: 39
thoughts: 73
Thoughts: Okay, let's see what we have here.
**Analyzing a Potential Race Condition**
Alright, so `2c272542baee` introduced a check: `cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie`. That's a reasonable first step in preventing something, likely a use-after-free or a related concurrency problem, given the context. However, the bug report flags that this new check overlooks something crucial: `nsock->dead`. It seems like the state of `nsock` being "dead" is a critical factor in this interaction.
My immediate thought is, "Where *else* does the code interact with `nsock->dead` within `nbd_xmit_timeout`?" It's entirely possible that there are other checks for this variable that, if missed here, could create a significant vulnerability. I need to understand the full landscape of how `nsock->dead` is being used in the timeout function to get a complete picture. This feels like a race condition is lurking. I need to identify it and assess its impact.
|
| 167/2 |
2026/07/09 11:52 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_xmit_timeout]
Results: map[SourceCode: 451: static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req)
452: {
453: struct nbd_cmd *cmd = blk_mq_rq_to_pdu(req);
454: struct nbd_device *nbd = cmd->nbd;
455: struct nbd_config *config;
456:
457: if (!mutex_trylock(&cmd->lock))
458: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
459:
460: /* partial send is handled in nbd_sock's work function */
461: if (test_bit(NBD_CMD_PARTIAL_SEND, &cmd->flags)) {
462: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
463: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
464: }
465:
466: if (!test_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags)) {
467: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
468: return BLK_EH_DONE;
469: }
470:
471: config = nbd_get_config_unlocked(nbd);
472: if (!config) {
473: cmd->status = BLK_STS_TIMEOUT;
474: __clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags);
475: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
476: goto done;
477: }
478:
479: if (config->num_connections > 1 ||
480: (config->num_connections == 1 && nbd->tag_set.timeout)) {
481: dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd),
482: "Connection timed out, retrying (%d/%d alive)\n",
483: atomic_read(&config->live_connections),
484: config->num_connections);
485: /*
486: * Hooray we have more connections, requeue this IO, the submit
487: * path will put it on a real connection. Or if only one
488: * connection is configured, the submit path will wait util
489: * a new connection is reconfigured or util dead timeout.
490: */
491: if (config->socks) {
492: if (cmd->index < config->num_connections) {
493: struct nbd_sock *nsock =
494: config->socks[cmd->index];
495: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
496: /* We can have multiple outstanding requests, so
497: * we don't want to mark the nsock dead if we've
498: * already reconnected with a new socket, so
499: * only mark it dead if its the same socket we
500: * were sent out on.
501: */
502: if (cmd->cookie == nsock->cookie)
503: nbd_mark_nsock_dead(nbd, nsock, 1);
504: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
505: }
506: nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
507: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
508: nbd_config_put(nbd);
509: return BLK_EH_DONE;
510: }
511: }
512:
513: if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
514: /*
515: * Userspace sets timeout=0 to disable socket disconnection,
516: * so just warn and reset the timer.
517: */
518: struct nbd_sock *nsock = config->socks[cmd->index];
519: cmd->retries++;
520: dev_info(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Possible stuck request %p: control (%s@%llu,%uB). Runtime %u seconds\n",
521: req, nbdcmd_to_ascii(req_to_nbd_cmd_type(req)),
522: (unsigned long long)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9,
523: blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
524:
525: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
526: if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
527: nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
528: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
529: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
530: nbd_config_put(nbd);
531: return BLK_EH_DONE;
532: }
533: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
534: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
535: nbd_config_put(nbd);
536: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
537: }
538:
539: dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Connection timed out\n");
540: set_bit(NBD_RT_TIMEDOUT, &config->runtime_flags);
541: cmd->status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
542: __clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags);
543: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
544: sock_shutdown(nbd);
545: nbd_config_put(nbd);
546: done:
547: blk_mq_complete_request(req);
548: return BLK_EH_DONE;
549: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 168/2 |
2026/07/09 11:52 |
llm |
history-explorer |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 21427
output: 32
thoughts: 80
Thoughts: Okay, let me break this down.
**Analyzing a Potential Race Condition in the NBD Driver**
Alright, so I'm looking at this `nbd_xmit_timeout` function and a potential issue related to network sockets. I see that the code currently checks if the cookie values match (`cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie`) *only* when a timeout is *not* specifically configured for the tag set (`!nbd->tag_set.timeout`). The bug report suggests there's a problem, and that we also need to consider if the network socket is "dead" (`nsock->dead`).
My immediate thought is, "Okay, that makes sense. It's likely a race condition if we don't handle a dead socket properly in this timeout situation." The socket could have died in the interim, but the code isn't accounting for that specifically. Now, I need to understand the implications better.
My next step is to quickly scan `nbd.c` for other instances where `nsock->dead` is being checked. I need to get a broader view of how this flag is used (or *not* used) within the NBD driver to understand the potential scope of this bug. Are there other places where a dead socket could lead to issues, like memory leaks or sending data to a disconnected socket? Understanding the existing checks will help me determine the appropriate fix and assess the risk level of the bug. I need to make sure I don't introduce a regression in fixing this.
|
| 169/2 |
2026/07/09 11:52 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:nsock->dead PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:drivers/block/nbd.c=305=static void nbd_mark_nsock_dead(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct nbd_sock *nsock,
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-307-{
drivers/block/nbd.c:308: if (!nsock->dead && notify && !nbd_disconnected(nbd->config)) {
drivers/block/nbd.c-309- struct link_dead_args *args;
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-316- }
drivers/block/nbd.c:317: if (!nsock->dead) {
drivers/block/nbd.c-318- kernel_sock_shutdown(nsock->sock, SHUT_RDWR);
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-328- }
drivers/block/nbd.c:329: nsock->dead = true;
drivers/block/nbd.c-330- nsock->pending = NULL;
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=1117=static blk_status_t nbd_handle_cmd(struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-1143- mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
drivers/block/nbd.c:1144: if (nsock->dead) {
drivers/block/nbd.c-1145- int old_index = index;
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=1277=static int nbd_add_socket(struct nbd_device *nbd, unsigned long arg,
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-1330- nsock->fallback_index = -1;
drivers/block/nbd.c:1331: nsock->dead = false;
drivers/block/nbd.c-1332- mutex_init(&nsock->tx_lock);
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=1350=static int nbd_reconnect_socket(struct nbd_device *nbd, unsigned long arg)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-1370-
drivers/block/nbd.c:1371: if (!nsock->dead)
drivers/block/nbd.c-1372- continue;
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-1374- mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
drivers/block/nbd.c:1375: if (!nsock->dead) {
drivers/block/nbd.c-1376- mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-1386- nsock->sock = sock;
drivers/block/nbd.c:1387: nsock->dead = false;
drivers/block/nbd.c-1388- INIT_WORK(&args->work, recv_work);
]
|
| 170/2 |
2026/07/09 11:52 |
llm |
history-explorer |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 22613
output: 38
thoughts: 185
Thoughts: **Analyzing Socket Deactivation in the NBD Driver**
Okay, so it looks like `nsock->dead` is the flag used to signal a dead or closed network socket, which makes sense. I see that `nbd_handle_cmd` is responsible for dealing with this state. The code snippet shows that when `nsock->dead` is true, the function attempts to recover by acquiring `nsock->tx_lock` and then selecting a new socket using `nbd_get_random_nsock`. Interesting.
My immediate thought here is about that `index` variable being redefined. It grabs `old_index`, and then it uses this `index = nsock - config->socks[0]` assignment. Wait, that means `config->socks` must be an array of pointers to `nsock` structures, right? It's calculating an offset to identify the index of the newly acquired socket. I'll need to confirm that `config->socks` is indeed an array of pointers to fully understand this, but that's what it looks like. If no new socket is found, it will go to error_out.
Now, let's take a closer look at `nbd_handle_cmd` to see exactly how this socket re-selection is handled and if it's the expected behavior. I need to understand what error conditions trigger this handling and what it does beyond socket reassignment.
|
| 171/2 |
2026/07/09 11:53 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_handle_cmd]
Results: map[SourceCode:1117: static blk_status_t nbd_handle_cmd(struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index)
1118: {
1119: struct request *req = blk_mq_rq_from_pdu(cmd);
1120: struct nbd_device *nbd = cmd->nbd;
1121: struct nbd_config *config;
1122: struct nbd_sock *nsock;
1123: blk_status_t ret;
1124:
1125: lockdep_assert_held(&cmd->lock);
1126:
1127: config = nbd_get_config_unlocked(nbd);
1128: if (!config) {
1129: dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
1130: "Socks array is empty\n");
1131: return BLK_STS_IOERR;
1132: }
1133:
1134: if (index >= config->num_connections) {
1135: dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
1136: "Attempted send on invalid socket\n");
1137: nbd_config_put(nbd);
1138: return BLK_STS_IOERR;
1139: }
1140: cmd->status = BLK_STS_OK;
1141: again:
1142: nsock = config->socks[index];
1143: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
1144: if (nsock->dead) {
1145: int old_index = index;
1146: index = find_fallback(nbd, index);
1147: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
1148: if (index < 0) {
1149: if (wait_for_reconnect(nbd)) {
1150: index = old_index;
1151: goto again;
1152: }
1153: /* All the sockets should already be down at this point,
1154: * we just want to make sure that DISCONNECTED is set so
1155: * any requests that come in that were queue'ed waiting
1156: * for the reconnect timer don't trigger the timer again
1157: * and instead just error out.
1158: */
1159: sock_shutdown(nbd);
1160: nbd_config_put(nbd);
1161: return BLK_STS_IOERR;
1162: }
1163: goto again;
1164: }
1165:
1166: /* Handle the case that we have a pending request that was partially
1167: * transmitted that _has_ to be serviced first. We need to call requeue
1168: * here so that it gets put _after_ the request that is already on the
1169: * dispatch list.
1170: */
1171: blk_mq_start_request(req);
1172: if (unlikely(nsock->pending && nsock->pending != req)) {
1173: nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
1174: ret = BLK_STS_OK;
1175: goto out;
1176: }
1177: ret = nbd_send_cmd(nbd, cmd, index);
1178: out:
1179: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
1180: nbd_config_put(nbd);
1181: return ret;
1182: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 172/2 |
2026/07/09 11:53 |
llm |
history-explorer |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 24177
output: 39
thoughts: 108
Thoughts: **Analyzing the Socket Handling in NBD Transactions**
Okay, so I'm digging into how these network block device (NBD) commands are handled, especially when we hit a socket issue. My understanding is that `nbd_handle_cmd` will attempt to salvage the situation if `nsock->dead` is true. It either hunts for a replacement socket or waits for a reconnect, right? And if those efforts are fruitless, it'll correctly flag the operation with `BLK_STS_IOERR`.
This is where it gets interesting, specifically around timeouts and retries with `nbd_xmit_timeout`. If this timeout function decides to requeue the command while `nsock->dead` is still true, the ultimate outcome should be a failure via `nbd_handle_cmd`, *unless* a fresh socket somehow materializes. I'm expecting this is by design.
Let me just double-check the logic within `nbd_xmit_timeout` again to confirm that I'm seeing everything correctly. Just to be sure the requeue and failure paths align as I expect. I'm especially interested in the conditions that trigger the requeue versus the cases where it just throws the towel in.
|
| 173/2 |
2026/07/09 11:53 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_xmit_timeout]
Results: map[SourceCode: 451: static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req)
452: {
453: struct nbd_cmd *cmd = blk_mq_rq_to_pdu(req);
454: struct nbd_device *nbd = cmd->nbd;
455: struct nbd_config *config;
456:
457: if (!mutex_trylock(&cmd->lock))
458: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
459:
460: /* partial send is handled in nbd_sock's work function */
461: if (test_bit(NBD_CMD_PARTIAL_SEND, &cmd->flags)) {
462: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
463: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
464: }
465:
466: if (!test_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags)) {
467: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
468: return BLK_EH_DONE;
469: }
470:
471: config = nbd_get_config_unlocked(nbd);
472: if (!config) {
473: cmd->status = BLK_STS_TIMEOUT;
474: __clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags);
475: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
476: goto done;
477: }
478:
479: if (config->num_connections > 1 ||
480: (config->num_connections == 1 && nbd->tag_set.timeout)) {
481: dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd),
482: "Connection timed out, retrying (%d/%d alive)\n",
483: atomic_read(&config->live_connections),
484: config->num_connections);
485: /*
486: * Hooray we have more connections, requeue this IO, the submit
487: * path will put it on a real connection. Or if only one
488: * connection is configured, the submit path will wait util
489: * a new connection is reconfigured or util dead timeout.
490: */
491: if (config->socks) {
492: if (cmd->index < config->num_connections) {
493: struct nbd_sock *nsock =
494: config->socks[cmd->index];
495: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
496: /* We can have multiple outstanding requests, so
497: * we don't want to mark the nsock dead if we've
498: * already reconnected with a new socket, so
499: * only mark it dead if its the same socket we
500: * were sent out on.
501: */
502: if (cmd->cookie == nsock->cookie)
503: nbd_mark_nsock_dead(nbd, nsock, 1);
504: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
505: }
506: nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
507: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
508: nbd_config_put(nbd);
509: return BLK_EH_DONE;
510: }
511: }
512:
513: if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
514: /*
515: * Userspace sets timeout=0 to disable socket disconnection,
516: * so just warn and reset the timer.
517: */
518: struct nbd_sock *nsock = config->socks[cmd->index];
519: cmd->retries++;
520: dev_info(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Possible stuck request %p: control (%s@%llu,%uB). Runtime %u seconds\n",
521: req, nbdcmd_to_ascii(req_to_nbd_cmd_type(req)),
522: (unsigned long long)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9,
523: blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
524:
525: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
526: if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
527: nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
528: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
529: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
530: nbd_config_put(nbd);
531: return BLK_EH_DONE;
532: }
533: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
534: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
535: nbd_config_put(nbd);
536: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
537: }
538:
539: dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Connection timed out\n");
540: set_bit(NBD_RT_TIMEDOUT, &config->runtime_flags);
541: cmd->status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
542: __clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags);
543: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
544: sock_shutdown(nbd);
545: nbd_config_put(nbd);
546: done:
547: blk_mq_complete_request(req);
548: return BLK_EH_DONE;
549: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 174/2 |
2026/07/09 11:53 |
llm |
history-explorer |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 26264
output: 51
thoughts: 105
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Bug Fix: Addressing Potential Timing Issues**
Okay, so the proposed fix is straightforward. It adds a check for `nsock->dead` to this conditional within the code:
```c
- if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
+ if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie || nsock->dead) {
```
Essentially, it's guarding against stale data, which is a good practice. I need to make sure I completely understand the implications of this change. My immediate thought is, "Is this the only place in `nbd_xmit_timeout` where `nsock->dead` needs to be considered?" Let me confirm that. No, the current implementation doesn't appear to perform this check elsewhere.
Now, I'm trying to see the scope of this bug's occurrence and how it was addressed in the past. To understand if there are any related issues, I should investigate the commit history of `nbd_xmit_timeout`. Perhaps a similar problem has been encountered and solved before. Let's dig into that history and see if any other commits address related timing issues or race conditions. I need to examine the context of the change to determine whether this change alone is sufficient, or if it indicates a broader problem.
|
| 175/2 |
2026/07/09 11:53 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[CodeRegexp:nbd_xmit_timeout Count:10 PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c Since:10 years]
Results: map[Output:9bdb4833dd39 blk-mq: Drop blk_mq_ops.timeout 'reserved' arg
0eadf37afc25 nbd: allow block mq to deal with timeouts
]
|
| 176/2 |
2026/07/09 11:53 |
llm |
history-explorer |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 26754
output: 51
thoughts: 41
Thoughts: Okay, here's the summary of those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience, presented in the first person:
**Focusing Git Log for Precise Diff Analysis**
Hmm, so I'm using `git log`, but I've realized `CodeRegexp` alone, as I was originally thinking, is only going to look at *diffs*. That's not quite what I need for this particular investigation. I need to find the *commits* themselves, the context around the change, and the history surrounding `nbd_xmit_timeout`. Right. So, I need a broader search strategy to identify commits referencing that key term in the *commit message* itself. That's where I need to start. From there, I can drill down further.
|
| 177/2 |
2026/07/09 11:54 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[Count:10 MessageRegexps:[nbd_xmit_timeout] PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c Since:10 years]
Results: map[Output:09dadb598502 nbd: fix io hung while disconnecting device
07175cb1baf4 nbd: make sure request completion won't concurrent
]
|
| 178/2 |
2026/07/09 11:54 |
llm |
history-explorer |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 27061
output: 25
thoughts: 29
Thoughts: Here's my attempt at summarizing the thought process, tailored for an expert audience:
**Analyzing Potential Anomalies**
Okay, time to dive in. My immediate focus is on those two hashes, `09dadb598502` and `07175cb1baf4`. I need to assess these, they stick out somehow, so I will start by verifying if they are indeed hashes. I'll need to confirm the algorithm used to generate them; assuming they are hashes, perhaps they represent suspicious code snippets, modified data, or potentially, keys. My initial thought process involves checking their context – where did these identifiers originate? Are they linked to any known vulnerabilities, compromised systems, or unusual network traffic patterns within our datasets? I will need to ensure they match our usual logging, or potentially raise a flag. Further analysis would require comparing these against known good hashes and analyzing the delta if it exists.
|
| 179/2 |
2026/07/09 11:55 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit 09dadb5985023e27d4740ebd17e6fea4640110e5
Author: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Date: Sat May 21 15:37:47 2022 +0800
nbd: fix io hung while disconnecting device
In our tests, "qemu-nbd" triggers a io hung:
INFO: task qemu-nbd:11445 blocked for more than 368 seconds.
Not tainted 5.18.0-rc3-next-20220422-00003-g2176915513ca #884
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:qemu-nbd state:D stack: 0 pid:11445 ppid: 1 flags:0x00000000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x480/0x1050
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3e/0xb0
schedule+0x9c/0x1b0
blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0x9d/0xf0
? ipi_rseq+0x70/0x70
blk_mq_freeze_queue+0x2b/0x40
nbd_add_socket+0x6b/0x270 [nbd]
nbd_ioctl+0x383/0x510 [nbd]
blkdev_ioctl+0x18e/0x3e0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x120
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fd8ff706577
RSP: 002b:00007fd8fcdfebf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000040000000 RCX: 00007fd8ff706577
RDX: 000000000000000d RSI: 000000000000ab00 RDI: 000000000000000f
RBP: 000000000000000f R08: 000000000000fbe8 R09: 000055fe497c62b0
R10: 00000002aff20000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000006d
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffe82dc5e70 R15: 00007fd8fcdff9c0
"qemu-ndb -d" will call ioctl 'NBD_DISCONNECT' first, however, following
message was found:
block nbd0: Send disconnect failed -32
Which indicate that something is wrong with the server. Then,
"qemu-nbd -d" will call ioctl 'NBD_CLEAR_SOCK', however ioctl can't clear
requests after commit 2516ab1543fd("nbd: only clear the queue on device
teardown"). And in the meantime, request can't complete through timeout
because nbd_xmit_timeout() will always return 'BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER', which
means such request will never be completed in this situation.
Now that the flag 'NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT' can make sure requests won't
complete multiple times, switch back to call nbd_clear_sock() in
nbd_clear_sock_ioctl(), so that inflight requests can be cleared.
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220521073749.3146892-5-yukuai3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index a0d0910dae2a..ec736cc52134 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -1429,7 +1429,7 @@ static int nbd_start_device_ioctl(struct nbd_device *nbd)
static void nbd_clear_sock_ioctl(struct nbd_device *nbd,
struct block_device *bdev)
{
- sock_shutdown(nbd);
+ nbd_clear_sock(nbd);
__invalidate_device(bdev, true);
nbd_bdev_reset(nbd);
if (test_and_clear_bit(NBD_RT_HAS_CONFIG_REF,
]
|
| 180/2 |
2026/07/09 11:55 |
llm |
history-explorer |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 28766
output: 25
thoughts: 52
Thoughts: Here's my summary, as the thought process unfolds:
**Digging into a Potential Timeout Issue in the Block Device Layer**
Okay, so `09dadb598502` flags an interesting situation: it suggests that `nbd_xmit_timeout()` consistently returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. That's not ideal, and it definitely warrants a closer look. My first instinct is to dive into `07175cb1baf4` – I'm thinking that patch might provide some clues about *why* this timeout is behaving this way. It's probably related, and maybe the answer is there. Let's see what that commit says.
|
| 181/2 |
2026/07/09 11:55 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit 07175cb1baf4c51051b1fbd391097e349f9a02a9
Author: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Date: Thu Sep 16 17:33:45 2021 +0800
nbd: make sure request completion won't concurrent
commit cddce0116058 ("nbd: Aovid double completion of a request")
try to fix that nbd_clear_que() and recv_work() can complete a
request concurrently. However, the problem still exists:
t1 t2 t3
nbd_disconnect_and_put
flush_workqueue
recv_work
blk_mq_complete_request
blk_mq_complete_request_remote -> this is true
WRITE_ONCE(rq->state, MQ_RQ_COMPLETE)
blk_mq_raise_softirq
blk_done_softirq
blk_complete_reqs
nbd_complete_rq
blk_mq_end_request
blk_mq_free_request
WRITE_ONCE(rq->state, MQ_RQ_IDLE)
nbd_clear_que
blk_mq_tagset_busy_iter
nbd_clear_req
__blk_mq_free_request
blk_mq_put_tag
blk_mq_complete_request -> complete again
There are three places where request can be completed in nbd:
recv_work(), nbd_clear_que() and nbd_xmit_timeout(). Since they
all hold cmd->lock before completing the request, it's easy to
avoid the problem by setting and checking a cmd flag.
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210916093350.1410403-3-yukuai3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index d18ba557a69d..0bb3c1e2d575 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -411,7 +411,11 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req,
if (!mutex_trylock(&cmd->lock))
return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
- __clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags);
+ if (!__test_and_clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
+ return BLK_EH_DONE;
+ }
+
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&nbd->config_refs)) {
cmd->status = BLK_STS_TIMEOUT;
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
@@ -846,7 +850,10 @@ static bool nbd_clear_req(struct request *req, void *data, bool reserved)
return true;
mutex_lock(&cmd->lock);
- __clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags);
+ if (!__test_and_clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
+ return true;
+ }
cmd->status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
]
|
| 182/2 |
2026/07/09 11:55 |
llm |
history-explorer |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 30006
output: 32
thoughts: 821
Thoughts: **Summary of Findings for NBD.c Bug Fixes**
Okay, let's break this down. The user wants a summary of idioms, locking rules, and patterns for fixing these NBD issues. I need to make sure I am clear on what needs to be considered.
Firstly, Bug 1 involves an I/O hang in `nbd_xmit_timeout()` when `timeout == 0` because it doesn't check if the socket is dead (`nsock->dead`). Bug 2 is about console spam from an un-rate-limited error message in `nbd_genl_connect()`.
For Bug 1, looking into `nbd_xmit_timeout()`, I see it handles timeouts. The proposed fix adds a check for `nsock->dead` to the requeue condition. Now, let's consult the commit history:
* Commit `c9ea57c91f03` ("nbd: fix race between timeout and normal completion") highlights the importance of clearing `NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT` while holding `cmd->lock` during requeue. However, checking `nbd_requeue_cmd`, I see this is handled internally by `nbd_requeue_cmd` now.
* Commit `2c272542baee` ("nbd: requeue command if the soecket is changed") provides a critical locking rule: `nsock->tx_lock` *must* be held when accessing `nsock->cookie` or, importantly for the fix, `nsock->dead`. This is essential to ensure that access to `nsock->dead` and `nsock->cookie` is safe from race conditions, particularly when the socket is being shut down.
* Commit `09dadb598502` ("nbd: fix io hung while disconnecting device") is another example of an I/O hang fix.
* Commit `07175cb1baf4` ("nbd: make sure request completion won't concurrent") shows that `cmd->lock` protects request completion and the `NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT` flag.
For Bug 2, the fix replaces `pr_err` with `pr_err_ratelimited`. Checking previous fixes:
* Commit `a897b6664e95` ("nbd: use dev_err_ratelimited in io path") shows the pattern of using `dev_err_ratelimited` to prevent dmesg spam when disconnecting the nbd device out of band.
* Commit `2da22da57348` ("nbd: fix zero cmd timeout handling v2") uses `dev_err_ratelimited` for timeout messages.
The clear idiom here is to use `dev_err_ratelimited` or `pr_err_ratelimited` for errors that can be triggered repeatedly by user space or network events like timeouts, closed sockets, or busy devices.
Finally, I need to verify that `nsock->dead` is properly protected by `nsock->tx_lock`. Based on commit `2c272542baee` and what I have seen, that is the case. This is a very important point!
|
| 183/2 |
2026/07/09 11:55 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:nsock->dead PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:drivers/block/nbd.c=305=static void nbd_mark_nsock_dead(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct nbd_sock *nsock,
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-307-{
drivers/block/nbd.c:308: if (!nsock->dead && notify && !nbd_disconnected(nbd->config)) {
drivers/block/nbd.c-309- struct link_dead_args *args;
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-316- }
drivers/block/nbd.c:317: if (!nsock->dead) {
drivers/block/nbd.c-318- kernel_sock_shutdown(nsock->sock, SHUT_RDWR);
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-328- }
drivers/block/nbd.c:329: nsock->dead = true;
drivers/block/nbd.c-330- nsock->pending = NULL;
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=1117=static blk_status_t nbd_handle_cmd(struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-1143- mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
drivers/block/nbd.c:1144: if (nsock->dead) {
drivers/block/nbd.c-1145- int old_index = index;
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=1277=static int nbd_add_socket(struct nbd_device *nbd, unsigned long arg,
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-1330- nsock->fallback_index = -1;
drivers/block/nbd.c:1331: nsock->dead = false;
drivers/block/nbd.c-1332- mutex_init(&nsock->tx_lock);
--
drivers/block/nbd.c=1350=static int nbd_reconnect_socket(struct nbd_device *nbd, unsigned long arg)
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-1370-
drivers/block/nbd.c:1371: if (!nsock->dead)
drivers/block/nbd.c-1372- continue;
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-1374- mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
drivers/block/nbd.c:1375: if (!nsock->dead) {
drivers/block/nbd.c-1376- mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
--
drivers/block/nbd.c-1386- nsock->sock = sock;
drivers/block/nbd.c:1387: nsock->dead = false;
drivers/block/nbd.c-1388- INIT_WORK(&args->work, recv_work);
]
|
| 184/2 |
2026/07/09 11:55 |
llm |
history-explorer |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 32329
output: 62
thoughts: 20
Thoughts: Okay, here's my attempt at summarizing that thought process, assuming I'm an expert and thinking critically about the code:
**Checking TX Lock in nbd_mark_nsock_dead**
Right, so I'm looking at `nbd_mark_nsock_dead`. The key question popping into my head is: is the `tx_lock` held within that function? The implications are huge, of course. If it *is* held, that changes everything about how I need to reason about concurrency and the potential for race conditions within that section of the code. I'll need to know whether any assumptions built upon having the `tx_lock` can be made within that section. If it *isn't* held, I'll need to be extremely careful about how shared resources are accessed and modified, as I could be dealing with a fundamentally unsafe area where other threads could be modifying the data underneath me. The locking strategy is critical here, so I need to nail this down before digging any deeper. Time to trace the execution path and see what's going on!
|
| 185/2 |
2026/07/09 11:56 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c IncludeSnippetLines:2 Name:nbd_mark_nsock_dead SourceTreePrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[References:[map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:nbd_send_cmd SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c SourceLine:802 SourceSnippet: 800: dev_err_ratelimited(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
801: "Request send failed, requeueing\n");
802: nbd_mark_nsock_dead(nbd, nsock, 1);
803: nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
804: return BLK_STS_OK;
] map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:nbd_xmit_timeout SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c SourceLine:503 SourceSnippet: 501: */
502: if (cmd->cookie == nsock->cookie)
503: nbd_mark_nsock_dead(nbd, nsock, 1);
504: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
505: }
] map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:recv_work SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c SourceLine:1021 SourceSnippet:1019:
1020: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
1021: nbd_mark_nsock_dead(nbd, nsock, 1);
1022: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
1023:
] map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:sock_shutdown SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c SourceLine:411 SourceSnippet: 409: struct nbd_sock *nsock = config->socks[i];
410: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
411: nbd_mark_nsock_dead(nbd, nsock, 0);
412: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
413: }
]] TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 186/2 |
2026/07/09 11:56 |
llm |
history-explorer |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 33233
output: 786
thoughts: 845
Thoughts: **My Analysis of the Proposed Fix**
Okay, let's break this down. First, I've got to confirm the locking rules. Yep, `nbd_mark_nsock_dead` is *always* called with `nsock->tx_lock` held. `nbd_handle_cmd` checks `nsock->dead` with `nsock->tx_lock` held. Same with `nbd_reconnect_socket`. So, the rule is pretty clear: access to `nsock->dead` *requires* holding `nsock->tx_lock`. The proposed fix specifically ensures this when checking `nsock->dead`, and that's crucial. Here's what I see:
1. **Addressing the I/O Hang in `nbd_xmit_timeout`:** We've had a similar problem before. `2c272542baee` solved an I/O hang by checking `cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie`. That established the pattern of requeueing to handle the situation with a different socket, which makes sense. `09dadb598502` addressed another hang by fixing `nbd_xmit_timeout` returning `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER` inappropriately. Now, the proposed fix adds the vital `nsock->dead` check inside the `tx_lock` critical section. This is *correct* according to the existing locking discipline. Importantly, when requeuing, `cmd->lock` must already be held, and that is already the case. Further, `c9ea57c91f03` ensures `NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT` is cleared under `cmd->lock` during the requeue. This reinforces the synchronization. So, the added check is the *correct* approach within the existing framework and addresses a potential race condition.
2. **Mitigating Console Spam in `nbd_genl_connect`:** I see a direct parallel to the console spam issue. `a897b6664e95` correctly replaced `dev_err` with `dev_err_ratelimited` to prevent spam when disconnecting the NBD device. We did a similar thing in `2da22da57348` to avoid log flooding with connection timeouts. The idiom is clear: use ratelimiting when dealing with errors that can occur repeatedly from external actions or tight loops (like those created by testing tools like syzkaller). The proposed fix aligns perfectly with this. Using `dev_err_ratelimited` is the right move here, preventing the console from being flooded.
In summary, the proposed fix directly addresses a potential race condition and adheres to the existing locking patterns and idioms within the NBD driver. It also aligns with the established practices for error reporting and ratelimiting, which is sound.
|
| 187/1 |
2026/07/09 11:56 |
action |
kernel-scratch-checkouter |
0m
Results: map[KernelScratchSrc:/app/workdir/cache/tmp/tmp1177916995]
|
| 188/1 |
2026/07/09 11:56 |
loop |
|
25m
|
| 189/2 |
2026/07/09 11:56 |
iteration |
0 |
25m
|
| 190/3 |
2026/07/09 11:56 |
agent |
patch-generator |
0m
Model:
Instruction:
You are an experienced Linux kernel developer tasked with creating a fix for a kernel bug.
You will be given a crash report, an initial explanation of the root cause done by another
kernel expert, and a summary of how similar bugs were fixed in the past.
Use the codeeditor tool to do code edits.
Note: you will not see your changes when looking at the code using codesearch tools.
Use the patch-diff tool to review the modifications you applied.
Your final reply should contain explanation of what you did in the patch and why
(details not present in the initial explanation of the bug).
Your fix must not just prevent the given crash, but also be the best fix for the underlying
root cause from the software engineering point of view. There can be several ways to fix the
same bug. Consider alternatives, and pick the best one. For example, additional checks may be
added at different locations/functions, it's usually better to place them earlier in the
execution to avoid multiple checks at various locations later.
Frequently the same coding mistake is done in several locations in the source code.
Check if your fix should be extended/applied to similar cases around to fix other similar bugs.
But don't go too wide, don't try to fix problems kernel-wide, fix similar issues
in the same file only.
If you are changing post-conditions of a function, consider all callers of the functions,
and if they need to be updated to handle new post-conditions. For example, if you make
a function that previously never returned a NULL, return NULL, consider if callers
need to be updated to handle NULL return value.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Prompt:
The crash that corresponds to the bug is:
INFO: task udevd:5877 blocked in I/O wait for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted syzkaller #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:udevd state:D stack:25800 pid:5877 tgid:5877 ppid:5040 task_flags:0x400140 flags:0x00080802
Call Trace:
<TASK>
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5510 [inline]
__schedule+0x17e7/0x5630 kernel/sched/core.c:7234
__schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:7311 [inline]
schedule+0x164/0x2b0 kernel/sched/core.c:7326
io_schedule+0x7f/0xd0 kernel/sched/core.c:8154
folio_wait_bit_common+0x836/0xbc0 mm/filemap.c:1323
folio_put_wait_locked mm/filemap.c:1492 [inline]
do_read_cache_folio+0x1ac/0x590 mm/filemap.c:4122
read_mapping_folio include/linux/pagemap.h:1015 [inline]
read_part_sector+0xb6/0x2b0 block/partitions/core.c:724
adfspart_check_POWERTEC+0x9a/0x7a0 block/partitions/acorn.c:451
check_partition block/partitions/core.c:143 [inline]
blk_add_partitions block/partitions/core.c:591 [inline]
bdev_disk_changed+0x851/0x17a0 block/partitions/core.c:695
blkdev_get_whole+0x372/0x510 block/bdev.c:751
bdev_open+0x324/0xd70 block/bdev.c:960
blkdev_open+0x461/0x600 block/fops.c:672
do_dentry_open+0x816/0x1380 fs/open.c:947
vfs_open+0x3b/0x340 fs/open.c:1052
do_open fs/namei.c:4700 [inline]
path_openat+0x2e44/0x3830 fs/namei.c:4863
do_file_open+0x23e/0x4a0 fs/namei.c:4892
do_sys_openat2+0x115/0x200 fs/open.c:1368
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1374 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1390 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1385 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x138/0x170 fs/open.c:1385
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0x560 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f9cc96a7407
RSP: 002b:00007ffec367c3a0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9cc9ea5880 RCX: 00007f9cc96a7407
RDX: 00000000000a0800 RSI: 000055fec0e9d350 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c
RBP: 000055fec0e7d910 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055fec0e91ba0
R13: 000055fec0e8b190 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000055fec0e91ba0
</TASK>
Showing all locks held in the system:
1 lock held by khungtaskd/34:
#0: ffffffff8e74a4a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:300 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8e74a4a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:840 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8e74a4a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x2e/0x180 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6775
2 locks held by getty/5427:
#0: ffff8881131c20a0 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}-{0:0}, at: tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x25/0x70 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:243
#1: ffffc900034732e8 (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: n_tty_read+0x45a/0x1360 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2211
1 lock held by udevd/5877:
#0: ffff88818b9a4350 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bdev_open+0xde/0xd70 block/bdev.c:948
2 locks held by syz.0.9928/27001:
#0: ffff88811a744740 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
#0: ffff88811a744740 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __sock_release net/socket.c:709 [inline]
#0: ffff88811a744740 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: sock_close+0x82/0x220 net/socket.c:1501
#1: ffffffff8e74fd28 (rcu_state.exp_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: exp_funnel_lock kernel/rcu/tree_exp.h:311 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8e74fd28 (rcu_state.exp_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: synchronize_rcu_expedited+0x2d0/0x770 kernel/rcu/tree_exp.h:961
=============================================
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 34 Comm: khungtaskd Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
nmi_cpu_backtrace+0x274/0x2d0 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:122
nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x17a/0x380 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:65
trigger_all_cpu_backtrace include/linux/nmi.h:162 [inline]
__sys_info lib/sys_info.c:157 [inline]
sys_info+0x135/0x170 lib/sys_info.c:165
check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:353 [inline]
watchdog+0xfd7/0x1030 kernel/hung_task.c:561
kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0:
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 27004 Comm: syz.0.9929 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:io_serial_out+0x7c/0xc0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:408
Code: e9 84 fc 44 89 f9 d3 e5 49 83 c6 40 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 4c 89 f7 e8 8c e3 f0 fc 41 03 2e 89 d8 89 ea ee <5b> 41 5c 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc 44 89 f9 80 e1 07 38 c1
RSP: 0018:ffffc90005866d30 EFLAGS: 00000002
RAX: 0000000000000031 RBX: 0000000000000031 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 00000000000003f8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000020
RBP: 00000000000003f8 R08: ffff88818ac78237 R09: 1ffff1103158f046
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff853f9a70 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffffffff9a57ee80 R14: ffffffff9a57eec0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fe0e539e6c0(0000) GS:ffff8881a56ab000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe0e4472780 CR3: 00000001120e0000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
serial_port_out include/linux/serial_core.h:813 [inline]
serial8250_console_putchar drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:3239 [inline]
serial8250_console_fifo_write drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:-1 [inline]
serial8250_console_write+0x13b6/0x1ba0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:3379
console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:3183 [inline]
console_flush_one_record kernel/printk/printk.c:3269 [inline]
console_flush_all+0x6ea/0xaf0 kernel/printk/printk.c:3343
__console_flush_and_unlock kernel/printk/printk.c:3373 [inline]
console_unlock+0xd1/0x1c0 kernel/printk/printk.c:3413
vprintk_emit+0x485/0x560 kernel/printk/printk.c:2479
_printk+0xdd/0x130 kernel/printk/printk.c:2504
nbd_genl_connect+0xa63/0x1a70 drivers/block/nbd.c:2175
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x233/0x340 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1114
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1194 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x614/0x7a0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1209
netlink_rcv_skb+0x226/0x4a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1218
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7bb/0x940 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
netlink_sendmsg+0x813/0xb40 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900
sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x13a/0x180 net/socket.c:775
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:790 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x54e/0x850 net/socket.c:2684
___sys_sendmsg+0x2a5/0x360 net/socket.c:2738
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2770 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2775 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2773 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1b1/0x290 net/socket.c:2773
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0x560 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe0e459ce59
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fe0e539e028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe0e4815fa0 RCX: 00007fe0e459ce59
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000200000001ac0 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007fe0e4632e6f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fe0e4816038 R14: 00007fe0e4815fa0 R15: 00007ffc232c20d8
</TASK>
The explanation of the root cause of the bug is:
This crash report highlights two intertwined issues in the Network Block Device (NBD) subsystem: a functional bug causing a permanent I/O hang (which triggers the hung task detector), and a logging bug causing console spam (which is captured in the NMI backtrace).
### 1. The Hung Task in `udevd` (Root Cause)
The primary bug is that `udevd` is blocked in `TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE` (`state:D`) for over 143 seconds while trying to read the partition table of the NBD device.
Here is the sequence of events that leads to this hang:
1. **Device Setup**: The syzkaller reproducer sends an `NBD_CMD_CONNECT` netlink message to configure `nbd0`. It provides a socketpair but does **not** set the `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` flag. It also leaves the I/O timeout at `0` (which means infinite retries from the user's perspective, though the block layer still uses a default 30-second timer).
2. **Uevent Triggered**: During setup, `nbd_genl_connect()` calls `nbd_start_device()` -> `nbd_set_size()`, which calls `set_capacity_and_notify()`. This triggers a uevent, prompting `udevd` to open the device and scan for partitions (`blk_add_partitions()`).
3. **Socket Closed**: The syzkaller program immediately exits, closing its end of the socketpair. The NBD `recv_work` thread detects the closed connection, calls `nbd_mark_nsock_dead()`, sets `nsock->dead = true`, and exits.
4. **Infinite Timeout Loop**: `udevd`'s read request is sent to the NBD device but receives no reply because the socket is dead. After 30 seconds, the block layer calls `nbd_xmit_timeout()`.
In `nbd_xmit_timeout()`, because `nbd->tag_set.timeout == 0` and there is only 1 connection, the code falls through to this block:
```c
if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
/* ... */
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
// ...
return BLK_EH_DONE;
}
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
// ...
return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
}
```
Because the socket hasn't been replaced (`cmd->cookie == nsock->cookie`), it unconditionally returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. It **fails to check if the socket is actually dead**. As a result, the request is never requeued or failed; it stays `INFLIGHT` on a dead socket forever. `udevd` hangs indefinitely, eventually triggering the kernel's hung task detector.
### 2. The Console Spam (NMI Backtrace)
When the hung task detector fires, it triggers an NMI backtrace on all CPUs. The backtrace shows CPU 0 running `syz.0.9929` deep inside `printk` (`console_flush_all`), called from `nbd_genl_connect()` at `drivers/block/nbd.c:2175`.
Why is it printing? Because syzkaller runs the reproducer in a tight loop. Since `nbd0` was never disconnected (due to the missing `DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` flag and `udevd` holding a reference), subsequent attempts to connect to `nbd0` hit this check in `nbd_genl_connect()`:
```c
mutex_lock(&nbd->config_lock);
if (refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)) {
mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
nbd_put(nbd);
if (index == -1)
goto again;
pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index); // <--- Line 2175
return -EBUSY;
}
```
Because this `pr_err` is not rate-limited, syzkaller spams the console with "nbd0 already in use" messages. This console flood delays `console_unlock`, which is exactly what CPU 0 was caught doing when the hung task detector fired the NMI.
### How to Fix
**1. Fix the I/O Hang:**
In `nbd_xmit_timeout()`, when `timeout == 0`, the driver must check if the socket is dead (`nsock->dead`). If it is dead, the command must be requeued so that `nbd_handle_cmd()` can process the dead socket (which will properly fail the request with `BLK_STS_IOERR` since `dead_conn_timeout` is 0).
```c
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req)
blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
- if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
+ if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie || nsock->dead) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
```
**2. Fix the Console Spam:**
Change the un-ratelimited `pr_err` in `nbd_genl_connect()` to prevent userspace from trivially spamming the kernel log and causing softlockups/NMI timeouts.
```c
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -2172,7 +2172,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd_put(nbd);
if (index == -1)
goto again;
- pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
+ pr_err_ratelimited("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
return -EBUSY;
}
```
Historical context on how similar bugs were fixed in the past:
Based on the research of the recent history of the `drivers/block/nbd.c` file, the proposed fixes perfectly align with the established idioms, locking rules, and patterns used to address similar bugs in the past.
Here is a summary of the findings:
### 1. Fixing the I/O Hang (`nbd_xmit_timeout`)
* **Similar Past Fixes:**
* Commit `2c272542baee` ("nbd: requeue command if the soecket is changed") previously addressed an I/O hang in this exact same `timeout == 0` code path. It added the `cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie` check to ensure that if a socket is reconfigured, the command is requeued instead of infinitely resetting the timer. Your fix logically extends this by also checking if the socket is dead.
* Commit `09dadb598502` ("nbd: fix io hung while disconnecting device") fixed another bug where `nbd_xmit_timeout()` would incorrectly return `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER` forever, preventing request completion. Requeuing the command so that `nbd_handle_cmd()` can properly fail it with `BLK_STS_IOERR` is the correct approach.
* **Locking Rules:**
* The `nsock->dead` flag must always be read or written while holding the `nsock->tx_lock` mutex. This rule is strictly followed throughout the file (e.g., in `nbd_handle_cmd()`, `recv_work()`, and `sock_shutdown()`). Your proposed fix correctly evaluates `nsock->dead` inside the `mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock)` block.
* When calling `nbd_requeue_cmd()`, the `cmd->lock` must be held. Commit `c9ea57c91f03` ("nbd: fix race between timeout and normal completion") reinforced this rule to ensure the `NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT` flag is safely cleared during requeue. The existing code in `nbd_xmit_timeout()` already holds `cmd->lock`, so your fix is safe.
### 2. Fixing the Console Spam (`nbd_genl_connect`)
* **Similar Past Fixes:**
* Commit `a897b6664e95` ("nbd: use dev_err_ratelimited in io path") addressed a nearly identical issue where disconnecting the NBD device out-of-band caused massive dmesg spam. The fix was to replace `dev_err` with `dev_err_ratelimited`.
* Commit `2da22da57348` ("nbd: fix zero cmd timeout handling v2") also utilized `dev_err_ratelimited` to prevent log flooding when connections time out.
* **Idioms:**
* It is a standard pattern in the NBD subsystem to use `pr_err_ratelimited()` or `dev_err_ratelimited()` for error paths that can be trivially triggered by userspace (e.g., via netlink messages or ioctls) or by network disruptions. Changing the un-ratelimited `pr_err` to `pr_err_ratelimited` is exactly how previous maintainers have solved this class of bugs.
**Conclusion:**
Your proposed strategy is highly consistent with how previous maintainers have fixed similar hangs and log-spam issues in the NBD subsystem. No additional locks or complex state tracking are required beyond what you have already identified.
Reply: I have applied a patch that addresses both the I/O hang and the console spam issues in the Network Block Device (NBD) subsystem.
Here is a detailed explanation of the changes made and why they are the best approach:
### 1. Fixing the I/O Hang in `nbd_xmit_timeout`
**What was done:**
I modified the `timeout == 0` handling block in `nbd_xmit_timeout()` to check if the socket is dead (`nsock->dead`) in addition to checking if the socket has been replaced (`cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie`). If either condition is true, the command is requeued.
**Why this is the best approach:**
- **Correct State Handling:** When a user configures an NBD device with `timeout = 0`, they are requesting infinite retries for I/O operations. However, if the underlying socket is closed and marked dead (e.g., the server crashed or the connection was severed), keeping the request in-flight on a dead socket is futile and leads to the permanent `TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE` hang seen in the crash report.
- **Reusing Existing Error Paths:** By requeuing the command when `nsock->dead` is true, we push the request back to the block layer. When the request is subsequently picked up by `nbd_handle_cmd()`, it will evaluate the dead socket and properly fail the I/O with `BLK_STS_IOERR` (since `dead_conn_timeout` is 0). This gracefully terminates the hung read operation from `udevd` without needing to duplicate the I/O failure logic inside the timeout handler.
- **Locking Safety:** The `nsock->dead` flag is safely evaluated while holding the `nsock->tx_lock` mutex, which perfectly adheres to the established locking rules in `drivers/block/nbd.c`.
### 2. Fixing the Console Spam in `nbd_genl_connect`
**What was done:**
I changed the un-ratelimited `pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);` to `pr_err_ratelimited(...)`.
**Why this is the best approach:**
- **Preventing Denial of Service:** The original code allowed a userspace process (like the syzkaller reproducer) to trivially flood the kernel ring buffer by repeatedly sending netlink connect messages to an NBD device that was already in use. This flood delays `console_unlock`, which can trigger softlockups or NMI backtraces (as seen in the crash report).
- **Consistency:** Using `pr_err_ratelimited` or `dev_err_ratelimited` is the standard idiom in the kernel (and specifically in the NBD subsystem) for error paths that can be triggered at high frequency by userspace actions or network events.
These changes provide a robust fix for the root causes while maintaining the architectural integrity and locking semantics of the NBD driver.
|
| 191/4 |
2026/07/09 11:56 |
llm |
patch-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 11261
output: 39
thoughts: 138
Thoughts: **Debugging the NBD Driver**
Okay, so I've got a couple of issues to tackle in the Network Block Device driver, specifically `drivers/block/nbd.c`. The first one's a nasty one; `udevd` is getting wedged in `TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE`. My hunch is it's related to how commands are handled when a socket dies and we've set a zero timeout – we're probably not requeuing the command correctly. Gotta dig into that.
The second issue is less critical but still annoying: we're seeing some console spam coming from `nbd_genl_connect()`. It looks like `pr_err` isn't rate-limited there. Needs fixing, but the priority is definitely the `udevd` hang.
Time to dive in. I'm going to leverage my usual approach here – I'll start by examining the code directly. Using `codesearch-definition-source`, or potentially just `read-file` if that's more convenient, I'll zero in on `nbd_xmit_timeout` to understand how timeouts are handled and particularly how it relates to command requeuing in failure scenarios, and `nbd_genl_connect` to look at the error logging. Hopefully I can get a clear picture of what's going wrong. Let's see what's what.
|
| 192/4 |
2026/07/09 11:56 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_xmit_timeout]
Results: map[SourceCode: 451: static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req)
452: {
453: struct nbd_cmd *cmd = blk_mq_rq_to_pdu(req);
454: struct nbd_device *nbd = cmd->nbd;
455: struct nbd_config *config;
456:
457: if (!mutex_trylock(&cmd->lock))
458: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
459:
460: /* partial send is handled in nbd_sock's work function */
461: if (test_bit(NBD_CMD_PARTIAL_SEND, &cmd->flags)) {
462: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
463: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
464: }
465:
466: if (!test_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags)) {
467: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
468: return BLK_EH_DONE;
469: }
470:
471: config = nbd_get_config_unlocked(nbd);
472: if (!config) {
473: cmd->status = BLK_STS_TIMEOUT;
474: __clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags);
475: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
476: goto done;
477: }
478:
479: if (config->num_connections > 1 ||
480: (config->num_connections == 1 && nbd->tag_set.timeout)) {
481: dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd),
482: "Connection timed out, retrying (%d/%d alive)\n",
483: atomic_read(&config->live_connections),
484: config->num_connections);
485: /*
486: * Hooray we have more connections, requeue this IO, the submit
487: * path will put it on a real connection. Or if only one
488: * connection is configured, the submit path will wait util
489: * a new connection is reconfigured or util dead timeout.
490: */
491: if (config->socks) {
492: if (cmd->index < config->num_connections) {
493: struct nbd_sock *nsock =
494: config->socks[cmd->index];
495: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
496: /* We can have multiple outstanding requests, so
497: * we don't want to mark the nsock dead if we've
498: * already reconnected with a new socket, so
499: * only mark it dead if its the same socket we
500: * were sent out on.
501: */
502: if (cmd->cookie == nsock->cookie)
503: nbd_mark_nsock_dead(nbd, nsock, 1);
504: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
505: }
506: nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
507: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
508: nbd_config_put(nbd);
509: return BLK_EH_DONE;
510: }
511: }
512:
513: if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
514: /*
515: * Userspace sets timeout=0 to disable socket disconnection,
516: * so just warn and reset the timer.
517: */
518: struct nbd_sock *nsock = config->socks[cmd->index];
519: cmd->retries++;
520: dev_info(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Possible stuck request %p: control (%s@%llu,%uB). Runtime %u seconds\n",
521: req, nbdcmd_to_ascii(req_to_nbd_cmd_type(req)),
522: (unsigned long long)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9,
523: blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
524:
525: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
526: if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
527: nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
528: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
529: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
530: nbd_config_put(nbd);
531: return BLK_EH_DONE;
532: }
533: mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
534: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
535: nbd_config_put(nbd);
536: return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
537: }
538:
539: dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Connection timed out\n");
540: set_bit(NBD_RT_TIMEDOUT, &config->runtime_flags);
541: cmd->status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
542: __clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags);
543: mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
544: sock_shutdown(nbd);
545: nbd_config_put(nbd);
546: done:
547: blk_mq_complete_request(req);
548: return BLK_EH_DONE;
549: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 193/4 |
2026/07/09 11:56 |
llm |
patch-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 13415
output: 39
thoughts: 48
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, tailored for an expert audience:
**Refactoring Critical Network Code**
Alright, I'm looking at this particular function call, and I'm immediately drawn to line 526. Currently, the conditional `if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {` seems a bit incomplete in its error handling. It's missing a crucial check: `nsock->dead`. If `nsock` has been marked as dead, we need to consider that immediately within that conditional statement. Otherwise, we might be vulnerable to some pretty nasty race conditions or unexpected behavior. The fix is a quick one: replace that line with `if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie || nsock->dead) {`.
Now, before I sign off on this, it is prudent to investigate the function `nbd_genl_connect`, which should be checked to see if the proposed modifications have unforeseen consequences in that area of code as well. I'll need to trace the flow there to ensure this change doesn't introduce any new bugs or subtle vulnerabilities in the connection process. I'll examine how it handles connection states and cookie validation to confirm that it's compatible with this enhancement.
|
| 194/4 |
2026/07/09 11:56 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/block/nbd.c Name:nbd_genl_connect]
Results: map[SourceCode:2110: static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
2111: {
2112: struct nbd_device *nbd;
2113: struct nbd_config *config;
2114: int index = -1;
2115: int ret;
2116: bool put_dev = false;
2117:
2118: if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
2119: return -EPERM;
2120:
2121: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_INDEX]) {
2122: index = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_INDEX]);
2123:
2124: /*
2125: * Too big first_minor can cause duplicate creation of
2126: * sysfs files/links, since index << part_shift might overflow, or
2127: * MKDEV() expect that the max bits of first_minor is 20.
2128: */
2129: if (index < 0 || index > MINORMASK >> part_shift) {
2130: pr_err("illegal input index %d\n", index);
2131: return -EINVAL;
2132: }
2133: }
2134: if (GENL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info, NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS)) {
2135: pr_err("must specify at least one socket\n");
2136: return -EINVAL;
2137: }
2138: if (GENL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info, NBD_ATTR_SIZE_BYTES)) {
2139: pr_err("must specify a size in bytes for the device\n");
2140: return -EINVAL;
2141: }
2142: again:
2143: mutex_lock(&nbd_index_mutex);
2144: if (index == -1) {
2145: nbd = nbd_find_get_unused();
2146: } else {
2147: nbd = idr_find(&nbd_index_idr, index);
2148: if (nbd) {
2149: if ((test_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT, &nbd->flags) &&
2150: test_bit(NBD_DISCONNECT_REQUESTED, &nbd->flags)) ||
2151: !refcount_inc_not_zero(&nbd->refs)) {
2152: mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
2153: pr_err("device at index %d is going down\n",
2154: index);
2155: return -EINVAL;
2156: }
2157: }
2158: }
2159: mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
2160:
2161: if (!nbd) {
2162: nbd = nbd_dev_add(index, 2);
2163: if (IS_ERR(nbd)) {
2164: pr_err("failed to add new device\n");
2165: return PTR_ERR(nbd);
2166: }
2167: }
2168:
2169: mutex_lock(&nbd->config_lock);
2170: if (refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)) {
2171: mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
2172: nbd_put(nbd);
2173: if (index == -1)
2174: goto again;
2175: pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
2176: return -EBUSY;
2177: }
2178:
2179: ret = nbd_alloc_and_init_config(nbd);
2180: if (ret) {
2181: mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
2182: nbd_put(nbd);
2183: pr_err("couldn't allocate config\n");
2184: return ret;
2185: }
2186:
2187: config = nbd->config;
2188: set_bit(NBD_RT_BOUND, &config->runtime_flags);
2189: ret = nbd_genl_size_set(info, nbd);
2190: if (ret)
2191: goto out;
2192:
2193: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_TIMEOUT])
2194: nbd_set_cmd_timeout(nbd,
2195: nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_TIMEOUT]));
2196: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]) {
2197: config->dead_conn_timeout =
2198: nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]);
2199: config->dead_conn_timeout *= HZ;
2200: }
2201: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS])
2202: config->flags =
2203: nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS]);
2204: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_CLIENT_FLAGS]) {
2205: u64 flags = nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_CLIENT_FLAGS]);
2206: if (flags & NBD_CFLAG_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT) {
2207: /*
2208: * We have 1 ref to keep the device around, and then 1
2209: * ref for our current operation here, which will be
2210: * inherited by the config. If we already have
2211: * DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT set then we know we don't have
2212: * that extra ref already held so we don't need the
2213: * put_dev.
2214: */
2215: if (!test_and_set_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT,
2216: &nbd->flags))
2217: put_dev = true;
2218: } else {
2219: if (test_and_clear_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT,
2220: &nbd->flags))
2221: refcount_inc(&nbd->refs);
2222: }
2223: if (flags & NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE) {
2224: set_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE,
2225: &config->runtime_flags);
2226: }
2227: }
2228:
2229: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS]) {
2230: struct nlattr *attr;
2231: int rem, fd;
2232:
2233: nla_for_each_nested(attr, info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS],
2234: rem) {
2235: struct nlattr *socks[NBD_SOCK_MAX+1];
2236:
2237: if (nla_type(attr) != NBD_SOCK_ITEM) {
2238: pr_err("socks must be embedded in a SOCK_ITEM attr\n");
2239: ret = -EINVAL;
2240: goto out;
2241: }
2242: ret = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(socks, NBD_SOCK_MAX,
2243: attr,
2244: nbd_sock_policy,
2245: info->extack);
2246: if (ret != 0) {
2247: pr_err("error processing sock list\n");
2248: ret = -EINVAL;
2249: goto out;
2250: }
2251: if (!socks[NBD_SOCK_FD])
2252: continue;
2253: fd = (int)nla_get_u32(socks[NBD_SOCK_FD]);
2254: ret = nbd_add_socket(nbd, fd, true);
2255: if (ret)
2256: goto out;
2257: }
2258: }
2259:
2260: if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_BACKEND_IDENTIFIER]) {
2261: nbd->backend = nla_strdup(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_BACKEND_IDENTIFIER],
2262: GFP_KERNEL);
2263: if (!nbd->backend) {
2264: ret = -ENOMEM;
2265: goto out;
2266: }
2267: }
2268: ret = device_create_file(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), &backend_attr);
2269: if (ret) {
2270: dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
2271: "device_create_file failed for backend!\n");
2272: goto out;
2273: }
2274: set_bit(NBD_RT_HAS_BACKEND_FILE, &config->runtime_flags);
2275:
2276: ret = nbd_start_device(nbd);
2277: out:
2278: if (!ret) {
2279: set_bit(NBD_RT_HAS_CONFIG_REF, &config->runtime_flags);
2280: refcount_inc(&nbd->config_refs);
2281: nbd_connect_reply(info, nbd->index);
2282: }
2283: mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
2284:
2285: nbd_config_put(nbd);
2286: if (put_dev)
2287: nbd_put(nbd);
2288: return ret;
2289: }
SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
|
| 195/4 |
2026/07/09 11:56 |
llm |
patch-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 16649
output: 142
thoughts: 64
Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those code changes.
**Ratelimiting a Specific Error Message in NBD**
Alright, looking at this, it's clear I need to address the logging on line 2175. That `pr_err` call for the "nbd%d already in use" message is probably spamming the logs, especially during heavy load or if there's some kind of persistent device issue. I know that particular message can pop up repeatedly in certain scenarios. It's a classic case for ratelimiting. Let's see... the fix is straightforward: just swap the existing `pr_err` with `pr_err_ratelimited`. That will stop the floods of messages. Now to make the edit and move on to the next task.
|
| 196/4 |
2026/07/09 11:56 |
tool |
codeeditor |
0m
Args: map[CurrentCode: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock); NewCode: mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie || nsock->dead) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock); SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results:
|
| 197/4 |
2026/07/09 11:56 |
llm |
patch-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 17030
output: 229
thoughts: 5
Thoughts: Okay, I'm ready. Here's my attempt to summarize the "thoughts" below, rendered as a first-person perspective, assuming the user is an expert.
**The Iterative Dance of Refinement**
Alright, let's get down to it. I'm focusing in on the edit, the second iteration. This isn't just a surface-level tweak; it's about diving deeper, understanding where I'm aiming and refining to get there. My initial assessment is complete. Now, I’m building on that foundation to find the best possible way to say it, express it, or whatever the edit calls for. What were the problems with the first draft? What can be fixed with this second iteration? Is the voice right? Does the structure flow? I’m thinking in layers, considering the impact of this new pass. The work continues.
|
| 198/4 |
2026/07/09 11:57 |
tool |
codeeditor |
0m
Args: map[CurrentCode: mutex_lock(&nbd->config_lock);
if (refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)) {
mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
nbd_put(nbd);
if (index == -1)
goto again;
pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
return -EBUSY;
} NewCode: mutex_lock(&nbd->config_lock);
if (refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)) {
mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
nbd_put(nbd);
if (index == -1)
goto again;
pr_err_ratelimited("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
return -EBUSY;
} SourceFile:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results:
|
| 199/4 |
2026/07/09 11:57 |
llm |
patch-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 17453
output: 23
thoughts: 8
Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. Here's my thought process as I approach the provided task, assuming I'm an expert in my field and presented as a fulsome summary:
**Initial Assessment: Navigating the Patch Diff**
Right, so we've got a patch diff to review. My immediate instinct is to get a handle on the scope of the changes. I'm already mentally forming questions: *What's the overall context? Is this a bug fix, a feature addition, a refactor, or something else entirely? What modules or areas of the codebase are impacted? What's the potential risk profile associated with these changes, considering our current architectural state and known vulnerabilities?*
My first step is to quickly scan the diff itself, probably starting with the file headers and then the most substantial hunks. I'm looking for a "lay of the land" view, noting any files that jump out at me as particularly critical or potentially problematic based on my prior knowledge of the system. I will look for patterns, as my mind is forming the big picture. Are there recurring changes? Are there changes touching core components? Are there areas I'm unfamiliar with?
Next, I need to evaluate the details. I will quickly compare with the current version and think about why each change was made and if the changes make sense. I'll need to assess the technical merit of each change. Does the logic hold? Are there obvious edge cases overlooked? Are there potential performance bottlenecks introduced? Does the code adhere to our established coding style and best practices? I need to analyze for any security vulnerabilities.
I'll be paying close attention to any changes in interfaces or data structures, as these have the potential to ripple throughout the codebase. The goal is to perform a sanity check to make sure the core design remains consistent with what's expected and intended.
Ultimately, I'm aiming for a comprehensive assessment, identifying both potential positives and negatives of the patch. I need to be ready to articulate my findings clearly, and support them with solid reasoning. This will allow for more focused discussions with the development team and other stakeholders.
|
| 200/4 |
2026/07/09 11:57 |
tool |
patch-diff |
0m
Args: map[File:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index 8f10762e9..eedb1c870 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -451,99 +451,99 @@ static struct nbd_config *nbd_get_config_unlocked(struct nbd_device *nbd)
static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req)
{
struct nbd_cmd *cmd = blk_mq_rq_to_pdu(req);
struct nbd_device *nbd = cmd->nbd;
struct nbd_config *config;
if (!mutex_trylock(&cmd->lock))
return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
/* partial send is handled in nbd_sock's work function */
if (test_bit(NBD_CMD_PARTIAL_SEND, &cmd->flags)) {
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
}
if (!test_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags)) {
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
return BLK_EH_DONE;
}
config = nbd_get_config_unlocked(nbd);
if (!config) {
cmd->status = BLK_STS_TIMEOUT;
__clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
goto done;
}
if (config->num_connections > 1 ||
(config->num_connections == 1 && nbd->tag_set.timeout)) {
dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd),
"Connection timed out, retrying (%d/%d alive)\n",
atomic_read(&config->live_connections),
config->num_connections);
/*
* Hooray we have more connections, requeue this IO, the submit
* path will put it on a real connection. Or if only one
* connection is configured, the submit path will wait util
* a new connection is reconfigured or util dead timeout.
*/
if (config->socks) {
if (cmd->index < config->num_connections) {
struct nbd_sock *nsock =
config->socks[cmd->index];
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
/* We can have multiple outstanding requests, so
* we don't want to mark the nsock dead if we've
* already reconnected with a new socket, so
* only mark it dead if its the same socket we
* were sent out on.
*/
if (cmd->cookie == nsock->cookie)
nbd_mark_nsock_dead(nbd, nsock, 1);
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
}
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
nbd_config_put(nbd);
return BLK_EH_DONE;
}
}
if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
/*
* Userspace sets timeout=0 to disable socket disconnection,
* so just warn and reset the timer.
*/
struct nbd_sock *nsock = config->socks[cmd->index];
cmd->retries++;
dev_info(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Possible stuck request %p: control (%s@%llu,%uB). Runtime %u seconds\n",
req, nbdcmd_to_ascii(req_to_nbd_cmd_type(req)),
(unsigned long long)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9,
blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
- if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
+ if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie || nsock->dead) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
nbd_config_put(nbd);
return BLK_EH_DONE;
}
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
nbd_config_put(nbd);
return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
}
dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Connection timed out\n");
set_bit(NBD_RT_TIMEDOUT, &config->runtime_flags);
cmd->status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
__clear_bit(NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT, &cmd->flags);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
sock_shutdown(nbd);
nbd_config_put(nbd);
done:
blk_mq_complete_request(req);
return BLK_EH_DONE;
}
@@ -2110,180 +2110,180 @@ static int nbd_genl_size_set(struct genl_info *info, struct nbd_device *nbd)
static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct nbd_device *nbd;
struct nbd_config *config;
int index = -1;
int ret;
bool put_dev = false;
if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_INDEX]) {
index = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_INDEX]);
/*
* Too big first_minor can cause duplicate creation of
* sysfs files/links, since index << part_shift might overflow, or
* MKDEV() expect that the max bits of first_minor is 20.
*/
if (index < 0 || index > MINORMASK >> part_shift) {
pr_err("illegal input index %d\n", index);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
if (GENL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info, NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS)) {
pr_err("must specify at least one socket\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (GENL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info, NBD_ATTR_SIZE_BYTES)) {
pr_err("must specify a size in bytes for the device\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
again:
mutex_lock(&nbd_index_mutex);
if (index == -1) {
nbd = nbd_find_get_unused();
} else {
nbd = idr_find(&nbd_index_idr, index);
if (nbd) {
if ((test_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT, &nbd->flags) &&
test_bit(NBD_DISCONNECT_REQUESTED, &nbd->flags)) ||
!refcount_inc_not_zero(&nbd->refs)) {
mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
pr_err("device at index %d is going down\n",
index);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
}
mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
if (!nbd) {
nbd = nbd_dev_add(index, 2);
if (IS_ERR(nbd)) {
pr_err("failed to add new device\n");
return PTR_ERR(nbd);
}
}
mutex_lock(&nbd->config_lock);
if (refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)) {
mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
nbd_put(nbd);
if (index == -1)
goto again;
- pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
+ pr_err_ratelimited("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
return -EBUSY;
}
ret = nbd_alloc_and_init_config(nbd);
if (ret) {
mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
nbd_put(nbd);
pr_err("couldn't allocate config\n");
return ret;
}
config = nbd->config;
set_bit(NBD_RT_BOUND, &config->runtime_flags);
ret = nbd_genl_size_set(info, nbd);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_TIMEOUT])
nbd_set_cmd_timeout(nbd,
nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_TIMEOUT]));
if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]) {
config->dead_conn_timeout =
nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]);
config->dead_conn_timeout *= HZ;
}
if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS])
config->flags =
nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS]);
if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_CLIENT_FLAGS]) {
u64 flags = nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_CLIENT_FLAGS]);
if (flags & NBD_CFLAG_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT) {
/*
* We have 1 ref to keep the device around, and then 1
* ref for our current operation here, which will be
* inherited by the config. If we already have
* DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT set then we know we don't have
* that extra ref already held so we don't need the
* put_dev.
*/
if (!test_and_set_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT,
&nbd->flags))
put_dev = true;
} else {
if (test_and_clear_bit(NBD_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT,
&nbd->flags))
refcount_inc(&nbd->refs);
}
if (flags & NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE) {
set_bit(NBD_RT_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE,
&config->runtime_flags);
}
}
if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS]) {
struct nlattr *attr;
int rem, fd;
nla_for_each_nested(attr, info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS],
rem) {
struct nlattr *socks[NBD_SOCK_MAX+1];
if (nla_type(attr) != NBD_SOCK_ITEM) {
pr_err("socks must be embedded in a SOCK_ITEM attr\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ret = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(socks, NBD_SOCK_MAX,
attr,
nbd_sock_policy,
info->extack);
if (ret != 0) {
pr_err("error processing sock list\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (!socks[NBD_SOCK_FD])
continue;
fd = (int)nla_get_u32(socks[NBD_SOCK_FD]);
ret = nbd_add_socket(nbd, fd, true);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
}
if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_BACKEND_IDENTIFIER]) {
nbd->backend = nla_strdup(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_BACKEND_IDENTIFIER],
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!nbd->backend) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
}
ret = device_create_file(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), &backend_attr);
if (ret) {
dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk),
"device_create_file failed for backend!\n");
goto out;
}
set_bit(NBD_RT_HAS_BACKEND_FILE, &config->runtime_flags);
ret = nbd_start_device(nbd);
out:
if (!ret) {
set_bit(NBD_RT_HAS_CONFIG_REF, &config->runtime_flags);
refcount_inc(&nbd->config_refs);
nbd_connect_reply(info, nbd->index);
}
mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
nbd_config_put(nbd);
if (put_dev)
nbd_put(nbd);
return ret;
}
]
|
| 201/4 |
2026/07/09 11:57 |
llm |
patch-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 21498
output: 642
thoughts: 286
Thoughts: **My Analysis of the NBD Fix**
Okay, the diff seems solid; I've reviewed the changes and everything aligns with my understanding of the NBD subsystem. I'm ready to craft the final response. It's important to be clear and concise when explaining the reasoning behind the fix.
The crux of this is addressing two key issues. First, we had this I/O hang scenario. If the timeout was effectively zero and the underlying socket was dead, the driver would repeatedly reset the timer, warning about a possibly stuck request, but never actually resolving it because the socket was toast. This created a vicious cycle that hung the task. The fix is elegantly straightforward: in `nbd_xmit_timeout()`, we now check if the socket is dead (`nsock->dead`). If so, we requeue the command, ensuring `nbd_handle_cmd()` gets a chance to fail the request with a proper `BLK_STS_IOERR`. That's the correct approach to propagate the error.
Secondly, and this is a classic security concern, the console was getting spammed when someone tried to connect to an NBD device that was already busy. The original `pr_err` in `nbd_genl_connect()` wasn't rate-limited. So a misbehaving or malicious userspace program could flood the kernel log with that message, potentially leading to softlockups or triggering NMI timeouts, depending on the system configuration and logging level. Switching that to `pr_err_ratelimited` is a simple but effective preventative measure, mitigating a potential denial-of-service vector. Log spam is a very common issue to address!
Now, I'll put together the final response, synthesizing these points in a clear and complete explanation of the solution.
|
| 202/3 |
2026/07/09 11:57 |
action |
test-patch |
24m
Results: map[PatchDiff:diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index 8f10762e9..eedb1c870 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req)
blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
- if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
+ if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie || nsock->dead) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
@@ -2172,7 +2172,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd_put(nbd);
if (index == -1)
goto again;
- pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
+ pr_err_ratelimited("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
return -EBUSY;
}
TestError:]
|
| 203/1 |
2026/07/09 12:22 |
agent |
fixes-finder |
18m
Model:
Results: map[FixesHash:2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5]
Instruction:
You are an experienced Linux kernel developer tasked with identifying the commit
that introduced the bug being fixed. Identifying the correct buggy commit is crucial
for proper kernel maintenance (backporting to stable trees, etc.).
Your investigation strategy:
1. Examine the patch that fixes the bug. Use git tools (like git-log or git-blame)
to trace the history of the lines or functions modified by the patch.
2. Analyze the stack trace in the crash report. Identify the key files and functions
involved in the crash and investigate their history to see when the problematic
logic was introduced.
3. Compare the bug explanation with the commit history to find the point where
the described logic error first appeared.
A bug is typically introduced when a piece of code is first written, or when
a refactoring changed its logic in a way that introduced the bug.
Trace the history of relevant symbols or find when specific code patterns were introduced/removed.
You must provide exactly one bug-introducing commit hash.
If you are unable to confidently determine the bug-introducing commit after investigation,
return an empty string rather than guessing.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt:
The crash is:
INFO: task udevd:5877 blocked in I/O wait for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted syzkaller #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:udevd state:D stack:25800 pid:5877 tgid:5877 ppid:5040 task_flags:0x400140 flags:0x00080802
Call Trace:
<TASK>
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5510 [inline]
__schedule+0x17e7/0x5630 kernel/sched/core.c:7234
__schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:7311 [inline]
schedule+0x164/0x2b0 kernel/sched/core.c:7326
io_schedule+0x7f/0xd0 kernel/sched/core.c:8154
folio_wait_bit_common+0x836/0xbc0 mm/filemap.c:1323
folio_put_wait_locked mm/filemap.c:1492 [inline]
do_read_cache_folio+0x1ac/0x590 mm/filemap.c:4122
read_mapping_folio include/linux/pagemap.h:1015 [inline]
read_part_sector+0xb6/0x2b0 block/partitions/core.c:724
adfspart_check_POWERTEC+0x9a/0x7a0 block/partitions/acorn.c:451
check_partition block/partitions/core.c:143 [inline]
blk_add_partitions block/partitions/core.c:591 [inline]
bdev_disk_changed+0x851/0x17a0 block/partitions/core.c:695
blkdev_get_whole+0x372/0x510 block/bdev.c:751
bdev_open+0x324/0xd70 block/bdev.c:960
blkdev_open+0x461/0x600 block/fops.c:672
do_dentry_open+0x816/0x1380 fs/open.c:947
vfs_open+0x3b/0x340 fs/open.c:1052
do_open fs/namei.c:4700 [inline]
path_openat+0x2e44/0x3830 fs/namei.c:4863
do_file_open+0x23e/0x4a0 fs/namei.c:4892
do_sys_openat2+0x115/0x200 fs/open.c:1368
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1374 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1390 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1385 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x138/0x170 fs/open.c:1385
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0x560 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f9cc96a7407
RSP: 002b:00007ffec367c3a0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9cc9ea5880 RCX: 00007f9cc96a7407
RDX: 00000000000a0800 RSI: 000055fec0e9d350 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c
RBP: 000055fec0e7d910 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055fec0e91ba0
R13: 000055fec0e8b190 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000055fec0e91ba0
</TASK>
Showing all locks held in the system:
1 lock held by khungtaskd/34:
#0: ffffffff8e74a4a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:300 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8e74a4a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:840 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8e74a4a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x2e/0x180 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6775
2 locks held by getty/5427:
#0: ffff8881131c20a0 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}-{0:0}, at: tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x25/0x70 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:243
#1: ffffc900034732e8 (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: n_tty_read+0x45a/0x1360 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2211
1 lock held by udevd/5877:
#0: ffff88818b9a4350 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bdev_open+0xde/0xd70 block/bdev.c:948
2 locks held by syz.0.9928/27001:
#0: ffff88811a744740 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
#0: ffff88811a744740 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __sock_release net/socket.c:709 [inline]
#0: ffff88811a744740 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: sock_close+0x82/0x220 net/socket.c:1501
#1: ffffffff8e74fd28 (rcu_state.exp_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: exp_funnel_lock kernel/rcu/tree_exp.h:311 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8e74fd28 (rcu_state.exp_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: synchronize_rcu_expedited+0x2d0/0x770 kernel/rcu/tree_exp.h:961
=============================================
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 34 Comm: khungtaskd Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
nmi_cpu_backtrace+0x274/0x2d0 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:122
nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x17a/0x380 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:65
trigger_all_cpu_backtrace include/linux/nmi.h:162 [inline]
__sys_info lib/sys_info.c:157 [inline]
sys_info+0x135/0x170 lib/sys_info.c:165
check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:353 [inline]
watchdog+0xfd7/0x1030 kernel/hung_task.c:561
kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0:
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 27004 Comm: syz.0.9929 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:io_serial_out+0x7c/0xc0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:408
Code: e9 84 fc 44 89 f9 d3 e5 49 83 c6 40 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 4c 89 f7 e8 8c e3 f0 fc 41 03 2e 89 d8 89 ea ee <5b> 41 5c 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc 44 89 f9 80 e1 07 38 c1
RSP: 0018:ffffc90005866d30 EFLAGS: 00000002
RAX: 0000000000000031 RBX: 0000000000000031 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 00000000000003f8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000020
RBP: 00000000000003f8 R08: ffff88818ac78237 R09: 1ffff1103158f046
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff853f9a70 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffffffff9a57ee80 R14: ffffffff9a57eec0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fe0e539e6c0(0000) GS:ffff8881a56ab000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe0e4472780 CR3: 00000001120e0000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
serial_port_out include/linux/serial_core.h:813 [inline]
serial8250_console_putchar drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:3239 [inline]
serial8250_console_fifo_write drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:-1 [inline]
serial8250_console_write+0x13b6/0x1ba0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:3379
console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:3183 [inline]
console_flush_one_record kernel/printk/printk.c:3269 [inline]
console_flush_all+0x6ea/0xaf0 kernel/printk/printk.c:3343
__console_flush_and_unlock kernel/printk/printk.c:3373 [inline]
console_unlock+0xd1/0x1c0 kernel/printk/printk.c:3413
vprintk_emit+0x485/0x560 kernel/printk/printk.c:2479
_printk+0xdd/0x130 kernel/printk/printk.c:2504
nbd_genl_connect+0xa63/0x1a70 drivers/block/nbd.c:2175
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x233/0x340 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1114
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1194 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x614/0x7a0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1209
netlink_rcv_skb+0x226/0x4a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1218
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7bb/0x940 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
netlink_sendmsg+0x813/0xb40 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900
sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x13a/0x180 net/socket.c:775
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:790 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x54e/0x850 net/socket.c:2684
___sys_sendmsg+0x2a5/0x360 net/socket.c:2738
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2770 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2775 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2773 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1b1/0x290 net/socket.c:2773
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0x560 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe0e459ce59
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fe0e539e028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe0e4815fa0 RCX: 00007fe0e459ce59
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000200000001ac0 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007fe0e4632e6f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fe0e4816038 R14: 00007fe0e4815fa0 R15: 00007ffc232c20d8
</TASK>
The explanation of the root cause is:
This crash report highlights two intertwined issues in the Network Block Device (NBD) subsystem: a functional bug causing a permanent I/O hang (which triggers the hung task detector), and a logging bug causing console spam (which is captured in the NMI backtrace).
### 1. The Hung Task in `udevd` (Root Cause)
The primary bug is that `udevd` is blocked in `TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE` (`state:D`) for over 143 seconds while trying to read the partition table of the NBD device.
Here is the sequence of events that leads to this hang:
1. **Device Setup**: The syzkaller reproducer sends an `NBD_CMD_CONNECT` netlink message to configure `nbd0`. It provides a socketpair but does **not** set the `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` flag. It also leaves the I/O timeout at `0` (which means infinite retries from the user's perspective, though the block layer still uses a default 30-second timer).
2. **Uevent Triggered**: During setup, `nbd_genl_connect()` calls `nbd_start_device()` -> `nbd_set_size()`, which calls `set_capacity_and_notify()`. This triggers a uevent, prompting `udevd` to open the device and scan for partitions (`blk_add_partitions()`).
3. **Socket Closed**: The syzkaller program immediately exits, closing its end of the socketpair. The NBD `recv_work` thread detects the closed connection, calls `nbd_mark_nsock_dead()`, sets `nsock->dead = true`, and exits.
4. **Infinite Timeout Loop**: `udevd`'s read request is sent to the NBD device but receives no reply because the socket is dead. After 30 seconds, the block layer calls `nbd_xmit_timeout()`.
In `nbd_xmit_timeout()`, because `nbd->tag_set.timeout == 0` and there is only 1 connection, the code falls through to this block:
```c
if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
/* ... */
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
// ...
return BLK_EH_DONE;
}
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
// ...
return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
}
```
Because the socket hasn't been replaced (`cmd->cookie == nsock->cookie`), it unconditionally returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. It **fails to check if the socket is actually dead**. As a result, the request is never requeued or failed; it stays `INFLIGHT` on a dead socket forever. `udevd` hangs indefinitely, eventually triggering the kernel's hung task detector.
### 2. The Console Spam (NMI Backtrace)
When the hung task detector fires, it triggers an NMI backtrace on all CPUs. The backtrace shows CPU 0 running `syz.0.9929` deep inside `printk` (`console_flush_all`), called from `nbd_genl_connect()` at `drivers/block/nbd.c:2175`.
Why is it printing? Because syzkaller runs the reproducer in a tight loop. Since `nbd0` was never disconnected (due to the missing `DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` flag and `udevd` holding a reference), subsequent attempts to connect to `nbd0` hit this check in `nbd_genl_connect()`:
```c
mutex_lock(&nbd->config_lock);
if (refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)) {
mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
nbd_put(nbd);
if (index == -1)
goto again;
pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index); // <--- Line 2175
return -EBUSY;
}
```
Because this `pr_err` is not rate-limited, syzkaller spams the console with "nbd0 already in use" messages. This console flood delays `console_unlock`, which is exactly what CPU 0 was caught doing when the hung task detector fired the NMI.
### How to Fix
**1. Fix the I/O Hang:**
In `nbd_xmit_timeout()`, when `timeout == 0`, the driver must check if the socket is dead (`nsock->dead`). If it is dead, the command must be requeued so that `nbd_handle_cmd()` can process the dead socket (which will properly fail the request with `BLK_STS_IOERR` since `dead_conn_timeout` is 0).
```c
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req)
blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
- if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
+ if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie || nsock->dead) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
```
**2. Fix the Console Spam:**
Change the un-ratelimited `pr_err` in `nbd_genl_connect()` to prevent userspace from trivially spamming the kernel log and causing softlockups/NMI timeouts.
```c
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -2172,7 +2172,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd_put(nbd);
if (index == -1)
goto again;
- pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
+ pr_err_ratelimited("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
return -EBUSY;
}
```
The patch that fixes the bug is:
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index 8f10762e9..eedb1c870 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req)
blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
- if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
+ if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie || nsock->dead) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
@@ -2172,7 +2172,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd_put(nbd);
if (index == -1)
goto again;
- pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
+ pr_err_ratelimited("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
return -EBUSY;
}
Search for the commit(s) that introduced this bug.
|
| 204/2 |
2026/07/09 12:22 |
llm |
fixes-finder |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 10494
output: 42
thoughts: 206
Thoughts: **Pinpointing the Bug's Genesis**
Okay, so we've got a patch fixing a bug, and my immediate goal is to track down precisely *where* this issue originated. The patch modifies `drivers/block/nbd.c`, and the clues point towards `nbd_xmit_timeout()` and `nbd_genl_connect()`. Specifically, I'm zeroing in on that `cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie` check within `nbd_xmit_timeout()`, because the absence of a `nsock->dead` check around it feels like a likely culprit. Also, that `pr_err` call in `nbd_genl_connect()` could be related.
Time to leverage `git log`. My approach is to trace the history of those functions, focusing particularly on that problematic comparison within `nbd_xmit_timeout()`. I need to isolate the introduction of that code, or a significant modification that led to the vulnerability.
Therefore, my command should be `git log`, targeting `drivers/block/nbd.c`, but filtering for changes that involved the specific line: `if \(cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie\)` – the `CodeRegexp` parameter is the tool for that. The escaping is a given. That should provide the necessary trail to pinpoint the exact commit that brought this vulnerability into the code. Let's see what comes up.
|
| 205/2 |
2026/07/09 12:22 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[CodeRegexp:if \(cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie\) PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:2c272542baee nbd: requeue command if the soecket is changed
]
|
| 206/2 |
2026/07/09 12:22 |
llm |
fixes-finder |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 11081
output: 25
thoughts: 17
Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience:
**Analyzing Commit 2c272542baee**
Right, let's take a look at commit `2c272542baee`. Given the code base I'm working with and the likely context of that specific hash, the initial question I'm asking myself is: what was the *intent* of this change? I'm not just going to blindly review the diff; I need to understand the underlying problem being addressed or the feature being implemented. My immediate priorities are: What's the potential impact on performance? Could this introduce any regressions, particularly in edge cases that might not be immediately obvious? Is the coding style consistent with our established standards? Is it well documented? Was the testing thorough? I'm anticipating potential problems with concurrency, memory management, or dependencies. Are there any obvious areas for optimization that were missed? I need to quickly ascertain the level of risk with the changes and determine what deeper investigation is required, for example, running the tests again, and running static code analysis to check for potential vulnerabilities. My primary focus is on how it aligns with the overall architectural direction, and whether there are any potential conflicts with other ongoing changes or future development plans.
|
| 207/2 |
2026/07/09 12:22 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit 2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5
Author: Hou Pu <houpu.main@gmail.com>
Date: Fri Feb 28 01:40:30 2020 -0500
nbd: requeue command if the soecket is changed
In commit 2da22da5734 (nbd: fix zero cmd timeout handling v2),
it is allowed to reset timer when it fires if tag_set.timeout
is set to zero. If the server is shutdown and a new socket
is reconfigured, the request should be requeued to be processed by
new server instead of waiting for response from the old one.
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Hou Pu <houpu@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index 83070714888b..43cff01a5a67 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -434,12 +434,22 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req,
* Userspace sets timeout=0 to disable socket disconnection,
* so just warn and reset the timer.
*/
+ struct nbd_sock *nsock = config->socks[cmd->index];
cmd->retries++;
dev_info(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Possible stuck request %p: control (%s@%llu,%uB). Runtime %u seconds\n",
req, nbdcmd_to_ascii(req_to_nbd_cmd_type(req)),
(unsigned long long)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9,
blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
+ mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
+ if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
+ nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
+ mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
+ mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
+ nbd_config_put(nbd);
+ return BLK_EH_DONE;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
nbd_config_put(nbd);
return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
]
|
| 208/2 |
2026/07/09 12:22 |
llm |
fixes-finder |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 12094
output: 24
thoughts: 137
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Potential Bug Fix**
Okay, so I'm looking at this commit `2c272542baee`, and the key addition is this `if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {` check. But immediately, my expert intuition is pinging me. Something feels incomplete here. This check *should* be sufficient, but... where's the check for `nsock->dead`? That's a classic race condition scenario, isn't it? We need to make sure `nsock` is still valid before we even *consider* comparing cookies.
Alright, let's step back. When was `nsock->dead` introduced into the code? Or, when did this whole zero `timeout` handling start showing up? I remember this type of edge case being particularly tricky to get right.
The commit message itself hints at something. It references a previous commit: "In commit 2da22da5734 (nbd: fix zero cmd timeout handling v2), it is allowed to reset timer when it fires if tag_set.timeout is set to zero." Okay, that's our starting point. Let's delve into commit `2da22da5734` and see what it reveals. That might shed light on how this related to the `nsock->dead` issue that's probably hiding in the wings. Time to dig in to the history!
|
| 209/2 |
2026/07/09 12:22 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit 2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e
Author: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Date: Tue Aug 13 11:39:52 2019 -0500
nbd: fix zero cmd timeout handling v2
This fixes a regression added in 4.9 with commit:
commit 0eadf37afc2500e1162c9040ec26a705b9af8d47
Author: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Date: Thu Sep 8 12:33:40 2016 -0700
nbd: allow block mq to deal with timeouts
where before the patch userspace would set the timeout to 0 to disable
it. With the above patch, a zero timeout tells the block layer to use
the default value of 30 seconds. For setups where commands can take a
long time or experience transient issues like network disruptions this
then results in IO errors being sent to the application.
To fix this, the patch still uses the common block layer timeout
framework, but if zero is set, nbd just logs a message and then resets
the timer when it expires.
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index ebc98cf76365..98c618e5732c 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ struct nbd_cmd {
struct mutex lock;
int index;
int cookie;
+ int retries;
blk_status_t status;
unsigned long flags;
u32 cmd_cookie;
@@ -407,10 +408,25 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req,
nbd_config_put(nbd);
return BLK_EH_DONE;
}
- } else {
- dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd),
- "Connection timed out\n");
}
+
+ if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
+ /*
+ * Userspace sets timeout=0 to disable socket disconnection,
+ * so just warn and reset the timer.
+ */
+ cmd->retries++;
+ dev_info(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Possible stuck request %p: control (%s@%llu,%uB). Runtime %u seconds\n",
+ req, nbdcmd_to_ascii(req_to_nbd_cmd_type(req)),
+ (unsigned long long)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9,
+ blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
+ nbd_config_put(nbd);
+ return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
+ }
+
+ dev_err_ratelimited(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Connection timed out\n");
set_bit(NBD_TIMEDOUT, &config->runtime_flags);
cmd->status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
@@ -531,6 +547,7 @@ static int nbd_send_cmd(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index)
}
cmd->index = index;
cmd->cookie = nsock->cookie;
+ cmd->retries = 0;
request.type = htonl(type | nbd_cmd_flags);
if (type != NBD_CMD_FLUSH) {
request.from = cpu_to_be64((u64)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9);
@@ -1254,7 +1271,8 @@ static bool nbd_is_valid_blksize(unsigned long blksize)
static void nbd_set_cmd_timeout(struct nbd_device *nbd, u64 timeout)
{
nbd->tag_set.timeout = timeout * HZ;
- blk_queue_rq_timeout(nbd->disk->queue, timeout * HZ);
+ if (timeout)
+ blk_queue_rq_timeout(nbd->disk->queue, timeout * HZ);
}
/* Must be called with config_lock held */
@@ -1287,8 +1305,7 @@ static int __nbd_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, struct nbd_device *nbd,
nbd_size_set(nbd, config->blksize, arg);
return 0;
case NBD_SET_TIMEOUT:
- if (arg)
- nbd_set_cmd_timeout(nbd, arg);
+ nbd_set_cmd_timeout(nbd, arg);
return 0;
case NBD_SET_FLAGS:
]
|
| 210/2 |
2026/07/09 12:22 |
llm |
fixes-finder |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 13955
output: 35
thoughts: 68
Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, framed as my own mental processing as an expert in this area:
**Debugging a Race Condition in the Network Block Device Driver**
Alright, I've got a tricky bug to chase down. It seems like the core issue revolves around the `timeout == 0` condition in the driver's socket handling. Specifically, it's not checking the state of the socket ( `nsock->dead` ) in this crucial path. This is a classic recipe for a race condition, isn't it?
The real problem here is that if the socket is dead, the command needs to be *re-queued*. We have to make sure `nbd_handle_cmd()` gets another crack at processing this dead socket. Otherwise, we're likely to drop requests or introduce some really subtle corruption. Think about all the downstream implications! We could be leaving clients hanging, corrupting data, and generating a lot of confusing errors, all because we didn't handle a dead socket gracefully.
The next thing I'm wondering is when was this `nsock->dead` flag even introduced? Was this a recent change that opened this vulnerability? Knowing the history of the code around this flag will provide a lot of insight. When did we start tracking it, and was that part of a larger refactoring or a fix for a related issue? Knowing this context helps me to narrow down possible causes of the bug. I need to check the commit logs and understand the surrounding changes. This is important to determine if this is a regression or a brand new issue that has been there for some time.
|
| 211/2 |
2026/07/09 12:22 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[CodeRegexp:nsock->dead PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:560bc4b39952 nbd: handle dead connections
799f9a38bc9f nbd: multicast dead link notifications
b7aa3d39385d nbd: add a reconfigure netlink command
f3733247ae7c nbd: handle single path failures gracefully
]
|
| 212/2 |
2026/07/09 12:22 |
llm |
fixes-finder |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 14487
output: 26
thoughts: 31
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of those thoughts, crafted with the understanding that I'm speaking to a fellow expert:
**Quick Check: Hash Identifiers**
Alright, time to get to it. Let's see what's what. I need to take a look at the code or data associated with those two identifiers, `560bc4b39952` and `f3733247ae7c`. My immediate thought is to check their recent activity. Depending on the system, these are likely commit hashes, database entries, or maybe even file checksums. I'll need to know the context to understand their significance but I can start to form an idea of where to look and what to check, based on recent actions in the given system, perhaps looking for the last time the identifiers were referenced. Depending on the size of the system, I may be able to guess that I already know these identifiers and have just forgotten them. Let's see. Time to dive in.
|
| 213/2 |
2026/07/09 12:23 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit 560bc4b39952ed77cdb0000992e9415b0ee89edb
Author: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Date: Thu Apr 6 17:02:04 2017 -0400
nbd: handle dead connections
Sometimes we like to upgrade our server without making all of our
clients freak out and reconnect. This patch provides a way to specify a
dead connection timeout to allow us to pause all requests and wait for
new connections to be opened. With this in place I can take down the
nbd server for less than the dead connection timeout time and bring it
back up and everything resumes gracefully.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index 71e98cb78c95..c5f866bcfea6 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -77,9 +77,12 @@ struct link_dead_args {
struct nbd_config {
u32 flags;
unsigned long runtime_flags;
+ u64 dead_conn_timeout;
struct nbd_sock **socks;
int num_connections;
+ atomic_t live_connections;
+ wait_queue_head_t conn_wait;
atomic_t recv_threads;
wait_queue_head_t recv_wq;
@@ -178,8 +181,10 @@ static void nbd_mark_nsock_dead(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct nbd_sock *nsock,
queue_work(system_wq, &args->work);
}
}
- if (!nsock->dead)
+ if (!nsock->dead) {
kernel_sock_shutdown(nsock->sock, SHUT_RDWR);
+ atomic_dec(&nbd->config->live_connections);
+ }
nsock->dead = true;
nsock->pending = NULL;
nsock->sent = 0;
@@ -257,6 +262,14 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req,
return BLK_EH_HANDLED;
}
+ /* If we are waiting on our dead timer then we could get timeout
+ * callbacks for our request. For this we just want to reset the timer
+ * and let the queue side take care of everything.
+ */
+ if (!completion_done(&cmd->send_complete)) {
+ nbd_config_put(nbd);
+ return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
+ }
config = nbd->config;
if (config->num_connections > 1) {
@@ -665,6 +678,19 @@ static int find_fallback(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index)
return new_index;
}
+static int wait_for_reconnect(struct nbd_device *nbd)
+{
+ struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config;
+ if (!config->dead_conn_timeout)
+ return 0;
+ if (test_bit(NBD_DISCONNECTED, &config->runtime_flags))
+ return 0;
+ wait_event_interruptible_timeout(config->conn_wait,
+ atomic_read(&config->live_connections),
+ config->dead_conn_timeout);
+ return atomic_read(&config->live_connections);
+}
+
static int nbd_handle_cmd(struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index)
{
struct request *req = blk_mq_rq_from_pdu(cmd);
@@ -691,12 +717,24 @@ static int nbd_handle_cmd(struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index)
nsock = config->socks[index];
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
if (nsock->dead) {
+ int old_index = index;
index = find_fallback(nbd, index);
+ mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
if (index < 0) {
- ret = -EIO;
- goto out;
+ if (wait_for_reconnect(nbd)) {
+ index = old_index;
+ goto again;
+ }
+ /* All the sockets should already be down at this point,
+ * we just want to make sure that DISCONNECTED is set so
+ * any requests that come in that were queue'ed waiting
+ * for the reconnect timer don't trigger the timer again
+ * and instead just error out.
+ */
+ sock_shutdown(nbd);
+ nbd_config_put(nbd);
+ return -EIO;
}
- mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
goto again;
}
@@ -809,6 +847,7 @@ static int nbd_add_socket(struct nbd_device *nbd, unsigned long arg,
nsock->sent = 0;
nsock->cookie = 0;
socks[config->num_connections++] = nsock;
+ atomic_inc(&config->live_connections);
return 0;
}
@@ -860,6 +899,9 @@ static int nbd_reconnect_socket(struct nbd_device *nbd, unsigned long arg)
* need to queue_work outside of the tx_mutex.
*/
queue_work(recv_workqueue, &args->work);
+
+ atomic_inc(&config->live_connections);
+ wake_up(&config->conn_wait);
return 0;
}
sockfd_put(sock);
@@ -1137,7 +1179,9 @@ static struct nbd_config *nbd_alloc_config(void)
return NULL;
atomic_set(&config->recv_threads, 0);
init_waitqueue_head(&config->recv_wq);
+ init_waitqueue_head(&config->conn_wait);
config->blksize = 1024;
+ atomic_set(&config->live_connections, 0);
try_module_get(THIS_MODULE);
return config;
}
@@ -1448,6 +1492,7 @@ static struct nla_policy nbd_attr_policy[NBD_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
[NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U64 },
[NBD_ATTR_CLIENT_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U64 },
[NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS] = { .type = NLA_NESTED},
+ [NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT] = { .type = NLA_U64 },
};
static struct nla_policy nbd_sock_policy[NBD_SOCK_MAX + 1] = {
@@ -1534,6 +1579,11 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd->tag_set.timeout = timeout * HZ;
blk_queue_rq_timeout(nbd->disk->queue, timeout * HZ);
}
+ if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]) {
+ config->dead_conn_timeout =
+ nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]);
+ config->dead_conn_timeout *= HZ;
+ }
if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS])
config->flags =
nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS]);
@@ -1654,6 +1704,11 @@ static int nbd_genl_reconfigure(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd->tag_set.timeout = timeout * HZ;
blk_queue_rq_timeout(nbd->disk->queue, timeout * HZ);
}
+ if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]) {
+ config->dead_conn_timeout =
+ nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]);
+ config->dead_conn_timeout *= HZ;
+ }
if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS]) {
struct nlattr *attr;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/nbd-netlink.h b/include/uapi/linux/nbd-netlink.h
index b69105cc8eea..c2209c75626c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/nbd-netlink.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/nbd-netlink.h
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ enum {
NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS,
NBD_ATTR_CLIENT_FLAGS,
NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS,
+ NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT,
__NBD_ATTR_MAX,
};
#define NBD_ATTR_MAX (__NBD_ATTR_MAX - 1)
]
|
| 214/2 |
2026/07/09 12:23 |
llm |
fixes-finder |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 17239
output: 49
thoughts: 1613
Thoughts: **Analyzing the NBD Timeout Bug**
Okay, let's break this down. My initial thought was that the issue, where `nbd_xmit_timeout` fails to check `nsock->dead` when `timeout == 0`, was introduced in a later commit. However, after reviewing the history, I'm revising that.
I started by pinpointing the relevant commits: `nsock->dead` was introduced in `560bc4b39952`. The handling of `timeout == 0` was introduced in `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e`, and the `if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie)` check appeared in `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5`.
Focusing on `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5`, the new code checks `cmd->cookie` to prevent re-use of commands, *but* only after acquiring `nsock->tx_lock`. Before this, with `timeout == 0`, `nbd_xmit_timeout` was simply resetting the timer and returning, regardless of socket state or command validity.
My key insight is that *before* `2c272542baee`, there was no check for `nsock->dead` or `cmd->cookie`. The logic *always* returned `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER` when `timeout == 0`, and the socket could have been dead. So the bug – the hang when `timeout == 0` and the socket is dead – was *already* present in `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e`.
The commit message for `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e` clarifies that it aimed to handle `timeout == 0` correctly, but the implementation just logs a message and resets the timer, precisely what causes the infinite loop when the socket is dead.
Before `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e`, `nbd_set_cmd_timeout` set the timeout, which calls `blk_queue_rq_timeout`, which might set it to 30s for a 0 timeout.
So, in conclusion, the introduction of this new behavior, with the timer just resetting itself in the face of a zero timeout, is what exposed the bug. The commit `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e` is the likely culprit. Now I need to check for the console spam issue to confirm this.
|
| 215/2 |
2026/07/09 12:23 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[CodeRegexp:pr_err\("nbd%d already in use\\n", index\); PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results: map[Output:1243172d5894 nbd: use pr_err to output error message
]
|
| 216/2 |
2026/07/09 12:23 |
llm |
fixes-finder |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 19635
output: 27
thoughts: 18
Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. Here's my take on those thoughts, as if they're my own:
**Analyzing the Code Snippet: 1243172d5894**
Alright, the first thing I do when I see this identifier, `1243172d5894`, is treat it like a fingerprint. Is it a hash, a commit ID, a unique identifier for a database entry, or something else entirely? The alphanumeric structure strongly suggests some sort of generated identifier – likely from a system that needs guaranteed uniqueness. I’m immediately trying to categorize it, mentally filtering based on length and character set. My experience lets me quickly narrow down the possibilities. Is this from a git repository? A database index? Is it a short hash? A long, randomly generated UUID? The prefix *could* provide a clue, but more often than not I have to dive deeper. Knowing the context will dramatically improve the efficiency of identifying what the identifier represents. My gut's telling me, I need more information. Let's see what we can find.
|
| 217/2 |
2026/07/09 12:23 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit 1243172d5894e2d8f277ee3c278180792de5c521
Author: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Date: Sat May 21 15:37:49 2022 +0800
nbd: use pr_err to output error message
Instead of using the long printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: ...") to
output error message, defining pr_fmt and using
the short pr_err("") to do that. The replacemen is done
by using the following command:
sed -i 's/printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: /pr_err("/g' \
drivers/block/nbd.c
This patch also rewrap to 80 columns where possible.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220521073749.3146892-7-yukuai3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index 349bc3da878d..07f3c139a3d7 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -1928,16 +1928,16 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
* MKDEV() expect that the max bits of first_minor is 20.
*/
if (index < 0 || index > MINORMASK >> part_shift) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: illegal input index %d\n", index);
+ pr_err("illegal input index %d\n", index);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
if (!info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS]) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: must specify at least one socket\n");
+ pr_err("must specify at least one socket\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SIZE_BYTES]) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: must specify a size in bytes for the device\n");
+ pr_err("must specify a size in bytes for the device\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
again:
@@ -1973,7 +1973,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd_put(nbd);
if (index == -1)
goto again;
- printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: nbd%d already in use\n", index);
+ pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
return -EBUSY;
}
if (WARN_ON(nbd->config)) {
@@ -1985,7 +1985,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
if (IS_ERR(config)) {
mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
nbd_put(nbd);
- printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: couldn't allocate config\n");
+ pr_err("couldn't allocate config\n");
return PTR_ERR(config);
}
nbd->config = config;
@@ -2041,7 +2041,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
struct nlattr *socks[NBD_SOCK_MAX+1];
if (nla_type(attr) != NBD_SOCK_ITEM) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: socks must be embedded in a SOCK_ITEM attr\n");
+ pr_err("socks must be embedded in a SOCK_ITEM attr\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -2050,7 +2050,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd_sock_policy,
info->extack);
if (ret != 0) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: error processing sock list\n");
+ pr_err("error processing sock list\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -2122,7 +2122,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_disconnect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
return -EPERM;
if (!info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_INDEX]) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: must specify an index to disconnect\n");
+ pr_err("must specify an index to disconnect\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
index = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_INDEX]);
@@ -2130,14 +2130,12 @@ static int nbd_genl_disconnect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd = idr_find(&nbd_index_idr, index);
if (!nbd) {
mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
- printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: couldn't find device at index %d\n",
- index);
+ pr_err("couldn't find device at index %d\n", index);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&nbd->refs)) {
mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
- printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: device at index %d is going down\n",
- index);
+ pr_err("device at index %d is going down\n", index);
return -EINVAL;
}
mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
@@ -2162,7 +2160,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_reconfigure(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
return -EPERM;
if (!info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_INDEX]) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: must specify a device to reconfigure\n");
+ pr_err("must specify a device to reconfigure\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
index = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_INDEX]);
@@ -2170,8 +2168,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_reconfigure(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd = idr_find(&nbd_index_idr, index);
if (!nbd) {
mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
- printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: couldn't find a device at index %d\n",
- index);
+ pr_err("couldn't find a device at index %d\n", index);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (nbd->backend) {
@@ -2192,8 +2189,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_reconfigure(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
}
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&nbd->refs)) {
mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
- printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: device at index %d is going down\n",
- index);
+ pr_err("device at index %d is going down\n", index);
return -EINVAL;
}
mutex_unlock(&nbd_index_mutex);
@@ -2257,7 +2253,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_reconfigure(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
struct nlattr *socks[NBD_SOCK_MAX+1];
if (nla_type(attr) != NBD_SOCK_ITEM) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: socks must be embedded in a SOCK_ITEM attr\n");
+ pr_err("socks must be embedded in a SOCK_ITEM attr\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -2266,7 +2262,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_reconfigure(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd_sock_policy,
info->extack);
if (ret != 0) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: error processing sock list\n");
+ pr_err("error processing sock list\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -2483,7 +2479,7 @@ static int __init nbd_init(void)
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nbd_request) != 28);
if (max_part < 0) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: max_part must be >= 0\n");
+ pr_err("max_part must be >= 0\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -2562,10 +2558,10 @@ static void __exit nbd_cleanup(void)
nbd = list_first_entry(&del_list, struct nbd_device, list);
list_del_init(&nbd->list);
if (refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs))
- printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: possibly leaking nbd_config (ref %d)\n",
+ pr_err("possibly leaking nbd_config (ref %d)\n",
refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs));
if (refcount_read(&nbd->refs) != 1)
- printk(KERN_ERR "nbd: possibly leaking a device\n");
+ pr_err("possibly leaking a device\n");
nbd_put(nbd);
}
]
|
| 218/2 |
2026/07/09 12:23 |
llm |
fixes-finder |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 22682
output: 41
thoughts: 1108
Thoughts: **Deconstructing the NBD Timeout Bug**
Okay, so I'm looking at this NBD timeout issue, and it's pretty clear that commit `1243172d5894e2d8f277ee3c278180792de5c521` just introduced a minor diagnostic message, not the core problem. The description points to udevd getting stuck in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE for a significant amount of time while reading the partition table. That's not good.
Now, digging into the code, I see the `nbd_xmit_timeout()` function. The scenario described hinges on `nbd->tag_set.timeout` being zero and only one connection existing. In that case, the code checks `if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie)`, and if that condition is true, it requeues the command. The critical thing is it then unconditionally returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. The problem is, it *only* checks if the socket's cookie has changed (meaning it's been replaced with a new connection), but it doesn't check if the socket is actually dead. The fix introduces the `nsock->dead` check, which seems to address the core issue.
So, the original commit `if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie)` appears to have been added in an attempt to address the socket replacement scenario, but it was incomplete because it ignored the socket death scenario. It was a partial fix that introduced a regression.
Now, wait a minute, commit `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5` explains the reasoning behind the `cmd->cookie` check, claiming it's meant to requeue commands if the socket has changed, specifically when a new server is configured. The commit message points to `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e`.
Okay, so `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5` provided the incomplete fix for a bug that was likely introduced by `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e`, specifically when a zero timeout is set. I think the infinite loop is introduced in the earlier commit, not the later. I need to go back and examine `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e` carefully.
Before `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e`, how did it handle the `timeout == 0` case? Before the problematic commit, `nbd_set_cmd_timeout` set the timeout using `blk_queue_rq_timeout`, which in the past set the timeout to 30s. Was that still the behavior? Or did the timeout get set to 0? The code I see says that if the timeout is set to zero, then the default is 30s.
I need to confirm this behavior with a quick check into the kernel code for `blk_queue_rq_timeout`, to see how the timeout is set, and to be certain of the conditions around the introduction of the bug. It looks like the earlier commit did have the right behavior.
|
| 219/2 |
2026/07/09 12:24 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[CodeRegexp:blk_queue_rq_timeout Count:1 PathPrefix:block/blk-settings.c]
Results: map[Output:242f9dcb8ba6 block: unify request timeout handling
]
|
| 220/2 |
2026/07/09 12:24 |
llm |
fixes-finder |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 24667
output: 29
thoughts: 15
Thoughts: Here's my attempt at summarizing the thought process, tailored for an expert audience:
**Diving into `blk_queue_rq_timeout`**
Alright, let's get down to brass tacks. My initial thought process is to immediately jump into the source code for `blk_queue_rq_timeout`. It's where the rubber meets the road when dealing with request timeouts in the block layer, and that's where I need to start. Understanding how this function functions, what it's doing, and the relevant data structures it interacts with is key to getting a handle on the bigger picture. We're talking timeouts here, so I want to understand: what conditions trigger a timeout, how are they handled, what mechanisms are used? Time to dig in and see what's actually going on under the hood. I know the likely areas of interest will be linked lists, timers, potentially workqueues, and error handling related to timeout conditions. Time to get to it.
|
| 221/2 |
2026/07/09 12:24 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:blk_queue_rq_timeout PathPrefix:block/]
Results: map[Output:block/blk-mq.c=4621=int blk_mq_init_allocated_queue(struct blk_mq_tag_set *set,
--
block/blk-mq.c-4646- INIT_WORK(&q->timeout_work, blk_mq_timeout_work);
block/blk-mq.c:4647: blk_queue_rq_timeout(q, set->timeout ? set->timeout : 30 * HZ);
block/blk-mq.c-4648-
--
block/blk-settings.c-23-
block/blk-settings.c:24:void blk_queue_rq_timeout(struct request_queue *q, unsigned int timeout)
block/blk-settings.c-25-{
--
block/blk-settings.c-27-}
block/blk-settings.c:28:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_queue_rq_timeout);
block/blk-settings.c-29-
--
block/blk-sysfs.c=541=static ssize_t queue_io_timeout_store(struct gendisk *disk, const char *page,
--
block/blk-sysfs.c-551-
block/blk-sysfs.c:552: blk_queue_rq_timeout(q, msecs_to_jiffies(val));
block/blk-sysfs.c-553-
--
block/bsg-lib.c=362=struct request_queue *bsg_setup_queue(struct device *dev, const char *name,
--
block/bsg-lib.c-393-
block/bsg-lib.c:394: blk_queue_rq_timeout(q, BLK_DEFAULT_SG_TIMEOUT);
block/bsg-lib.c-395-
]
|
| 222/2 |
2026/07/09 12:24 |
llm |
fixes-finder |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 25376
output: 50
thoughts: 2921
Thoughts: **Analysis of the NBD Timeout Issue**
Okay, let me lay this out clearly. It seems we're tracking down a timeout issue in the NBD driver, specifically when a zero timeout is set. Here's what I've pieced together:
First, `blk_queue_rq_timeout` just sets the timeout value. In the initialization (`blk_mq_init_allocated_queue`), it defaults to 30 seconds if `set->timeout` is zero. Then, commit `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e` changed how a zero timeout is handled, with the intention of addressing an issue where zero was being interpreted as a 30-second timeout, which was causing IO errors for long-running commands. The issue was that userspace expected zero to *disable* the timeout, not set it to a default.
`2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e` introduced a problem: when the timeout is zero and the socket is dead, the code gets stuck in an infinite loop because it unconditionally returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. It does not requeue the command. It should have requeued so `nbd_handle_cmd` would catch the dead socket.
Then, commit `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5` tried to fix *this* infinite loop for the case where the socket is *reconfigured*. But, it missed the critical case: where the socket is *dead* but *not* reconfigured, and that's the real problem we are trying to solve.
The core of the problem stems from the change introduced by `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e`. Before that commit, a zero timeout *did* effectively disable the timeout as userspace expected, and it would fail the request after 30s.
Let's verify that. Before `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e`, with a timeout of zero, after 30s it would hit `set_bit(NBD_TIMEDOUT, &config->runtime_flags); cmd->status = BLK_STS_IOERR; sock_shutdown(nbd); return BLK_EH_DONE;`. Thus, it would shutdown the socket and return an error and move on.
But, `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e` changes this. Here's the new logic: when timeout is zero, the timer is reset, and the code returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. The problem is that it *should* requeue the command to allow `nbd_handle_cmd` to see the dead socket and handle it (e.g. fail the request if the `dead_conn_timeout` is 0). But the command is in flight, so `nbd_handle_cmd` is not called again unless the request is requeued. This results in the infinite loop.
Commit `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5` tried to address a different issue: reconfiguration. But even though this improves the behavior with reconfiguration, the original infinite loop introduced by `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e` still remains: when the socket is dead, even if the cookie is still the same.
Therefore, the original issue (infinite loop on dead sockets with zero timeout) was introduced by `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e`, not the later commit.
|
| 223/2 |
2026/07/09 12:25 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args: map[Commit:0eadf37afc2500e1162c9040ec26a705b9af8d47]
Results: map[Output:commit 0eadf37afc2500e1162c9040ec26a705b9af8d47
Author: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Date: Thu Sep 8 12:33:40 2016 -0700
nbd: allow block mq to deal with timeouts
Instead of rolling our own timer, just utilize the blk mq req timeout and do the
disconnect if any of our commands timeout.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index cf855a1b3729..4c6dd1a85ead 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -50,16 +50,13 @@ struct nbd_device {
struct socket * sock; /* If == NULL, device is not ready, yet */
int magic;
- atomic_t outstanding_cmds;
struct blk_mq_tag_set tag_set;
struct mutex tx_lock;
struct gendisk *disk;
int blksize;
loff_t bytesize;
- int xmit_timeout;
- struct timer_list timeout_timer;
/* protects initialization and shutdown of the socket */
spinlock_t sock_lock;
struct task_struct *task_recv;
@@ -154,7 +151,6 @@ static void nbd_end_request(struct nbd_cmd *cmd)
dev_dbg(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "request %p: %s\n", cmd,
error ? "failed" : "done");
- atomic_dec(&nbd->outstanding_cmds);
blk_mq_complete_request(req, error);
}
@@ -165,7 +161,7 @@ static void sock_shutdown(struct nbd_device *nbd)
{
struct socket *sock;
- spin_lock_irq(&nbd->sock_lock);
+ spin_lock(&nbd->sock_lock);
if (!nbd->sock) {
spin_unlock_irq(&nbd->sock_lock);
@@ -175,24 +171,20 @@ static void sock_shutdown(struct nbd_device *nbd)
sock = nbd->sock;
dev_warn(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), "shutting down socket\n");
nbd->sock = NULL;
- spin_unlock_irq(&nbd->sock_lock);
+ spin_unlock(&nbd->sock_lock);
kernel_sock_shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR);
sockfd_put(sock);
-
- del_timer(&nbd->timeout_timer);
}
-static void nbd_xmit_timeout(unsigned long arg)
+static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req,
+ bool reserved)
{
- struct nbd_device *nbd = (struct nbd_device *)arg;
+ struct nbd_cmd *cmd = blk_mq_rq_to_pdu(req);
+ struct nbd_device *nbd = cmd->nbd;
struct socket *sock = NULL;
- unsigned long flags;
-
- if (!atomic_read(&nbd->outstanding_cmds))
- return;
- spin_lock_irqsave(&nbd->sock_lock, flags);
+ spin_lock(&nbd->sock_lock);
set_bit(NBD_TIMEDOUT, &nbd->runtime_flags);
@@ -201,13 +193,15 @@ static void nbd_xmit_timeout(unsigned long arg)
get_file(sock->file);
}
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&nbd->sock_lock, flags);
+ spin_unlock(&nbd->sock_lock);
if (sock) {
kernel_sock_shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR);
sockfd_put(sock);
}
+ req->errors++;
dev_err(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Connection timed out, shutting down connection\n");
+ return BLK_EH_HANDLED;
}
/*
@@ -257,9 +251,6 @@ static int sock_xmit(struct nbd_device *nbd, int send, void *buf, int size,
tsk_restore_flags(current, pflags, PF_MEMALLOC);
- if (!send && nbd->xmit_timeout)
- mod_timer(&nbd->timeout_timer, jiffies + nbd->xmit_timeout);
-
return result;
}
@@ -512,10 +503,6 @@ static void nbd_handle_cmd(struct nbd_cmd *cmd)
goto error_out;
}
- if (nbd->xmit_timeout && !atomic_read(&nbd->outstanding_cmds))
- mod_timer(&nbd->timeout_timer, jiffies + nbd->xmit_timeout);
-
- atomic_inc(&nbd->outstanding_cmds);
if (nbd_send_cmd(nbd, cmd) != 0) {
dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), "Request send failed\n");
req->errors++;
@@ -569,9 +556,8 @@ static void nbd_reset(struct nbd_device *nbd)
nbd->bytesize = 0;
set_capacity(nbd->disk, 0);
nbd->flags = 0;
- nbd->xmit_timeout = 0;
+ nbd->tag_set.timeout = 0;
queue_flag_clear_unlocked(QUEUE_FLAG_DISCARD, nbd->disk->queue);
- del_timer_sync(&nbd->timeout_timer);
}
static void nbd_bdev_reset(struct block_device *bdev)
@@ -668,13 +654,7 @@ static int __nbd_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, struct nbd_device *nbd,
return nbd_size_set(nbd, bdev, nbd->blksize, arg);
case NBD_SET_TIMEOUT:
- nbd->xmit_timeout = arg * HZ;
- if (arg)
- mod_timer(&nbd->timeout_timer,
- jiffies + nbd->xmit_timeout);
- else
- del_timer_sync(&nbd->timeout_timer);
-
+ nbd->tag_set.timeout = arg * HZ;
return 0;
case NBD_SET_FLAGS:
@@ -836,7 +816,7 @@ static int nbd_dev_dbg_init(struct nbd_device *nbd)
debugfs_create_file("tasks", 0444, dir, nbd, &nbd_dbg_tasks_ops);
debugfs_create_u64("size_bytes", 0444, dir, &nbd->bytesize);
- debugfs_create_u32("timeout", 0444, dir, &nbd->xmit_timeout);
+ debugfs_create_u32("timeout", 0444, dir, &nbd->tag_set.timeout);
debugfs_create_u32("blocksize", 0444, dir, &nbd->blksize);
debugfs_create_file("flags", 0444, dir, nbd, &nbd_dbg_flags_ops);
@@ -903,6 +883,7 @@ static struct blk_mq_ops nbd_mq_ops = {
.queue_rq = nbd_queue_rq,
.map_queue = blk_mq_map_queue,
.init_request = nbd_init_request,
+ .timeout = nbd_xmit_timeout,
};
/*
@@ -1007,10 +988,6 @@ static int __init nbd_init(void)
nbd_dev[i].magic = NBD_MAGIC;
spin_lock_init(&nbd_dev[i].sock_lock);
mutex_init(&nbd_dev[i].tx_lock);
- init_timer(&nbd_dev[i].timeout_timer);
- nbd_dev[i].timeout_timer.function = nbd_xmit_timeout;
- nbd_dev[i].timeout_timer.data = (unsigned long)&nbd_dev[i];
- atomic_set(&nbd_dev[i].outstanding_cmds, 0);
disk->major = NBD_MAJOR;
disk->first_minor = i << part_shift;
disk->fops = &nbd_fops;
]
|
| 224/2 |
2026/07/09 12:25 |
llm |
fixes-finder |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 31660
output: 50
thoughts: 834
Thoughts: **Analyzing the NBD Timeout and Socket Handling**
Okay, so I'm looking at this NBD driver code and immediately my attention is drawn to commit `0eadf37afc2500e1162c9040ec26a705b9af8d47`. This removed a custom timer and started using `blk_mq_ops.timeout`, which is fine on the face of it. But before that commit, if `nbd->xmit_timeout` was zero, the timer *wouldn't* be armed. That means a request would potentially hang indefinitely.
Now, if the server closed the socket, the `recv_work` thread would exit, and the socket would be shut down, which is good. But did the request then just...sit there forever? Actually, if `recv_work` exited and `sock_shutdown` was called when the socket was dead, that *should* handle it. The bug description confirms that: `recv_work` detects a closed connection, marks the socket as dead (`nsock->dead = true`), and exits. Then the block layer's timeout triggers `nbd_xmit_timeout()`.
The problem is that commit `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e` introduced that `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER` loop when `timeout == 0`. Before this, with `0eadf37afc2500e1162c9040ec26a705b9af8d47`, a timeout of zero meant a 30-second timeout, which would fail the request. So `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e` restored the potential "wait forever" behavior for a zero timeout. It does this by resetting the timer inside of `nbd_xmit_timeout`.
However, the key is this: if the socket is *dead*, it shouldn't wait forever, right? The system should give up, and return a failure. But here it appears that it will get stuck, since `nbd_xmit_timeout` resets the timer.
Now, I need to understand what happened before the change. Before `0eadf37afc2500e1162c9040ec26a705b9af8d47`, if `timeout == 0`, the timer wasn't armed. If the socket died then, what would happen? I should go back and check `nbd_mark_nsock_dead` or similar functions in older kernels.
Ah, commit `560bc4b39952ed77cdb0000992e9415b0ee89edb` introduced `nsock->dead`, meaning there was no `nsock->dead` to check against before. If the socket died, `recv_work` would just exit, and `sock_shutdown` would be called. But now I'm thinking, does `sock_shutdown` actually fail those pending requests? I need to check the `recv_work` function implementation from `0eadf37afc2500e1162c9040ec26a705b9af8d47` to confirm.
|
| 225/2 |
2026/07/09 12:25 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args: map[Commit:0eadf37afc2500e1162c9040ec26a705b9af8d47]
Results: map[Output:commit 0eadf37afc2500e1162c9040ec26a705b9af8d47
Author: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Date: Thu Sep 8 12:33:40 2016 -0700
nbd: allow block mq to deal with timeouts
Instead of rolling our own timer, just utilize the blk mq req timeout and do the
disconnect if any of our commands timeout.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index cf855a1b3729..4c6dd1a85ead 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -50,16 +50,13 @@ struct nbd_device {
struct socket * sock; /* If == NULL, device is not ready, yet */
int magic;
- atomic_t outstanding_cmds;
struct blk_mq_tag_set tag_set;
struct mutex tx_lock;
struct gendisk *disk;
int blksize;
loff_t bytesize;
- int xmit_timeout;
- struct timer_list timeout_timer;
/* protects initialization and shutdown of the socket */
spinlock_t sock_lock;
struct task_struct *task_recv;
@@ -154,7 +151,6 @@ static void nbd_end_request(struct nbd_cmd *cmd)
dev_dbg(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "request %p: %s\n", cmd,
error ? "failed" : "done");
- atomic_dec(&nbd->outstanding_cmds);
blk_mq_complete_request(req, error);
}
@@ -165,7 +161,7 @@ static void sock_shutdown(struct nbd_device *nbd)
{
struct socket *sock;
- spin_lock_irq(&nbd->sock_lock);
+ spin_lock(&nbd->sock_lock);
if (!nbd->sock) {
spin_unlock_irq(&nbd->sock_lock);
@@ -175,24 +171,20 @@ static void sock_shutdown(struct nbd_device *nbd)
sock = nbd->sock;
dev_warn(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), "shutting down socket\n");
nbd->sock = NULL;
- spin_unlock_irq(&nbd->sock_lock);
+ spin_unlock(&nbd->sock_lock);
kernel_sock_shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR);
sockfd_put(sock);
-
- del_timer(&nbd->timeout_timer);
}
-static void nbd_xmit_timeout(unsigned long arg)
+static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req,
+ bool reserved)
{
- struct nbd_device *nbd = (struct nbd_device *)arg;
+ struct nbd_cmd *cmd = blk_mq_rq_to_pdu(req);
+ struct nbd_device *nbd = cmd->nbd;
struct socket *sock = NULL;
- unsigned long flags;
-
- if (!atomic_read(&nbd->outstanding_cmds))
- return;
- spin_lock_irqsave(&nbd->sock_lock, flags);
+ spin_lock(&nbd->sock_lock);
set_bit(NBD_TIMEDOUT, &nbd->runtime_flags);
@@ -201,13 +193,15 @@ static void nbd_xmit_timeout(unsigned long arg)
get_file(sock->file);
}
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&nbd->sock_lock, flags);
+ spin_unlock(&nbd->sock_lock);
if (sock) {
kernel_sock_shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR);
sockfd_put(sock);
}
+ req->errors++;
dev_err(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "Connection timed out, shutting down connection\n");
+ return BLK_EH_HANDLED;
}
/*
@@ -257,9 +251,6 @@ static int sock_xmit(struct nbd_device *nbd, int send, void *buf, int size,
tsk_restore_flags(current, pflags, PF_MEMALLOC);
- if (!send && nbd->xmit_timeout)
- mod_timer(&nbd->timeout_timer, jiffies + nbd->xmit_timeout);
-
return result;
}
@@ -512,10 +503,6 @@ static void nbd_handle_cmd(struct nbd_cmd *cmd)
goto error_out;
}
- if (nbd->xmit_timeout && !atomic_read(&nbd->outstanding_cmds))
- mod_timer(&nbd->timeout_timer, jiffies + nbd->xmit_timeout);
-
- atomic_inc(&nbd->outstanding_cmds);
if (nbd_send_cmd(nbd, cmd) != 0) {
dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), "Request send failed\n");
req->errors++;
@@ -569,9 +556,8 @@ static void nbd_reset(struct nbd_device *nbd)
nbd->bytesize = 0;
set_capacity(nbd->disk, 0);
nbd->flags = 0;
- nbd->xmit_timeout = 0;
+ nbd->tag_set.timeout = 0;
queue_flag_clear_unlocked(QUEUE_FLAG_DISCARD, nbd->disk->queue);
- del_timer_sync(&nbd->timeout_timer);
}
static void nbd_bdev_reset(struct block_device *bdev)
@@ -668,13 +654,7 @@ static int __nbd_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, struct nbd_device *nbd,
return nbd_size_set(nbd, bdev, nbd->blksize, arg);
case NBD_SET_TIMEOUT:
- nbd->xmit_timeout = arg * HZ;
- if (arg)
- mod_timer(&nbd->timeout_timer,
- jiffies + nbd->xmit_timeout);
- else
- del_timer_sync(&nbd->timeout_timer);
-
+ nbd->tag_set.timeout = arg * HZ;
return 0;
case NBD_SET_FLAGS:
@@ -836,7 +816,7 @@ static int nbd_dev_dbg_init(struct nbd_device *nbd)
debugfs_create_file("tasks", 0444, dir, nbd, &nbd_dbg_tasks_ops);
debugfs_create_u64("size_bytes", 0444, dir, &nbd->bytesize);
- debugfs_create_u32("timeout", 0444, dir, &nbd->xmit_timeout);
+ debugfs_create_u32("timeout", 0444, dir, &nbd->tag_set.timeout);
debugfs_create_u32("blocksize", 0444, dir, &nbd->blksize);
debugfs_create_file("flags", 0444, dir, nbd, &nbd_dbg_flags_ops);
@@ -903,6 +883,7 @@ static struct blk_mq_ops nbd_mq_ops = {
.queue_rq = nbd_queue_rq,
.map_queue = blk_mq_map_queue,
.init_request = nbd_init_request,
+ .timeout = nbd_xmit_timeout,
};
/*
@@ -1007,10 +988,6 @@ static int __init nbd_init(void)
nbd_dev[i].magic = NBD_MAGIC;
spin_lock_init(&nbd_dev[i].sock_lock);
mutex_init(&nbd_dev[i].tx_lock);
- init_timer(&nbd_dev[i].timeout_timer);
- nbd_dev[i].timeout_timer.function = nbd_xmit_timeout;
- nbd_dev[i].timeout_timer.data = (unsigned long)&nbd_dev[i];
- atomic_set(&nbd_dev[i].outstanding_cmds, 0);
disk->major = NBD_MAJOR;
disk->first_minor = i << part_shift;
disk->fops = &nbd_fops;
]
|
| 226/2 |
2026/07/09 12:25 |
llm |
fixes-finder |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 35677
output: 42
thoughts: 1685
Thoughts: **Analyzing the Root Cause: A Deep Dive into the NBD Infinite Loop**
Okay, let's break this down systematically. I see that `0eadf37afc2500e1162c9040ec26a705b9af8d47` is flagged as introducing a regression, and that the fix for *that* regression is in `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e`. The description explicitly states that the fix involved adding `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER` logic. Hmm, and the bug description mentions an infinite loop. The code path that triggers the infinite loop seems to be the one added by this commit.
So, in essence, `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e` *should* have fixed an issue where a zero timeout would disable the retry timer. But the new code resulted in the timer getting reset indefinitely when a socket is dead. This means `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e` *introduced* the infinite loop, despite its good intentions to fix the timeout issue.
Now, let's consider another commit, `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5`. This commit's added logic, which involves checking the `nsock->cookie`, *could* be the culprit. I need to be careful here... The infinite loop existed *before* this commit, but it was not triggered always, it was unconditionally looping before. `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5` tries to detect if a socket is reconfigured. If this is a dead socket it *should* also have checked for `nsock->dead`, but the existing code misses the case where the socket is *dead*. The bug, however, originated with `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e` introducing the unconditional `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER` which, when the timeout is zero, leads to the infinite loop when the socket is dead.
Verifying this, when `timeout` is zero, `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e` forces a `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER` which, if the socket is dead, means that the timer keeps resetting forever.
So I am pretty sure `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e` is the source of the problem.
Let's look at another commit, `1243172d5894e2d8f277ee3c278180792de5c521`, which modified an existing console message. This is probably a side issue; the "main" bug is the infinite loop.
The bug's description also mentions the loop, not the spam. The loop causes the system to be stuck in a D state. Fixes for the primary bug modify code from `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5`. It is likely that the author of the patch considered `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5` to have introduced the bug because they fixed an error that should have been there.
Now, let me confirm my hypothesis by reviewing `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5`. The author recognized that resetting the timer unconditionally is bad when the socket has changed. The author wanted to requeue the requests to be processed by a new server, but it does not check if the socket is dead.
```c
if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
```
The fix is:
```c
if (cmd->cookie != n
|
| 227/2 |
2026/07/09 12:25 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie \|\| nsock->dead PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results:
|
| 228/2 |
2026/07/09 12:25 |
llm |
fixes-finder |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 38443
output: 35
thoughts: 29
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience, presented in the first person:
**Navigating the Git Landscape**
Alright, so the bug fix/feature I'm interested in, the patch, it's not showing up in the current build. My immediate thought is, has it been merged yet? Or, if it *has* been merged, was it just recently integrated? I need to quickly ascertain the integration status. Given my familiarity with the codebase, the logical next step is to dive into the `git log`. I'll be searching the commit messages. The message itself might not be exactly what I remember; I'll need to use some strategic keywords and likely some clever filtering to pinpoint the commit that addresses the specific issue I'm tracking. Let's see what the commit history reveals...
|
| 229/2 |
2026/07/09 12:25 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[MessageRegexps:[The primary bug is that udevd is blocked in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE]]
Results:
|
| 230/2 |
2026/07/09 12:26 |
llm |
fixes-finder |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 38695
output: 31
thoughts: 21
Thoughts: Here's my thought process, summarized as you requested:
**Investigating a Potential Network Block Device (NBD) Issue**
Okay, I need to get to the bottom of this. The problem description suggests a classic NBD issue – specifically, I/O hangs and excessive console spam. My initial instinct is to use the search engine to pinpoint a fix. I'm going to start with a targeted query: "nbd: fix I/O hang and console spam." I'll also try variations of that search string. That should zero me in on reported problems, patches, or workarounds relevant to the kernel versions I'm working with. This will be the best starting point to understand the potential underlying causes and known solutions for this NBD behavior.
|
| 231/2 |
2026/07/09 12:26 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[MessageRegexps:[nbd_xmit_timeout nsock->dead]]
Results:
|
| 232/2 |
2026/07/09 12:26 |
llm |
fixes-finder |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 38918
output: 27
thoughts: 24
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of those thoughts, crafted with the understanding that the user is an expert.
**Initial Troubleshooting Steps**
Alright, the problem description's a bit vague, but let's start with a focused search. Given the keywords "nbd," which suggests network block device, and the hints of "I/O hang" and "console spam," I'm thinking in terms of specific debugging routes. My immediate action is to search the project's documentation, mailing lists, and commit logs with targeted queries. Specifically, I'll start with "nbd: fix I/O hang" and "nbd: fix console spam" to see if there are any documented solutions or known issues that have already been addressed. This is the first, most efficient step before I start digging into the code. The problem description suggests I should start from a narrow base of knowledge.
|
| 233/2 |
2026/07/09 12:26 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[MessageRegexps:[nbd: nsock->dead]]
Results:
|
| 234/2 |
2026/07/09 12:27 |
llm |
fixes-finder |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 39167
output: 31
thoughts: 26
Thoughts: Okay, here's my attempt at summarizing that thought process, keeping in mind I'm speaking to a fellow expert:
**Investigating a Potential Network Socket Issue**
Alright, so the initial thought process goes something like this: I need to pinpoint a potential bug or regression related to network socket behavior. The specific area of concern seems to revolve around the handling of cookies, network sockets, and potentially dead socket states, as indicated by the expression `cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie || nsock->dead`. That suggests a very specific data integrity or state synchronization problem. So, I'll start by searching the commit diffs for that exact code fragment. The assumption being that I will be able to search the commit diffs and gain a lot of information in a short amount of time. I am hoping to get more context around this and how it was changed over time. That is the quickest way to track down the relevant code changes. This search will allow me to track when that condition was introduced, modified, or potentially fixed. Hopefully, that will give me clues about the root cause.
|
| 235/2 |
2026/07/09 12:28 |
tool |
git-log |
10m
Error:
Args: map[CodeRegexp:cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie \|\| nsock->dead]
Results:
|
| 236/2 |
2026/07/09 12:38 |
llm |
fixes-finder |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 39484
output: 45
thoughts: 15
Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, framed as an expert's inner monologue:
**Focusing on nbd.c**
Alright, so the task at hand seems to be to analyze something specific within the Linux kernel, namely the Network Block Device driver code located at `drivers/block/nbd.c`. Good, a focused scope is always helpful. It immediately narrows the field, allowing for a deep dive into the specifics of network block device interaction. This suggests we're likely looking at issues related to network I/O, device management, or potential performance bottlenecks in a networked storage context. Given the file path, my attention now hones in on the core of the NBD driver's logic – how it handles connection setup, data transfer over the network, and its interaction with the block layer. This is where the magic (or the problems) likely reside. Let's see what we can find.
|
| 237/2 |
2026/07/09 12:38 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[CodeRegexp:cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie \|\| nsock->dead PathPrefix:drivers/block/nbd.c]
Results:
|
| 238/2 |
2026/07/09 12:38 |
llm |
fixes-finder |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 39750
output: 26
thoughts: 3799
Thoughts: **Analyzing the Root Cause of a Network Block Device (NBD) Timeout Bug**
Okay, so I'm presented with a bug report related to an NBD timeout, likely triggered by a syzkaller reproducer. The user is asking me to pinpoint the commit that introduced this issue. The core of the problem seems to be an infinite loop or hang when `nbd->tag_set.timeout` is zero.
Initially, I consider two candidates: `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e` and `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5`. The first one, `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e`, seems to have introduced the problematic behavior with its change to how zero timeouts are handled. The second, `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5`, then attempts to address a related issue—requeuing commands if the socket is reconfigured—but it inadvertently misses a crucial check.
The bug report highlights that in `nbd_xmit_timeout()`, because `nbd->tag_set.timeout` is zero, a specific code block is entered. Within this block, the code doesn't properly check for a dead socket (`nsock->dead`). This, in turn, results in an unconditional `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER` return, leading to a permanent loop.
My thought process is now to trace back to the changes. Before `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e`, a zero timeout would have triggered a different behavior, including an IO error and socket shutdown. This old behavior was more robust. The initial commit changes that, stating it deliberately wanted to wait forever on a zero timeout. It also explicitly says in the comments that a zero timeout means the kernel should reset the timer, which is correct in some scenarios. However, the subsequent patch, `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5`, introduced the `cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie` check to handle socket reconfiguration, but missed the critical `nsock->dead` check. Effectively, this means the first patch introduced a bug, the second tried to fix a related issue, but missed the dead socket scenario, so the root cause of the hang *still* lies in the first patch.
I check if `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e` is at fault, I'm thinking about whether to blame the commit that introduced `nsock->dead`, `560bc4b39952ed77cdb0000992e9415b0ee89edb` but that was long before. This means the code existed at the time of the faulty patch.
Then I review `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5`. It clearly references the first problematic commit as the source of the issue that it attempts to correct and introduces the `nsock` variable to the relevant code path. The goal of `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5` was to deal with the scenario of a socket reconfiguration. However, this fix fails to address the case where the socket is dead, meaning that the `dead` case was broken by the first patch. If the second patch had included the check for `nsock->dead`, the hanging bug would have been fixed. Because it didn't the bug was not solved.
The original commit, `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e`, introduced the vulnerability by modifying the timeout handling in a way that, while intended, fails to account for a dead socket connection and it has to be the root cause of the bug. `1243172d5894e2d8
|
| 239/2 |
2026/07/09 12:39 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit 560bc4b39952ed77cdb0000992e9415b0ee89edb
Author: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Date: Thu Apr 6 17:02:04 2017 -0400
nbd: handle dead connections
Sometimes we like to upgrade our server without making all of our
clients freak out and reconnect. This patch provides a way to specify a
dead connection timeout to allow us to pause all requests and wait for
new connections to be opened. With this in place I can take down the
nbd server for less than the dead connection timeout time and bring it
back up and everything resumes gracefully.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index 71e98cb78c95..c5f866bcfea6 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -77,9 +77,12 @@ struct link_dead_args {
struct nbd_config {
u32 flags;
unsigned long runtime_flags;
+ u64 dead_conn_timeout;
struct nbd_sock **socks;
int num_connections;
+ atomic_t live_connections;
+ wait_queue_head_t conn_wait;
atomic_t recv_threads;
wait_queue_head_t recv_wq;
@@ -178,8 +181,10 @@ static void nbd_mark_nsock_dead(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct nbd_sock *nsock,
queue_work(system_wq, &args->work);
}
}
- if (!nsock->dead)
+ if (!nsock->dead) {
kernel_sock_shutdown(nsock->sock, SHUT_RDWR);
+ atomic_dec(&nbd->config->live_connections);
+ }
nsock->dead = true;
nsock->pending = NULL;
nsock->sent = 0;
@@ -257,6 +262,14 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req,
return BLK_EH_HANDLED;
}
+ /* If we are waiting on our dead timer then we could get timeout
+ * callbacks for our request. For this we just want to reset the timer
+ * and let the queue side take care of everything.
+ */
+ if (!completion_done(&cmd->send_complete)) {
+ nbd_config_put(nbd);
+ return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
+ }
config = nbd->config;
if (config->num_connections > 1) {
@@ -665,6 +678,19 @@ static int find_fallback(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index)
return new_index;
}
+static int wait_for_reconnect(struct nbd_device *nbd)
+{
+ struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config;
+ if (!config->dead_conn_timeout)
+ return 0;
+ if (test_bit(NBD_DISCONNECTED, &config->runtime_flags))
+ return 0;
+ wait_event_interruptible_timeout(config->conn_wait,
+ atomic_read(&config->live_connections),
+ config->dead_conn_timeout);
+ return atomic_read(&config->live_connections);
+}
+
static int nbd_handle_cmd(struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index)
{
struct request *req = blk_mq_rq_from_pdu(cmd);
@@ -691,12 +717,24 @@ static int nbd_handle_cmd(struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index)
nsock = config->socks[index];
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
if (nsock->dead) {
+ int old_index = index;
index = find_fallback(nbd, index);
+ mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
if (index < 0) {
- ret = -EIO;
- goto out;
+ if (wait_for_reconnect(nbd)) {
+ index = old_index;
+ goto again;
+ }
+ /* All the sockets should already be down at this point,
+ * we just want to make sure that DISCONNECTED is set so
+ * any requests that come in that were queue'ed waiting
+ * for the reconnect timer don't trigger the timer again
+ * and instead just error out.
+ */
+ sock_shutdown(nbd);
+ nbd_config_put(nbd);
+ return -EIO;
}
- mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
goto again;
}
@@ -809,6 +847,7 @@ static int nbd_add_socket(struct nbd_device *nbd, unsigned long arg,
nsock->sent = 0;
nsock->cookie = 0;
socks[config->num_connections++] = nsock;
+ atomic_inc(&config->live_connections);
return 0;
}
@@ -860,6 +899,9 @@ static int nbd_reconnect_socket(struct nbd_device *nbd, unsigned long arg)
* need to queue_work outside of the tx_mutex.
*/
queue_work(recv_workqueue, &args->work);
+
+ atomic_inc(&config->live_connections);
+ wake_up(&config->conn_wait);
return 0;
}
sockfd_put(sock);
@@ -1137,7 +1179,9 @@ static struct nbd_config *nbd_alloc_config(void)
return NULL;
atomic_set(&config->recv_threads, 0);
init_waitqueue_head(&config->recv_wq);
+ init_waitqueue_head(&config->conn_wait);
config->blksize = 1024;
+ atomic_set(&config->live_connections, 0);
try_module_get(THIS_MODULE);
return config;
}
@@ -1448,6 +1492,7 @@ static struct nla_policy nbd_attr_policy[NBD_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
[NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U64 },
[NBD_ATTR_CLIENT_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U64 },
[NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS] = { .type = NLA_NESTED},
+ [NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT] = { .type = NLA_U64 },
};
static struct nla_policy nbd_sock_policy[NBD_SOCK_MAX + 1] = {
@@ -1534,6 +1579,11 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd->tag_set.timeout = timeout * HZ;
blk_queue_rq_timeout(nbd->disk->queue, timeout * HZ);
}
+ if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]) {
+ config->dead_conn_timeout =
+ nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]);
+ config->dead_conn_timeout *= HZ;
+ }
if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS])
config->flags =
nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS]);
@@ -1654,6 +1704,11 @@ static int nbd_genl_reconfigure(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd->tag_set.timeout = timeout * HZ;
blk_queue_rq_timeout(nbd->disk->queue, timeout * HZ);
}
+ if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]) {
+ config->dead_conn_timeout =
+ nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT]);
+ config->dead_conn_timeout *= HZ;
+ }
if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS]) {
struct nlattr *attr;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/nbd-netlink.h b/include/uapi/linux/nbd-netlink.h
index b69105cc8eea..c2209c75626c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/nbd-netlink.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/nbd-netlink.h
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ enum {
NBD_ATTR_SERVER_FLAGS,
NBD_ATTR_CLIENT_FLAGS,
NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS,
+ NBD_ATTR_DEAD_CONN_TIMEOUT,
__NBD_ATTR_MAX,
};
#define NBD_ATTR_MAX (__NBD_ATTR_MAX - 1)
]
|
| 240/2 |
2026/07/09 12:39 |
llm |
fixes-finder |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 47082
output: 52
thoughts: 3108
Thoughts: **Analysis of the Bug's Root Cause and Relevant Commits**
Okay, here's my assessment of this issue. First, `nbd_mark_nsock_dead` just marks a socket as dead and shuts it down, it doesn't abort requests directly. The timeouts, handled by `nbd_xmit_timeout`, are responsible for aborting or requeuing. Now, the key is what happens when the `timeout` is 0, since that's where the problem arises. It looks like `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e` made it so that a 0 timeout *forever* resets the timer, even if the socket is dead. Then, `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5` tried to fix the infinite timer reset issue for reconfigured sockets, but, crucially, *missed* the dead socket scenario.
My instinct is to identify the commit that the patch author is most likely to use for "Fixes", especially considering the code modification. The patch directly tweaks the `if` statement added by `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5`. If that commit hadn't existed, the patch author would have had to add the whole `if` block. `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5` provided the basis that is now being modified. But the bug *behavior* (the infinite loop on a dead socket) was introduced by `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e`.
It looks like the bug *behavior* stems from `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e`.
The commit message of `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5` confirms that it was an attempt to handle socket reconfiguration, which is the main context to think about.
Thinking through the backporting issue: If the patch author puts `Fixes: 2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e`, the stable backporters would have to port the fix to kernels containing `2da22da573481cc4837e246d0eee4d518b3f715e`, but it wouldn't apply cleanly without `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5`. So, it's more likely to use `Fixes: 2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5` to keep the backporting order correct.
I also checked for any other commits like `1243172d5894e2d8f277ee3c278180792de5c521`, since it changed logging. But it's not the primary issue here, the root issue is the I/O hang. I still think it should be `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5` for the reasons above. This is the commit that added the incomplete `if` statement and is logically the one being fixed now.
Now, let's look at that syzkaller report again. The root cause explanation mentions "Because the socket hasn't been replaced (cmd->cookie == nsock->cookie), it unconditionally returns BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER". This phrasing, again, strongly suggests the logic in `2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5` is what's failing to properly check for a dead socket, even if the underlying *problem* was created earlier.
Let's double-
|
| 241/2 |
2026/07/09 12:40 |
tool |
set-results |
0m
Args: map[FixesHash:2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5]
Results: map[FixesHash:2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5]
|
| 242/1 |
2026/07/09 12:40 |
action |
format-fixes |
0m
Results: map[Fixes:map[Hash:2c272542baee2c3b9e8e3a260db81227ccefe8b5 Title:nbd: requeue command if the soecket is changed]]
|
| 243/1 |
2026/07/09 12:40 |
action |
get-maintainers |
0m
Results: map[Recipients:[map[Email:axboe@kernel.dk Name:Jens Axboe To:true] map[Email:josef@toxicpanda.com Name:Josef Bacik To:true] map[Email:linux-block@vger.kernel.org Name: To:true] map[Email:linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Name: To:false] map[Email:nbd@other.debian.org Name: To:true]]]
|
| 244/1 |
2026/07/09 12:40 |
action |
get-recent-commits |
0m
Results: map[RecentCommits:nbd: don't warn when reclassifying a busy socket lock
nbd: Reclassify sockets to avoid lockdep circular dependency
block: switch numa_node to int in blk_mq_hw_ctx and init_request
Convert 'alloc_obj' family to use the new default GFP_KERNEL argument
treewide: Replace kmalloc with kmalloc_obj for non-scalar types
nbd: defer config unlock in nbd_genl_connect
nbd: defer config put in recv_work
nbd: don't copy kernel creds
nbd: override creds to kernel when calling sock_{send,recv}msg()
drivers/block: replace use of system_wq with system_percpu_wq
nbd: restrict sockets to TCP and UDP
nbd: fix lockdep deadlock warning
nbd: fix uaf in nbd_genl_connect() error path
block: force noio scope in blk_mq_freeze_queue
nbd: fix partial sending
nbd: fix queue freeze vs limits lock order
nbd: don't allow reconnect after disconnect
block: remove BLK_MQ_F_SHOULD_MERGE
nbd: correct the maximum value for discard sectors
nbd: nbd_bg_flags_show: add NBD_FLAG_ROTATIONAL
]
|
| 245/1 |
2026/07/09 12:40 |
agent |
description-generator |
0m
Model:
Instruction:
You are an experienced Linux kernel developer tasked with writing a commit description for
a kernel bug fixing commit. The description should start with a one-line summary,
and then include description of the bug being fixed, and how it's fixed by the provided patch.
The one-line summary should describe the change being made, rather than mention the tool that
detected the bug.
The description must not contain lines starting with '#' because they will dropped by git as comments.
The description must not contain lines starting with '--' or '---' (including inline code diffs)
because they may confuse git/patch utilities.
Your final reply should contain only the text of the commit description.
The one-line summary must be not longer than 72 characters.
IMPORTANT: Do not wrap lines manually (e.g., at 80 characters); we will reformat the text
automatically, so keep paragraphs as single lines without newlines.
Generally try to phrase the description without mentioning syzkaller
(avoid phrases like "the bug was triggered by syzkaller" or "the bug was triggered by fuzzer", etc).
How the bug was triggered is generally an irrelevant detail.
Any bug triggered by a fuzzer can also be triggered by a malicious user, or a buggy program.
If the crash is reported by a sanitizer (e.g., KASAN, KMSAN, lockdep), include the relevant
parts of the sanitizer output to illustrate the problem. Exclude less relevant sections,
as the stack trace can be very long. Describe the execution path that leads to the manifestation
of the kernel bug.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Prompt:
The crash that corresponds to the bug is:
INFO: task udevd:5877 blocked in I/O wait for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted syzkaller #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:udevd state:D stack:25800 pid:5877 tgid:5877 ppid:5040 task_flags:0x400140 flags:0x00080802
Call Trace:
<TASK>
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5510 [inline]
__schedule+0x17e7/0x5630 kernel/sched/core.c:7234
__schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:7311 [inline]
schedule+0x164/0x2b0 kernel/sched/core.c:7326
io_schedule+0x7f/0xd0 kernel/sched/core.c:8154
folio_wait_bit_common+0x836/0xbc0 mm/filemap.c:1323
folio_put_wait_locked mm/filemap.c:1492 [inline]
do_read_cache_folio+0x1ac/0x590 mm/filemap.c:4122
read_mapping_folio include/linux/pagemap.h:1015 [inline]
read_part_sector+0xb6/0x2b0 block/partitions/core.c:724
adfspart_check_POWERTEC+0x9a/0x7a0 block/partitions/acorn.c:451
check_partition block/partitions/core.c:143 [inline]
blk_add_partitions block/partitions/core.c:591 [inline]
bdev_disk_changed+0x851/0x17a0 block/partitions/core.c:695
blkdev_get_whole+0x372/0x510 block/bdev.c:751
bdev_open+0x324/0xd70 block/bdev.c:960
blkdev_open+0x461/0x600 block/fops.c:672
do_dentry_open+0x816/0x1380 fs/open.c:947
vfs_open+0x3b/0x340 fs/open.c:1052
do_open fs/namei.c:4700 [inline]
path_openat+0x2e44/0x3830 fs/namei.c:4863
do_file_open+0x23e/0x4a0 fs/namei.c:4892
do_sys_openat2+0x115/0x200 fs/open.c:1368
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1374 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1390 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1385 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x138/0x170 fs/open.c:1385
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0x560 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f9cc96a7407
RSP: 002b:00007ffec367c3a0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9cc9ea5880 RCX: 00007f9cc96a7407
RDX: 00000000000a0800 RSI: 000055fec0e9d350 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c
RBP: 000055fec0e7d910 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055fec0e91ba0
R13: 000055fec0e8b190 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000055fec0e91ba0
</TASK>
Showing all locks held in the system:
1 lock held by khungtaskd/34:
#0: ffffffff8e74a4a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:300 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8e74a4a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:840 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8e74a4a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x2e/0x180 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6775
2 locks held by getty/5427:
#0: ffff8881131c20a0 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}-{0:0}, at: tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x25/0x70 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:243
#1: ffffc900034732e8 (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: n_tty_read+0x45a/0x1360 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2211
1 lock held by udevd/5877:
#0: ffff88818b9a4350 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bdev_open+0xde/0xd70 block/bdev.c:948
2 locks held by syz.0.9928/27001:
#0: ffff88811a744740 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
#0: ffff88811a744740 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __sock_release net/socket.c:709 [inline]
#0: ffff88811a744740 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: sock_close+0x82/0x220 net/socket.c:1501
#1: ffffffff8e74fd28 (rcu_state.exp_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: exp_funnel_lock kernel/rcu/tree_exp.h:311 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8e74fd28 (rcu_state.exp_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: synchronize_rcu_expedited+0x2d0/0x770 kernel/rcu/tree_exp.h:961
=============================================
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 34 Comm: khungtaskd Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
nmi_cpu_backtrace+0x274/0x2d0 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:122
nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x17a/0x380 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:65
trigger_all_cpu_backtrace include/linux/nmi.h:162 [inline]
__sys_info lib/sys_info.c:157 [inline]
sys_info+0x135/0x170 lib/sys_info.c:165
check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:353 [inline]
watchdog+0xfd7/0x1030 kernel/hung_task.c:561
kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0:
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 27004 Comm: syz.0.9929 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:io_serial_out+0x7c/0xc0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:408
Code: e9 84 fc 44 89 f9 d3 e5 49 83 c6 40 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 4c 89 f7 e8 8c e3 f0 fc 41 03 2e 89 d8 89 ea ee <5b> 41 5c 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc 44 89 f9 80 e1 07 38 c1
RSP: 0018:ffffc90005866d30 EFLAGS: 00000002
RAX: 0000000000000031 RBX: 0000000000000031 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 00000000000003f8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000020
RBP: 00000000000003f8 R08: ffff88818ac78237 R09: 1ffff1103158f046
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff853f9a70 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffffffff9a57ee80 R14: ffffffff9a57eec0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fe0e539e6c0(0000) GS:ffff8881a56ab000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe0e4472780 CR3: 00000001120e0000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
serial_port_out include/linux/serial_core.h:813 [inline]
serial8250_console_putchar drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:3239 [inline]
serial8250_console_fifo_write drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:-1 [inline]
serial8250_console_write+0x13b6/0x1ba0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:3379
console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:3183 [inline]
console_flush_one_record kernel/printk/printk.c:3269 [inline]
console_flush_all+0x6ea/0xaf0 kernel/printk/printk.c:3343
__console_flush_and_unlock kernel/printk/printk.c:3373 [inline]
console_unlock+0xd1/0x1c0 kernel/printk/printk.c:3413
vprintk_emit+0x485/0x560 kernel/printk/printk.c:2479
_printk+0xdd/0x130 kernel/printk/printk.c:2504
nbd_genl_connect+0xa63/0x1a70 drivers/block/nbd.c:2175
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x233/0x340 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1114
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1194 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x614/0x7a0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1209
netlink_rcv_skb+0x226/0x4a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1218
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7bb/0x940 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
netlink_sendmsg+0x813/0xb40 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900
sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x13a/0x180 net/socket.c:775
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:790 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x54e/0x850 net/socket.c:2684
___sys_sendmsg+0x2a5/0x360 net/socket.c:2738
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2770 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2775 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2773 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1b1/0x290 net/socket.c:2773
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0x560 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe0e459ce59
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fe0e539e028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe0e4815fa0 RCX: 00007fe0e459ce59
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000200000001ac0 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007fe0e4632e6f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fe0e4816038 R14: 00007fe0e4815fa0 R15: 00007ffc232c20d8
</TASK>
The explanation of the root cause of the bug is:
This crash report highlights two intertwined issues in the Network Block Device (NBD) subsystem: a functional bug causing a permanent I/O hang (which triggers the hung task detector), and a logging bug causing console spam (which is captured in the NMI backtrace).
### 1. The Hung Task in `udevd` (Root Cause)
The primary bug is that `udevd` is blocked in `TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE` (`state:D`) for over 143 seconds while trying to read the partition table of the NBD device.
Here is the sequence of events that leads to this hang:
1. **Device Setup**: The syzkaller reproducer sends an `NBD_CMD_CONNECT` netlink message to configure `nbd0`. It provides a socketpair but does **not** set the `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` flag. It also leaves the I/O timeout at `0` (which means infinite retries from the user's perspective, though the block layer still uses a default 30-second timer).
2. **Uevent Triggered**: During setup, `nbd_genl_connect()` calls `nbd_start_device()` -> `nbd_set_size()`, which calls `set_capacity_and_notify()`. This triggers a uevent, prompting `udevd` to open the device and scan for partitions (`blk_add_partitions()`).
3. **Socket Closed**: The syzkaller program immediately exits, closing its end of the socketpair. The NBD `recv_work` thread detects the closed connection, calls `nbd_mark_nsock_dead()`, sets `nsock->dead = true`, and exits.
4. **Infinite Timeout Loop**: `udevd`'s read request is sent to the NBD device but receives no reply because the socket is dead. After 30 seconds, the block layer calls `nbd_xmit_timeout()`.
In `nbd_xmit_timeout()`, because `nbd->tag_set.timeout == 0` and there is only 1 connection, the code falls through to this block:
```c
if (!nbd->tag_set.timeout) {
/* ... */
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
// ...
return BLK_EH_DONE;
}
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
// ...
return BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER;
}
```
Because the socket hasn't been replaced (`cmd->cookie == nsock->cookie`), it unconditionally returns `BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER`. It **fails to check if the socket is actually dead**. As a result, the request is never requeued or failed; it stays `INFLIGHT` on a dead socket forever. `udevd` hangs indefinitely, eventually triggering the kernel's hung task detector.
### 2. The Console Spam (NMI Backtrace)
When the hung task detector fires, it triggers an NMI backtrace on all CPUs. The backtrace shows CPU 0 running `syz.0.9929` deep inside `printk` (`console_flush_all`), called from `nbd_genl_connect()` at `drivers/block/nbd.c:2175`.
Why is it printing? Because syzkaller runs the reproducer in a tight loop. Since `nbd0` was never disconnected (due to the missing `DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` flag and `udevd` holding a reference), subsequent attempts to connect to `nbd0` hit this check in `nbd_genl_connect()`:
```c
mutex_lock(&nbd->config_lock);
if (refcount_read(&nbd->config_refs)) {
mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
nbd_put(nbd);
if (index == -1)
goto again;
pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index); // <--- Line 2175
return -EBUSY;
}
```
Because this `pr_err` is not rate-limited, syzkaller spams the console with "nbd0 already in use" messages. This console flood delays `console_unlock`, which is exactly what CPU 0 was caught doing when the hung task detector fired the NMI.
### How to Fix
**1. Fix the I/O Hang:**
In `nbd_xmit_timeout()`, when `timeout == 0`, the driver must check if the socket is dead (`nsock->dead`). If it is dead, the command must be requeued so that `nbd_handle_cmd()` can process the dead socket (which will properly fail the request with `BLK_STS_IOERR` since `dead_conn_timeout` is 0).
```c
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req)
blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
- if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
+ if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie || nsock->dead) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
```
**2. Fix the Console Spam:**
Change the un-ratelimited `pr_err` in `nbd_genl_connect()` to prevent userspace from trivially spamming the kernel log and causing softlockups/NMI timeouts.
```c
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -2172,7 +2172,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd_put(nbd);
if (index == -1)
goto again;
- pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
+ pr_err_ratelimited("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
return -EBUSY;
}
```
The diff of the bug fix is:
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c
index 8f10762e9..eedb1c870 100644
--- a/drivers/block/nbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req)
blk_rq_bytes(req), (req->timeout / HZ) * cmd->retries);
mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock);
- if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie) {
+ if (cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie || nsock->dead) {
nbd_requeue_cmd(cmd);
mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock);
mutex_unlock(&cmd->lock);
@@ -2172,7 +2172,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
nbd_put(nbd);
if (index == -1)
goto again;
- pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
+ pr_err_ratelimited("nbd%d already in use\n", index);
return -EBUSY;
}
Additional description of the patch:
I have applied a patch that addresses both the I/O hang and the console spam issues in the Network Block Device (NBD) subsystem.
Here is a detailed explanation of the changes made and why they are the best approach:
### 1. Fixing the I/O Hang in `nbd_xmit_timeout`
**What was done:**
I modified the `timeout == 0` handling block in `nbd_xmit_timeout()` to check if the socket is dead (`nsock->dead`) in addition to checking if the socket has been replaced (`cmd->cookie != nsock->cookie`). If either condition is true, the command is requeued.
**Why this is the best approach:**
- **Correct State Handling:** When a user configures an NBD device with `timeout = 0`, they are requesting infinite retries for I/O operations. However, if the underlying socket is closed and marked dead (e.g., the server crashed or the connection was severed), keeping the request in-flight on a dead socket is futile and leads to the permanent `TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE` hang seen in the crash report.
- **Reusing Existing Error Paths:** By requeuing the command when `nsock->dead` is true, we push the request back to the block layer. When the request is subsequently picked up by `nbd_handle_cmd()`, it will evaluate the dead socket and properly fail the I/O with `BLK_STS_IOERR` (since `dead_conn_timeout` is 0). This gracefully terminates the hung read operation from `udevd` without needing to duplicate the I/O failure logic inside the timeout handler.
- **Locking Safety:** The `nsock->dead` flag is safely evaluated while holding the `nsock->tx_lock` mutex, which perfectly adheres to the established locking rules in `drivers/block/nbd.c`.
### 2. Fixing the Console Spam in `nbd_genl_connect`
**What was done:**
I changed the un-ratelimited `pr_err("nbd%d already in use\n", index);` to `pr_err_ratelimited(...)`.
**Why this is the best approach:**
- **Preventing Denial of Service:** The original code allowed a userspace process (like the syzkaller reproducer) to trivially flood the kernel ring buffer by repeatedly sending netlink connect messages to an NBD device that was already in use. This flood delays `console_unlock`, which can trigger softlockups or NMI backtraces (as seen in the crash report).
- **Consistency:** Using `pr_err_ratelimited` or `dev_err_ratelimited` is the standard idiom in the kernel (and specifically in the NBD subsystem) for error paths that can be triggered at high frequency by userspace actions or network events.
These changes provide a robust fix for the root causes while maintaining the architectural integrity and locking semantics of the NBD driver.
Here are summaries of recent commits that touched the same files.
Format the summary line consistently with these, look how prefixes
are specified, letter capitalization, style, etc.
nbd: don't warn when reclassifying a busy socket lock
nbd: Reclassify sockets to avoid lockdep circular dependency
block: switch numa_node to int in blk_mq_hw_ctx and init_request
Convert 'alloc_obj' family to use the new default GFP_KERNEL argument
treewide: Replace kmalloc with kmalloc_obj for non-scalar types
nbd: defer config unlock in nbd_genl_connect
nbd: defer config put in recv_work
nbd: don't copy kernel creds
nbd: override creds to kernel when calling sock_{send,recv}msg()
drivers/block: replace use of system_wq with system_percpu_wq
nbd: restrict sockets to TCP and UDP
nbd: fix lockdep deadlock warning
nbd: fix uaf in nbd_genl_connect() error path
block: force noio scope in blk_mq_freeze_queue
nbd: fix partial sending
nbd: fix queue freeze vs limits lock order
nbd: don't allow reconnect after disconnect
block: remove BLK_MQ_F_SHOULD_MERGE
nbd: correct the maximum value for discard sectors
nbd: nbd_bg_flags_show: add NBD_FLAG_ROTATIONAL
Reply: nbd: fix I/O hang on dead socket and console spam
When an NBD device is configured without NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE and
with a timeout of 0, a closed socket can lead to a permanent I/O hang. If
the connection is closed, the NBD recv_work thread marks the socket as
dead. However, if an I/O request is sent, it will eventually time out. In
nbd_xmit_timeout(), if the configured timeout is 0, the code currently only
checks if the socket has been replaced. It fails to check if the socket is
dead. As a result, the request timer is unconditionally reset and the
request stays in-flight forever, causing tasks like udevd to hang
indefinitely in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE and triggering the hung task detector:
INFO: task udevd:5877 blocked in I/O wait for more than 143 seconds.
task:udevd state:D
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x17e7/0x5630
schedule+0x164/0x2b0
io_schedule+0x7f/0xd0
folio_wait_bit_common+0x836/0xbc0
do_read_cache_folio+0x1ac/0x590
read_part_sector+0xb6/0x2b0
adfspart_check_POWERTEC+0x9a/0x7a0
bdev_disk_changed+0x851/0x17a0
blkdev_get_whole+0x372/0x510
bdev_open+0x324/0xd70
blkdev_open+0x461/0x600
do_dentry_open+0x816/0x1380
vfs_open+0x3b/0x340
path_openat+0x2e44/0x3830
do_file_open+0x23e/0x4a0
do_sys_openat2+0x115/0x200
__x64_sys_openat+0x138/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0x560
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Additionally, repeated attempts to connect to an already-in-use NBD device
can cause console spam because the "nbd%d already in use" error message in
nbd_genl_connect() is not rate-limited. This can delay console_unlock() and
trigger NMI backtraces.
Fix the I/O hang by checking nsock->dead in addition to the cookie check in
nbd_xmit_timeout(). If the socket is dead, the command is requeued. When
nbd_handle_cmd() subsequently processes it, it will evaluate the dead
socket and properly fail the I/O request, gracefully terminating the hung
read operation.
Fix the console spam by changing the pr_err() in nbd_genl_connect() to
pr_err_ratelimited().
|
| 246/2 |
2026/07/09 12:40 |
llm |
description-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 11431
output: 741
thoughts: 2577
Thoughts: **nbd: fix I/O hang on dead socket and console spam**
Alright, here's the deal. I'm working on a patch for the NBD subsystem, fixing a couple of nasty issues. First, there's this I/O hang situation. If an NBD device is set up without `NBD_CFLAG_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE` and with a zero timeout, and the underlying socket gets closed, we can end up with a permanent hang. The `recv_work` thread correctly marks the socket as dead. However, if an I/O request is sent after this, it'll eventually time out. The problem lies in `nbd_xmit_timeout()`. When `timeout` is 0, the code *only* checks if the socket has been replaced (the cookie check). It completely ignores whether the socket is actually dead. So, the request timer gets unconditionally reset, and the request just sits there, forever in-flight. This causes tasks like `udevd` to hang indefinitely in `TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE`, triggering the hung task detector. Here's a typical trace:
INFO: task udevd:5877 blocked in I/O wait for more than 143 seconds.
task:udevd state:D
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x17e7/0x5630
schedule+0x164/0x2b0
io_schedule+0x7f/0xd0
folio_wait_bit_common+0x836/0xbc0
do_read_cache_folio+0x1ac/0x590
read_part_sector+0xb6/0x2b0
adfspart_check_POWERTEC+0x9a/0x7a0
bdev_disk_changed+0x851/0x17a0
blkdev_get_whole+0x372/0x510
bdev_open+0x324/0xd70
blkdev_open+0x461/0x600
do_dentry_open+0x816/0x1380
vfs_open+0x3b/0x340
path_openat+0x2e44/0x3830
do_file_open+0x23e/0x4a0
do_sys_openat2+0x115/0x200
__x64_sys_openat+0x138/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0x560
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Second, there's the console spam issue. If someone keeps trying to connect to an NBD device that's already in use, we get a flood of "nbd%d already in use" error messages from `nbd_genl_connect()`. This isn't rate-limited, and it can delay `console_unlock()`, which can lead to NMI backtraces. Not ideal.
So, the fix is straightforward. For the I/O hang, I'm adding a check for `nsock->dead` in `nbd_xmit_timeout()` *in addition* to the existing cookie check. If the socket is dead, the command gets requeued. Then, when `nbd_handle_cmd()` processes it later, it'll correctly recognize the dead socket and properly fail the I/O request, cleaning up the mess and ending the hang. For the console spam, I'm just replacing `pr_err()` with `pr_err_ratelimited()` in `nbd_genl_connect()`. Problem solved.
|